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ABSTRACT 
A CR3SS AND FOUR STRIPES 
THE REVIVAL OF NATIONALISM IN OONTEMPORARY SOOILRND AND CATALONIA 
The thesis aimes t o denranstrate that the contenporary n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t countries are not an accidental 
occurrence or a coincidence. I t looks f o r ways t o eJ5)lain t h i s 
n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l by i d e n t i f y i n g conmon causal processes, and 
concentrates on the cases of Scottish and Catalan nationalism. 
However, i t i s not possible t o i d e n t i f y a single theory which could 
explain the recent growth of sub-state nationalism i n a l l advanced 
i n d u s t r i a l countries. Therefore, a framework of analysis i s 
suggested vv^ich ainis t o replace the cla s s i c a l Marxist model of base 
- superstructure relations w i t h a trian g u l a r model of c i v i l society, 
state and economy, which does not assume deterministic relationships 
between the three constructs. Rather than seeing p o l i t i c a l action as 
determined by economic structures, the framework concentrates on the 
changing relationships between state, c i v i l society and economy, and 
examines p o l i t i c a l action i n the l i g h t of these processes. 
Within t h i s framework, the r e v i v a l of Scottish and Catalan 
nationalism i s analysed i n a h i s t o r i c a l perspective. I t i s argued 
t h a t i n each case, the constellation of relationships and processes 
v^ich characterise advanced c a p i t a l i s t society lead t o a 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of. national i d e n t i t y . How the people became 
p o l i t i c i s e d , and vihat the r e s u l t of n a t i o n a l i s t mobilisation i s , 
depends on spe c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l circumstances. 
(1) 
A CROSS AND FOUR STRIPES 
The Revival of Nationalism 
in 
Contemporary Scotland and Catalonia 
Susanne Barbara Maria Schech 
Thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosphy 
Department of Geography 
University of Durham 
1990 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
0?^ 

"The struggle of man against power is the struggle of mem-
ory against forgetting". 
Milan KunderarT/ ie Book of Laughter and Forgetting. 
"How can anyone hope that the proletariat of all lands, 
who differ so greatly in temperament, in culture, in economic 
development, would shoulder the yoke of a uniform political 
program? Only the demented could imagine such a possibility". 
Michael Bakunin:T/ ie International and Karl Marx. 
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just 
as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the 
dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising 
themselves and things, in creating something that has never 
yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they 
anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and 
borrow from their names, battle cries, and costumes in order 
to present the new scene of world history, in this time-honoured 
disguise and this borrowed language." 
Karl Marx: The Eighteenth Bruma ire. 
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PREFACE 
22 
1. Nationalism today in Scotland and Catalonia 
On November 11, 1988, the Scottish National Party candidate Jim 
S i l l a r s ran away wi t h a sensational v i c t o r y i n the Glasgow Govan 
by-election, overturning a 19,500 Labour majority. A f t e r more than a 
decade of stagnation i n Scottish nationalism, the Scottish Nationalist 
Party was once again on the upsurge, breaking i n t o the Labour vote of 
urban-industrial Scotland. Govan, the home of the Glasgow Rangers 
f o o t b a l l club and a working class seat thought t o be safe Labour, had 
experienced a s i i n i l a r p o l i t i c a l upheaval i n 1973, v^ien Margo 
MacDonald's by-election victory"*" sent shivers down labour's spine. I n 
1988, the nightmare came trvie again f o r Labour a c t i v i s t s . "Govan 
r e s u l t spins Labour i n t o t u r m o i l " , declared the f r o n t page headline of 
the Glasgow Herald on the following day. And sure enough, i n the 
aftermath of the by-election, the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere was charged i n 
Scotland, as labour's i n t e r n a l and external c o n f l i c t s over the 
Scottish s i t u a t i o n generated intense debate, and p o l i t i c s became more 
e x c i t i n g than even i n the 1970's. 
The most recent r i s e of p o l i t i c a l nationalism i n Scotland does not 
come as a surprise. Ever since the Tory Party came i n t o power i n 1979, 
the party's support i n Scotland, waning since the 1950's, has been 
sinking r a p i d l y ^ . 1987 saw the t h i r d consecutive election i n which the 
Tories were returned t o V-Jhitehall, with a huge majority i n the House 
of Commons, despite being thrashed i n Scotland by Labour. So small i s 
the group of Scottish Tory MPs t h a t the Scottish A f f a i r s Select 
Committee (v^ich scrutinises the a c t i v i t i e s of the Scottish Office) 
"Ste. MacDonald received 41.9 per cent of the vote, overturning an 
eleven thousand Labour majority. 
2 
The f i r s t post-war Tory v i c t o r y i n the General Election of 1951 
gave the Conservatives 48.6 per cent of the Scottish vote. By 1970, 
support f o r the Tories i n Scotland was reduced t o 38.0 per cent, and 
when Ms. Thatcher came i n t o o f f i c e i n 1979, i t was only 31.4 per cent. 
I n eight years of Tory government, the share of the vote shrank even 
f u r t h e r t o 24.0 per cent, only h a l f the vote of 1951. 
(Preface) (23) 
had t o be abolished because tihe government party could not f i n d enough 
members i n i t s ranks. The Scottish opposition MPs staged a walkout i n 
protest, and Labour MP Denis Canavan made the sarcastic proposal that 
the job could be done by "the Commons Foreign A f f a i r s Committee 
because the Government was t r e a t i n g Scotland as i f i t were a colony" 
(Scotsman. 21.12.1988, 4). 
But symbolic walkouts were no longer considered s u f f i c i e n t by many 
opposition MPs and party a c t i v i s t s . Withdrawal from the House of 
Commons and s e t t i n g up an extra-parliamentary Scottish Assembly i s a 
strategy seriously considered i n some p o l i t i c a l quarters, and not only 
t h a t of the SNP. Even before the l a s t general election, the popular 
p o l i t i c a l magazine, Radical Scotland, painted a "doomsday scenario" of 
a numerically powerful, but otherwise helpless Labour Party v^iich had 
massive support i n Scotland wit±i t h e i r anti-Tory, pro devolution 
platform, but was kept i n permanent opposition by the English voters. 
How long were t±ie Scots supposed t o vote f o r Labour and wait f o r t h e i r 
promises t o come true? The Govan by-election r e s u l t showed t h a t voters 
were prepared t o look f o r another party: the SNP, which has brought 
movement i n t o Scottish p o l i t i c s before, and which sinc:e 1979 has been 
undergoing changes which made i t more acc:eptable t o Labour supporters. 
The Glasgow Herald summed i t up by c a l l i n g i t the "newly constituted 
l e f t - l e d SNP" (Glasgow Herald. 12.11.1988, 1), of which former labour 
Party a c t i v i s t Jim S i l l a r s has become a symbol.' 
Meanwhile, i n Catalonia, elections f o r the autonomous Catalan 
parliament were held f o r the t h i r d time on May 29, 1988. With 45.7 % 
of the vote, the centre-right Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t party Convergencia i 
Unio was again returned with an absolute majority of the parliamentary 
seats. I n an analysis of the election r e s u l t , the Spanish d a i l y E l 
Pais suggested i n a headline t h a t "The new v i c t o r y of CiU reinforces 
the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n bet:\'/een the Generalitat and the government party". 
I t explained t h a t the renewed majority 
" i s an event of considerable p o l i t i c a l ij:Tportance i n t±ie 
present s i t u a t i o n i n Catalonia (...). I n a period of forming 
and i n i t i a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l and administrative mechanisms, i t 
gives [the party] a free hand i n organising, placing personnel 
and a l l o c a t i n g resources. The l i m i t e d control of the parliament 
f a c i l i t a t e s t h i s dynamic. Modelling the public apparatus thus 
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reproduces the conditions which reinforce i t s p o l i t i c a l 
presence ( . . . ) . " 
(El Pais. 5.6.1988, 23) 
Autonomy was shown t o be f i r m l y established i n Catalonia since the 
e x c i t i n g years of the l a t e 1970's. Seemingly irremovable i n the centre 
of Catalan p o l i t i c s i s Convergencia and i t s small a l l i a n c e partner 
Unio, which have managed almost t o monopolise nationalism ever since 
i t s s u r p r i s i n g v i c t o r y over the h i t h e r t o hegemonic s o c i a l i s t s and 
communists i n 1980. The dominant brand of nationalism, "pujolisme", i s 
named a f t e r the charismatic president, J o r d i Pujol, who i s the 
u n r i v a l l e d leader of Catalan p o l i t i c s , even though only 27% of the 
electorate voted f o r him i n 1988. 
So f i r m l y established i s Convergencia i Unio t h a t more than 40% of the 
electorate d i d not bother voting, a f a c t president Jordi Pujol 
explained w i t h reference t o the "great sensation of t r a n q u i l l i t y , 
security, s t a b i l i t y " h i s c i t i z e n s were experiencing i n the l a t e 
1980's. Others however deplore the p o l i t i c a l apathy and complacency 
reigning over Catalonia, v^ere only money making and sport watching 
seem t o create excitement. 
Indeed, the F.C. Barcelona, a symbol of Catalanism under the 
d i c t a t o r s h i p when other symbols and p o l i t i c s were s t r i c t l y forbidden, 
i s s t i l l "more than a club"^. On May 10, 1989, Bar9a won the European 
4 
Cup i n Berne, and 15,000 fans celebrated the v i c t o r y on the Rambles . 
"A few minutes before the end of the match i n Berne, the 
silence which had reigned over the streets i n the c i t y 
centre was broken by an avalanche of fans heading f o r the 
Canaletas [Rambles]." 
(El Periodico, sports supplement, 31.5.1988, 16) 
"Mes qu'un club", or "more than a club", was the slogan of Bar9a 
i n the 1970's, when the stadium became regularly transformed i n t o a sea 
of Catalan f l a g s , and ^ e n beating the arch r i v a l Real Madrid was l i k e 
h i t t i n g the unloved Franco on h i s head. 
4 
A rambla i s a dry r i v e r bed which i n many towns and c i t i e s has 
been transformed i n t o an avenue. I n Barcelona, the Rambles are a stretch 
of promenades i n the heart of the c i t y , leading down t o the harbour. 
Always f u l l of people during the day, i t s lower part i s a t r a d i t i o n a l 
place of gathering f o r celebrating great triumphs or holding 
demonstrations or s t r e e t b a t t l e s (Vazques Montalban, 1986, 63). 
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On the promenade, only team colours and Catalan flags were allowed 
while a European and a Spanish f l a g were burned by the fans. The 
newspapers dedicated special supplements and f r o n t pages t o the event, 
and generally, enthusiasm was markedly greater than at the Catalan 
elections a year before. 
Nationalism has an undeniable st:rength i n Catalonia; i t underlies the 
p o l i t i c a l system and appears i n a l l spheres of Catalan l i f e . Since the 
Catalan government and the p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s were established i n 
1980, diverging opinions about the most appropriate n a t i o n a l i s t 
ideology and action have deepened. Some would l i k e t o replace the 
"suffocating, narrow-minded and f o l k l o r i s t " nationalism of the r u l i n g 
party w i t h a more "u n i v e r s a l i s t , open, enlightened" type which seemed 
t o dominate Catalan p o l i t i c s under the Franco regime (Diari de 
Barcelona, 28.4.1987, 2). I n the post-Franco generations, support has 
been growing f o r r a d i c a l Catalan c u l t u r a l and independentist groups, 
some of vAiich support the use of weapons t o achieve " l i b e r a t i o n " . 
There i s no doubt t h a t since the 1950's, Catalan nationalism has grown 
st e a d i l y despite attenpts of successive authoritarian and democratic 
Spanish governments t o repress and control the p o l i t i c a l movement, and 
i t now dominates Catalan p o l i t i c s . 
The n a t i o n a l i s t successes i n Scotland, ard the successive n a t i o n a l i s t 
governments i n Catalonia, raise again old questions which have never 
been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y analysed and solved since the European n a t i o n a l i s t 
r e v i v a l began i n the 1960's. Despite ups and downs, sub-state 
nationalism has not disappeared from Western European p o l i t i c s . The 
r i s e of the Scottish National Party was widely regarded as an a n t i 
government protest vote i n the 1960's, w i t h l i t t l e chance of making a 
l a s t i n g impact i n Scottish p o l i t i c s , and the United Kingdom i n 
general. I n the 1970's, observers related the n a t i o n a l i s t boom t o the 
North Sea o i l discoveries vhich promised t o convert Scotland i n t o a 
Northern version of Kuwait ( e.g. Young and Sarsanedas, 1976, 19-23). 
The persistence of Scottish support f o r self-government or 
independence i n the 1980's i s often ascribed t o the nation's 
disapproval of the Thatcher governments. 
The a c t i v i t i e s of the Catalans against the Francoist dictatorship were 
so closely connected t o t h e i r n a t i o n a l i s t aspirations, t h a t i t i s 
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d i f f i c u l t t o separate the two aspects of the struggle. For many 
p o l i t i c a l l y aware Catalans, the f i g h t f o r democracy and f o r autonomy 
were two sides of the same coin. But i n retrospect - and from the 
viewpoint of a conservative Catalanist government -, the c u l t u r a l 
forces have been elevated t o the main motor of the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l 
(Benet, interview, 17.4.1988). Either t h i s means t h a t Catalan 
nationalism involves both p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l forces, or th a t the 
d r i v i n g forces w i t h i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement have changed since the 
demise of Francoism. VJhatever the answer, nationalism has outlasted 
i n t e r n a l and external changes i n both countries. 
2. The themes of this thesis 
These recent events show t h a t nationalism and n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n 
advanced c a p i t a l i s t countries are f a r from dead. They have been on the 
upsurge since the 1960's, and despite many attenpts t o ignore them or 
deny t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and social itrportance, they have not disappeared. 
This thesis looks i n t o the causal relationships and other social 
processes v^iich help t o explain t h i s r e v i v a l of sub-state nationalism 
i n "nation-states", which not long ago were believed t o be 
unchallengeable monoliths. 
Given the great problems nationalism has given t o scores of 
researchers, i t would be u n r e a l i s t i c t o expect a single coherent 
theory t o explain once and f o r a l l the emergence of n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements. The aims of t h i s thesis are f a r more modest. I t departs 
from a set of r e l a t i o n s v*iich have been i d e n t i f i e d as central t o 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements, even i f t h e i r respective importance may vary 
considerably i n concrete cases. These include the economic and class 
r e l a t i o n s , those between the central state and the national society, 
and the c u l t u r a l and t e r r i t o r i a l r e l a t i o n s , i n the order of t h e i r 
treatment i n the chapters of t h i s thesis. A preceding h i s t o r i c a l 
chapter sets these r e l a t i o n s i n t o perspective, because i t i s not 
possible t o make sense of contemporary n a t i o n a l i s t movements without 
knowing where they came from. A f t e r a l l , the aim i s not t o analyse and 
dissect nationalism per se, and therefore, the h i s t o r i c a l background 
i s needed t o t i e the recent r e v i v a l i n t o r e a l i t y . This also enables 
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the other chapters t o r e f e r back i n t o h i s t o r y whenever appropriate, 
because although the 1960's mark the beginning of n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l 
i n the chosen case studies, there are underlying processes v^iich were 
operating i n previous decades too. 
Given the absence of a coherent theory which could guide the analysis 
of the case studies, t h i s thesis uses a basic framework which centres 
on the concepts of state, c i v i l society and economic sphere (see 
secrtion 3 of the f i r s t chapter). Nationalist movements are operating 
w i t h i n the sphere of c i v i l society, and they are mainly i n c o n f l i c t 
w i t h the c e n t r a l state. The economic re l a t i o n s shape t o a considerable 
degree the fundamental st:ructures of c a p i t a l i s t societies, and are 
therefore also an inportant factor, although they constitute neit±ier 
the only nor the most important determinant of p o l i t i c a l nationalism. 
As t h i s framework assumes t h a t relationships between the (national) 
c i v i l society, i t s economic structure, and the (central) st:ate are 
dynamic, conplex and non-hierarchical, i t i s useful f o r an analysis of 
nationalism v ^ i c h concentrates on processes rather than structures. I t 
helps t o assess t o what extent contenporary n a t i o n a l i s t movements were 
affected by recent changes i n the relationship between these basic 
constructs of c a p i t a l i s t societies, and leaves s u f f i c i e n t room f o r 
contingent proc:esses which vary from case t o case. 
I n order f o r t h i s rather loose framework of analysis t o be more than 
j u s t a poorly defined backdrop of an e n p i r i c a l study, i t has t o be 
used - and tightened up - i n dialogue with the material provided by 
the case studies. As each chapter explores another aspect of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l and i t s p o l i t i c a l manifestiation, i t also t r i e s t o 
throw l i g h t on the relationships between state, c i v i l society and 
economic sphere. By l i n k i n g the case studies closely witih the 
framework of analysis i n the structure of t h i s thesis, theory and 
e n p i r i c a l evidence become more intertwined. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the perspective of t h i s study and i t s met±iodology i s discussed i n the 
f i r s t appendix. 
F i n a l l y , a short explanation i s required f o r the choice of Catalonia 
and Scotland (Fig. 1) as the two case studies used here. They were the 
stage of two of the stzrongest n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n the 1960's and 
1970's, and t h e i r respective h i s t o r i e s reveal some p a r a l l e l s . On the 
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other hand, the Catalan and the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movements seemed 
s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t t o avoid the p i t f a l l s of generalisations drawn 
from single or very s i m i l a r cases. Further reasons f o r adopting a 
coitparative approach and f o r choosing Catalonia and Scotland are given 
i n section 1.3 of the f i r s t chapter and i n Appendix 1. 
The next chapter introduces Catalan and Scottish nationalism by 
looking a t the differences i n the ideologies and d e f i n i t i o n s t h e i r 
advocates use. I t discusses the conparative approach and then goes on 
t o examine the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on old and new nationalisms. I n the 
f i n a l section, the framework of analysis v*iich holds the remaining 
chapters together i s presented i n more d e t a i l . 
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Chapter one: 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERARY REVIEW 
31 
This chapter introduces nationalism as a p o l i t i c a l movement which 
has not only an ideological content, but also a material base. I t i s 
suggested i n the f i r s t section of the chapter t h a t national 
structures (such as c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , customs, relations of 
production, etc.) and nationalism i t s e l f are continually 
reconstructed and changed through social i n t e r a c t i o n . This accounts 
f o r contrasts both between d i f f e r e n t nationalisms, and between 
d i f f e r e n t phases of the same n a t i o n a l i s t movement. I n part two of 
the f i r s t section, the differences between Catalan and Scottish 
nationalism are i l l u s t r a t e d w i t h reference t o the way i n vtiich 
n a t i o n a l i s t ideologues and i n t e l l e c t u a l s defined and described the 
nationalism, and the tasks of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, of t h e i r own 
country. The section concludes w i t h a b r i e f methodological comment 
which introduces, and argues f o r , the comparative approach t o 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements adopted i n t h i s thesis. Although the Catalan 
and the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movements d i f f e r i n many respects, t h i s 
should not inpede the uncovering of processes v\^ich have influenced 
t h e i r re-emergence. 
Section two discusses the main currents of recent w r i t i n g on 
nationalism, without however pretending t o give more than j u s t a 
selective account of i t . I n geography, sub-state nationalism has 
been discovered as a subject matter only i n the l a s t few years, and 
therefore, the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e i s rather l i m i t e d . The s i t u a t i o n 
i s d i f f e r e n t i n the p o l i t i c a l and social sciences, where a vast 
number of studies coexists unhappily w i t h the r e i t e r a t e d complaint 
t h a t nationalism has so f a r slipped through a l l the grids and models 
of explanation which researchers have t r i e d t o force upon i t . The 
most useful analyses of nationalism are informed i n one way or 
another by theories of modernisation and c a p i t a l i s t development. The 
second par t of the section i s therefore dedicated t o modernisation 
theories of nationalism, and the t h i r d discusses marxist approaches 
t o the issue. One of the main drawbacks of both perspectives i s 
t h e i r enphasis on structures, and t h e i r neglect of processes and of 
relationships between structures. C r i t i c s have argued t h a t there i s 
a need t o re-evaluate the r o l e of agency i n p o l i t i c a l movements i n 
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the l i g h t of fundamental changes i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t society. 
Part four thus looks at attempts t o define contenporary n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements as "new social movements". I n the f i n a l part, the focus of 
the l i t e r a t u r e research turns on the case studies, as a few 
comparative studies of Catalan and Scottish nationalism are b r i e f l y 
reviewed. 
Based on the i n s i g h t t h a t there i s a t present no the o r e t i c a l model 
which accounts f o r the recent n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l i n Western 
European states, section three of t h i s chapter presents a conceptual 
framework w i t h i n which the n a t i o n a l i s t movements of Catalonia and 
Scotland can be analysed. I t suggests t h a t h i s t o r y ard human agency 
are v i t a l t o the understanding of nationalism. Secondly, i t adopts 
the GraiBscian d i s t i n c t i o n between several superstructural levels, 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r between c i v i l society and state, and 
conceptualises n a t i o n a l i s t movements as p o l i t i c a l struggles f o r 
hegemony and p o l i t i c a l control over a spe c i f i c t e r r i t o r y . Thirdly, 
i t maintains t h a t since the societies of Catalonia and Scotland are 
structured by c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s of production, the answers t o 
why, when, how, and by whom the n a t i o n a l i s t movements were revived 
have t o take i n t o account the economic sphere and the class 
structure of these societies. 
1. NEO-NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS: WHAT'S NEW? 
1.1 DefiniiKT nationalisni 
I t i s beyond the scope of t h i s thesis t o provide a discussion of 
nationalism per se. Many authors have contributed t o the vast 
l i t e r a t u r e on nationalism, and the atteiipts of w r i t e r s such as 
B r e u i l l y , Gellner, Hayes, Kedourie and Seton-Watson t o come t o terms 
w i t h an elusive concept are well-known ( B r e u i l l y , 1982, 18-42; 
Gellner, 1981; Hayes, 1960, 1-10; Kedourie, 1966, 14-16; 
Seton-Watson, 1977, 1-13). Ha-/ever, since the terms "nation" and 
"nationalism" need t o be situated i n the context of t h i s thesis, 
some comments about t h e i r meaning are appropriate here. 
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The f i r s t p o i n t i s t h a t nationalism i s universal. I n the modem 
world, everyone has, or should have, a n a t i o n a l i t y . Every c i t i z e n 
w i t h a n a t i o n a l i t y i s a member of a nation, and forms part - i n 
Benedict Anderson's words - of an "imagined p o l i t i c a l community". 
They have a sense of belonging t o t h i s nation, and f e e l s o l i d a r i t y 
w i t h t h e i r f e l l o w nationals, although they do not know them 
personally. Rather than regarding nationalism as an ideology l i k e 
l i b e r a l i s m , socialism or fascism, i t i s more f i t t i n g t o coirpare i t 
w i t h a r e l i g i o n , o r kinship. 
The nation i s a p o l i t i c a l community because i t claims sovereignty 
over a defined t e r r i t o r y . The claim t o sovereignty i s rooted i n the 
h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s o f the modem nation, "because the concept was 
bom i n an age i n which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying 
the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, h i e r a r c h i c a l dynastic 
realm" (B. Anderson, 1983, 15-16). Nationalism i s therefore a 
p o l i t i c a l movement which asserts i t s claim t o self-government and 
sovereignty over the national t e r r i t o r y . 
The second p o i n t must now d i f f e r e n t i a t e between d i f f e r e n t kinds of 
nationalisms. Raymond Williams pointed out t h a t s u p e r f i c i a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n s are made between national f e e l i n g and nationalist 
f e e l i n g , and also by juxtaposing the national i n t e r e s t w i t h 
nationalism (R. Williams, 1976, 178-180). The Catalan case shows 
t h a t a movement i n favour of self-government can be generally 
described as a "national" movement, v ^ i i l e i n Scotland, the 
" n a t i o n a l i s t s " and t h e i r supporters are separated o f f from the r e s t 
of the Scots as a minority movement. But more inportant i s the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between sub-state and other n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
Catalonia and Scotland are nations without a state because they form 
p a r t o f one or more established states. Their n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
demand a degree of sovereignty from the state. This demand brings 
them i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h the central states involved, which 
themselves derive t h e i r l e g i t i m a t i o n from the nation v*iom they claim 
t o represent. To return t o Williams' argument, from the point of 
view of the B r i t i s h government, the demands of the Scottish 
r a t i o n a l i s t s are not i n the national i n t e r e s t . For Blaut, the 
confrontation between sub-state nationalism and central state 
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involves two nationalisms v^ich are opposed t o each other, because 
the state i s f i g h t i n g t o keep both i t s t e r r i t o r y " u n i f i e d " and i t s 
p r i v i l e g e of continuing national oppression (Blaut, 1987, 15). 
So f a r only the national f e e l i n g , the sense of s o l i d a r i t y among 
members of the same nation has been mentioned as a basis f o r 
nationalism. This neglects the f a c t t h a t nations have peculiar 
features which are h i s t o r i c a l l y constituted. They usually are 
distinguished by language and popular culture, t e r r i t o r y and 
geography, economic structure, c i v i l society, and psychological 
featxares . These features are not permanent. Whether they fade away 
or consolidate, and how they are a r t i c u l a t e d , depends on the 
v i c i s s i t u d e s of a p o l i t i c a l struggle which i s centred around a 
s p e c i f i c s t a t e model. For exanple, the Catalan language i s central 
t o the consolidation of a Catalan national i d e n t i t y and t o the 
p o l i t i c a l struggle f o r autonomy . I n the .early stages, the 
l i n g u i s t i c concerns aimed a t reconstructing a Catalan high culture 
were prominent i n Catalan nationalism. I n Scotland, the s p e c i f i c a l l y 
Scottish languages are almost forgotten and do not play a major r o l e 
i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement (see Chapter s i x , section 3.1). Over the 
centuries, the Scots found i t more b e n e f i c i a l t o teach t h e i r 
c h ildren English, and the l i t e r a r y n a t i o n a l i s t s of the 1920's had no 
Scottish popular language t o which they could r e f e r . 
Because national communities are i d e n t i f i e d by c e r t a i n features 
v>tiich set thera apart from surrounding t e r r i t o r i e s and peoples, 
Nationalists point out the d i s t i n c t i v e character of t h e i r nation. 
For exairple, Prat de l a Riba (the leader and ideologist of the f i r s t 
Catalanist party, Lliga Regionalista) w o t e i n 1906: 
"... we saw t h a t Catalonia had a language, a law, an a r t of 
i t s own; t h a t i t had a national s p i r i t , a national character, 
a national thought: Catalonia v/as, therefore, a nation." 
(Prat de l a Riba, 1934, 42) 
^Although the Catalan language i s the main symbol of Catalan 
n a t i o n a l i s t v i n d i c a t i o n , i t causes coirplications when used t o define the 
Catalan nation. For i t i s not only i n present-day Catalonia t h a t Catalan 
i s widely spoken and a powerful motor of the n a t i o n a l i s t parties, but 
also i n Valencia province, the Balearic Islands, and Catalunya Nord i n 
France, none of which i s l i k e l y t o support a single Catalan state. 
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Catalans have often referred t o the f e t nacional, the national 
r e a l i t y , rather than the "national question" which appears i n so 
many publications. I t i s widely considered a f a c t t h a t Catalonia i s 
a nation, as much as i t i s a f a c t t h a t the majority of the people 
speak Catalan. The same i s t r u e f o r Scotland, because the existence 
o f the Scottish nation has never been questioned. 
Although i t i s t r u e t h a t no single feature i s necessary f o r a 
sub-state nation t o maintain i t s distinctiveness and t o nottrish a 
p o l i t i c a l movement, there i s something such nations have i n common, 
namely the sense of a d i s t i n c t h i s t o r y v*iich usually involved 
independence or self-qovemment (C. H. Williams, 1988, 204). I n so 
f a r as a people i s held together by a common past, n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements put much enphasis on historiography. The independent past 
i s projected i n t o the future, which holds a common destiny. A f t e r 
the incorporation i n t o a larger state, national communities are 
subjected t o state l e g i s l a t i o n and pxDlicies and socio-economic and 
p o l i t i c a l processes which often reduce the sub-state differences. 
However, t h i s should not be interpreted as an inevitable process of 
homogenisation and assimilation. Sub-state nations can also keep 
t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e features, and state p o l i c y can contribute t o 
increase the gap between i t s constituent national communities. For 
example, one important condition f o r the formation o f a Catalan 
boxirgeoisie i n the 18th and 19th century which became the leading 
force i n the f i r s t period of nationalism was the -access of Catalonia 
t o the c o l o n i a l markets and the c o n t r o l of the Spanish market. Later 
on, the e f f o r t s of the Franco regime t o eradicate national 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y once and f o r a l l , and t o r a d i c a l l y persecute 
nationalisms which undermined Spanish nationalism, achieved only an 
even stronger Catalan nationalism. 
The presence of a n a t i o n a l i s t movement influences the development of 
those p a r t i c u l a r structures v*iich characterise the nation. The 
contenporary manifestations of p o l i t i c a l nationalism i n Catalonia 
and Scotland show t h a t i t i s not sinply an ideology, but rather t h a t 
the people - and key actors such as i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n p a r t i c u l a r -
are a c t i v e l y recreating and changing the structure o f t h e i r nation. 
The f o l l o w i n g section demonstrates t h a t national feelings manifest 
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themselves i n d i f f e r e n t ways i n the two case studies, which i n t u r n 
has a bearing on the type of approach the n a t i o n a l i s t movement has 
been taking. 
1.2 Nationalist ideology and national feelingr contrasts between 
Catalonia and Scx>tland 
Differences between Catalan and Scottish nationalism can be 
i l l u s t r a t e d by looking a t the way i n v^ich the state of the nation 
and the task of nationalism are formulated. Throughout the h i s t o r y 
of Catalan nationalism, the concepts of construccio and 
nacionalitzacio have occupied a central place i n the discourses of 
the ideologists and p o l i t i c i a n s . They run through the speeches and 
w r i t i n g s of n a t i o n a l i s t s aross the whole p o l i t i c a l spectrum"^. 
Prat de l a Riba, the father of Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t thinking, 
believed i n the regeneration of the country - and also of the 
stagnating Spanish state - w i t h a dynamic, modernising Catalan 
i n d u s t r i a l boxirgeoisie (Sole Tura, 1970, 153). The l i b e r a l Rovira i 
V i r g i l i complained about the "national inpoverishment" of Catalonia 
and c a l l e d f o r a b i g popular e f f o r t i n r a i s i n g national 
consciousness (nacionalitzacio). He delivered a prime exanple of the 
construction metaphor: 
"We re a l i s e d t h a t the e d i f i c e of the Catalan n a t i o n a l i t y i s 
i n ruins l i k e an old, abandoned monument. Since the 
"renaixenija" of l a s t century, some walls have been r e b u i l t , 
some arches restored. But everything considered, i f we do 
not press on w i t h t h i s task, i t w i l l soon s t a r t crumbling 
again." 
The conservative Torres i Bages, f o r example, said i n the l a t e 
19th century t h a t "only the reconstruction of the region can make t h i s 
most inconvenient domination [ o f the c e n t r a l i s t parliamentary oligarchy] 
disappear which has existed now f o r so many years" (Sole Tura, 1970, 
88). I n a very d i f f e r e n t context of the immediate post-Franco period, 
the communist p o l i t i c i a n Ribo used the term he claimed t h a t "since 
t h a t very year 1939, the reconstruction of Catalonia, of Catalan 
society, was beginning from the base - the workers' movement and the 
popular movements" (Ribo, 1977a, 28). 
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(Rovira i V i r g i l i , 1979^^, 13) 
I n the mid 1960's, Josep Benet observed t h a t Catalan cultiare was i n 
a phase o f t r a n s i t i o n between survival and recuperation; i n the 
absence of an i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f Catalan cu l t u r e , destroyed during 
the f i r s t years of the dictator s h i p o f Franco, the Catalan people 
had t o collaborate t o create a l t e r n a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s t o make the 
r e v i v a l possible (Benet, 1980, 155). Elsev^iere, Benet stressed t h a t 
the "construction of autonomy must be the task of a l l the c i t i z e n s 
o f t h i s country, without exclusion" and asked f o r c r e a t i v i t y , 
enthusiasm and s e l f - s a c r i f i c e (Benet, 1980, 290). 
The discourse of construction i s well-established i n the party, and 
the p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g s , o f the present leader o f the Catalan 
government, Pujol, who coined the phrase " f e r pais" ("make country") 
i n the 1960's. Pujol stated i n 1958 t h a t h i s generation - i. e . the 
post-war generation - found i t s e l f belonging t o a people which was 
s p i r i t u a l l y broken and mater i a l l y - i. e . s o c i a l l y and economically 
- exhausted. Though the destruction of the Catalan national s p i r i t 
was mainly the r e s u l t of the defeat i n 1939, i t had already begun i n 
the Second Republic: 
"There were in d i v i d u a l s and generations i n Catalonia which 
wanted t o construct t h i s people, t h i s Catalan community. 
V a l e n t i A l m i r a l l , Prat de l a Riba, the bishop Torras, 
Aguilo, Guimer^, and, i n a d i f f e r e n t context, Salvador Segui 
and Caitpalans , were a l l men v^o were involved i n the 
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This a r t i c l e was w r i t t e n i n 1916. 
^The f i r s t f i v e are names from the conservative Catalanist scene of 
the t u r n o f the century. A l m i r a l l and Prat are ideologists, the l a t t e r 
became leader o f the lAiga Regional i s t a . Torres i Bages represent the 
small-town Catalanism, the Catalonia of the comarques; he was also a 
prominent Catalanist w r i t e r and bishop of Vic, the town w i t h the 
greatest density of c l e r i c s i n the whole of Spain (Cahner, interview, 
11.2.1988). Guimera i s a playwright and Aguilo a poet of the 19th 
century renaixen9a, and both are symbols of the national r e v i v a l . Segui, 
on the other hand, was a leading f i g u r e on the moderate wing of the 
anarchist union CNT (Conferacion Nacional de Trabajadores), who was 
assassinated i n 1923, a t a time v^en he was negociating w i t h l e f t wing 
Catalanist groups. Cartpalans belongs t o the small social-democratic, 
republican tendency o f the early 20th century. He was an ideologue of 
(Footnote Continued) 
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reconstruction of the Catalan people from the roots: the 
sentiment, the w i l l and the i n s t i t u t i o n s . (...) [But] there 
came a moment v^en t h i s l i n e was interrupted. Ihe leaders 
stopped "ma]cing Catalonia" and began t o play w i t h the 
material which were destined t o conplete [the construction 
o f ] the tenple." 
(Pujol, 1980, 38-39) 
Pujol saw the task o f the new generation of Catalans^ i n recovering 
"some basic v i r t u e s " and "creating and l i v i n g a c o l l e c t i v e n y s t i c " 
vtiich i s accessible t o the \Nhole community. At the same time, the 
necessary economic and social structures had t o be established 
(Pujol, 1980, 47). 
While the terms construccio and nacionalitzacio take d i f f e r e n t 
meanings depending on who i s addressed as the supposedly roost 
dynamic force i n t h i s process - v^o constructs what and v^o 
nationalises whom they are undoubtedly iirportant i n the national, 
i f not n a t i o n a l i s t , discourse of Catalan p o l i t i c s . This i s surely a 
r e f l e c t i o n o f the e f f o r t s o f the central state i n the 20th century 
t o a c t i v e l y destroy and subsequently i n h i b i t attenpts t o recreate a 
(Footnote Continued) 
the use (Unio Socialista de Catalunya) i n the 1920's. This homage i s 
equally i n t e r e s t i n g f o r the names i t does not include, i n p a r t i c u l a r of 
the period o f the Second Republic. These were the leaders v^ich, 
according t o Pujol, caused damage t o the Catalan nation because "they 
played w i t h p o l i t i c s " . 
^With "new generation" are meant those who have not experienced the 
c i v i l war and the immediate postwar depression. They are those Catalans 
who leave school or u n i v e r s i t y i n the l a t e 1950's and the 1960's, a t a 
time of development and social change, and become involved, i n a more or 
less d i r e c t way, i n the anti-Francoist struggle. Josep Benet 
distinguished two basic periods under the Franco regime. The f i r s t i s a 
period of repression, during v>^ich the Catalan culture and i d e n t i t y was 
kept a l i v e mostly through small scale i n i t i a t i v e s and i n the pri v a t e 
sphere or i n cl a n d e s t i n i t y . From the 1960's onwards, new generations 
become the main actors i n the c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l opposition. 
Although these had been formed w i t h i n the Francoist society, they d i d 
not abandon Catalan language and culture, but began t o recover i t . 
"in the 1960's, the youth began t o rediscover a h i s t o r y , a 
language; new people emerged, and the young people were 
brought up t o w r i t e i n Cas t i l i a n now began t o w r i t e i n 
Catalan." 
(Benet, interview, 17.4.1988) 
The new Catalan publishing houses were a signal of the changes i n 
the c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l climate. 
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national community w i t h i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and representative 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . However, the f a c t , t h a t even before the dictatorship 
periods Prat de l a Riba and V i r g i l i spoke of construction, indicates 
t h a t i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n of 
p a t r i o t s i n the achievement of national autonomy was always 
recognised as inportant. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , i t has been suggested 
t h a t the greatest resources of Catalan nationalism l i e i n the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of c i v i l society. 
"People of such small ^advanced' stateless nations (...) 
must f i n d t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y by f a l l i n g back on the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s .of t h e i r own c i v i l societies, as public and 
s t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s are a l i e n and often h o s t i l e t o them." 
(Giner, 1980, 10) 
I n Scotland, no such conception exists. A lack of indigenous 
c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y i s recognised, but the remedy i s not sought i n 
popular c r e a t i v i t y , but rather i n cin independent state which would 
support the a i l i n g p a t i e n t (Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987). 
S i m i l a r l y , confidence i n the Scottish bourgeoisie i s not great as 
f a r as the construction of the country's economy i s concemed. The 
p a t r i o t i c CV of the r u l i n g class i n Scotland i s not impressive, i f 
one considers the orchestrated rundown of the Scottish heavy 
industry and the close connections between the Scottish bourgeoisie 
and the London governments. But more inportantly, t h i s rundown, the 
p l a n t closures and takeovers have diminished the indigenous 
i n d u s t r i a l employers, and the Scottish economy has become more and 
more dependent on public investment. Again, i t i s a Scottish state, 
or f o r devolutionists, a Scottish parliament and administration 
\ ^ c h i s expected t o take on the main task i n the construction of a 
more developed, more equitable and r i c h e r Scottish society. 
But Scottish nationalism (as expressed by the Scottish National 
Party) has never commanded the support of the majority of the Scots. 
Tom Nairn, one of Scotland's most a r t i c u l a t e n a t i o n a l i s t marxists, 
described i t • as "a strange, narrow, sectarian b e l i e f , v^iich has 
adorned i t s e l f w i t h some p o s i t i v e , progressive social-democratic 
ideas as time went by, but v^ich as a movement and social 
organisation i s s t i l l rooted i n i t s o r i g i n s " (Taqeszeitunq, 
20.4.1989, 11). Neal Ascherson claimed t h a t the fundamental dilemma 
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i n Scottish society was of a psychological nature, the contradiction 
between se l f - a s s e r t i o n and s e l f - d i s t r u s t . National s e l f - d i s t r u s t , 
the doubt about the nation's entitlement and capacity t o re a l i s e i t s 
p o t e n t i a l through social action, i s contrasted w i t h the 
g l o r i f i c a t i o n o f h i s t o r i c Scottish rebels and uprisings as moments 
of euphoric self-assertion. I n the 1970's devolution debate, 
s e l f - d i s t r u s t scored a v i c t o r y . According t o Ascherson, the debate 
"focused on the p o s s i b i l i t y of self-government, as i f 
national f e e l i n g and pride were - i n a contradictory manner 
- p r i v a t e emotions which had no place i n the public domain." 
(Ascherson, 1988, 86) 
Thus, v M l e a p r i v a t e f e e l i n g of Scottish i d e n t i t y exists on one 
l e v e l , p o l i t i c a l nationalism e x i s t s on a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l and has 
been vinable t o create an ideology v^ich i s able t o capture the 
Scottish imagination i n the long term. The high t i d e of Scottish 
nationalism i n the mid-1970's was a moment of self-assertion v^iich 
d i d not l a s t . Whether the new t i d e of 1988/1989 w i l l be seen i n a 
d i f f e r e n t l i g h t , i s too early t o say. 
The Catalan metaphor of the national e d i f i c e must be twisted 
considerably i f i t i s t o f i t the Scottish case. The Scottish nation 
e x i s t s , and i t s existence has never been denied or threatened by the 
Scots or anyone else. Even i f a c e r t a i n lack of Scottish 
self-confidence i s often deplored^, Scottish national conscience i s 
usually assumed t o be w e l l developed and i n no need of p a r t i c u l a r 
consciousness r a i s i n g e f f o r t s . I n the 1970's, a widely heard 
pro-devolutionist argument was t h a t Scotland i n f a c t already had a l l 
'one exanple f o r the de l i c a t e nature of the c o l l e c t i v e Scottish 
consciousness i s the degree t o which i t i s affected by the foirtunes of 
the Scottish i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o o t b a l l team, v^ich has often served t o 
represent Scottish i d e n t i t y . I n the context of the c r u c i a l years of 1978 
and 1979, Stephen Maxwell remembered an English j o u r n a l i s t saying t h a t 
"the only time the Scots are happy i s i n between q u a l i f y i n g f o r the 
world cup and crashing out of the world cup i n humiliating 
circumstances" (Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987). The World Cup of 1978, i n 
i ^ i c h Scotland was the only team from the B r i t i s h I s l e s , brought a time 
o f euphoria t o an end. Scottish newspapers carried l e t t e r s arguing t h a t 
the f a i l u r e o f the Scots t o manage a f o o t b a l l team suggested t h a t they 
would be even less able t o manage Scotland. 
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the necessary i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r self-government 
and only lacked a parliament t o be conplete. I n contrast t o 
Catalonia, the Scottish nation could therefore be imagined as a 
coitplete house - w i t h the p r i n c i p a l columns representing the 
Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s -, functioning and i n reasonable working 
order, but owned by the wrong landlord: the London government. 
The ideologies of nationalism are also rather d i f f e r e n t i n the two 
cases. Catalan nationalism has a markedly e s s e n t i a l i s t discourse, 
which was developed by the father of Catalan nationalism. Prat de l a 
Riba, and became hegemonic i n the early 20th century . I n the second 
h a l f of the 20th century, h i s t o r i c a l perspectives modified the 
e s s e n t i a l i s t ideology, but no fundamental r e d e f i n i t i o n of Catalan 
nationalism took place (Bilbeny, 1988, 217-222). 
Whereas i n Scottish nationalism, t h i s e s s e n t i a l i s t aspect i s played 
down. Scottish i d e n t i t y i s described as an emotional i d e n t i t y , not 
dependent on p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s , characteristics, etc.. 
"Scottish nationalism i s more an instrumental nationalism 
rather than an expressive nationalism. People might s t a r t 
o f f from exactly the same premise and the same 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l values as t h e i r neighbour, and say t o 
themselves, " r i g h t , what s o r t of society ought we t o l i v e 
i n " . [They] could then go on quite r a t i o n a l l y t o say, "well, 
the only way we get t h a t s o r t of society i n Scotland i s 
through the SNP", and would not necessarily express anything 
other than t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and social values i n supporting 
the SNP. They would not be expressing a sense of Scottish 
i d e n t i t y , or anything else." 
(Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987) 
Llobera argued t h a t Catalan nationalism i s characterised by the 
idea of Volksgeist since the beginning of the century and cannot be 
reduced t o e i r p i r i c a l manifestations such as language, a r t , law, etc.. 
"The work of Prat de l a Riba [ p a r t i c u l a r l y "La n a c i o n a l i t a t 
Catalana"] s i g n i f i e d not only t h a t the idea of a Catalan 
nation as a s p i r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e had been i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
established, but, more inp o r t a n t l y , t h a t t h i s idea had 
become, i f one i s allowed t o paraphrase the Young Marx, a 
material force which had a g r i p on the masses." 
(Llobera, 1983, 332) 
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Nationalism i s thus seen even from w i t h i n the n a t i o n a l i s t party as a 
p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n which r e f l e c t s a pragmatic approach, rather than 
a deep-seated i d e n t i t y fed by a mystical force. One inportant reason 
f o r synpathising w i t h nationalism i s the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the 
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status quo, the f e e l i n g t h a t "things are not r i g h t " . 
Despite such differences i n n a t i o n a l i s t s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n and 
discourse, which t o some extent r e f l e c t v a r i a t i o n s i n the structure 
and the p o l i t i c a l self-confidence of c i v i l society, a comparison of 
the two cases i s possible. Although s p e c i f i c manifestations of 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements must be considered, they do not necessarily 
irrpede research approaches which aim t o investigate where the l i n e 
has t o be drawn between general processes and s p e c i f i c features, or 
between necessary and contingent re l a t i o n s . 
1.3 Methodological cxatiments: Ccmparison and generalisation 
1.3.i The comparative approach 
I t was not only i n Scotland and Catalonia t h a t nationalism recently 
came back on the p o l i t i c a l agenda, but also i n several other 
countries. I n developing countries, examples include the Palestinian 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement, the upsurge of nationalism i n the Tamil areas 
of S r i Lanka"''^ , and - i n a rather d i f f e r e n t context - i n the Fijis"''''" 
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As a point on the side, i t appears t h a t f o r several of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t s interviewed here, an iirportant moment i n the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n 
of t h e i r national i d e n t i t y came v^en they were l i v i n g outside the UK. 
This confronted them w i t h the image of the United Kingdom abroad, which 
i s dominated by England. 
"""^ The Tamil movement f o r self-government i n S r i Lanka i s 
spearheaded by a g u e r r i l l a group called the "Tamil Tigers". According t o 
the Guardian, " [ t ] h e Tigers have been, f o r the past four years, among 
the most deadly and successful of n a t i o n a l i s t g u e r r i l l a movements" 
(Guardian, 19.10.1987, 13). 
•""•^ e Guardian spoke of a " t i d a l wave of nationalism i n the F i j i s " 
(Guardian, 19.3.1989, 23). 
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12 and the Phili p i n e s . I n the "second world", n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
have also become manifest. On the Balkan peninsula, Yugoslavia has 
experienced an outbreak of l a t e n t n a t i o n a l i s t c o n f l i c t s between 
Serbs and Albanians (Guardian, 27.6.1986), vAiile the new era of 
qlasnost and p o l i t i c a l reform i n the Soviet Union has seen an 
upsurge of n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, 
Armenia and other parts of the state (Economist, 2.7.1988, 41). 
While these examples show t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t movements are t o p i c a l and 
inportant i n a l l types of p o l i t i c a l and economic systems, the r i s e 
of sub-state nationalism i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t countries i s most 
pertinent i n the context of t h i s thesis. There i s hardly any 
European country which i s not affected, but the re-energence of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t challenge has been most surprising t o the oldest 
"nation-states", France, Spain and B r i t a i n . 
The majority of e n p i r i c a l analyses of n a t i o n a l i s t movements consist 
of single case studies, i n monographs as wel l as edited collections. 
Hernandez and Mercade, who proposed a model f o r the investigation of 
the d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n Spain, concluded tha t , though 
one set of questions can be used f o r a l l , each of them required a 
s p e c i f i c , exclusive and profound analysis. The view t h a t one's own 
nation i s a unique case which bears l i t t l e r e l a t i o n t o others was 
often mentioned i n interviews and conversations conducted f o r the 
purpose of t h i s thesis. The Catalans i n p a r t i c u l a r appeared t o 
consider t h e i r nationalism a unique case because the l i n g u i s t i c 
f a c t o r i s so strong (Sellares, interview, 14.4.1988). Looking f o r 
differences rather than common t r a i t s i s a fundamental part of 
n a t i o n a l i s t ideology, and the h i s t o r i c i s t perspective of many 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements underlines the distinctiveness i n the nation's 
h i s t o r y . 
The H i i l i p i n e movement f o r denocracy which succeeded i n removing 
right-wing d i c t a t o r Marcos was f u e l l e d by a "growing s p i r i t of 
nationalism" (Guardian, 29.1.1986, 9). 
(Chapter one) (44) 
However, the present wave of nationalism has also sparked o f f 
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conparative studies i n d i f f e r e n t d i s c i p l i n e s . I t i s recognised 
t h a t something can be gained by adopting a perspective which does 
not r e s t r i c t i t s e l f t o the spe c i f i c , but also looks a t wider 
influences and general trends. Hroch's study of n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements i n cent r a l and eastern Europe (translated from German i n 
1986) can be regarded as a pioneering investigation, v^ich i s 
relevant although i t deals w i t h a d i f f e r e n t epoch. Hroch pointed out 
t h a t unique and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features of a n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
can only be conceptualised by comparing i t w i t h others. I n the 
context of the Catalan and Scottish cases, i t emerges tha t v\hat 
f u e l l e d Catalan p o l i t i c a l nationalism - e.g. the language issue and 
the t e r r i t o r i a l organisation - are marginal concerns t o na t i o n a l i s t s 
i n Scotland. There i s no single factor, or combination of factors, 
which make n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l inevitable. But more inportantly, the 
comparison permits one t o i d e n t i f y common causes and influences 
vAiich helped t o t r i g g e r o f f n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n a var i e t y of 
states (Hroch, 1968, 26) . James Anderson pointed out tha t 
nationalisms "are constituted by more than t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r 
space-time locations and are not reducible t o t h e i r immediate 
context". H i s t o r i c a l l y , nationalism has t o be set i n the context of 
the r i s e and development of capitalism and "an integrated world 
system". Therefore, p a r t i c u l a r nationalisms share certain features 
and problems which j u s t i f y coirparisons and generalisations over 
space and time (J. Anderson, 1988, 19). 
1 . 3 . i i Catalonia and Scotland 
I n the chosen case studies, there are plenty of s i m i l a r i t i e s and 
differences, as w e l l as teirporal incongruities. On the surface, 
there seem t o be some basic common t r a i t s , such as the population 
size, the loss of independence (1707 and 1714 f o r Scotland and 
For exanples, see Petr e l l a , 1980, 1-28; Anderson, J, 1985; 
Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D.W., 1982; Meny, Y, 1986, and Moreno Fernandez, 
1986. 
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Catalonia respectively), the emergence of a self-government movement 
i n the l a t e 19th century and the experience of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n 
the 19th century. I n both cases, the 1960's was a period of 
n a t i o n a l i s t fermentation, and i n the 1970's, the n a t i o n a l i s t 
a g i t a t i o n pressurised the state i n t o action. Unlike the Basque or 
the Northern I r i s h Republican nationalism, neither the Catalans nor 
the Scots regarded the armed struggle as a means of achieving 
independence. 
I t must also be noted t h a t neither n a t i o n a l i s t movement could be 
exclusively or p r i m a r i l y associated t o any p a r t i c u l a r social class. 
The support f o r self-government came from various sectors of 
society, and most types of class analyses have not been very 
successful i n explaining why. 
However, there are also immediately recognisable differences. 
Catalanism - v>rtiether i n the c u l t u r a l or the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d - has 
been repressed severely during t h i s century, but the movement seems 
t o have emerged stronger and w i t h more popular support from each 
phase of repression. One exanple i s the language, \Jhich was banned 
from the public sphere during the Franco regime. I n Catalonia, most 
people speak Catalan, while the o f f i c i a l state language i s 
C a s t i l i a n . The c u l t u r a l movement, aimed at r e h a b i l i t a t i n g and 
"normalising" the indigenous language, was very heterogeneous and 
enjoyed support among a l l social classes. Scotland, on the other 
hand, has not experienced state repression. The language of most 
Scots i s English. Scots, the o f f i c i a l language of the Scottish court 
before the Union of Crowns, has since l o s t i t s status as a c u l t u r a l 
language, and Gaelic has been receding r a p i d l y and i s now spoken by 
less than 2% of the population. The language issue i s of very 
marginal significance i n Scottish nationalism, but a t the centre of 
the Catalanist r e v i v a l . 
Another ijmportant difference consists i n the rate of success of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n previous phases of r e v i v a l . I n Scotland, 
nationalism d i d not enjoy much popular support before the l a t e 
1960's, and no tangible concessions have yet been wrought from 
c e n t r a l government. I n Catalonia, however, a measure of 
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self-administration was conceded i n 1914, and i n 1933, a parliament 
and government was granted t o the Catalans by the new Republic. This 
helped t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e p o l i t i c a l Catalanism and t o lend 
legitimacy t o demands f o r self-government i n the 1970's. 
The i n p l i c a t i o n s of these s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences are 
noticeable i n a l l the chapters of t h i s thesis. While there are 
c e r t a i n developments common t o both cases, t h e i r inpact often 
depends on s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l circumstances. Rather than measuring 
the degree and inportance of s i m i l a r i t y and difference, t h i s thesis 
uses thera t o explore from d i f f e r e n t perspectives the conplicated 
reasons and mechanisms of n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l . 
2. WRITIM3 ABOUT NATIONALISM 
2.1 Geography and nationalism; a late beginning 
Naturally, the new wave of nationalism has not remained uncommented 
on by social s c i e n t i s t s and p o l i t i c a l analysts. Writing on 
nationalism and n a t i o n a l i s t movements has always been a daunting 
subject. Nevertheless, a large body of l i t e r a t u r e exists, which has 
accumulated since the l a s t century, and i t i s not surprising t h a t 
t h i s preexisting knowledge and thought has influenced the attenpts 
t o explain the n a t i o n a l i s t movements of the post-war era. 
Geography i s not very w e l l equipped t o deal with t e r r i t o r i a l 
d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the European states and p o l i t i c a l fragmentation 
along geographical l i n e s \*iich d e l i m i t national communities, because 
the p o l i t i c a l geographical analysis has been t r a d i t i o n a l l y biased 
towards the nation-state and supra-state regions or international 
t e r r i t o r i a l c o n f l i c t s (Williams and Kofman, 1989, 7). But since 
contenporary movements increasingly prefer t e r r i t o r i a l t o primordial 
d e f i n i t i o n s of nationalism, and present the central state as the 
common enemy of a l l social groups l i v i n g i n the national community 
(Linz, 1985, 207), more geographers have begun t o dedicate t h e i r 
research t o the phenomenon i n the 1980's. 
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Two recent edited publications incorporate most of the anglophone 
geographers v*io are a t present working on nationalism (Johnston e t ^ 
a l . , (eds.)/ 1988; Williams and Kofman (eds.), 1989). Since 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements are distinguished from other s o c i a l moven^ts 
by t h e i r attachment t o a s p e c i f i c t e r r i t o r y , i t i s not surprising 
t h a t geographers concentrate on the significance of t e r r i t o r y f o r 
nationalism. James Anderson i s a prominent exponent of t h i s 
enphasis, v^i c h he believes t o be the "most promising approach t o 
constructing a general t h e o r e t i c a l framework" (J. Anderson, 1988, 
20). However, the two cases under consideration i n t h i s thesis 
demonstrate t h a t the t e r r i t o r i a l aspect of nationalism can be more 
or less ii t p o r t a n t . 'While i n Scotland, the d e l i m i t a t i o n of the nation 
follows old-established boundaries, Catalan nationalism includes a 
growing m i n o r i t y v ^ i c h i s i n favour of independence f o r a l l the 
Catalan-speaking t e r r i t o r i e s (paisos Catalans). Secondly, ever since 
i t s r e v i v a l i n the 1880's, Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t s and r e g i o n a l i s t s 
have displayed a great i n t e r e s t i n the geography of the Principat. 
The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h a place and the f e e l i n g of belonging t o a 
comarca i s i n t i j n a t e l y bound up w i t h Catalan i d e n t i t y . 
Some geographers, who c r i t i c i s e d approaches which are either 
c u l t u r a l or economic determinist, have come up w i t h a socio-spatial 
thesis i n order t o explain n a t i o n a l i s t and r e g i o n a l i s t movements. 
This enabled Cooke t o i n t e r p r e t Welsh regionalism (sic) i n terms of 
t e r r i t o r i a l l y s p e c i f i c class r e l a t i o n s and the r o l e of e t h n i c i t y i n 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g c i v i l society i n c e r t a i n regions and places (Cooke, 
1989, 211-218). The influence of new s o c i a l i s t theory i s not 
14 
i n c i d e n t a l (Cooke, 1984, 369-374). Harvey pioneered t h i s type of 
approach, though he was less concerned w i t h regionalism or 
nationalism than the regional v a r i a t i o n of - and the inpact of space 
14 . . . 
I n an interview w i t h Cooke f o r Society and Space, Raymond 
Williams argued t h a t a new theory of socialism must now c e n t r a l l y 
involve place. Due t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of c a p i t a l , place i s 
probably a stronger bond f o r the working class than f o r the the c a p i t a l 
owning classes. He stressed t h a t apart from class i d e n t i t i e s , other 
bonds re l a t e d t o c u l t u r e and place were also important, and t h a t each 
becomes stronger v^en reinforced by others. 
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and place on - the developinent of capitalism. With a more 
fashionable terminology, Soja also analysed the "intercontingent" 
nature of s p a t i a l and social r e l a t i o n s , drawing the conclusion t h a t 
the "inner contradictions of c a p i t a l are ejqjressed through the 
restle s s formation and reformation of geographical landscapes", and 
t h a t therefore s o c i a l movements must become ' consciously s p a t i a l 
movements (Soja, 1985, 177; 182; 188). One exanple f o r t h i s wo\ald be 
the Scottish Trades Union Congress claiming t o speak f o r Scotland, 
and not j u s t f o r the labour movement i n Scotland (Kerevan, 1984, 7). 
But so f a r , few attenpts have been made t o apply these 
geographically informed approaches of new social theory t o 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
2.2 Modernisation approaches 
I n the two cases analysed here - as i n most others - nationalism has 
not appeared "out of the blue"; rather, i t grew on several layers of 
n a t i o n a l i s t a c t i v i t y from previous decades. However, i n using 
theories of nationalism which deal w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s t movements of 
the 19th century - when the formation of nations was the p o l i t i c a l 
expression of c a p i t a l i s t development - i t i s assumed t h a t the 
sub-state n a t i o n a l i s t movements of the 1960's and thereafter are 
operating i n s i m i l a r conditions and following s i m i l a r aims. 
MacLaughlln pointed out t h a t i n the l a t e 18th and the 19th century, 
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the paradigmatic cmrrents of social philosophy and historiography 
tr e a t e d the nation-state as the exclusive a l t e r n a t i v e t o the "idiocy 
of r u r a l l i f e " and regarded nationalism as natural and primordial. 
This perspective of nationalism as a necessary stage i n h i s t o r y , 
p a r t of a set of fundamental c u l t u r a l and economic foirces was also 
shared by Marxism (MacLaughlin, 1987, 1). I t s t i l l informs 
autonomist approaches t o recent n a t i o n a l i s t movements and l i v e s on 
o, r?"^ ^ century, t h i s i s mainly l i b e r a l i s m . Based on Bertrand 
Russell, Maclaughlin stated t h a t "the p r i n c i p l e t h a t nations, l i k e 
i n d i v i d u a l s , had a r i g h t t o be "free", i . e . not t o be ruled by p r i e s t s 
monarchs or foreigners, was, i n practice, the most inportant doctrine of 
late-nineteenth-century l i b e r a l i s m " (MacLaughlin, 1987, 2-3). 
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i n those v^ i c h form pa r t of modernisation theory. MacLaughlin 
suggested t h a t the o r i g i n of such widespread "autonomist" theorising 
l i e s w i t h Hegel's v i s i o n of the state as an "earthly incarnation of 
Divine W i l l " , and therefore beyond the control of any p a r t i c u l a r 
s o c i a l class (MacLaughlin, 1986a, 309). 
The most useful theories of nationalism are informed i n one way or 
other by theories of modernisation and c a p i t a l i s t development. These 
approaches look a t nationalism from outside, as opposed t o the 
inside view of nationalism as a natural, organic " f a c t " . I t i s 
claimed t h a t one can understand nationalism only by looking a t the 
material conditions set by "real h i s t o r y " , or i n other words, 
through socio-economic analysis (Eley, 1981, 104). This mode of 
thought includes w r i t e r s l i k e Hobsbawm (nationalism arose together 
w i t h the bourgeoisie) ; Nairn (the r e a l o r i g i n s of nationalism are 
located i n the machinery of world p o l i t i c s ) ; Lasuen (model of the 
inverted multi-regional s t a t e ) ; Smith (effects of decolonialisation 
on i n t e l l e c t u a l s of minority ethnic groups); Gellner ( c u l t u r a l 
boundaries i n h i b i t s o cial mobility) and Hechter (uneven development 
reproduces ethnic boundaries) . The work of A. D. Smith puts the 
enphasis on the increase of i n t e l l e c t u a l s , which i s connected with 
the expansion of bureaucracy and educational i n s t i t u t i o n s (Smith, 
1982, 27-29). Deutsch h i g h l i g h t s the iitportance of social 
communications and the r o l e of the media and other i n s t i t u t i o n s i n 
spreading n a t i o n a l i s t ideas (Eeutsch, 1966). I n a more general 
framework, Gellner regards nationalism as a consequence of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n processes v^ich on the one hand erode t r a d i t i o n a l 
cultures, and on the other hand require the construction of a 
national c u l t u r e (Gellner, 1978; 1983). He argued t h a t a shared 
c u l t u r e i s needed because the social organisation i n c a p i t a l i s t 
states i s characterised by high degrees of m o b i l i t y and d i v i s i o n of 
labour. EXie t o an objective need f o r homogeneity, i n d u s t r i a l society 
i s therefore necessarily a n a t i o n a l i s t society. Where c u l t u r a l 
homogeneity i s not perfect, c o n f l i c t s ensue which can be solved 
e i t h e r by a s s i m l a t i o n or the drawing of new boundaries (Gellner, 
1981, 767-769) . For the purpose of t h i s study, Gellner's account of 
nationalism has two main disadvantages. F i r s t l y , as an attempt t o 
explain the emergence of nationalism ( i n i t s 19th centmry guise), i t 
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cannot explain the r e v i v a l of sub-state nationalism i n states with a 
soci a l organisation i ^ i i c h i s cha r a c t e r i s t i c f o r advanced capitalism 
(high social m o b i l i t y , pronounced and changing d i v i s i o n of labour, 
strong dominant cul t u r e , e t c . ) . This f a i l u r e r e s u l t s from the fa c t 
t h a t i t i s a s t r u c t u r a l determinist approach, \*iich leads t o the 
second disadvantage. Everything i s seen i n terms of the needs of 
modernisation and i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n as i f t h i s were a uniform 
process, w i t h l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n paid t o sp e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l and 
s p a t i a l settings i n which t h i s process takes place, and influence^' 
on i t by the actions of social groups. This i s not surprising, given 
t h a t Gellner described modem society as a mass of mobile 
in d i v i d u a l s (Gellner, 1981, 757) . 
Tom Nairn developed Gellner ideas i n h i s own work where he argued 
t h a t nationalism emerges from t e r r i t o r i a l c o n f l i c t which he regarded 
as an i n e v i t a b l e consequence of uneven c a p i t a l i s t development. This 
lead him t o a determinist conception of the mechanisms behind 
n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c i s a t i o n although he intended t o avoid i t by 
taking a Gramscian perspective of s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s i n c a p i t a l i s t 
society. His study of Scottish nationalism presents c u l t u r a l 
i d e n t i t y , the UK state, and social and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as 
constant, s t a t i c features, and leaves the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of national 
i d e n t i t y t o be explained as a "forced by-product of the grotesquely 
uneven nature of c a p i t a l i s t development" (Nairn, 1977, 128). 
Scotland's development i n the past 250 years does not permit an easy 
categorisation i n t o "over-developed" or "under-developed", and Nairn 
does not take i n t o account the massive decline experienced by the 
indigenous industry and c a p i t a l i s t class over t h i s century. 
MacLaughlin i s j u s t i f i e d i n q u a l i f y i n g Nairn's work as " s t r u c t u r a l 
determinist", but not i n arguing t h a t Nairn d i d not recognise the 
hegemonic capacities of the B r i t i s h state (MacLaughlin, 1986b, 
315; 317). 
•^ S^ee the l a s t chapter of the second (1981) e d i t i o n . 
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I n h i s support f o r n a t i o n a l i s t movements as a way t o break up an 
archaic state which i s standing i n the way t o socialism, Nairn leans 
heavily on Lenin's perception of the early 20th century n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements (Nairn, 1977, 86-90). Since much of marxist w r i t i n g has 
been influenced by Lenin's and Stalin's polemics on the "national 
question", the next section i s dedicated t o a more detailed analysis 
of the ways i n which marxists accounted f o r the f a c t t h a t 
nationalism was often p o l i t i c a l l y more powerful than class struggle. 
2.3 Marxist debates on nationalism 
Nairn's much quoted statement t h a t "the theory of nationalism 
represents Marxism's great h i s t o r i c a l f a i l u r e " (Nairn, 1977, 329; 
Gellner, 1978, 103; B. Anderson, 1983, 13; Ninini, 1985, 58) i s , i n 
some sense, misleading, as marxists have not r e a l l y searched f o r a 
t h e o r e t i c a l understanding of nationalism, or even succeeded i n 
e j ^ l a i n i n g what Marx meant by suggesting t h a t the p r o l e t a r i a t of 
each country must f i r s t s e t t l e matters w i t h " i t s own bourgeoisie". 
Therefore, Anderson argued th a t "nationalism has proved an 
uncomfortable anomaly f o r marxist theory and, precisely f o r that 
reason, has been lar g e l y eluded, rather than confronted" (B. 
Anderson, 1983, 13). 
At the bottom l i n e of most marxist analyses l i e s the h i s t o r i c a l 
explanation of the creation of nations. This holds t h a t they are 
formed through the growth of exchange between regions and 
t e r r i t o r i e s and must be considered bourgeois because i t i s the 
merchant c a p i t a l i s t s who control t h i s development. Despite other 
deep seated t h e o r e t i c a l and p o l i c y related disagreements, Marx, 
Kautsky, Luxemburg and Lenin a l l agreed t h a t the nation-state was 
the state forro which best suited the requirements of capitalism. 
Whether i t therefore constituted a step i n the h i s t o r i c a l 
development which could not be skipped was debated among the leading 
marxists i n the early 20th century. 
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2.3.i Classical marxist positions 
I n welding the p o l i t i c a l form of c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s onto the 
economic, nationalism became associated w i t h the ideologies of the 
bourgeoisie. Contrary t o the bourgeois ideology of "homogeneous 
socie t i e s " and "eternal, long-standing r i g h t s of the people vAiich 
are above the h i s t o r i c process", most marxists give p r i o r i t y t o 
c o n f l i c t caused by antagonistic class int e r e s t s and argue th a t 
"democracy" and " c i v i l l i b e r t i e s " are i n f a c t expressions of 
s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c conditions and epochs (Hentze, 1975, 106-109). 
Consequently, nations - a p o l i t i c a l category v*iich belongs t o the 
epoch of r i s i n g capitalism - must eventually depart from the scene 
w i t h the f a l l of capitalism, even though i n a t r a n s i t i o n period, 
s o c i a l i s t nations are l i k e l y t o emerge from the rubble of the old, 
bourgeois nations ( S t a l i n , 1954, v o l . XI, 353). 
Rosa Luxemburg, on the other hand, was a relentless marxist opponent 
of nationalism"'"^. She i d e n t i f i e d the petty bourgeoisie as the 
p r i n c i p a l force i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements, p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s , who saw t h e i r prospects f o r social m o b i l i t y blocked 
by the dominant culture. This judgement led her t o canpaign against 
the social democratic p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the f i r s t world war (v^ich 
constituted a v i c t o r y of nationalism over internationalism) as well 
as i n her w r i t i n g s on the national question i n Poland and other 
oppressed nations. Luxemburg explained the strong n a t i o n a l i s t 
tendencies among the Polish working class by the i n t r u s i o n i n t o the 
p r o l e t a r i a t of elements of the petty bourgeoisie, v^ich had a 
material i n t e r e s t i n restoring Polish independence. These groups 
were prevented by the " r u s s i f i c a t i o n p o l i c y " from occupying 
desirable posts i n administration and public and c u l t u r a l l i f e , and 
therefore suffered economic and social decline (Hentze, 1975, 36). 
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Rosa Luxemburg stands out even among her s o c i a l i s t 
contemporaries i n the radical and t o t a l manner wi t h v^^ich she 
subordinates the national i n t e r e s t t o the class i n t e r e s t " (Hentze, 
1975, 117). 
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Lenin, on the other hand, supported the Social Democrats' position 
on fundamental democratic r i g h t s - such as the r i g h t t o 
self-determination - f o r st r a t e g i c considerations. According t o 
t h i s , the s o c i a l i s t revolution could j u s t as l i k e l y stem from mass 
mobilisation f o r self-determination i n an oppressed nation as be 
sparked o f f by a mass s t r i k e . The task of the social democratic 
p a r t i e s was t o lead the mass movement and t o transcend the bounds of 
bourgeois l e g a l i t y by extending "the struggle f o r every fundamental 
democratic demand up t o a d i r e c t p r o l e t a r i a n onslaught on the 
bourgeoisie" (Lenin, 1964, v o l . XXII, 145). The key therefore t o 
Lenin's p o s i t i o n i s h i s analysis of the t r a j e c t o r y of revolutionary 
mass struggles and the central r o l e of class alliances w i t h i n them. 
Lenin also warned against i s o l a t i n g the demand f o r national 
self-determination as a bourgeois claim, because a l l democratic 
demands - not j u s t n a t i o n a l i s t claims - could be manipulated by the 
bourgeoisie (Lenin, 1964, v o l . XXII, 153). Democratic demands 
therefore were not considered by Lenin as inherently bourgeois, 
whereas other marxists have s t r i c t l y associated n a t i o n a l i s t ideas 
w i t h the bourgeoisie. He claiined t h a t "the necessity t o proclaim and 
grant l i b e r t y t o a l l oppressed peoples ( i . e . , t h e i r r i g h t t o 
self-determination) w i l l be as urgent i n the s o c i a l i s t revolution as 
i t was f o r the v i c t o r y of the bourgeois - democratic revolution i n , 
say, Gennany i n 1848, or Russia i n 1905" (Lenin, 1864, v o l . XXII, 
153) . This idea was picked up by Gramsci, f o r whom a big area of 
soci a l practices and values existed v^ich d i d not stem from class 
allegiance. 
However, Lenin's promise t o inplement f u l l democracy (including the 
r i g h t t o self-determination) under socialism i s i n contrast w i t h h i s 
description of the s o c i a l i s t t r a n s i t i o n period as the dictatorship 
of the p r o l e t a r i a t . Secondly, Lenin stressed t h a t the democratic 
i n t e r e s t s of one country had t o be subordinated t o the democratic 
i n t e r e s t s of several or a l l countries, and he l e f t no doubt about 
the f a c t t h a t the long term aim of socialism was the removal of 
national and state boundaries. This could be achieved only by 
o f f e r i n g the oppressed nations the freedom t o secede, v^^ile at the 
same time educating the working classes f o r international 
s o l i d a r i t y . These ir r e c o n c i l a b l e perspectives prompted the 
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suggestion t h a t Lenin hoped t h a t h i s strategy of supporting "the 
slogan of self-determination, rather than acting as a stimulant t o 
nationalism, would prove as an anaesthetic" (Connor, 1985, 34), and 
provoked Luxemburg t o c a l l Lenin's motives f o r supporting the r i g h t 
t o self-determination opportunist (Hentze, 1975, 159). The events 
a f t e r the Russian revolution j u s t i f i e d t h i s opinion, and Nairn 
claimed t h a t what remained of Lenin's dogma on nationalism 
"was a double-faced p o s i t i o n , the ambiguity of the formulae 
without t h e i r i n q u i r i n g , restless tension: polemic mumified 
i n t o p r i e s t l y chant". (Nairn, 1977, 86) 
Lenin's concern f o r the subject of nationalism was forced upon him 
through the experience of the d i v i s i o n of the Social Democracy i n 
the F i r s t World War. Supporting national struggles i n certain 
h i s t o r i c s i t u a t i o n s was part of h i s strategy of seeking alliances on 
the path t o socialism, and served therefore a sp e c i f i c function 
which was always secondary t o the main issue of class struggle. 
2 . 3 . i i Marxist theory and modem sub-state nationalism 
With respect t o the recent wave of sub-state nationalisms, the 
Leninist and the Luxemburg approaches s t i l l exert a strong influence 
on researchers i n the marxist t r a d i t i o n . Against i d e a l i s t and 
essential i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , marxists have pointed out tha t 
e x p l o i t a t i v e relationships also e x i s t between dominant and 
subordinate classes w i t h i n the sub-state nation which i s struggling 
against a "foreign" state. This contradiction i s f a r more relevant 
than the shared experiences of h i s t o r y and of e x p l o i t a t i o n by an 
external enemy (Maclaughlin, 1986, 317-319). The question i s then, 
i n v^ose i n t e r e s t i s the mobilisation of people under a national 
banner? 
The reply of Luxemburg, and many others, was t o point t o the 
bourgeoisie, or a sector of i t , and t o explain how i t was using 
nationalism f o r i t s own benefit, v ^ i l e a t the same time d i s t r a c t i n g 
the workers and peasants from the fundamental struggle. I n Catalonia 
and Scotland of the 1960's, ha-/ever, the issue i s no longer the r i s e 
(Chapter one) (55) 
of the bourgeoisie and i t s struggle f o r p o l i t i c a l control over a 
p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y . This was c e r t a i n l y a strong impulse behind the 
Catalanism of the early decades of the century, and the present 
domination of Catalan nationalism and p o l i t i c s by the conservative 
Convergencia i Unio would support the argument t h a t the bourgeoisie 
seems t o b e n e f i t from n a t i o n a l i s t movements. Even i f they are not 
the strongest force i n the movements themselves, they seem t o reap 
the harvest afterwards. I n Scotland, there has never been a sign 
t h a t the employers were interested i n autonomy or independence; 
rather, much e f f o r t and money has been expended i n the attenpt t o 
stop any change i n the present setup (see Chapter four, section 
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3.3) . Ca l l i n g the n a t i o n a l i s t s "bourgeois" or " t a r t a n t o r i e s " i s 
more a r e s u l t of p a r t y - p o l i t i c a l bickering, as opposed t o a thorough 
analysis of the involvement of d i f f e r e n t social classes i n the 
movement. 
There i s a danger i n confusing the class character of a n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement w i t h the class interests i t might end up serving. Many of 
the present-day sub-state n a t i o n a l i s t movements claim t o be 
s o c i a l i s t , or a t least social-democratic, and t o represent the 
i n t e r e s t s of the workers (v^atever the d e f i n i t i o n of the term). 
Hedges found t h a t there i s a tendency i n some movements ( i n h i s 
case. Northern I r i s h nationalism) t o i d e n t i f y w i t h a n t i - i n p e r i a l i s t 
struggles, v ^ i c h i d e n t i f i e s the ex p l o i t e r with the colonial power 
(Hedges, 1988, 114-115) . This type of marxist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n forms 
the main body of Blaut's w r i t i n g , who holds t h a t "national struggle 
i s indeed class struggle" (Blaut, 1987, 24). Based on a very 
selective reading of Marx, Engels and Lenin, the argument goes l i k e 
t h i s . I n class societies, class struggle i s the primary source of 
c o n f l i c t , and i s connected w i t h every other c o n f l i c t . Class struggle 
"makes use of a l l t r a i t s and i n s t i t u t i o n s of culture as instruments 
and arenas of e x p l o i t a t i o n and resistance", therefore one can 
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During the referendum campaign, f o r exaitple, the "no" caitpaign of 
the Conservatives had f a r more resources than those v^ich were 
favourable t o the devolution b i l l . The CBI i n Scotland has spoken out 
against Scottish autonomy \^enever the n a t i o n a l i s t movement seemed t o be 
warming up (Macartney, 1981, 21; Ascherson, 1986, 53). 
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maintain t h a t i t i s the motor of h i s t o r y (Blaut, 1987, 58). I t j u s t 
appears i n various guises. N a t i o n a l i s t movements are struggling f o r 
state power, which i s what every class wants t o achieve. Therefore, 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements can be bourgeois as well as working class. 
Blaut's view i s strongly influenced by h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 
Puerto Rican n a t i o n a l i s t movement, and he does not atteirpt t o apply 
h i s insights t o other n a t i o n a l i s t movements, such as the Scottish 
and the Catalan. 
Touraine has found t h a t even i n European c a p i t a l i s t settings (he 
analysed the Occitan movement i n France), the autonomist model of 
nationalism, v±iich combines social struggle w i t h struggle f o r 
national l i b e r a t i o n , " i s the one which dominates the mind today" 
(Touraine, 1985, 168). But most movements i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t 
countries do not f i n d themselves i n a c o l o n i a l s i t u a t i o n . And more 
importantly, Touraine has maintained t h a t 
"these two orders of stiruggle - class struggle and national 
struggle - are of d i f f e r e n t natures. They may be 
interraingled, may even j o i n , but they cannot be 
u n i f i e d . ( ) The stronger external constraints are, the 
more the two orders of struggle become intermingled, which 
r e s u l t s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the production of ideologies 
proclainu_ng t h e i r fundamental u n i t y , even t h e i r i d e n t i t y . As 
soon as these constraints weaken, especially a f t e r 
decolonisation, one finds instead t h a t a separation occurs 
between nationalism and the workers' or peasants' movement, 
which generally leads t o the triumph of the n a t i o n a l i s t s 
over the revolutionaries, and of the m i l i t a r y over the 
unionists," 
(Touraine, 1985, 173) 
Class struggle and national struggle are thus two d i s t i n c t "orders 
of struggle", autonomous from each other, even though under certain 
conditions both can coincide i n t h e i r short-term aims. 
Fundamentally, however, t h e i r f o c i are d i f f e r e n t ; one struggles 
against social domination, the other against the p o l i t i c a l 
domination - not necessarily as such, but t h a t exercised by a 
particular state. 
At the other end of the marxist spectrum, Debray i s diametrically 
opposed t o Blaut and rather closer t o Touraine's view. He believes 
t h a t the nation i s "the c u l t u r a l organisation of the human 
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c o l l e c t i v i t y i n question", and therefore a "primary invariable" 
which belongs t o human nature (Debray, 1977, 26-28). He stressed the 
m u l t i p l i c i t y and piecemeal nature of history, which i s created by 
the masses "w i t h i n circumscribed c u l t u r a l and natural communities" 
and "as and v^ere they are" (Debray, 1977, 37) . 
This selective presentation of marxist thought on nationalism gives 
an idea how d i f f e r e n t i n terpretations of nationalism, of the 
objectives and the main social forces i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements, have 
been put forward. One main weaJoiess they a l l share i s tha t 
relationships between structures t h a t are recognised as important 
(such as society and state, c u l t u r e and state, s o c i a l class and 
cul t u r e , etc.) are not examined. I n the following section, a 
d i f f e r e n t approach i s presented which t r i e s t o avoid class-based 
explanation and puts great eirphasis on human agency. Rather than 
conceptualising nationalism as a part of class struggle as i n the 
Leninist t r a d i t i o n , some authors take the view t h a t i n the l a t e 
c a p i t a l i s t society, n a t i o n a l i s t movements can no longer be ascribed 
t o a p a r t i c u l a r social class. 
2.4 Nationalism; a new social movanent? 
One of the fundamental problems of modernisation and marxist 
approaches i s t h e i r d i f f i c u l t y i n connecting s t r u c t u r a l factors with 
social and p o l i t i c a l mobilisation. I t has already been noted t h a t 
there i s no combination of underlying conditions which inevitably 
leads t o a n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Therefore, i t does not s u f f i c e t o 
regard such movements solely as the e f f e c t of a s t r u c t u r a l c r i s i s . 
The actors of these movements are not j u s t puppets, but make 
decisions and mobilise, put forward ideas and develop objectives. 
The second p o i n t i s t o do w i t h changes i n the c a p i t a l i s t system, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the new roles of the state. Postindustrial capitalism 
i s l i n k e d w i t h new forms of c o n f l i c t , often s h i f t e d t o the c u l t u r a l 
rather than the economic and p o l i t i c a l ground (Melucci, 1985, 
789-792) . There are new forms of subordination which are derived 
from the expansion of c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s of production and growing 
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i n t e r v e n t i o n of the state (Laclau and Mouffe, 1984, 160). Based on 
analyses of Habermas and Touraine, Melucci asserted t h a t 
" C a p i t a l i s t development (...) requires a growing 
intervention i n social relationships, i n symbolic systems, 
i n i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y and needs. Complex societies no 
longer have an "economic" basis, they are produced by an 
increasing i n t e g r a t i o n of economic, p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l 
structures." 
(Melucci, 1984, 826) 
However, Melucci f a i l s t o provide evidence f o r t h i s s h i f t from the 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l t o the c u l t u r a l . Secondly, n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements are not prime examples f o r the new social movements. He 
argues t h a t the national question i s i n e x t r i c a b l y linked t o class 
c o n f l i c t during the phase of i n d u s t r i a l capitalism (Melucci, 1988, 
246) . And he maintains t h a t the ethnic-national movements which have 
appeared i n the more advanced Western societies represented a 
counter example, because here social and p o l i t i c a l demands are 
intertwined ( i b i d . , 260). He thus adopted his model of new social 
movements, i n which "movements are action systesns operating i n a 
systematic f i e l d of p o s s i b i l i t i e s and constraints" (Melucci, 1984, 
821), t o the n a t i o n a l i s t movements by combining the "social movement 
dimension" w i t h s t r u c t u r a l factors such as economic development, 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n , etc. (Melucci, 1983, 
63) . 
I t therefore appears t h a t the new social movements approach does not 
provide r a d i c a l l y new insights f o r students of n a t i o n a l i s t 
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movements. However, the value of Melucci's and Touraine's work i s 
t h a t they point out the p o l i t i c a l focus of n a t i o n a l i s t movements, 
which has widened w i t h the increased relevance of the state, w i t h 
respect t o both c i v i l society and economy. Secondly, they appreciate 
t h a t every movement involves a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t groups and 
agents, and can therefore not be regarded as a monolithic force. 
Relationships between these agents and groups are very important t o 
the understanding of n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
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See i n p a r t i c u l a r Tourame, 1985. 
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These ideas are discussed f u r t h e r i n the t h i r d section, where the 
framework of analysis i s presented. Before summing up the lessons 
learned from the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e , a few studies must be 
mentioned which compare recent Catalan and Scottish nationalism. 
2.5 Ocanparisons of Catalan and Scottish nationalism 
Among the academic studies conparing Scottish and Catalan 
nationalism, Moreno's doctoral thesis i s the most extensive piece. 
His research objective was "to analyse and evaluate the approaches 
t o p o l i t i c a l decentralisation i n B r i t a i n and Spain, more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y i n Scotland and Catalonia, and t o postulate future 
scenarios, according t o t h e i r p o l i t i c a l d e s i r a b i l i t y " (Moreno, 1986, 
9) . A f t e r i d e n t i f y i n g three "necessary and s u f f i c i e n t " preconditions 
f o r the emergence of n a t i o n a l i s t or r e g i o n a l i s t movements 
(national/regional consciousness, centre - periphery dichotomy, and 
s o c i a l mobilisation and p o l i t i c a l organisation) ( i b i d . , 75), present 
i n both cases, he goes on t o o u t l i n e (party-) p o l i t i c a l strategies 
of accommodating n a t i o n a l i s t demands f o r autonomy w i t h i n the 
e x i s t i n g state boundaries. Why these preconditions are s u f f i c i e n t , 
and how they r e l a t e t o each other i s not analysed. The 
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centre-periphery dichotomy i s mainly defined i n economic terms i n 
the cases of Catalonia and Scotlard, although Moreno claims t h a t 
deprivation or grievance are not necessary elements of regionalism 
and nationalism. According t o h i s model (Moreno, 1986, 63), the only 
required s t r u c t u r a l elements are c u l t u r a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l 
s p a t i a l differences and a national/regional i d e n t i t y . This makes i t 
d i f f i c u l t t o understand v^y and when social and p o l i t i c a l 
m obilisation takes place. 
But the objective of Moreno's work i s not t o explain the emergence 
of the n a t i o n a l i s t movements, but t o discuss the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and 
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Moreno distinguishes between r e l a t i v e deprivation i n Scotland and 
coiiparative grievance i n Catalonia, which reinforce national i d e n t i t i e s 
and i n t e r - r e g i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s (Moreno, 1986, 63). 
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p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s a r i s i n g from them, and the ways t o solve them. 
He therefore looked a t the (party-) p o l i t i c a l processes i n the 
1970's leading up t o the referenda, and argued t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
d i v i s i o n s between the Labour Party and the "utopian" separatist aims 
of the Scottish Nationalists were the most irtportant irtpediments t o 
Scottish devolution; i n contrast, Catalan demands f o r autonomy 
succeeded because they were moderate and based on consensus policy, 
t o vdiich the central state had t o give i n ( i b i d . , 139 f f . and 156 
f f . ) . I n h i s l a s t chapter, v*iere Moreno speculates on the future 
developments i n Scotland and Catalonia, he advocates a cross-party 
assembly under the leadership of the Labour Party as a "preferable" 
path towards Scottish devolution. I n the case of Catalonia, he takes 
the l i n e of the Catalan S o c i a l i s t s who want a federal solution 
( i b i d . , 356). I n these p o l i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s , which define the 
p o l i t i c a l rather narrowly i n terms of p o l i t i c a l parties, i t i s not 
clear what makes t h i s type of self-government worth s t r i v i n g f o r , 
who s t r i v e s f o r i t and f o r v^at reasons. I n absence of any mention 
of s o c i a l class i n t e r e s t s , Moreno's thesis seems t o rest on the 
assuirption t h a t regional self-government i s a way of saving the 
democratic and social i n t e g r i t y of the Spanish and B r i t i s h 
nation-states. But are corporatism, centralism and uniformisation 
r e a l l y outdated now, and does regional self-government, as i n the 
Catalan case, r e a l l y bring a fundamental change i n government? 
A West-German study of " r e g i o n a l i s t movements" goes a step further 
and asked v>*iether and t o what extent p o s t i n d u s t r i a l values could 
account f o r the resurgence of regionalism. Kreckel e t a l . define as 
p o s t i n d u s t r i a l those societies which have s a t i s f i e d t o a large 
extent material needs (which cause class c o n f l i c t ) ; instead, new 
s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l needs give r i s e t o new forms of 
p o l i t i c a l movements t h a t no longer f i t i n t o the o l d categories of 
class c o n f l i c t . These new values and needs include the demand f o r 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , which, the authors believe, has given r e g i o n a l i s t 
movements new force and a p o s t i n d u s t r i a l perspective (Kreckel et. 
a l . , 1984, 68-79). The researchers conpared Catalonia, Occitania 
and Scotland, and found t h a t the more f o r c e f u l movements of Scotland 
and Catalonia were based mainly on i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t values 
( i b i d . , 454) and h i s t o r i c a l nationalism. They concluded t h a t "the 
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time has not yet come f o r a po s t - i n d u s t r i a l (...) regionalism" 
( i b i d . , 459) . This refutes not only t h e i r own hypothesis, but also 
Melucci's idea t h a t nationalism today i s a po s t - i n d u s t r i a l 
phenomenon (see p. 59 above). 
However, the i n t e r e s t of Kreckel e t al.'s research l i e s i n t h e i r 
consideration of changes of p o l i t i c a l and social objectives i n 
movements viddh are based on t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t y . Although these 
changes were rather less dramatic than they expected, there has 
doubtless been a modification of class-based p o l i t i c s i n advanced 
c a p i t a l i s t societies \*iich i s also r e f l e c t e d t o some extent i n 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements. Chapter f i v e looks a t these processes i n the 
context of the growth of tl i e state, and argues t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements t o some extent r e f l e c t the increasing c o n f l i c t s between 
state and c i v i l society v^iich r e s u l t from t h i s growth. 
F i n a l l y , Jack Brand's paper (1985) looks a t the application of 
Hechter's explanatory model of i n t e r n a l colonialism t o Scottish and 
Catalan nationalism. Hechter's general model, from which the author 
himself retracted on several occasions (Hechter, 1975; 1978; Levi 
and Hechter, 1985, 130-131), hinges on the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 
economic discrimination of peripheral regions w i t h d i s t i n c t i v e 
c u l t u r a l t r a i t s . Although i t i s widely assumed th a t a sense of 
economic discrimination does contribute t o p o l i t i c a l nationalism i n 
Catalonia and Scotland (eg. Moreno, 1986, 8; Kendrick, 1983, 
124-125) ; see Chapter three i n t h i s t h e s i s ) , Brand showed th a t i t i s 
not easy t o make a case f o r discrimination i n eit h e r s i t u a t i o n . 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , Catalonia and Scotland were " r i c h , strong economies 
when modem nationalism was f i r s t expressed" (Brand, 1985, 277) -
i.e . i n the l a s t century - . Subsequently, they have come t o occupy 
d i f f e r e n t positions i n the c a p i t a l i s t economic system ( i b i d . , 292), 
a f a c t which demonstrates t h a t objective economic discrimination i s 
neither an in e v i t a b l e nor a necessary precondition f o r p o l i t i c a l 
nationalism. Brand therefore turned t o d i s t i n c t i v e popular culture 
as a mobilising force, but f a i l e d t o explain the mechanism, the 
d i f f e r e n t character and degree of the influence of culture on both 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
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2.6 Lessons fitan the literature review 
Looking back on a considerable v a r i e t y of research on contenporary 
sub-state nationalism, and on nationalism i n general, i t i s clear 
t h a t there are no s a t i s f a c t o r y answers t o the questions surrounding 
the upsurge of n a t i o n a l i s t movements. Attenpts t o formulate a theory 
which i s applicable t o a wide range of n a t i o n a l i s t movements have 
f a i l e d . However, we owe them many inportant insights, which w i l l be 
b r i e f l y summarised below. 
Analyses based on modernisation theory argue t h a t the development of 
nationalism i n i n d u s t r i a l bureaucratic societies i s due t o s p e c i f i c 
material conditions and socio-economic structures. I n the case of 
sub-state n a t i o n a l i s t movements, the unevenness of c a p i t a l i s t 
development and the r e s u l t i n g d i s p a r i t i e s i n wealth, opportunities, 
l i v i n g standards, c u l t u r a l values etc. are u l t i m a t e l y held 
responsible f o r n a t i o n a l i s t demands. This thesis shares the view 
t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t movements are best analysed from a m a t e r i a l i s t 
perspective, but does not single out economic and social structures 
as the most inportant determinants. I t c r i t i c i s e s marxist approaches 
f o r u n c r i t i c a l l y accepting much of the instrumental ism and economic 
determinism of c l a s s i c a l marxist theory, v^ich looked at n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements mainly i n terms of class interests. Although i t i s 
inportant t o look at the social class conposition of n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements and t o f i n d out v^ich social class i s posed t o benefit 
from n a t i o n a l i s t demands, i t i s obvious t h a t i n contenporary 
c a p i t a l i s t societies, sub-state nationalism cannot be simply viewed 
as a l o c a l v a r i a t i o n of class struggle. 
Also, marxist and modernisation approaches have great d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of r e l a t i n g s t r u c t u r a l factors t o the p o l i t i c a l processes of 
n a t i o n a l i s t mobilisation, and of accounting f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t 
agents, which cannot easily be defined i n class terms. New social 
movement approaches focus on social processes and r e l a t i o n s (rather 
than structures) and therefore permit a more f l e x i b l e and dynamic 
analysis of p o l i t i c a l action. They point out t h a t other c o n f l i c t s , 
such as those between c i v i l society and the state, have became very 
inportant i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t societies. This point i s 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l t o t h e a n a l y s i s o f n a t i o n a l i s m , because i t can 
shed l i g h t on t h e r o l e o f t h e s t a t e , and on t h e c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s o f c i v i l s o c i e t y v ^ i i c h occupy a c e n t r a l place i n 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
What, then, are t h e requirements f o r a conparative study o f 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements? F i r s t l y , i t must avo i d narrow, monocausal 
models o f e x p l a n a t i o n . Secondly, a h i s t o r i c a l approach should be 
taken, because today's n a t i o n a l i s t movements are t o some ex t e n t 
c o n d i t i o n e d by t h e i r predecessors, i d e o l o g i c a l l y as w e l l as 
m a t e r i a l l y . T h i s should n o t p r e j u d i c e a thorough e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e 
changes i n Catalan and S c o t t i s h s o c i e t i e s i n t h e post-war era v ^ i c h 
r e l a t e t o more fundamental processes, and u n d e r l i e t h e r i s e o f 
n a t i o n a l i s m i n i t s s p e c i f i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n . T h i r d l y , t h e enphasis 
should be on r e l a t i o n s h i p s , between d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l f o r c e s , 
s t r u c t u r a l f a c t o r s as w e l l as c o n t i n g e n t developments. Johnston e t . 
a l . suggest t h a t 
" [ i ] f we wish t o achieve a more c o n t e x t u a l l y and 
h i s t o r i c a l l y r o o t e d understanding o f n a t i o n a l i s m , we s h a l l 
have t o undertake an a n a l y s i s t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s t a t e and c i v i l s o c i e t y ( n a t i o n a l 
and r e g i o n a l ) , t h e economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n these s o c i e t i e s have undergone, t h e d i f f e r e n t 
responses o f s o c i a l classes and groups t o these changes, and 
f i n a l l y , t h e i n t e r n a l geographical d i v i s i o n s o f t h e 
t e r r i t o r y claiji:ied by n a t i o n a l i s t movements. I t i s o n l y w i t h 
a rounded understcinding o f n a t i o n a l i s m t h a t we can 
a p p r e c i a t e t h a t n a t i o n a l i s m i s n o t an i n e v i t a b l e s t r a t e g y , 
b u t r a t h e r t h a t i t emerges as one amongst p o s s i b l e 
t e r r i t o r i a l and p o l i t i c a l responses t o a changing w o r l d . " 
(Johnston e t . a l . . 1988, 12) 
Sketching o u t what k i n d s o f s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i e s can be 
employed t o reach such a "rounded understanding", i s t h e t o p i c o f 
t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . 
(Chapter one) (64) 
3. A FRAMEW3RK OF ANALYSIS 
3.1 History, s t r u c t i i r e s and agency 
I n o r d e r t o study t h e causal and c o n t i n g e n t processes v ^ i c h h e l p t o 
e j i p l a i n t h e resiorgence o f n a t i o n a l i s t movenients i n Catalonia and 
Scotland i n t h e 1960's and 1970's, a framework o f a n a l y s i s i s needed 
v ^ i c h f u l f i l s s e v e r a l requireiiients. I t nuist be f l e x i b l e enough t o 
i n c o r p o r a t e t h e s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s encountered between 
Ca t a l o n i a and Scotland. For exanple, Catalan n a t i o n a l i s m d u r i n g t h e 
r e p r e s s i v e Franco d i c t a t o r s h i p was expressed i n c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s 
r a t h e r t h a n e x p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s . I n Scotland, 
economic grievances and hopes f o r s o c i a l and economic progress 
played a more important r o l e i n t h e r i s e o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. Although d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r n a t i o n a l i s m can be 
i d e n t i f i e d , these are by no means permanent. Even over a decade t h e 
balance o f f a c t o r s can change. The experience o f t h e 1980's shows 
t h a t S c o t t i s h n a t i o n a l i s m i s a f f e c t e d by a c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l i n 
Scotland and by i n p o r t a n t changes i n t h e B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , 
w h i l e t h e economic f a c t o r s , which were p r e v i o u s l y thought t o be 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r n a t i o n a l i s m , no longer assume a c e n t r a l r o l e . 
Secondly, h i s t o r y must be g i v e n a prominent place i n t h e framework. 
I t i s i r r p o r t a n t t o recognise t h a t past experiences weigh h e a v i l y on 
people's consciousness i n general, and sub-state n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements i n p a r t i c u l a r . T his i s e q u a l l y t r u e f o r dominant s t a t e 
n a t i o n a l i s m , because t h e dominant c u l t u r e has f a r g r e a t e r 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r p u t t i n g i t s view o f h i s t o r y and i t s v e r s i o n o f 
n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y across (C.H. W i l l i a m s , 1988, 203). However, Debray 
noted t h a t 
" [ a ] human bei n g i s t h e sum o f many t e r r i t o r i e s and groups, 
compressed t o g e t h e r . The most powerful i s g e n e r a l l y t h e 
deepest seated: o f two forms o f a l l e g i a n c e , t h e more 
r e c e n t l y a cquired w i l l be t h e weaker." 
(Debray, 1984, 18) 
The d e s i r e t o belong t o a t e r r i t o r y and a group has not vanished i n 
t h e wake o f economic u n i f i c a t i o n and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n \4iich 
(Chapter one) (65) 
c h a r a c t e r i s e t h e w o r l d i n t h e l a t e 20th century. " I t i s " , claimed 
Debray, "as i f every mechanism f o r c u t t i n g people o f f from t h e i r 
r o o t s r e l eased another one f o r r e d i s c o v e r i n g r o o t s , p h y s i c a l l y o r 
s y m b o l i c a l l y , as i f t h e v e r t i g o caused by sensory d e p r i v a t i o n were 
everywhere s t i m u l a t i n g a panic s t r i c k e n f l i g h t i n t o the past" 
(Debray, 1984, 18). 
T h i r d l y , p o l i t i c a l agency i s c r u c i a l i n c o n v e r t i n g n a t i o n a l 
consciousness i n t o a p o l i t i c a l movement. T h i s poses questions about 
t h e r o l e o f p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p , and o f s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s i n , 
ar d t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f , t h e movements i n question. I n each 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement, i n d i v i d u a l s , s o c i a l groups and i n s t i t u t i o n s 
make p o l i t i c a l choices according t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s under vAiich they 
are o p e r a t i n g and which i n f l u e n c e t h e i r a c t i o n . This was a l s o 
recognised by Johnston e t a l . : 
"The p r e e x i s t i n g c u l t u r a l mosaic s u p p l i e s t h e resource upon 
which n a t i o n a l i s t movements are based, b u t when and v^ere, 
and f o r v i i a t reasons, such resources w i l l be drawn upon t o 
promote n a t i o n a l i s m and i t s corresponding p o l i t i c a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n are determined by i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e 
a c t i o n , as w e l l as t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e , s o c i e t y 
and t e r r i t o r y . " 
(Johnston e t a l . , 1988, 13) 
The exact n a t u r e o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t a t e , s o c i e t y and 
t e r r i t o r y i s d i f f e r e n t i n each c a p i t a l i s t country, and i t i s 
i i t p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h general tendencies o f change from s p e c i f i c 
h i s t o r i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s . Also, t h e connection between such s t r u c t u r a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s and p o l i t i c a l events such as n a t i o n a l i s t a c t i o n s i s 
complex and dependent on p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, i f we accept t h a t 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n forms p a r t o f t h e f a b r i c o f c i v i l s o c i e t y . The 
success o f a sub-state n a t i o n a l i s t movement depends on t h e a b i l i t y 
o f d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l groups t o form a l l i a n c e s , which i n 
t u r n depends on t h e i r r o l e i n c i v i l s o c i e t y and on s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c 
c o n d i t i o n s . I t i s t h e r e f o r e important t o analyse why, and t o see 
v\tiat k i n d s o f a l l i a n c e s are formed i n support o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t 
cause. The answers t o these questions shed l i g h t on t h e d i v e r s e 
outcome o f t h e referenda on self-government i n 1979: t h e Catalans' 
achievement o f autonomy and t h e Scots' f a i l u r e t o achieve 
d e v o l u t i o n . 
(Chapter one) (66) 
The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n suggests t h a t t h e Gramscian concepts o f s t a t e 
and c i v i l s o c i e t y can be employed t o explore t h e causal processes 
a f f e c t i n g t h e n a t i o n a l i s t movements w h i l e a v o i d i n g s t r u c t u r a l 
d e t e r m i n i s t e x p l a n a t i o n s . 
3.2 Superstructures; State and c i v i l society 
An approach, which i s on t h e one hand aware o f u n d e r l y i n g f a c t o r s 
and long-term processes s t r u c t u r i n g t h e s o c i e t y , c u l t u r e and 
i d e n t i t y o f a sub-state n a t i o n , vvhile on t h e o t h e r i t i s able t o 
focus on a c t i o n s o f s p e c i f i c groups o r agents a t c e r t a i n p o i n t s i n 
t i m e w i t h o u t t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n a l l a c t i o n s i n terms o f t h e f a c t o r s 
and s t r u c t u r e s , p o i n t s towards ideas developed by Gramsci, f o r two 
reasons. F i r s t l y , because h i s n o t i o n o f c i v i l s o c i e t y f i l l s t h e gap 
between base and s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , w i t h o u t however l o s i n g t h e n o t i o n 
o f s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s . Second, h i s treatment o f s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l 
elements - such as t h e n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r c u l t u r e and i t s 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e organic i n t e l l e c t u a l , hegemony, and t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
b l o c - i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r t h e a n a l y s i s o f n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
^ l i c h draw on c u l t u r e and p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s i n order t o g a i n 
p o l i t i c a l hegemony. 
Gramsci was c r i t i c a l o f t h e t w o f o l d b a s i s - s u p e r s t r u c t u r e theory 
v ^ i i c h , according t o Mouffe, gave r i s e t o m a r x i s t economism^"*". An 
exanple i s t h e L e n i n i s t c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
as being i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e bourgeoisie (see above, s e c t i o n 
2.3). Consciousness, which i s necessary t o a l l p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n , i s , 
however, n o t acquired s i n p l y through belonging t o a s o c i a l c l a s s . 
Rather, s u b j e c t s g a i n t h e i r consciousness through s o c i a l p r a c t i c e , 
which a l s o i n v o l v e s r e p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s : education, r e l i g i o u s 
p r a c t i c e , forming f a m i l i e s , communication l e i s u r e , e t c . . Other types 
^ o u f f e p o i n t e d out t h a t n a r x i s t s ' f a i l u r e t o adequately e x p l a i n 
i d e o l o g y had two main causes, both o f vAiich are embraced by t h e t e r n 
"econctnism". F i r s t l y , s u p e r s t r u c t u r e was thought o f as epiphenomenon o f 
t h e economic base, and secondly, i t was seen as determined by t h e 
p o s i t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t s i n t h e mode o f p r o d u c t i o n (Mouffe, 1979, 170). 
(Chapter one) (67) 
o f group i d e n t i t i e s t h e r e f o r e emerge, i n c l u d i n g those based on 
c u l t u r e and t e r r i t o r y , and they do not have a necessary r e l a t i o n s h i p 
t o an economic c l a s s . However, these i d e n t i t i e s can be seized upon 
by s o c i a l classes i n order t o cement a hegemonic b l o c . 
22 
By x n t r o d u c i n g t h e concept o f hegemony , Gramsci found a way o f 
e j q ) l a i n i n g how a dominant c l a s s can r u l e w i t h t h e consent o f o t h e r 
groups by transcending t h e l i m i t s o f t h e p u r e l y economic i n t e r e s t s 
and i n c o r p o r a t i n g o t h e r types o f i n t e r e s t s shared by o t h e r s o c i a l 
groups (Mouffe, 1979, 180) . This " c r e a t i o n o f a h i g h e r s y n t h e s i s " 
(op. c i t . p p. 184) i s t h e achievement o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s , whose 
t e r r a i n i s c i v i l s o c i e t y . The f o l l o w i n g quote shows how t h e gap 
between economic b a s i s and s u p e r s t r u c t u r e s i s closed: 
"The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s and t h e w o r l d o f 
p r o d u c t i o n i s n o t as d i r e c t as i t i s w i t h t h e fundaniental 
s o c i a l groups b u t i s , i n v a r y i n g degrees, "mediated" by t h e 
y i o l e f a b r i c o f s o c i e t y and by t h e complex o f 
s u p e r s t r u c t u r e s , o f which t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s are, p r e c i s e l y , 
t h e " f u n c t i o n a r i e s " . I t should be p o s s i b l e both t o measure 
t h e "organic q u a l i t y " [ o r g a n i c i t a ] o f t h e v a r i o u s 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s t r a t a and t h e i r degree o f connection w i t h a 
fundamental s o c i a l group, and t o e s t a b l i s h a g r a d a t i o n o f 
t h e i r f u n c t i o n s and o f t h e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e s from t h e bottom 
t o t h e t o p (from t h e s t r x i c t u r a l base upwards). What we can 
do, f o r t h e moment, i s t o f i x two major s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l 
" l e v e l s " : t h e one t h a t can be c a l l e d " c i v i l s o c i e t y " , t h a t 
i s t h e ensemble o f organisms commonly c a l l e d " p r i v a t e " , and 
t h a t o f " p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y " o r "the S t a t e " . These two l e v e l s 
correspond on t h e one hand t o t h e f u n c t i o n o f "hegemony" 
which t h e dominant group exercises throughout s o c i e t y and on 
t h e o t h e r hand t o t h a t o f " d i r e c t domination" o r command 
exe r c i s e d through t h e S t a t e and " j u r i d i c a l " government." 
(Gramsci, 1971, 12) 
22 . . . According t o R. W i l l i a m s , 
"hegemony supposes t h e existence o f something which i s t r u l y 
t o t a l , v ^ i c h i s n o t merely secondary o f s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l , 
l i k e t h e weak sense o f ideology, b u t which i s l i v e d a t such 
depth, v ^ i c h s a t u r a t e s t h e s o c i e t y t o such an e x t e n t , and 
w^ich, as Gramsci p u t i t , even c o n s t i t u t e s t h e l i m i t o f 
caramon sense f o r most people under i t s sway, t h a t i t 
corresponds t o t h e r e a l i t y o f s o c i a l experience v e r y much 
more c l e a r l y than any n o t i o n s d e r i v e d from t h e formula o f 
base and s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " . 
(R. W i l l i a m s , 1973, 8) 
(Chapter one) (68) 
The d i s t i n c t i o n o f se v e r a l s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l l e v e l s , s i m p l i f i e d i n t h e 
a n a l y t i c a l s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e S t a t e and c i v i l s o c i e t y , i s very u s e f u l 
t o t h e study o f n a t i o n a l i s t s t r u g g l e s . These can now be 
concep t u a l i s e d as s t r u g g l e s t a k i n g place i n c i v i l s o c i e t y and 
c o n f r o n t i n g t h e c e n t r a l s t a t e ; as s t r u g g l e s f o r hegemony and 
p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over a t e r r i t o r y i n which a d i s t i n c t i v e s o c i e t y 
has formed over t i m e . I t i s no longer t h e economic sphere which i s 
seen as t h e main b a t t l e f i e l d o f t h e two a n t a g o n i s t i c classes, b u t 
r a t h e r c i v i l s o c i e t y v^ere s t r u g g l e s f o r p o l i t i c a l power take place. 
However, t h e above quote shows t h a t c i v i l s o c i e t y cannot be 
considered as one homogenoiJis u n i t , e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e 
economic b a s i s on t h e one si d e and t h e State on t h e o t h e r . Rather, 
i t should be envisaged as a s e r i e s o f l e v e l s (see f o r example R. 
Wi l l i a m s , 1973, 4-5), w i t h grey zones on e i t h e r s i d e . I n Chapter 
f i v e these "grey zones" w i l l r e c e i v e more a t t e n t i o n . 
The t h r e e f o l d d i v i s i o n between r e l a t i o n s o f pr o d u c t i o n , c i v i l 
s o c i e t y and s t a t e have been seized upon by researchers who are 
t r y i n g t o g e t away from economic reductionism and i d e a l i s t 
e x p l a n a t i o n s o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s w i t h o u t l o s i n g a broad m a r x i s t 
p e r s p e c t i v e on c a p i t a l i s t systems. C i v i l s o c i e t y i s interposed 
between t h e p o l i t i c a l ( s t a t e ) and t h e economic sphere and c o n s i s t s 
o f "heterogeneous r e l a t i o n s " between the v a r i o u s s o c i a l groups; i t 
places v a r i o u s c o n s t r a i n t s on t h e s t a t e (Urry, 1981, 100-102). Urry 
agreed w i t h Gramsci t h a t t h e s t a t e a t t e i t p t s t o e s t a b l i s h hegemony, 
b u t these e f f o r t s "may w e l l e i t h e r strengthen e x i s t i n g forms and 
bases o f r e s i s t a n c e ( . . . ) , o r generate new bases focused around 
popular s t r u g g l e s w i t h i n c i v i l s o c i e t y against t h e s t a t e " ( i b i d . , 
64) . He invoked Laclau's c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n o f s o c i a l classes as 
having no r e a l i t y unless as s t r u g g l e s w i t h i n c i v i l s o c i e t y . These 
s t r u g g l e s are s t r u c t u r e d by t h r e e basic forms, i ) o f c a p i t a l 
23 
accumulation and r e l a t i o n s between c a p i t a l and labou r , i i ) o f 
23 
Although I ^ c l a u f o l l o w s Gramsci's approach t o su p e r s t r u c t u r e s , he 
goes even f u r t h e r i n negating t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f s o c i a l s t r u g g l e s i n 
t h e l a s t i n s t a n c e by t h e econoitr/, whereas Gramsci considers t h e 
fundamental s o c i a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n t o be t h a t between t h e working c l a s s 
(Footnote Continued) 
(Chapter one) (69) 
p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n and s t a t e apparatuses, and i i i ) o f gender, 
age, r a c i a l , r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s w i t h i n c i v i l 
s o c i e t y ( i b i d . , 66). 
Thus, a v a r i e t y o f s o c i a l s t r u g g l e s i s p e r c e i v a b l e , some more and 
some l e s s d i r e c t l y determined by c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d uction. 
I n those s t r u g g l e s v ^ i c h are l e s s d i r e c t l y determined, such as f o r 
exanple r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l s t r u g g l e s , t h e dominant c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
i s n o t between classes, b u t between t h e people and t h e s t a t e . The 
view t h a t human agents engage i n s o c i a l s t r u g g l e as s u b j e c t s , formed 
as such t h r o u g h s o c i a l experience i n c i v i l s o c i e t y , sheds some l i g h t 
on n a t i o n a l i s t movements. C u l t u r e - most n o t a b l y language and 
s p a t i a l and t e r r p o r a l l o c a t i o n are among t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s 
i n f l u e n c i n g t h e f o r m a t i o n o f s u b j e c t s . S o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
s t r u g g l e s can t h e r e f o r e be based no t o n l y on c l a s s consciousness, 
b u t a l s o on c u l t u r a l , o r t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t i e s . 
But a t t h e same time, i t must be recognised t h a t t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , 
c u l t u r e e t c . a r e a l s o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n t h e s t a t e apparatus and 
i n c i v i l s o c i e t y . T e r r i t o r i a l i t y i n p a r t i c u l a r has o f t e n been 
ignored i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l theory, where i t i s i m p l i c i t l y 
assumed t h a t s t a t e s , " n a t i o n a l " and " i n t e r n a t i o n a l " economies and 
c i v i l s o c i e t i e s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y p l a c e l e s s . I n conterrporary s o c i a l 
t h e o r y , however, "a f a r - r e a c h i n g and t r a n s f o r m a t i v e 
r e - t h e o r e t i s a t i o n o f t h e s p a t i a l i t y o f s o c i a l l i f e " has taken place 
" a f t e r n e a r l y a c e n t u r y o f conceptual m y s t i f i c a t i o n and n e g l e c t " 
(Soja, 1985, 176). N a t i o n a l i s t movements, v ^ i c h demand p o l i t i c a l 
c o n t r o l over a s p e c i f i c t e r r i t o r y , h i g h l i g h t t h e inportance o f 
t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i n t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f s t a t e , c i v i l s o c i e t y and 
economy, and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them. Chapter seven looks a t 
t h e t e r r i t o r i a l angle o f these r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and shows how 
t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t y underpins p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e s and c o n t r o l . I t 
l o oks a t t h e reasons v*iy t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s more important t o Catalan 
(Footnote Continued) 
and t h e b o u r g e o i s i e (Laclau and Mouffe, 1984, 66-84). Urry however used 
a p r e v i o u s p u b l i c a t i o n o f Laclau, where he accepted t h e p r i o r i t y o f t h e 
c l a s s s t r u g g l e over t h e popular-democratic s t r u g g l e (Laclau, 1979, 108). 
(Chapter one) (70) 
t h a n t o S c o t t i s h n a t i o n a l i s m by examining t h e i n t e r n a l t e r r i t o r i a l 
and s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s . 
3.3 Na t i o n a l i s m and c u l t u r e ; t h e n o t i o n o f t h e n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r 
The n o t i o n o f t h e n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r , which i n Gramsci's w r i t i n g i s a 
c u l t u r a l concept r e f e r r i n g t o t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e masses w i t h i n t h e 
c u l t u r e o f t h e n a t i o n (Gramsci, 1971, 421, f o o t n o t e 65), plays a key 
r o l e i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f hegemony. The term embraces popular 
c u l t u r e , common sense, t r a d i t i o n s and popular h i s t o r y , and t h e 
f e e l i n g s o f common people. Gramsci b e l i e v e d t h a t hegemony was only 
maintained when t h e dominant classes overcame t h e i r narrow economic 
i n t e r e s t s and adopted n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r values which would secure 
them t h e a c t i v e consent o f o t h e r s o c i a l groups. Since t h e 
n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r i s a sedimentation o f everyday e j ^ r i e n c e , o f l i v e d 
meanings and values, i t has no necessary c l a s s contents, and Ccin be 
claimed by anyone. 
T h i s i s a l s o an i n p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y . I f B. 
Anderson noted t h a t t h e r e are no g r e a t n a t i o n a l i s t i d e o l o g i s t s as 
t h e r e are g r e a t m a r x i s t s , l i b e r a l t h i n k e r s e t c . (B. Anderson, 1983, 
14), then one reason i s s u r e l y t h a t n a t i o n a l i s m draws on 
n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r values. I n order f o r n a t i o n a l i s m t o have popixLar 
appeal, i t must i n c o r p o r a t e n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r elements and p o l i t i c a l 
a n a l y s i s a t t h e same time. A sub-state n a t i o n a l i s t movement has t o 
c o n f r o n t t h e dominant c u l t u r e and hegemony w i t h i t s "own" c u l t u r e , 
v^^ich i s dominant i n i t s t e r r i t o r y . I t i s t h e r e f o r e o f t e n t h e 
popular c u l t i a r a l elements which are claimed by t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s . 
F o l k l o r e , popular language, p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , codes o f 
behaviour, " n a t i o n a l " poets and w r i t e r s e t c . are c r u c i a l t o 
n a t i o n a l i s m . The h i g h p r o f i l e i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements o f 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n t h e wider sense accounts f o r t h e inportance o f t h e 
c u l t u r a l content. Gramsci p o i n t e d o u t t h a t w i t h o u t t h e i n t i m t e , 
o r g a n i c l i n k a g e between t h e popular masses viho " f e e l " and t h e 
understanding and "knowledge" o f t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s , no p o l i t i c s o r 
h i s t o r y i s p o s s i b l e (Gramsci, 1983, 93-94). This i s a l s o t r u e f o r 
(Chapter one) (71) 
n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c s , which cannot succeed as a s t r a t e g y cooked up 
by a group o f bureaucrats o r i n t e l l e c t u a l s . 
For example, S c o t t i s h n a t i o n a l i s m i n t h e 1920's could be described 
as such a movement which e s s e n t i a l l y lacked a n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r 
b a s i s , and was r e s t r i c t e d t o v e r y small i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s . 
Despite a r i c h t r a d i t i o n o f f o l k l o r e and o f famous t h i n k e r s and 
i n v e n t o r s , S c o t t i s h n a t i o n a l i s m has a t present not g o t a s t r o n g 
c u l t u r a l coitponent. I n Catalan n a t i o n a l i s m , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e 
n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r c u l t u r e has been important a t l e a s t since t h e 
l a t e - 1 9 t h centiary. I t s b a s i c m a n i f e s t a t i o n i s t h e Catalan language, 
spoken by t h e m a j o r i t y and adopted by a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t o f t h e 
people \Aio immigrated over many decades. 
Far from being p u r e l y i d e o l o g i c a l concepts, hegemony and t h e 
n a t i o n a l - p o p u l a r are s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s and inc a r n a t e d i n m a t e r i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . T his makes i t p o s s i b l e t o analyse how t h e s p e c i f i c 
c u l t u r e which a n a t i o n a l movement inc o r p o r a t e s i s c o n s t i t u t e d . I n 
Chapter s i x , a s e l e c t i o n o f t h e most r e l e v a n t i n s t i t u t i o n s and 
s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s i s t a c k l e d . 
3.4 Relations of production and c i v i l society 
I n s e c t i o n 3.2 above, t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e Gramscian view on s o c i a l 
s t r u g g l e s concentrated on c i v i l s o c i e t y and t h e s t a t e , v ^ i l e t h e 
r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n were ignored. I t was shown t h a t contemporary 
w r i t e r s i n Gramsci's f o o t s t e p s envisage s o c i a l s t r u g g l e s which are 
v i r t u a l l y independent from t h e economic sphere. Although t h i s might 
h e l p t o g e t away from economist conceptions o f n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
(v* i i c h t e n d t o d e f i n e them i n terms o f c l a s s i n t e r e s t ) , i t would be 
f o o l i s h t o separate n a t i o n a l i s t s t r u g g l e from s o c i a l c l a s s and t h e 
r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n . A f t e r a l l , t h e c i v i l s o c i e t i e s o f Catalonia 
and Scotland are based on s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s o f productions V\^ich 
are - o r have been - c h a r B c t e r i s t i c t o these s o c i e t i e s . The 
h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e i s i i r p o r t a n t here, because t h e r e are 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s i n a l l c i v i l s o c i e t i e s t h a t have 
(Chapter one) (72) 
t h e i r r o o t s i n economic s t r u c t u r e s v ^ i c h have been transformed 
s i n c e . 
Secondly, c o n c e i v i n g o f n a t i o n a l i s t s t r u g g l e s as popular s t r u g g l e s 
i s t o o vague and appears t o present them as homogeneous and 
b e n e f i c i a l t o a l l people. N a t i o n a l i s t movements are o f t e n f o r c e d t o 
d e f i n e economic and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s , where i t i s i n p o s s i b l e t o 
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b e n e f i t everyone , and then, t h e dominant s o c i a l classes i n t h e 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement decide i n whose i n t e r e s t these p o l i c i e s are. 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements which are based on a broad 
consensus and an agenda o f narrowly d e f i n e d n a t i o n a l autononr/, i t i s 
v e r y l i k e l y t h a t t h e newly autonomous u n i t w i l l be governed by t h a t 
s o c i a l c l a s s which was hegenranic before. I n Catalonia, t h i s i s t h e 
case s i n c e autonomy has been granted. 
T h i r d l y , i n many instances, economic grievances which are conceived 
w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n a l framework i n f l u e n c e t h e support, o u t l o o k and t h e 
s o c i a l composition o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t movements. This i s 
w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e S c o t t i s h case. Foster and Woolfson argued 
t h a t s t r u g g l e s a g a i n s t p l a n t c l o s u r e s i n Scotland were broadly 
supported by t h e n a t i o n a l community, and f e d i n t o t h e n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 389; Woolfson and Foster, 1988, 
90-93; see a l s o Sadler, 1985, 190-271). The i n c r e a s i n g support f o r 
self-government by t h e S c o t t i s h TUC a l s o t e s t i f i e s t o t h i s . Economic 
s t r u g g l e s t a k e on n a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n Scotland because o f t h e 
post-war t r a d i t i o n o f economic planning. The s t a t e i s made a t l e a s t 
p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f o r t u n e s o f t h e S c o t t i s h economy 
(Salmond, 1986, 226), and economic s t r u g g l e s t h e r e f o r e take on an 
a d d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l dimension. I n Catalonia, t h i s i s a l s o observed, 
alt h o u g h here t h e p o l i t i c i s a t i o n o f economic s t r u g g l e s d u r i n g t h e 
Franco regime were p r i m a r i l y t h e r e s u l t o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n t o form 
independent unions. 
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The S c o t t i s h N a t i o n a l Party i s a p o i n t i n case. I n t h e 1970's, i t 
saw an o p p o r t u n i t y t o make everybody b e t t e r o f f through North sea o i l 
revenues, and w i t h o u t any fundamental changes i n t h e s o c i a l and economic 
system. The c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h i s p r o j e c t was, however, soon undermined. 
(Chapter one) (73) 
These p o i n t s demonstrate t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t movements are constrained 
by economic s t r u c t u r e s ; however, they are not s i n p l y c l a s s movements 
i n popular d i s g u i s e . I n Chapter t h r e e , t h e relevance o f t h e economic 
dimension t o t h e n a t i o n a l i s t movements i s presented i n more d e t a i l . 
3.5 Outlook 
The framework o f a n a l y s i s presented above i s n o t a new th e o r y o f 
n a t i o n a l i s m which claims u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y . But i t 
conceptualises t h e b a s i c cornerstones o f s t a t e , c i v i l s o c i e t y and 
economy i n a way \ ^ i c h accepts s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them 
w i t h o u t g i v i n g a necessary primacy t o any o f them. N a t i o n a l i s t 
movements are conceived as p o l i t i c a l movements w i t h i n c i v i l s o c i e t y 
which c o n f r o n t t h e s t a t e . 
The next chapters i n v e s t i g a t e these r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e changes v ^ i c h 
t h e y have undergone, and how they a f f e c t e d t h e n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
i n C a t a l o n i a and Spain. Despite t h e l i n e a r order i n which they 
appear, they do n o t present a one-way chain o f arguments; t h e 
p i c t u r e o f n a t i o n a l i s m they c o n s t r u c t i s m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l . 
Chapter two looks back on t h e past, because n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
j u s t i f y themselves by r e f e r r i n g t o h i s t o r y . I t assesses t h e 
iir p o r t a n c e o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n t h e past, r e l a t e s i t t o 
s p e c i f i c s o c i a l and economic s t r u c t u r e s v\^ich developed i n t h e 
Catalan and t h e S c o t t i s h c i v i l s o c i e t i e s . Chapter t h r e e explores t h e 
developments i n t h e economic sphere i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e n a t i o n a l i s t 
r e v i v a l i n t h e 1960's and 1970's i n order t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e 
economic dimension o f sub-state n a t i o n a l i s m . I n Chapter f o u r , i t i s 
argued t h a t t h e responses o f d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l classes t o economic 
and s o c i a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s a f f e c t e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n towards t h e 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement. A t t h e same time, t h e ways i n vdiich d i f f e r e n t 
s o c i a l c lasses p e r c e i v e d these economic and s o c i a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s 
were mediated by t h e i r n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y . Chapter f i v e deals w i t h 
t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e s t a t e and c i v i l s o c i e t y , v ^ i i c h are c r u c i a l 
b o t h t o t h e causes and t h e form o f n a t i o n a l i s t movements. I t 
concentrates on t h e growth o f s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n and t h e r e s u l t i n g 
(Chapter one) (74) 
problems o f l e g i t i m a t i o n which under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s l e a d t o 
s u b -state n a t i o n a l i s m . However, t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f c i v i l s o c i e t y i s 
an i n p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n these processes, and t h e r e f o r e Chapter s i x 
takes a c l o s e r l o o k a t s e l e c t e d c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o f t h e Catalan 
and S c o t t i s h c i v i l s o c i e t y . I n Catalonia, a network o f i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
v ^ i c h were separate from t h e s t a t e apparatus, p r o v i d e d a b a s i s f o r 
n a t i o n a l i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n , v ^ i l e Scotland's c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
were found t o be more i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e B r i t i s h s t a t e . The 
c u l t u r a l conponent o f S c o t t i s h n a t i o n a l i s m was t h e r e f o r e r a t h e r weak 
i n t h e 1960's and 1970's. Chapter seven contenplates t h e 
t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , o f n a t i o n a l i s t movements. I t p o i n t s o u t t h a t c i v i l 
s o c i e t y , s t a t e and economy are n o t p l a c e l e s s , b u t r a t h e r 
t e r r i t o r i a l l y s t r u c t u r e d , and argues t h a t t h i s fundamentally a f f e c t s 
p o l i t i c a l processes. But even t e r r i t o r i a l i t y does no t p l a y t h e same 
r o l e i n b o t h case s t u d i e s , because s p a t i a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are 
interdependent, and t h e r e f o r e a r t i c u l a t e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways. I n 
Chapter e i g h t , t h e v a r i o u s dimensions o f t h e a n a l y s i s o f Catalan and 
S c o t t i s h n a t i o n a l i s m a r e drawn t o g e t h e r and summarised. 
(Chapter one) (75) 
Chapter two: 
N A T I O N A L I S T M O V E M E N T S AND H I S T O R I C A L C O N T E X T 
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I n t h e preceding chapter, i t was argued t h a t conterrporary 
n a t i o n a l i s m i n C a t a l o n i a and Scotland has h i s t o r i c a l r o o t s . H i s t o r y 
p r o v i d e s t h e symbols o f n a t i o n a l i s m and t h e terms i n v t i i c h 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements are d e f i n e d , and t o make sense o f n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s a h i s t o r i c a l approach. I h i s a l s o helps 
t o e x p l a i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f c i v i l s o c i e t y and t h e s t a t e , v ^ c h are 
a t t h e c e n t r e o f n a t i o n a l i s t c o n f l i c t s , and accounts f o r t h e 
v a r i a t i o n s and s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s between 
them i n t h e two case s t u d i e s . H i s t o r i c a l approaches above a l l 
acknowledge change and v a r i a b i l i t y (Hobsbawm, 1972, 385-386). 
However, h i s t o r i c a l accounts which h e l p t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e p o l i t i c a l 
and economic c o n t e x t o f n a t i o n a l i s m i n Catalonia and Scotland are 
themselves f a r from unbiased. I h e f i r s t s e c t i o n argues t h a t 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements c o n s t r u c t t h e i r own h i s t o r i c a l framework, 
v ^ i i c h o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t s t h e hegemonic h i s t o r i o g r a p h y o f t h e s t a t e . 
The f o l l o w i n g seven s e c t i o n s use a v a r i e t y o f h i s t o r i c a l accounts t o 
t r a c e t h e development o f n a t i o n a l i s m i n t h e co n t e x t o f 
socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s from t h e l a t e 17th t o t h e 
mid-20th c e n t u r y . W i t h i n t h i s p e r i o d , C a t a l o n i a and Scotland l o s t 
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l independence, became i n t e g r a t e d i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
s t a t e s , and began t o quest i o n - w i t h d i f f e r e n t degrees o f i n t e n s i t y 
- t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n . 
1. INTRDDUCnON: HISTORY OF NATIONALISM AND NRTIONALIST 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
1.1 On the origin of nationalism 
An i n p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n t h e Catalan and S c o t t i s h h i s t o r y o f 
n a t i o n a l i s m i s t h e exis t e n c e o f a h i s t o r y o f n a t i o n a l independence 
(Chapter two) (77) 
t o v ^ i i c h n a t i o n a l i s t movements can refer"*". I n t h e cases o f Scotland 
and C a t a l o n i a , t h i s h i s t o r y o f independence t e r m i n a t e d a t t h e 
beg i n n i n g o f t h e 18th century. Scotland became p a r t o f t h e U n i t e d 
Kingdom w i t h t h e T r e a t y o f Union i n 1707, and Ca t a l o n i a l o s t i t s 
independence i n 1714 as a r e s u l t o f t h e war o f succession. I n both 
cases, a p e r i o d o f government lander a union o f crowns preceded t h e 
p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n ( t h e crowns o f C a s t i l l e and Aragon were u n i t e d 
by marriage i n 1479, and Scotland's and England's crown were u n i t e d 
under James I i n 1603). 
Two t h i n g s must be borne i n mind vtien l o o k i n g a t t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
r o o t s o f n a t i o n a l i s t movements. The f i r s t i s thi a t n a t i o n a l i s m as a 
p o l i t i c a l movement has a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t h i s t o r y . The term 
" n a t i o n a l " i n t h e p o l i t i c a l sense emerged as conceptions o f s o c i e t y 
and p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n changed w i t h t h e French r e v o l u t i o n ^ . 
When independence was l o s t i n Scotland and Cata l o n i a , t h e r e was no 
organised n a t i o n a l i s t movement f i g h t i n g t o r e g a i n sovereignty. T h i s 
i s e x p l a i n e d by t h e f a c t t h a t a t t h e beginning o f t h e 18th century, 
t h e p o p u l a r p e r c e p t i o n o f n a t i o n a l independence was n o t developed, 
and t h e r e f o r e , n a t i o n a l i s m d i d n o t e x i s t . The moving f o r c e s i n those 
days were s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d t o a s m a l l e l i t e w h i l e t h e masses below 
"Hvalter Benjamin's "angel o f h i s t o r y " ; N a i r n , 1977, 359; B. 
Anderson, 1983, 141. 
2 
I t i s w o r t h w h i l e t o quote Lukacs here, whose concise d e s c r i p t i o n 
o f t h e economic and h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f post-1789 n a t i o n a l i s m i s 
based on t h e premise t h a t a fundamental change had taken place i n 
pop u l a r conception o f "the n a t i o n a l " : 
" I t i s i n t h e n a t u r e o f a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n t h a t , i f 
s e r i o u s l y c a r r i e d through t o i t s c o n c l u s i o n , t h e n a t i o n a l 
idea becomes t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e broadest masses. I n France 
i t was o n l y as a r e s u l t o f t h e Re v o l u t i o n and Napoleonic 
r u l e t h a t a f e e l i n g o f nationhood became t h e experience and 
p r o p e r t y o f t h e peasantry, t h e lower s t r a t a o f t h e p e t t y 
b o u r g e o i s i e and so on. For t h e f i r s t t ime they experienced 
France as t h e i r own country, as t h e i r s e l f - c r e a t e d 
motherland. But t h e awakening o f n a t i o n a l s e n s i b i l i t y and 
w i t h i t a f e e l i n g and understanding f o r n a t i o n a l h i s t o r y 
occurs n o t o n l y i n France. The Napoleonic wars everywhere 
evoked a wave o f n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g , o f n a t i o n a l r e s i s t a n c e to 
t h e Napoleonic conquests, an experience o f enthusiasm f o r 
n a t i o n a l independence". (Dukacs, 1962, 22-23). 
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were passive r e c e i v e r s o f modernisation, p o l i t i c a l change and 
c u l t u r a l enlightenment. But as N a i r n noted, t h i s was not a t a l l 
unusual. Not u n t i l t h e French Revolution i n 1789 t e r r i t o r i a l 
i d e n t i t y connected w i t h mass p o l i t i c s and democracy; before, i t was 
n o t uncommon f o r an o l d n a t i o n t o be governed by a f o r e i g n and 
d i s t a n t r u l e r (Nairn, 1977, 137). A n a t i o n a l i s t r e a c t i o n t o t h e l o s s 
o f s o v e r e i g n t y i n Scotland and Catalonia would have r e q u i r e d a 
d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l consciousness, o f a t y p e v ^ c h c o u l d o n l y come 
i n t o e x i s t e n c e a f t e r 1789. Therefore, t h e b e n e f i t s o r disadvantages 
from t h e l o s s o f independence mainly concerned t h e r u l i n g c l a s s , and 
manifested themselves i n t h e economic sphere, and n o t i n a p o l i t i c a l 
3 
movement. I t i s o n l y i n 19th century t h a t powerful n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements emerged i n Europe, even then, Scotland and Catalonia were 
" l a t e developers" conpared t o o t h e r European n a t i o n s . 
Ihese n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n e v i t a b l y conveyed a sense and an 
ejqDerience o f h i s t o r y t o t h e broad masses. The c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e t o 
t h e a h i s t o r i c a l v i s i o n s o f human progress c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e 
Enlightenment was t h a t now, man was recognised as t h e moving f o r c e 
i n h i s t o r y . For Lukacs, t h e connection between n a t i o n a l i s m and 
h i s t o r y i n t h a t p e r i o d was very c l e a r : 
"The appeal t o n a t i o n a l independence and n a t i o n a l c h a r a cter 
i s n e c e s s a r i l y connected w i t h a reawakening o f n a t i o n a l 
h i s t o r y , w i t h memories o f t h e past, o f past greatness, o f 
moments o f n a t i o n a l dishonour, whether t h i s r e s u l t s i n a 
p r o g r e s s i v e o r r e a c t i o n a r y ideology." 
(mkacs, 1962, 23) 
However, t h e n a t i o n a l past evoked by n a t i o n a l i s t movements i s o f t e n 
s i t u a t e d i n t h e p r e - n a t i o n a l i s t era. I n t h e cases o f Scotland and 
C a t a l o n i a , t h e p r e - l 8 t h h i s t o r y i n s p i r e d demands f o r self-government 
because i t served as l e g i t i m a t i o n o f these demands. Anderson c a l l e d 
t h i s " s u b j e c t i v e a n t i q u i t y " o f n a t i o n s i n t h e eyes o f n a t i o n a l i s t s 
v^o are o b j e c t i v e l y s i t u a t e d i n modernity one o f t h e paradoxes o f 
•^ The term " n a t i o n a l i s m " d i d not come i n t o general use u n t i l t h e end 
o f t h e 19th c e n t u r y , as B. Anderson remarked i n a f o o t n o t e o f h i s book 
(B. Anderson, 1983, 14). 
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nationalism (B. Anderson, 1983, 14). This leads t o the ideological 
function of h i s t o r y i n nationalism, because historiography-
l e g i t imises p o l i t i c a l demands and power structures. I n the struggle 
between c e n t r a l state and sub-state a n a t i o n a l i s t movement, the 
l a t t e r has t o create i t s version of h i s t o r y i n order t o ccmbat the 
dominant state-centred perspective (C. H. Williams, 1988, 203-204). 
Co n t r o l l i n g a people's h i s t o r y i s the f i r s t step t o maintaining 
power over the people i t s e l f . Advocating an a l t e r n a t i v e view on 
national h i s t o r y i s one precondition f o r contesting p o l i t i c a l 
c o n t r o l . The fol l o w i n g section demonstrates how h i s t o r y i s used f o r 
l e g i t i m a t i o n of nationalism i n Catalonia and Scotland. 
1.2 Contesting dominant historiographv i n Scxjtland and Catalonia 
I n Scotland, few i n t e l l e c t u a l s have interpreted h i s t o r y from a 
n a t i o n a l i s t perspective. Tumbull and Beveridge examined some 
h i s t o r y t e x t s on Scotland t o demonstrate how anglicised the 
dominant i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Scottish h i s t o r y was. They found t h a t 
the "stagnant, dark age, barbaric" pre-union past was contrasted 
w i t h the "enlightened, progressive, modem" post-union developments 
under English influence. This kind of historiography, they argued, 
"functions t o discourage i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with a past, or, i n other 
words, t o e f f e c t a rupture between a nation's present and i t s past" 
(Tumbull and Beveridge, 1986, 42). This i s also r e f l e c t e d i n the 
navels of the 19th and early 20th century, because both 
historiography and narrative i n a novel require a f e e l i n g of change, 
a f e e l i n g " t hat h i s t o r y i s not j u s t the account of the events of the 
past but the process which accounts f o r the events of the past" 
(Craig, 1982, 8). Craig found t h a t i n the romantic novels of Walter 
Scott, an idealised v i s i o n of the Scottish past i s disconnected from 
the seemingly hist o r y - l e s s present; t h i s reproduces the same lack of 
4 
Among others, they included i n t h e i r study Smout's History of the 
Scottish People (1970), H. G. Graham's The Social L i f e of Scotland i n 
the Eighteenth Century (1889) and H. T. Buckle's History of C i v i l i s a t i o n 
i n England, v o l . I l l (1861). 
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cx3ntinuity which Tumbull and Beveridge saw i n Scottish history 
t e x t s . 
I n Scottish schools, Scottish h i s t o r y a f t e r 1707 p r a c t i c a l l y does 
not e x i s t ; rather, i t i s categorised as " B r i t i s h history". A 
Scottish perspective on conteitporary h i s t o r y only developed slowly 
i n the wake of r i s i n g nationalism i n the 1960's, and not i n the 19th 
century as was the case i n Catalonia. I n Scotland, historiographical 
publications experienced a noticeable increase as a r e s u l t of the 
p o l i t i c a l successes of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement a f t e r 1960, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y from the 1970's onwards (Harvie, interview, 4.9.1987; 
Smith, 1989, 11). But i n spite of t h i s recent i n t e r e s t i n Scottish 
perspectives on modem his t o r y , the bulk of Scottish historiography 
i s biased towards mainstream B r i t i s h approaches. 
McDonogh looked a t Catalan elementary school h i s t o r y textbooks i n 
the 1890's \* i i c h r e f l e c t s the s p i r i t of Catalan regionalism and 
established national consciousness by r e f e r r i n g t o a medieval period 
of wealth created by Catalan merchants and financiers. As i n other 
countries, historiography i n the era of Catalan bourgeois hegemony 
was the preserve of scholars and i n t e l l e c t u a l s which - t o use a 
Gramscian term - were the organic i n t e l l e c t u a l s of the bourgeoisie. 
However, i t became the patrimony of the Catalan people as a v^ole 
(Llobera, 1983, 340), and Catalan working class perspectives have 
been added t o t h i s body of national ( i s t ) historiography. 
Periods of national repression are inportant i n understanding how 
n a t i o n a l i s t perspectives of hi s t o r y are constructed. This i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y obvious i n Catalonia v^ere during the Franco period, 
teaching and research on the hi s t o r y of Catalonia was prohibited or 
at least severely r e s t r i c t e d . The Catalan h i s t o r i a n Izard argues 
t h a t a people vjho experience a c o l l e c t i v e awareness of c r i s i s and 
insufferable oppression seeks consolation i n the past and feels the 
need t o reconstruct i t s h i s t o r y (Izard, 1983, 74). Thus, the 
cat a l a n i s t historiography and the ideologies of the 19th century 
play an inportant r o l e i n the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l of the 1960's, 
since during much of the Francoist period i t was d i f f i c u l t t o pursue 
research on Catalan h i s t o r y . 
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There are many testimonies t o the ways i n which Catalan h i s t o r y was 
coirpletely r e w r i t t e n f o r the Francoist education system and became 
integrated i n t o Spanish h i s t o r y . The view t h a t a l l h i s t o r y was now 
the c o l l e c t i v e enterprise of the Spaniards was disseminated i n 
textbooks of p o l i t i c a l formation (McDonogh, 1986, 35), and the 
h i s t o r y of autonoirr/ and regionalism was denigrated. Thus, children 
learned t h a t there existed "bad Spaniard" who denied t h e i r 
fatherland, Spain, and engaged i n the "senseless business of 
demonstrating t h a t t h e i r regions were nations i n t h e i r own r i g h t and 
(constituted) states which were completely independent and d i f f e r e n t 
from Spain" (Burgos y Mazo, quoted by Benet, 1979, 323). I n the face 
of such bl a t a n t Spanish n a t i o n a l i s t indoctrination, historiography 
became a weapon i n the struggle t o maintain a Catalan national 
i d e n t i t y , and served as a means of defining and rebuilding Catalonia 
as a nation ( E l l i o t , 1960, 13). Catalanist historians such as Coll i 
Alentom and Ainaud de lasarte therefore taught Catalan h i s t o r y i n 
p r i v a t e c i r c l e s , and from 1960 onwards p u b l i c l y , t o growing 
audiences (Ainaud de Lasarte, interview, 30.3.1988; Minobis, 1979, 
13) . The most i n f l u e n t i a l Catalan historians i n the 1960's were 
Soldevila and Vicens i Vives, and the Marxist Pierre V i l a r , who had 
a great impact on the Catalan Left, but there were other 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s who wrote about Catalan h i s t o r y ^ . 
Relying on a v a r i e t y of secondary sources which include n a t i o n a l i s t 
perspectives, the following sections of t h i s chapter describe those 
aspects of the h i s t o r y of Catalan and Scottish society v^ich are 
iirportant t o the understanding of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. The next 
section begins by looking a t the s i t u a t i o n of Catalonia and Scotland 
Exairples are the discussion about Sole^Tura's interpretations of 
the hegemony of the Lliga Regionalista between the author and Benet i n 
the j o u r n a l Serra d'Or i n 1968 (Benet, 1968, 39 and Sole-Tura, 1968, 
25) ; a r t i c l e s discussing the h i s t o r y of the Catalan workers' movement 
(Pinol, 1965, 13-15; and Balcells, 1971, 13-16); and the p o l i t i c a l 
developments during the republican era (Coll i Alentom, 1971, 11-12; 
Cruells, 1971, 33; Ardiaca, 1971, 35-36). Serra d'Or played an 
outstanding r o l e i n the mediation of Catalan h i s t o r y , because i t was the 
only jo u r n a l i n Catalan language published under Franco, and strongly 
syupathetic t o Catalan nationalism (see Chapter 6). 
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i n the l a t e 17 t h century, j u s t before they both l o s t t h e i r 
independent parliament. I n Scotland, the union w i t h England came a t 
a p o i n t when the country was divided between the modernising 
Lowlands and the p r e - c a p i t a l i s t Highlands, I n the absence of a 
modem Scottish p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y , the union was established on the 
basis of economic and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . I n the Catalan case, the 
loss of independence was the r e s u l t of a m i l i t a r y defeat. 
2. INDEPENDENT SOOTIAND MJD CAIALDNIA IN THE 17TH CENTURY 
Scottish society was divided i n the 17th century between the 
Lowlands, v ^ i c h were dominated by merchant c a p i t a l and c r a f t s i n the 
burghs, and the Highlands where fe u d a l i s t landlord - tenant 
r e l a t i o n s s t i l l survived (Foster, 1975, 142-144) (Figs. 2 and 3). 
Scottish c a p i t a l i s t development i n the Lowlands was always under 
t h r e a t from Highland uprisings and raids^, and the m i l i t a r y and 
p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e w i t h the English was necessary t o defend the way 
of l i f e i n the Scottish Lowlands and i n England against the 
"barbaric" Highland clans. The pro-union forces came "mainly from 
the bigger landowners and West coast merchants (Vi^ose interests and 
a t t i t u d e s closely matched those of t h e i r English counterparts)" 
(Foster, 1975, p. 147). As the most developed parts of the pre-union 
economy i n Scotland were the coal and s a l t industries on the Forth, 
i t therefore seems t h a t the more dynamic iitpulses towards c a p i t a l i s t 
development came from the land owning class (Dickson, 1980, 70-71). 
At the end of the 17th century, i t had became clear t h a t the 
Scottish bourgeoisie would not accumulate enough c a p i t a l t o engender 
a s i g n i f i c a n t c a p i t a l i s t development i n Scotland, and lacked the 
m i l i t a r y strength t o secure f o r i t s e l f a p r i v i l e g e d r o l e i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d i n g (Dickson, 1980, 83). I n the end, Scottish 
c a p i t a l opted f o r a deal w i t h England. I n exchange f o r Scottish 
^See P. H. Brown, 1971, Vol. I I , 372; Vol. I l l , pp. 16-78, pp. 
156-188, and pp. 269-325 and Prebble, 1985, 33. 
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r e b e l l i o n against the Spanish government t o protect the prosperity 
achieved i n the Catalan Principat (P. V i l a r , 1987, 420). A second 
Catalan r e v o l t l ed t o the loss of independence a f t e r a long war of 
succession between 1705 and 1714, i n which the Catalans backed the 
Habsburg monarchy against the Bourbon pretender t o the throne. 
Habsburg had promised t o maintain the Catalan p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Following the conquest of Barcelona, the Spanish king Felipe V 
imposed a new p o l i t i c a l and administrative superstructure on 
Catalonia i n 1716 (Nova Planta de Govern) and l e f t a representative 
of the crown i n charge. At the same time, the autonomous p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , Generalitat and Consell de Cent, were abolished 
(Mercader, 1979, 245). 
The next two sections explore the economic, social and c u l t u r a l 
developments i n the 150 years or so i n Catalonia and Scotland a f t e r 
the loss of independence. This period witnessed a slow process of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n both countries; but i n the Catalan case, t h i s 
formed a society and economy v;hich was increasingly d i f f e r e n t from 
the r e s t of Spain, while Scotland was economically integrated i n t o 
the B r i t i s h eirpire, and only one of B r i t a i n ' s i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g 
regions. 
Q 
The r e v o l t was triggered o f f by the movement of government troops 
through Catalan t e r r i t o r y and by the government's attenpt t o -
un c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - r e c r u i t Catalans f o r the army. The unrest i n the 
Catalan countryside was carried i n t o the c i t y of Barcelona by the 
seqadors. as the migrant troops o f casual land labourers were called. 
The Catalan national anthem, "Els segadors", was inspired by these 
r e b e l l i o n s . 
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3. AFTER IDSING INDEPENDENCE: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOEMENTS IN 
CATALONIA 
3.1. Industrialisation and the gnercrence of a class society 
I n the 18th century, i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n began i n Catalonia on the 
basis of a strong a g r i c u l t u r a l sector. The population of Catalonia 
doubled i n the space of 70 years, growing from 407,000 inhabitants 
i n 1718 t o 814,000 i n 1788 ( V i l a r , 1962, I I , 42). The growth took 
place mainly i n the r i c h a g r i c u l t u r a l areas of the l i t t o r a l and the 
p r e - l i t t o r a l . The largest c i t y was Barcelona, istiich together w i t h 
I t s immediate suburbs quadrupled i t s population. Several smaller 
c i t i e s experienced growth, such as Tortosa, Vic, Mataro, Tarragona, 
Manresa, Reus and Girona, a l l of vAiich had over 5,000 inhabitants, 
but they were growing a t a lesser rate t h a t the Barcelona area 
(Mercader, 1979, 318). As i n other European regions, the 18th 
century brought modernisation t o the a g r i c u l t u r a l p lains and coastal 
areas. The e>5>ansion of the area under vineyards was made possible 
by the rabassa morta contract between land owner and producer, 
vdiich was a uniquely Catalan i n s t i t u t i o n . The security o f tenure i t 
involved made long-term investment viable and bound the farmers t o 
the land, and t h i s enabled the countryside t o develop i n an 
atmosphere of r e l a t i v e l y stable class r e l a t i o n s i n the course of the 
9 
V i l a r means here Barcelona w i t h i t s suburbs St. Andreu de Palomer, 
St. M a r t i , St. Gervasi, Sarria, Orta, Vallvidrera, Vallbona, and 
Badalona, Espluges, Hospitalet de Llobregat, St. Adria del Besos, St. 
Just Desvem and Sta. Coloma de Gramamet which together accounted f o r 
37,488 inhabitants i n 1718 and 128,505 i n 1787 ( V i l a r , 1962, I I , 119). 
•'"'^The rabassa morta had existed i n Catalonia since the l a t e Middle 
Ages. But i t became an inportant i n s t i t u t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y since the 18th 
century, when vine production expanded. I t was ba s i c a l l y a sharecropping 
contract which was defined i n terms of the l i f e o f a vineyard, but vAiich 
could p r a c t i c a l l y l a s t i n d e f i n i t e l y . The sharecropper paid the landowner 
one t h i r d o f the harvest, but had security of tenure and far-reaching 
autonomy i n the c u l t i v a t i o n of the land. As t h i s system stressed the 
partnership between landlord and peasant, i t helped t o avoid the 
p r o l e t a r i s a t i o n of the countryside and the r e s u l t i n g s ocial c o n f l i c t -
a t l e a s t u n t i l the Hiiloxera c r i s i s i n the 1880's (Hansen, 1977, 27; 
56-62) . 
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18th and f o r much of the 19th century (Hansen, 1977, 64). Around the 
new export oriented product, a range of supporting industries 
developed such as b o t t l e and pipe manufacturers and d i s t i l l e r i e s , 
v i i i c h enabled the transportation of l i q u o r t o European and South 
American destinations. I n 1778, Barcelona was declared a free p o r t 
and allowed t o trade d i r e c t l y w i t h American colonies. 
The r e s u l t of these developments was a growing bourgeoisie involved 
i n manufacturing and trade i n the c a p i t a l , but also i n the r u r a l 
towns. Capital was also reinvested i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production: 
"Those who had become r i c h through trading or manufacturing 
i n the 18th century, who were numerous p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
second h a l f of the century, purchased land mainly around the 
towns and i n the valleys and small basins of intensive 
a g r i c u l t u r e . I n these areas, investments i n the iiiprovement 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l production often consisted of commercial or 
i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l . " 
( V i l a r , 1962, v o l . I I , 576) 
However, the Napoleonic wars (1808-14), the loss of the major 
American colonies and the French occupation (1824-27) caused 
disruptions i n the economic development of Catalonia. But the return 
of American c o l o n i a l i s t as a r e s u l t of the independence of the 
colonies brought an i n f l u x of c a p i t a l i n Catalan i n d u s t r i a l 
enterprises which favoured p a r t i c u l a r l y the modemisation of the 
t e x t i l e industry (Vicens i Vives, 1979, 38). I n the mid-19th 
century, a Catalan bourgeoisie and p r o l e t a r i a t had established 
themselves, and the development gap between Catalonia and the res t 
of the Spanish t e r r i t o r y widened. 
This gap soon became a p o l i t i c a l problem, when the Liberals gained 
power under Isabel I I (1833). The Catalan i n d u s t r i a l i s t s realised 
t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s were not served by a government v^ich promoted 
a l i b e r a l t r a d i n g p o l i c y and c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of the administration. 
As the economic c r i s i s of the l a t e 1830's worsened w i t h the f i r s t 
e f f e c t s o f the free trade p o l i c y , i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and workers joined 
i n opposition against the central government i n 1840 t o press f o r a 
p r o t e c t i o n i s t i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y . V i l a r described the period between 
1820 and 1885 as the r e g i o n a l i s t - p r o t e c t i o n i s t phase, i n v*iich the 
leaders o f Catalan industry t r i e d t o conquer and protect the Spanish 
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market. The second aim was t o establish themselves as the p o l i t i c a l 
leaders, not of a Catalan state, but of the Spanish nation ( V i l a r , 
1987, 74). For i n d u s t r i a l i s t l i k e Guell i Ferrer, Nicolau Tous, Sol 
i Padris, i n t e l l e c t u a l s l i k e Vidal Ferrer, Duran i Bas and Bosch 
Labrus, and administrators and p o l i t i c i a n s such as Aribau and Victor 
Balaguer, i t was not d i f f i c u l t t o e n l i s t craftsmen, artisans and 
small traders f o r the cause of protectionism. 
I n the countryside, the church and the Institut Agricola Catala de 
Sant Isidre"^"*" had as great an influence on p o l i t i c s as the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s i n the c i t i e s . Their i n t e r e s t s were not opposed t o 
each other, because 
"The absence of heavy industry on the one hand and large 
estates i n the Andalucian s t y l e on the other; the dispersion 
of the t e x t i l e industry yhidh had reached the highest 
v a l l e y s ; and the family l i n k s between i n d u s t r i a l wealth and 
land ownership secured a spread and cohesion o f the middle 
bourgeoisie s u f f i c i e n t t o coitpensate f o r the mediocre aspect 
of the enterprises on the i n d i v i d u a l scale. The r e s u l t of 
a l l t h i s i s t h a t the a g r i c u l t u r a l , the f o l k l o r i s t and even 
the pious b u l l e t i n s appropriated and diffused the themes of 
the Fomento [del Trabajo Nacional] , feeding them i n t o a 
c o l l e c t i v e psychology." 
( V i l a r , 1987, 77) 
The press, ranging from small l o c a l pairphlets t o national (Spanish) 
papers, t r i e d t o convert the p r o t e c t i o n i s t point of view i n t o the 
common denominator of a l l classes, or f a i l i n g t h i s , then a t least of 
a l l sectors of the Catalan r u l i n g class. Although protectionism 
applied t o the whole Spanish t e r r i t o r y , i t was not shared by any 
group of influence i n the r e s t of Spain, and although a t d i f f e r e n t 
times p o l i t i c a l channels were opened ^ i c h enabled the Catalan 
bourgeoisie t o influence Spanish p o l i t i c s , t h i s never amounted t o a 
hegemonic r e l a t i o n s h i p ( V i l a r , 1987, 84-85). Spanish p o l i t i c s was 
l a r g e l y dominated by classes which had established t h e i r power base 
i n the p r e - i n d u s t r i a l era, consisting o f large landowners, a 
•"••^ he I n s t i t u t de Sant Isidre was an organisation of the b i g 
landowners. 
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The Fomento was an organisation of mostly Catalan i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . 
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m i l i t a r y e l i t e , merchants and banking i n t e r e s t s and t h e i r organic 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The r e l a t i v e l y w e l l organised'^"^ Catalan i n d u s t r i a l 
bourgeoisie therefore looked f o r support among the Catalan working 
class, not j u s t t o cement t h e i r economic power, but also t o gain 
hegemony, as V i l a r argued: 
"A coherent and organised leading class as we have described 
i t above i s not e a s i l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h small immediate gains 
i n the purely material f i e l d . I t does not only want the 
State, i t s means, i t s co n t i n u i t y , i t s s e c u r i t i e s , but i t 
also needs t o f e e l and believe i t s e l f t o be the incarnation, 
the " v i t a l force" of the \*iole society. I t l i k e s t o surround 
i t s e l f w i t h the e n t i r e people and invoke the grand interests 
of the fatherland." 
( V i l a r , 1987, 86-87) 
Thus, V i l a r explained the s h i f t of i n t e r e s t of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie from the Spanish t o the Catalan stage w i t h i t s f a i l u r e 
t o became the hegemonic force i n Spain. However, i t must be stressed 
t h a t i t never gave up the l a t t e r aim, and came back t o pursue i t i n 
the e a r l y 20th century, when i t had succeeded i n dominating Catalan 
p o l i t i c s . 
But was the bourgeois hegemony i n Catalonia of the 19th century 
uncontested? I n the countryside, i t was challenged several times by 
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C a r l i s t wars , but a f t e r the defeat i n 1874, t h i s challenge was 
l o s i n g strength. I n the c i t i e s , an urban working class was emerging 
as a possible threat. Termes estimated the urban working class 
(including the i n d u s t r i a l workers and the salaried workers i n 
commerce, administration, transport, communications, etc.) t o 
account f o r 11.8 % of the t o t a l Catalan population i n 1877 and f o r 
13 
Several organisations existed v^ich were dominated by Catalan 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , including the Ccmision de Fabricas, the Asociacion 
Defensora del Trabajo Nacional and several Asociaciones Econonicas. The 
most e f f e c t i v e lobby was the Institute Industrial de Cataliana, founded 
i n 1848, and the Fcmento del Trabajo Nacional which was founded i n 1879 
as a r e s u l t of a concentration process. 
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These wars (1833-36 and 1872-74) involved large parts of r u r a l 
provinces i n the Basque and i n the Catalan region, and can be 
in t e r p r e t e d a t least party as a reaction against c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and 
modemisation (see Butler Clarke, 1906, 100-111 and 374-388). 
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12.7% i n 1887 (with the population growing a t a f a s t r a t e ) . Figures 
f o r 1900 show t h a t the biggest accumulation of workers i n Catalonia 
(45.7%) l i v e d i n the c i t y of Barcelona (Termes, 1987, 238-9). But 
f o r most of the 19th century t h i s class lacked appropriate 
conditions t o organise i t s e l f . Accorriing t o V i l a r , apart from 
spontaneous and rather inconsequential v i o l e n t eruptions i n 1835 and 
1855, the Catalan workers believed t h e i r masters' arguments v*iich 
pointed t o conpetition from abroad and t o the Spanish state as the 
causes f o r social discontent ( V i l a r , 1987, 87-88). However, the 
common in t e r e s t s d i d not go very f a r . For exanple, the j o i n t 
opposition of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and workers i n 1840 t o the free trade 
p o l i c y was followed i n 1842 and 1843 by widespread r i o t s and 
temporary establishment of popular control i n some working class 
areas (compared by some t o the Paris Coramane i n 1871) . M i l i t a r y 
force ended t h i s phase of unrest, and t h i s was not t o be the l a s t 
time t h a t the Catalan bourgeoisie c a l l e d on the central government 
f o r assistance i n the struggle against Catalan workers. 
The lack of organisation of the working class was mainly due t o the 
executions and phases of repression following the struggles of the 
1840's and the 1850's. Throughout the 19th century, the bourgeoisie 
r a d i c a l l y opposed any type of workers' organisation. VJhenever the 
repression was s l i g h t l y relaxed, numerous workers' associations 
emerged (Vicens i Vives, 1979, v o l . V I , 134-150). But i t was not 
possible t o create a strong workers' movement from these dispersed 
and i n t e r m i t t e n t associations. The workers became able t o contest 
the bourgeois hegemony only i n the 20th century. 
3.2 The Catcaan Renaixencpa; cultural nationalism 
At the same time as i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was taking o f f i n the 1830's, 
a c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l began as an i n t e l l e c t u a l bourgeoisie developed 
alongside the i n d u s t r i a l e l i t e . The Catalan language, v^ich had 
ceased t o be the o f f i c i a l language i n 1714 but was widely spoken i n 
everyday l i f e , was being recovered as a c u l t u r a l and professional 
language during the 19th century. This process began wi t h poets such 
as Rubio i Ors, Maragall and Verdaguer, who wrote i n Catalan, and 
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thus i n i t i a t e d a l i t e r a r y movement which saw i t s roots i n the work 
of the great poets of the golden age of the Crown of Aragon. 
However, the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l was not l i m i t e d t o l i t e r a t u r e . New 
schools of law, economic theory and joumalism developed v^ose 
protagonists can be described i n the Gramscian sense as the "organic 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s " of the bourgeoisie. Vicens i Vives described how 
these new generations of i n t e l l e c t u a l s began t o influence the upper 
and middle classes w i t h t h e i r ideas of Catalan regionalism"'"^. The 
strong influence of the top lawyers of Barcelona on the 
p r o t e c t i o n i s t movement pronpted Vicens i Vives t o conclude th a t the 
Catalan bourgeoisie "found i t s e l f surrounded by eminent 
personalities who assisted them i n a l l spheres" of l i f e (Vicens i 
Vives, 1979, v o l . VI, 116). 
Just as the renaissance poets and playwrights looked back t o the 
medieval period, the historians of the mid-19th century also took a 
favourable view of Catalan h i s t o r y . The h i s t o r i c a l w r i t i n g s of 
hi s t o r i a n s such as Vi c t o r Balaguer and Joan Cortada inspired visions 
of a greater and more autonomous Catalonia . 
Probably the most important development of tha t period w i t h respect 
t o the development of nationalism was the creation of a wide range 
of p r i v a t e associations and i n s t i t u t i o n s which became characteristic 
f o r Catalan c i v i l society. Economic and eiiployers associations (e.g. 
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Joan Mane i Flaquer, the most i n f l u e n t i a l voice of the Diario de 
Barcelona i n the mid-19th century, i s a good exanple of an "organic 
i n t e l l e c t u a l " . Vicens i Vives commented t h a t 
"Mane managed t o create a school of i i r p a r t i a l p o l i t i c a l 
joumalism which was rooted i n the Catalan way of l i f e and 
the aspirations of the country. The bourgeoisie saw i t s e l f 
represented i n t h i s (type of joumalism), and gradually 
swallowed the r e g i o n a l i s t and regenerationist theories a l a 
Catalana, which the good Mane was disseminating every week 
through t h i s newspaper with the help of a v^ole panel of 
collaborators." 
Vicens i Vives, 1979, v o l . VI, 115) 
'^^Ictor Balaguer published La Corona de Aragon i n 1854 and 
followed t h i s up w i t h H i s t o r i a de Catalunya y de l a Corona de Aragon i n 
1860, the same year i n which Joan Cortada's book on Catalunya y los 
Catalanes came out. A l l were w r i t t e n i n Ca s t i l i a n . 
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Itoics del Pais and Comissio de Fabriques) served as t h i n k tanks of 
the i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie and as pressure groups w i t h the p o l i t i c a l 
decision makers, v ^ l e the opera c i r c l e s of the Liceu, and the 
Ateneu Barcelones were symbols of bourgeois c u l t u r a l hegemony. The 
excursionist associations, the Catalan journals and l i t e r a r y 
groups were the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f the i n t e l l e c t u a l s and urban 
professionals. 
The c u l t u r a l associations and i n s t i t u t i o n s of the working class had 
a much more d i f f i c u l t l i f e i n the 19th century, always threatened by 
government repression as soon as they deviated from a narrowly 
defined c u l t u r a l function. As mentioned i n the section above, 
working class p o l i t i c a l organisations were prohibited, and 
persecuted vtien they d i d surface i n periods of lesser repression, 
and therefore, c u l t u r a l organisations often took on p o l i t i c a l 
functions as w e l l . The Ateneu Catala de l a Classe Obrera i s one 
example f o r such working class i n s t i t u t i o n s (Vicens i Vives, 1979, 
v o l . V I , 142). Others served as i n s t i t u t i o n s o f social mo b i l i t y , 
advocating the education of workers i n t o "responsible" members of 
Catalan society (Sola, 1978, 32-33). 
At the end of the 19th century, Catalan society was unique i n Spain 
w i t h a growing manufacturing base and a r e l a t i v e l y strong i n d u s t r i a l 
bourgeoisie, which was often i n c o n f l i c t w i t h the other Spanish 
regional oligarchies over governmental economic p o l i c i e s . I t s 
organic i n t e l l e c t u a l s were re v i v i n g Catalan c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s , and 
t h i s combination of c u l t u r a l and economic i n f r a s t r u c t u r e became the 
material basis of bourgeois Catalan nationalism a t the t u r n of the 
century. 
The excursionist associations, Associacio Catalemista 
d'Excursions Cientifiques and Associacio d'Excursions Catalana, created 
i n 1876 and 1878 i n Barcelona, were the f i r s t of a long l i s t of s i m i l a r 
organisations. L i t e r a r y c i r c l e s often developed around Catalan journals 
such as the D i a r i Catala, l a Renaixensa, and La I l u s t r a c i o Catalana. 
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4. AFTER LOSING INDEPENDENCE: SOCIAL AND EOONCMIC DEVELOEMENTS IN 
SCOTLAND 
4.1 E<X)ncmic change and disparities 
I n order t o understand why Scotland d i d not develop a n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement i n the l a t e 19th century, one must look, as i n the case of 
Catalonia, t o i t s p o l i t i c a l and economic location i n the Union. The 
most s i g n i f i c a n t economic development was the i n d u s t r i a l revolution 
Vidiich bound Scotland and England together from the l a t e 18th century 
onwards. The union provided the opportunity f o r the Scottish 
bourgeoisie t o be involved i n an i n d u s t r i a l revolution which was 
decentralised, spontaneous and self-sustaining. I t therefore 
permitted a higher degree of autonomous development than other 
submerged n a t i o n a l i t i e s i n Europe were able t o achieve (Nairn, 1977, 
138) . This r e l a t i v e freedom applied mainly t o the Scottish Lowlands, 
whose soc i a l formation was s i m i l a r t o t h a t of English regions on the 
verge of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . 
I n the 18th century, improved trading conditions under the Treaty of 
Union helped t o increase the penetration of market rela t i o n s i n the 
countryside and the export o r i e n t a t i o n of ag r i c u l t u r e i n the 
Lowlands ( c a t t l e , arable enclosures). P r o f i t s made i n the A t l a n t i c 
trade were p a r t l y invested i n i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s l i k e coal and 
copper mining and a f t e r 1770 increasingly i n t o t e x t i l e s (Dickson, 
1980, 90). I n the Highlands, expansion of sheep farming led t o 
consolidation of land holdings and widespread evictions. The 
Scottish l a i r d s were t r a d i t i o n a l l y very powerful because there were 
few freeholders, and the security of tenure f o r tenants was very 
l i m i t e d . 
"Economic dominance was j u s t i f i e d by t h e i r social p o s i t i o n 
i n the community: as h e r i t o r s they controlled poor r e l i e f , 
parish education and church patronage; they regulated wage 
rates and could d i r e c t labour f o r road b u i l d i n g i n t h e i r 
capacity as j u s t i c e s of the peace; and f i n a l l y , they sat i n 
judgement of t h e i r own tenants i n the barony courts". 
(Dickson, 1980, 95) 
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The Highlands were t r a d i t i o n a l l y the most populated areas of 
Scotland. I n 1755, j u s t over h a l f of the population l i v e d North of 
the Tay and only 37% i n the cen t r a l b e l t (Dickson, 1980, 91). 
Just 10 years e a r l i e r , a mortal blow had been dealt t o the 
insurrection of an army of the Highland clans, whose invasion of 
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England i n 1745 was punished severely by the B r i t i s h troops . As 
Naim argued, the relatio n s h i p of the "backward" Highlands and the 
"advanced" Lowlands was so unequal t h a t the former had no chance of 
s u r v i v a l and of developing a n a t i o n a l i s t movement based on the 
d i s t i n c t i v e Gaelic culture (Naim, 1977, 148). A f t e r 1745, the 
Lowland cul t u r e , increasingly influenced by England, became dominant 
while the Highland culture went i n t o decline, accelerated by the 
clearances, emigration waves and a n g l i c i s a t i o n programmes. This 
process of decline was f a r from being a natural one. I n the 
clearances, f o r exanple, force was used t o e v i c t the inpoverished 
peasants from the estates (McGrath, 1981, 12-13 and 35-37). I n 
McGrath's famous play about the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the Highlands, the 
replacement of peasant families w i t h more p r o f i t a b l e Cheviot sheep 
converted the Highlands i n t o a "mighty wildemess" v^^ich became the 
hunting ground f o r the wealthy English and anglicised Scots e l i t e 
(McGrath, 1981, 38-44). 
But the Highlands also became a source of myths. I n the early 19th 
century, the romantic movement flourished p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Scotland, 
where the memory of Highland culture became infested with a 
sentimental national consciousness (Figs. 4 and 5). However, t h i s 
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Prebble writes about the English reaction t o the 1745 r e b e l l i o n : 
"By b r u t a l i t y the Highlands were subdued, the glens eirptied, 
the clans destroyed, and the Hanoverian dynasty made so 
secure t h a t s i x t y years or so l a t e r the Prince Regent could 
indulge h i s romantic fancies by paying f o r the tomb of 
Prince Charles." 
(Prebble, 1967, 309) 
The measures included l o o t i n g and destruction of Highland 
settlements, widespread k i l l i n g s and repression through the B r i t i s h 
army, as w e l l as government l e g i s l a t i o n . Amongst the l a t t e r was the 
p r o h i b i t i o n of k i l t and t a r t a n , which was l i f t e d only i n 1782. 
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selective reconstruction of the past was kept very separate from 
p r a c t i c a l and p o l i t i c a l considerations. 
"What mattered i n Scotland i t s e l f , however, was t o render 
t h i s awareness p o l i t i c a l l y n u l l - t o make ce r t a i n t h a t i t 
would not be f e l t t h a t conteirporary Scotland should be the 
independent continuation of the auld sang", 
(Naim, 1977, 150) 
With the defeat of the Highland forces. Lowland capitalism was able 
t o develop and t o impose i t s economic and social r e l a t i o n s under 
conditions of r e l a t i v e peace and protection. I n the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
areas i n the Lowlands, commercial expansion i n the 18th century 
enabled landowners t o improve and r a t i o n a l i s e a g r i c u l t u r a l 
production. This often involved the evictions of tenants, and 
therefore, the urban population grew i n the central b e l t . I t reached 
almost 1 m i l l i o n (half of Scotland's t o t a l population) i n 1820 
(Dickson, 1980, 137-8). This expanding labour and consumer market 
encouraged i n d u s t r i a l developments, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of cotton, 
19 
l i n e n and woollen manufacturing (1780-1830) . As i n Catalonia, the 
small t e x t i l e firms which emerged were set up w i t h merchant and 
small landowner c a p i t a l . 
Big landowners were not involved i n i n d u s t r i a l developments, only i n 
coal e x p l o i t a t i o n . But p o l i t i c a l l y , the landed aristocracy i n 
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Scotland (Figs. 4 and 5) was s t i l l powerful. Therefore, the 
i n d u s t r i a l entrepreneurs found t h e i r interests b e t t e r represented 
through the Union. 
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I n 1831, a t h i r d o f the 95,000 waged persons i n Glasgow were 
working i n the t e x t i l e industry (Dickson, 1980, 185), 
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The incorporation of the Scottish Parliament i n t o the Westminster 
Parliament "involved a drama of Byzantine manoeuvre acted out by the 
great t e r r i t o r i a l magnets of Scotland, the IXikes of A r g y l l , Hamilton, 
A t h o l l , and Queensbury, and the leaders of the English p a r t i e s " (Harvie, 
1977, 63). 
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F I G . 4 : A N I D Y L L OF '45 
This pre-Raphaelite painting by Millais (1828-1896), which shows "Scottish Girls charmed 
by the dash of their EngUsh enemy" in 1745, is an example of the reinterpretation of history 
from an Enghsh perspective in the Romantic period. 
FIG.5 : SCOTLAND FOR H O L I D A Y 
L M S S C O T L A N D for H O L I D A Y S L N E R 
rrs QUICKlt IT l A R 
This advertisement for British Rail, painted by Broadhead, propagates a new 
purpose for the Scottish Highlands after they had been cleared from people. 
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" I n Scotland, where the p o l i t i c a l dominance of the landed 
i n t e r e s t was very marked, the manufacturers could thus 
b e n e f i t from the c l i e n t status of the Scottish bourgeoisie 
a f t e r the Union of Parliaments. With l e g i s l a t i v e powers 
located a t Westminster, Scottish manufacturers sometimes 
gained from the actions of t h e i r more successful brethren -
gains v s ^ i i c h they would have been less l i k e l y t o obtain from 
a resurrected Scottish Parliament." 
(Dickson, 1980, 147) 
While the p o l i t i c a l representatives were e f f e c t i v e l y nominated by 
the landlords, the bourgeoisie started t o gain more influence over 
c i v i l society through the education system, the Church ( a f t e r the 
secession of the Free Church i n 1843) and l o c a l government. 
Opposition t o the development of capitalism from below was not 
strong and e f f e c t i v e u n t i l 1830. The main t h r e a t t o the social order 
came from the artisans and waged labour force of the Lowlands. 
According t o Dickson, 
"The d i r e c t i o n of working class action o s c i l l a t e d between 
trade unionism, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l appeals t o the a u t h o r i t i e s 
f o r redress of grievances, p o l i t i c a l radicalism and 
insurrectionism i n response t o the tightening of economic 
constraints and t o p o l i t i c a l repression." 
r i b i d . . 1980, 176) 
Immigration was an inportant means of escaping economic constraints 
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and p o l i t i c a l repression . 
The second h a l f of the 19th century witnessed the second i n d u s t r i a l 
r e v o l u t i o n , the s h i f t from the t e x t i l e industry t o i r o n and 
shipbuilding. By the end of the century, Clydeside became the single 
most inportant shipbuilding centre i n the UK and the Scottish 
economy was dominated by a closely k n i t network of family firms. 
Already i n the 1870's, the family dynasties on the Clydeside had 
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Dickson mentioned as an exairple a meeting on June 16th 1819 i n 
Glasgow of 35,000-40,000 f ^ p l e who asked the Prince Regent f o r 
f i n a n c i a l support t o enable them t o emigrate t o the colonies (Dickson, 
1980, 176). 
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consolidated t h e i r p o s i t i o n as a cosmopolitan e l i t e , proud of t h e i r 
c i b i l i t y t o trade and invest on an int e r n a t i o n a l scale. Considering 
the r o l e of the shipbuilding industry i n the economic relations 
w i t h i n the Enpire, i t i s not surprising t o f i n d t h a t Scottish 
c a p i t a l i s t s were vociferous supporters of free trade^^. Although 
o v e r a l l s i m i l a r i t i e s prevailed between the Scottish and the English 
economic structure, the former set i t s e l f apart from the l a t t e r 
through the extent of i t s bias towards heavy industry, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
heavy engineering and shipbuilding. 
Scottish i d e n t i t y persisted i n the 19th century, but was not 
connected w i t h p o l i t i c a l claims. The National Association f o r the 
Vindication of Scottish Rights (1853), a sh o r t - l i v e d movement which 
got support from both Liberals and Conservatives, was mainly 
concerned w i t h the defence of Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s and never 
developed a serious caitpaign w i t h popular support (Webb, 1978, 37), 
The cairpaign of the 1880's f o r a Scottish secretary l i m i t e d i t s e l f 
t o arguments of greater administrative e f f i c i e n c y through 
decentralisation and was led by some prominent a r i s t o c r a t s such as 
the Earl of Rosebery, the Earl of F i f e and the IXike of A r g y l l . That 
post had been abolished i n the afteririath of the 1745 Highland 
r e v o l t s . When i t was granted i n 1885 by the Liberal government, the 
e f f e c t of t h i s measure was an increase i n the assimilation of 
Scottish and English a f f a i r s (Harvie, 1977, 34). 
According t o Harvie, the weakness of nationalism i n Scotland 
throughout the 19th century was the "inevitable consequence of the 
entente between emotive nationalism and e f f e c t i v e unionism" (Harvie, 
1977, 40) . Scotland d i d not harbour economic grievances with respect 
t o England, and her r e l i g i o u s and educational i n s t i t u t i o n s remained 
committed t o the Union. Being n a t i o n a l i s t i n a country which 
benefited from the Union and inperialism d i d not make much sense. 
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The Anti-Corn law League i s an exairple of the free trade stance 
of the Scottish bourgeoisie which also gained support from the working 
class. This i s i n t o t a l contrast t o the p r o t e c t i o n i s t a g i t a t i o n of the 
Catalan bourgeoisie around the same time. 
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benefited from the Union and imperialism d i d not make much sense. 
This seemed t o have been the p r e v a i l i n g opinion even during the 
Scottish home r u l e debate of the l a t e 19th century, which was only a 
weak r e f l e c t i o n of the long-standing home r u l e demands of 
neighbouring Ireland. 
4.2. The heme rule movement i n Scotland 
The home r u l e movement i n Scotland emerged i n the l a t e 19th century 
under the influence of the f a r more deeply rooted movement i n 
Ireland. I n contrast t o the I r i s h movement, the Scottish Home Rule 
Association (1886) lacked broad popular support and mainly 
concentrated on issues of decentralisation and greater autonomy 
which concerned more those sectors of the middle class which were 
involved w i t h Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s . The home r u l e r s followed a 
strategy of working w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l system t h r o u ^ the 
established p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . Several p r i v a t e member b i l l s were 
presented t o the House of Commons vtiere support was not strong 
enough t o grant any success. 
While the I r i s h Home Rule Movement became more r a d i c a l and popular 
during the f i r s t world war (D. Williams, 1966; Hachey, 1977, 
130-200), i t s Scottish o f f s p r i n g retreated i n t o insignificance. 
Considering the difference i n the roles of Scotland and Ireland i n 
the B r i t i s h enpire (Cullen and Smout, 1977, 3-18), t h i s i s r e a d i l y 
landerstood. 
The lack of success of the home r u l e movement has been explained by 
analysts w i t h the f a c t t h a t i t d i d not have the backing of any 
so c i a l class. The i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie abandoned the Liberal Party 
v^en i t became too supportive of Home Rule, and found i t s interests 
b e t t e r served i n the staunchly unionist Conservative Party. The 
middle class, wtiich was often the d r i v i n g force i n n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements of the 19th century, also saw t h e i r i n t e r e s t s connected t o 
the enpire. Many of those who emigrated from Scotland were s k i l l e d 
workers from the Lowlands, craftsmen, clerks and weavers; t h e i r r o l e 
i n government service, trade missions and c a p i t a l investment i n the 
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B r i t i s h eirpire i n h i b i t e d a f u l l y fledged Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement (Harvie, 1911, 96) . There were l i n k s between home r u l e and 
Scottish r a d i c a l p o l i t i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y during and a f t e r the 
Highland land struggles (of c r o f t e r s against landlords), vMch were 
put down by government troops under the Conservatives i n 1886. The 
p o l i t i c a l activism of the r a d i c a l c r o f t e r s was, however, only a l a t e 
response t o a process of nmg i n a l i s a t i o n , e v i c t i o n and peasant 
repression \^^ch had been going on f o r many decades already, and 
could not be a dominant force i n Scottish p o l i t i c s . But i t was 
supported i n the 1880's by "middle-class Gaelic r e v i v a l i s t s " and 
trade unions i n the Lowlands. This may account f o r the supportive 
a t t i t u d e of the Labour movement under Hardie towards land reform and 
home r u l e (Keating and Bleimann, 1979, 46). 
When the Liber a l Party, v^iich chanpioned the home r u l e movement, 
s p l i t over I r i s h home r u l e i n 1886, the Scottish Labour movement, 
v^iich gradually emerged from the ruins of the Liberal Party, adopted 
the home r u l e issue. For the f i r s t and second decade of the 2Gth 
century, however, the Labour Party concentrated i t s e f f o r t s on 
t r y i n g t o conquer a place on the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l stage (Dickson, 
1980, 269). But a f t e r the F i r s t World War, which had brought about 
the defeat o f empires l i k e the Ottoman and the Austrian-Hungarian, 
the r i g h t o f small nations t o govern themselves gained greater 
acceptance, and home r u l e was put back on the Labour Party agenda. 
The Scottish Home Rale Association involved many Labour MPs during 
the 1920's, who brought several home r u l e b i l l s i n t o the House of 
Caramons. Ifeating and Bleimann see the reason f o r Labour's commitment 
i n the great post-war confidence i n the Scottish economy and the 
s o c i a l i s t p o t e n t i a l of the Scottish population. This confidence 
dissipated f a s t , along w i t h the i n t e r e s t i n home r u l e , v^tien the 
economic depression began t o be f e l t i n Scotland. More general 
developments such as the economic c r i s i s of the inter-war period and 
the expansion of state bureaucracy brought Scotland and England 
closer together. 
"The F i r s t World War e f f e c t i v e l y closed the option of 
devolution as a settlement f o r B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l i l l s . ( . . . ) 
[T]he economic and p o l i t i c a l inpact of t o t a l war grea t l y 
accelerated the assimilation of Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s , and 
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enhanced the power of the B r i t i s h agencies, while the 
economic upheavals i t caused brought an end t o the r e l a t i v e 
prosperity the nation had enjoyed i n the B r i t i s h economy." 
(Haivie, 1977, 43) 
The Labour Party distanced i t s e l f from the unsuccessful home ru l e 
movement i n the course of the 1920's. This eventually led t o the 
foundation of the National Party of Scotland i n 1928. 
The home r u l e movement also lacked a c u l t u r a l conponent, v i t a l i n 
other national movements and also i n the I r i s h struggle f o r home 
r u l e . Unlike the Catalan 19th century renaissance^ vdiich was booming 
i n bourgeois c i r c l e s , Scottish l i t e r a t u r e d i d not provoke a growth 
i n national i d e n t i t y i n s i m i l a r c i r c l e s here. This led Fry t o claim 
t h a t 
"the lack of much culture t o be proud of deprived c u l t u r a l 
nationalism of p o l i t i c a l force.(...) The re a l motor of 
national f e e l i n g was the pride the Scots f e l t i n the rapid 
development of t h e i r country and i t s contribution t o the 
Union." 
(Fry, 1987, 204). 
I n the 1920's, t h i s changed i n so f a r as a modest c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l 
began i n Scotland. However, i t d i d not influence Scottish public 
opinion, a t least not markedly. As i n the 19th century, the cause of 
devolution was the playground f o r eccentrics. 
To summarise therefore, nationalism never became a p o l i t i c a l force, 
as i t d i d i n Catalonia during t h i s period, because the economic 
development o f the country ensured t h a t the int e r e s t s of the 
bourgeoisie (and l a t e r also of the working class) were taken care of 
i n the union w i t h England. 
5. CATALONIA: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE REGIONALIST PERIOD 
(1892-1923) 
This section deals w i t h the development of. Catalan p o l i t i c a l 
nationalism a t the end of the 19th century and the p o l i t i c a l 
hegemony of the n a t i o n a l i s t party, the Lliga Regionalista. 
(Chapter two) (102) 
5.1 The politicisation of Catalan nationcLLism 
According t o Vicens i Vives, the "Bases de Manresa" i n 1892 
con s t i t u t e a t u r n i n g point i n the cata l a n i s t movement, turning 
towards a more p o l i t i c a l and more n a t i o n a l i s t a t t i t u d e . I n Manresa, 
the Uhio Regionalista had i t s f i r s t assembly during v*iich the 
p o l i t i c a l programme of autonomy was formulated f o r the f i r s t time. 
The "Bases de Manresa" therefore heralded the beginning of p o l i t i c a l 
nationalism (Vicens i Vives, 1979, v o l . VI, 262) . The assembly was 
dominated by a new generation of Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s , vdio had 
grown up w i t h the c u l t u r a l renaissance and learned t o take the 
p a r t i c u l a r features of Catalan culture as a f a c t . The Centre Escxjleir 
Catalanista, founded i n 1886, was a centre of p o l i t i c a l formation 
f o r several of the future leaders of the Unio Regionalista, v^iich 
was l a t e r reshaped and became the Lliga Regioncilista. The Lliga was 
formed i n 1901 under the leadership of Prat de l a Riba, integrating 
the p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l associations i n which the n a t i o n a l i s t s 
were organised. 
Sole-Tura, however, takes a more s t r u c t u r a l i s t view i n declaring 
1898 the event which marked the t r a n s i t i o n t o nationalism. Before 
t h i s date, 
"the Catalan high bourgeoisie was able t o i d e n t i f y i t s e l f 
w i t h t h ^ conservative regionalism of people such as Mane y 
Flaquer , and asked f o r l i t t l e more than a good 
p r o t e c t i o n i s t p olicy, a modest degree of decentralisation 
and a well-founded conservatism v>^ich would help i t t o 
maintain i t s hegemony i n Catalonia and t o secure the 
consensus of the Catalan masses." 
(Sole-Tura, 1970, 288) 
I n 1898, v^en Spain l o s t control over i t s l a s t colonies i n the war 
w i t h the USA, the bourgeoisie l o s t f a i t h i n the central government 
and turned t o the Catalanist movement. I n November 1898, the 
presidents of f i v e of the most i n f l u e n t i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the 
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Director of the Diano de Barcelona, the leading newspaper i n the 
c a p i t a l . 
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. 24 Catalan bourgeoisie presented a proposal t o the monarch vAiich 
included an economic agreement and the suggestion o f creating a 
single province of Catalonia and of adjusting vocational t r a i n i n g t o 
the needs of Catalan industry (Llorens, 1979, 382) . Most of the 
presidents were t o head the e l e c t o r a l l i s t of the Ll i g a Regionalista 
three years l a t e r . 
The loss o f the colonies i n 1898 was a disaster f o r Catalan 
indus t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t e x t i l e manufacturing, v^iich d i d not 
recover from the loss of protection and guaranteed external market. 
Borja de Riquer noted t h a t a f t e r 1882, vAien the Law of Trading 
Relations w i t h the A n t i l l e s was introduced, the Catalan t e x t i l e 
exports t o the colonies had become an inportant o u t l e t f o r the 
t e x t i l e industry. I n 1896, exports had ri s e n t o 22 per cent o f t o t a l 
production. I n 1898, i t had dropped t o 13 per cent and was reduced 
f u r t h e r t o reach 7 per cent i n 1901, when the Lliga Regiomlista was 
founded (Riquer, 1977, 67). This put the t e x t i l e industry, v^iich was 
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generally small-scale , dispersed and not very modem, lander severe 
pressure. 
The m i l i t a r y defeat undermined the legitimacy of the Spanish state. 
I t resulted i n a loss of influence i n the p o l i t i c a l and economic 
scene abroad and i n a f i n a n c i a l and economic c r i s i s developing a t 
home, and created a p o l i t i c a l vacuum which i n Catalonia benefited 
the L l i g a Regionalista. The events of 1898 provoked the economic 
leaders t o withdraw t h e i r support of the Spanish pa r t i e s and become 
involved i n the foundation and the leadership of a Catalan party, 
the Lliga Regionalista. The Lliga drew on the i n t e l l e c t u a l s and 
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Involved were Domenech i Montaner from the Ateneu, Joan Sallares 
from the Fanent del Treball Nacional, Dr. Robert from the Societat 
Economica d'Amies del Pais, Carles de Caiips from the I n s t i t u t Agricola 
Catala de Sant Isidre and Sebastia Torres from the Lliga de Defensa 
Industrial i Ccsnert;ial. 
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J u t g l a r maintained t h a t between 1904 and 1906, Catalonia had 
3,000 mostly small and dispersed cotton factories \jhich employed around 
125,000 workers, out of a t o t a l o f 250,000 t o 300,000 i n d u s t r i a l workers 
(Jutglar, 1982, v o l . V I I , 87-88). 
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ideologies vAiich had grown i n the seed beds of the c u l t u r a l and 
p o l i t i c a l associations, but the c r u c i a l aspect was the fa c t t h a t 
many i n d u s t r i a l i s t s now threw t h e i r weight behind the regionalistes. 
The continuous r i s e i n national p o l i t i c a l consciousness over the 
l a t t e r h a l f o f the 19th century, v^i c h was taking root p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the middle classes - though t o varying extent - was a 
precondition of the post-1898 developments i n Catalonia. Although 
the foundation of the Lliga Regionalista was an ijiportant step on 
the road t o the d i s t i n c t i v e p o l i t i c a l world of Catalonia in the 
1930's, i t d i d not s i g n i f y a break of the Catalan establishment w i t h 
the Spanish state. I n f a c t , the h i s t o r y of the Lliga shows tha t i t 
retained i n t e r e s t i n Spanish p o l i t i c s and nourished plans t o reform 
the p o l i t i c a l system, rather than breaJdng out of i t . 
5.2 The hegemony of bourgeois nationalism under the Lliqa 
Nationalism helped the Catalan bourgeoisie t o establish i t s e l f as 
the r u l i n g class. Presenting the Spanish government as the main 
opponent of the Catalan people, the Lliga soon developed i t s central 
p o l i t i c a l argument and argued t h a t 
"the free i n i t i a t i v e of the Catalans, on the margin o f the 
c e n t r a l i s t State, i s the only t h i n g t h a t can solve the 
problems of Catalonia." 
(Riquer, 1977, 237) 
This served two purposes, f i r s t l y t o present class c o n f l i c t - as 
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surfaced during the course of 1902 - as a small problem between 
enployers and workers, easily resolved w i t h "bona voluntat per part 
de tothom" i f only the ce n t r a l state would l e t them get on w i t h 
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I n 1902, a general s t r i k e developed i n Barcelona v*iich was put 
down w i t h the help o f the m i l i t a j r y . This was the f i r s t of several 
occasions i n which class c o n f l i c t s were "solved" w i t h violence from the 
centre without provoking c r i t i c i s m from the caitp of the Lliga. I n the 
s t r i k e s and r i o t s of 1919, the Lliga took a more active stance by 
c a l l i n g upon the government t o restore order i n the Catalan c a p i t a l . 
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"with the good w i l l o f everyone" 
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i t . Secondly, a basic precondition f o r success of the Lliga was t o 
avoid being i d e n t i f i e d as a simple instrument of the bourgeoisie. 
The party needed the support of other social groups i n order t o 
assume the r o l e as a representative of the Catalans as a nation 
(Riquer, 1977, 234-5). 
Francesc Cambo, v^o became the p o l i t i c a l leader of the Lliga i n the 
e a r l y 20th century ( v ^ i i l e Prat de l a Riba was something l i k e the 
s p i r i t u a l leader) and defined i t s p o l i t i c a l strategy, maintained 
these tendencies, but was a t the same time careful not t o lose 
contact w i t h the central state or the Spanish monarchs. While the 
Lliga was dominating Catalan p o l i t i c s , i t d i d not make moves i n the 
d i r e c t i o n of separatism, but rather t r i e d t o gain a foothold in 
Spanish p o l i t i c s . I n t h i s sense, i t was a continuation and 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the p o l i c y of p u t t i n g pressure on the state which 
prevailed i n the 19th century. 
The Lliga was always t o r n between i t s claims t o represent the v^iole 
Catalan nation, and the r e a l p o l i t i c a l and economic inter e s t s Vv^iich 
dominated the party. A f t e r the loss of i t s l i b e r a l wing i n 1904 (El 
Poble Catala), the Lliga became more conservative, although i t 
always t r i e d t o widen i t s popular base. One of the more successful 
attertpts was the e l e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e Solidaritat Catalana, v*iich 
gained 41 of the 44 Catalan seats i n the Cortes i n 1907 and helped 
t o establish the Lliga as the major p o l i t i c a l force i n Catalonia. 
The smaller c a t a l a n i s t , C a r l i s t and Republican parties v^ich formed 
p a r t of the Solidaritat soon went t h e i r own ways, but the experience 
served as an exaitple f o r the power of national feelings i n the short 
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term. But over the years i t became obvious t h a t the social 
c o n f l i c t s vdiich were widening the gap between the p r i n c i p a l 
representatives of p o l i t i c a l nationalism and the organisations of 
the working class were more s i g n i f i c a n t , dissolving rather quickly 
the i l l u s i o n s of i n t e r - c l a s s s o l i d a r i t y t h a t had remained from the 
experience of the Solidaritat Catalana. I t must also be mentioned 
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The Setmana Tragica was an early signal i n 1909. 
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t h a t the working class associations and unions d i d not take p a r t i n 
the Solidaritat Cataleina, but formed t h e i r own all i a n c e , Solidaridad 
Qbrera, v^iich constituted an inportant step towards organised 
syndicalism. However, since the bulk of the workers was 
disfranchised and lacked a powerful organisation, consent from t h a t 
sector of the Catalan population was not seen as relevant or 
necessary. I n the aftermath of the r i o t s of 1909, and based on the 
Solidaridad Catalana, the CNT^ ^ (Confederacion Nacional de Trabajo) 
was formed i n Catalonia. I t was t o become the most iirportant 
workers' organisation i n the next three decades. 
Although support from the working class was not achieved, the Lliga 
d i d succeed i n i t s appeal t o some sectors of the urban middle class. 
I n t h i s context, i t s control of the p r o v i n c i a l government of 
Barcelona and i t s resources was relevant, f o r i t was under Prat de 
l a Riba's leadership of Barcelona t h a t the process of modernisation 
of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e began i n Barcelona. I t was extended t o the other 
three provinces v^en the central government f i n a l l y conceded 
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permission t o form ^ o i n t p r o v i n c i a l administrations . This law was 
published a t the end of 1913, and i n A p r i l 1914 the Mancxanunitat of 
Catalunya was formed, w i t h the support of a l l p o l i t i c a l parties. 
Prat de l a Riha was elected president unanimously (Benet, 1964, 13). 
While no decentralisation of power over resources from the centre 
was involved, the Manconunitat made a strong ijrpact i n the f i e l d of 
administration and services, renowned f o r t h e i r poor q u a l i t y i n 
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The Catalan anarcho-syndicalists were the d r i v i n g force i n the 
foundation of the CNT i n 1910. I t s roots lay w i t h the Solidaridad 
Obrera, created as a working class response t o the bourgeois Solidaritat 
Catalana i n 1907, v ^ i c h then became the Federacion Regional. The 
Federacion gave b i r t h t o the (Spanish-wide) CNT i n 1910 (Ucelay da Cal, 
1982, 80). I n i t s f i r s t congress, 30,000 members were represented; i n 
1919, the CNT had 714,028 members, of v^ich 427,000 were l i v i n g i n 
Catalonia (Jubglar, 1982, v o l . V I I , 269-275). 
•^^Already i n 1898, the proposal of the f i v e presidents was t o merge 
the four p r o v i n c i a l governments i n t o one single administration covering 
the T f t ^ o l e of Catalonia. This aim was also pursued by the Lliga 
Regionalista, as a f i r s t step towards Catalan autonomy. 
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Spain. Despite i t s weak powers and scarce resources, the 
Mancoitiunitat became an inportant p o l i t i c a l and symbolic power base 
f o r the L l i g a . I t i s not surprising t h a t the following years are 
regarded as the years of the Lliga's hegemony; and t h a t Cambo f e l t 
encouraged t o increase pressure f o r reform of a Spanish p o l i t i c a l 
system t h a t was no longer able t o function. 
"The Lliga was indeed capable of mobilising the communal 
s p i r i t , and the scope of i t s cairpaigns i n those years 
evidently went beyond the l i m i t e d perspective of a p o l i t i c a l 
party. However, t h i s i s precisely one of the characteristics 
of i n t e r - c l a s s i s t movements, which are able t o e x p l o i t 
ambiguities t o t h e i r own advantage. I t was a f t e r the v i c t o r y 
i n the general elections of A p r i l 1916 t h a t the men of the 
Lliga openly decided t o transcend t h e i r party p o l i t i c a l 
perspectives i n order t o mobilise a broader spectrum of 
pub l i c opinion." 
(Jutglar, 1982, v o l . V I I , 323) 
I n other words, the Lliga appealed t o the n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment i n 
order t o press f o r more autonomy. Again, an al l i a n c e w i t h other 
Catalan p a r t i e s was required. The Assemblea de Parliamentciris'^''", 
v ^ i c h was supposed t o achieve t h i s , f a i l e d , and i n the climate of 
shairpening social c o n f l i c t , the Lliga decided t o leave the course of 
confrontation and work w i t h the central government instead. I n 1918, 
32 33 attenpts were undertaken by both the Lliga , the Manccmunitat and 
the Spanish government t o make a statute of autonomy f o r Catalonia, 
but the plan never advanced beyond the formation of a commission. 
\ h i s assembly was an attenpt i n 1917 by the Lliga Regionalista t o 
set up a Catalan assembly wi t h the Catalan members of Parliament i n 
order t o question the legitimacy of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l setup and t o push 
f o r greater autonomy. 
"^ T^he Lliga polled the l o c a l government bodies on the issue of 
autonomy, and found t h a t 98% were i n favour of a greater degree of 
autonomy (Jutglar, 1982, v o l . V I I , 329). 
•^ "^ The Manccmunitat used the n a t i o n a l i s t euphoria a t the end of the 
F i r s t World War t o announce t o the Spanish government t h a t 
"At t h i s solemn moment i n world h i s t o r y , which vindicates 
the p r i n c i p l e of the c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t of nations t o govern 
themselves f r e e l y (...), the Catalans address the Government 
and the Spanish people t o convey t h e i r desire t o govern 
Catalan a f f a i r s autonomously." 
( I . Molas, 1974, 140) 
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5.3 Class struggle and the end of bourgeois aspirations to 
autoncarry 
Under the inpact of the post-war depression and due t o the 
increasing strength of the anarcho-syndicalist workers' movement, 
class struggle became the p r i o r i t y i n Catalonia between 1918 and 
1923, while the n a t i o n a l i s t c o n f l i c t took the backseat. 
I t was mentioned above t h a t the majority of the Catalan working 
class was not represented through any of the p o l i t i c a l parties i n 
Catalonia. The r e l a t i v e l y small republican and social-democratic 
Catalanist p a r t i e s (the UFNR, the Unio Catalanista, the Partit 
Republica Catala, the Federacio Danocratica Nacionalista and the 
34 
Accio Catalana (1922), a s p l i t - o f f form the Lliga ) - were c r i t i c a l 
o f the L l i g a , but had no r e a l support among the workers, although 
they aimed a t an a l l i a n c e between the petty bourgeoisie and the 
working class (Molas, 1974, 138). Late attertpts t o bridge the gap 
between the CNT and the l e f t - w i n g Catalan p a r t i e s were doomed t o 
f a i l u r e i n the atmosphere of open class struggle which opened w i t h a 
b i g s t r i k e wave i n 1919. The divisions between the small bourgeoisie 
and the workers became obvious during these years. From a safe 
distance, the progressive middle classes i n Catalonia i d e n t i f i e d 
w i t h the small nations involved i n the world war and followed w i t h 
great i n t e r e s t the peace negotiations \shich seemed t o s e t t l e the 
natio n a l questions i n Europe. The post-war economic and p o l i t i c a l 
c r i s i s shattered t h e i r social-democratic i l l u s i o n s very quickly: 
" I n the atmosphere of r a d i c a l i s a t i o n and hardening of the 
class struggle i n Barcelona, under the inpact of the 
Canadenca s t r i k e i n February 1919, the i n t e r c l a s s i s t dreams 
of the p e t t y bourgeoisie dissolved before the d i r e c t 
confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the p r o l e t a r i a t . 
The p e t t y bourgeoisie, the Catalan L e f t - i.e. the l e f t - w i n g 
c a t a l a n i s t s and the Catalan republicans - was dreaming about 
the "new world" o f nations, of progress and peace. Ihe 
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The two presidents of the Catalan government during the Second 
Republic, came from such small p e t t y bourgeois p a r t i e s ; Macia from the 
Federacio Deroocratica Nacionalista and Coirpanys from the Partit 
Republica Catala ( I . Molas, 1974, 138). 
(Chapter two) (109) 
workers, however, the p r o l e t a r i a t organised by the 
anarcho-syndicalist and revolutionary CNT, were think i n g 
about a d i f f e r e n t "new world" bom i n 1917: t h a t of the 
Soviets." 
(Ucelay da Cal, 1978, 57) 
Thus, i t had become inpossible f o r the L l i g a and f o r the small 
p a r t i e s t o the L e f t t o reconcile the d i f f e r e n t social classes with a 
n a t i o n a l i s t p r o j e c t . Unable t o cope wi t h a working class vfeLch had 
learned t o f i g h t back, the L l i g a and the Catalan bourgeoisie ca l l e d 
on the cen t r a l state f o r m i l i t a r y a i d , which came i n the form o f a 7 
year d i c t a t o r s h i p . I t was only under the dic t a t o r s h i p of Primo de 
Rivera (1923-1930) t h a t inter-class p o l i t i c a l projects involving the 
working class began t o develop. 
Thus, Catalan nationalism was consolidated i n the hands of the 
bourgeoisie a f t e r the loss of the l a s t Spanish colonies. Though the 
L l i g a Regionalista appealed t o the Catalan people as a v,*iole and f o r 
some time managed t o maintain hegemony, i t f a i l e d t o obtain the 
support of the bulk of the working class. 
I n the following section, the marginal r o l e of Scottish p o l i t i c a l 
nationalism i n the f i r s t h a l f of the 20th century i s exaitdned. I t 
argues t h a t the main reason f o r lack o f popular support f o r 
nationalism i n Scotland was the confidence i n the management 
a b i l i t i e s of the cen t r a l state. 
6. THE SCOTTISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND CENTRALISED ECONOMIC 
PLANNING IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
I n the period o f depression a f t e r the f i r s t world war, a Scottish 
c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l began '^s^ch marked a notable difference t o the 19th 
century, although i t occurred on a much smaller scale than the 
Catalan renaissance o f the l a s t century. I n the f i r s t place, i t 
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35 affected poetry and involved the rediscovery of the minority 
languages i n Scotland. The most renowned poet of the period, the 
communist and n a t i o n a l i s t Hugh MacDiarmid, wrote mostly i n Scots. 
Like the Catalan w r i t e r s of the renaixenga, the Scottish l i t e r a r y 
movement wanted t o connect w i t h the t r a d i t i o n of the 15th and 16th 
century, i . e . w i t h pre-union l i t e r a t u r e , but the socio-economic 
circumstances f o r such an undertaking were quite d i f f e r e n t . A great 
increase i n magazines and publications was registered, but there was 
no galvanising process of i n t e l l e c t u a l s around p a r t i c u l a r magazines 
and associations as there had been i n Catalonia. Some young w r i t e r s 
created the Scottish National Movement i n 1926 (Hanham, 1967, 153), 
and played a prominent r o l e i n the creation of the f i r s t n a t i o n a l i s t 
party, the National Party of Scotland (NPS). Hanham saw an obvious 
connection between nationalism and Scottish culture i n the l a t e 
1920's. 
"The Scottish l i t e r a r y renaissance had stood f o r the 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t the Scottish nation needed a Scottish 
l i t e r a r y class t o give meaning and depth t o i t s culture and 
t o put Scotland on the map of Europe". 
(Hanham, 1967, 162) 
However, t h i s was a minority of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n a very marginal 
p o l i t i c a l movement, which soon abandoned ideas o f c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l 
and s o c i a l j u s t i c e and became a caiipaigning body f o r Scottish 
autonomy. When the NSP joined with the conservative and moderate 
de v o l u t i o n i s t Scottish Party i n 1934 t o form the Scottish National 
Party, many i n t e l l e c t u a l s l e f t the party, among them MacDiarmid. I n 
1967, he would c r i t i c i s e the SNP f o r i t s lack of i n t e r e s t i n 
Scotland's c u l t u r a l predicament, arguing t h a t he d i d not believe 
t h a t a nation could be regenerated by arguments based on s t a t i s t i c s 
or improved business techniques (Grieve, 1969, 228). But the lack of 
a c u l t u r a l argument i n Scottish p o l i t i c a l nationalism remained a 
constant. The SNP of the 1930's, hov;ever, had d i f f e r e n t p r i o r i t i e s . 
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Some of the most iirportant names i n Scottish poetry are Norman 
MacCaig, George Mackay Brown ard Dan Crichton Smith w r i t i n g i n English, 
Sydney Goodsir Smith, Alexander Scott, Robert Garioch, Albert Mackie, 
Tom Law and Hugh MacDiarmd i n Scots, and Sorley MacLsan and George 
Campbell Hay i n Gaelic. 
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A very marginal p o l i t i c a l force, i t s leadership t r i e d t o widen the 
base of support by making home r u l e the common ground, but i t could 
not increase i t s popularity"^ ^. 
Meanv^le, the other p a r t i e s ' i n t e r e s t i n devolution had become very 
low key. Home r u l e became a f o s s i l i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l programnnes 
\\^ich were increasingly geared t o c e n t r a l i s t planning, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the Labour Party: 
" ( . . . ) from the 1930s, the old Home Rule concept i t s e l f 
became redundant w i t h the party's move t o a philosophy 
st a t e planning and centralised economic management." 
(Keating, 1983, p. 29) 
This i n t e r e s t i n state intervention i n the economy was strengthened 
considerably under the inpression of the inter-war c r i s i s , the 
deepest c a p i t a l i s t c r i s i s experienced so f a r . I t call e d not f o r 
decentralisation, but f o r a strong state which could influence the 
c a p i t a l i s t forces. 
I n t h i s context, one must consider the peculiar s i t u a t i o n of the 
Scottish economy. For several decades, i t had suffered from decline 
i n t e x t i l e and heavy industries as c a p i t a l was invested abroad i n 
the enpire and coirpetition became stronger from l a t e developers i n 
other parts of Europe. To the s t r u c t u r a l c r i s i s came the world 
economic depression. I n the f i r s t h a l f of the 1930s, vjhen the 
economic c r i s i s was a t i t s worst, Scotland's unemployment was always 
above 25 per cent (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 86-87). I n the face of 
economic and soc i a l c r i s i s , the labour Party supported centralised 
economic planning, which was i n c o n f l i c t w i t h ideas of 
decentralisation and self-government. The Conservative Party was 
also i n favour of a greater r o l e f o r the government i n economic 
a f f a i r s . Thus, there existed from the 1930's onwards a consensus 
I n 1929, the NPS got 3,000 votes, vMch i t increased i n 1931 t o 
20,000. I n 1935, the SNP received 29,000 and maintained the same l e v e l 
i n 1945 (30,000), i n s p i t e of the by-election v i c t o r y of Robert Mclntyre 
during the war-time e l e c t o r a l truce between the main par t i e s . 
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v*iich favoured a strong, powerful government and went conpletely 
against the aims t h a t the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t s were pursuing. 
This consensus also included most of the Scottish population. During 
the war and the post-war reconstruction, the r o l e of the state i n 
economic planning ejqsanded phenomenally. I n the post-war labour 
government, Thomas Johnston, v^o had helped i n r e v i t a l i s i n g the 
Scottish Home Rule movement i n 1918, was Secretary f o r Scotland and 
"succeeded i n i d e n t i f y i n g the Labour Party a t B r i t i s h l e v e l 
and the 1945 administration i n p a r t i c u l a r , w i t h the 
aspirations o f the Scottish people as a whole f o r f u l l 
n ational development and f o r control over t h e i r economy." 
(Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 97) 
Thus, Scottish p o l i t i c a l nationalism, which j u s t began t o organise 
i t s e l f a t a time o f economic disaster, a l l but disappeared under a 
wave of B r i t i s h national s o l i d a r i t y during the war, and only 
maintained a meagre existence on the margins of serious p o l i t i c s . I t 
was unable t o get i t s message through i n a period ;\^ere a l l hope 
seemed t o l i e w i t h a benevolent and strong state. A sector of the 
SNP, including i t s chairman, reacted t o t h i s by moving back t o the 
home r u l e approach of the 1920's and bu i l d i n g up contacts w i t h other 
p a r t i e s i n order t o prepare the ground f o r a National Convention. 
The increasing antagonism between separatists and home r u l e r s i n the 
SNP erupted i n 1942, when the home ru l e r s l e f t the party and 
eventually set up the Scottish Conventional Association. Between 
1949 and 1952, the SCA allegedly collected 2.5 m i l l i o n signatures i n 
favour of a Scottish parliament with devolved powers over Scottish 
a f f a i r s (Webb, 1978, 66), but could not convert t h i s general support 
i n t o a popular p o l i t i c a l movement. However, there are some signs 
t h a t the labour movement took notice of these developments and t r i e d 
t o counteract a dangerous p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of national feelings. The 
Scottish Trade Union Congress began t o voice demands f o r a Scottish 
cabinet, warning of a resurgence of nationalism, and resolved i n 
1948 t h a t i t 
"deplores the trend towards Scottish Nationalism which i s 
revealing i t s e l f i n the Scottish TU movement, and d r i v i n g us 
t o support uneconomic projects. Congress believes t h a t 
Scottish c u l t u r e and t r a d i t i o n s w i l l be preserved by t h e i r 
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own strength and v i r i l i t y without the need f o r e x p l o i t i n g 
N a t i o n a l i s t sentiments," 
(quoted i n Tuckett, 1985, 323) 
Although the SCA revealed t h a t support f o r more devolution was 
widespread and succeeded i n r a i s i n g the n a t i o n a l i s t i c tone of the 
1945 e l e c t i o n canpaign, i t neither provoked a change i n p o l i c i e s of 
the B r i t i s h p a r t i e s nor a larger share of the vote f o r the SNP. 
Scottish nationalism presented no danger t o established unionist 
p o l i t i c s u n t i l the 1960's. 
I n conclusion, the Scottish N a t i o n a l i s t Party was formed a t a time 
v^en the economic c r i s i s forged a B r i t i s h consensus over the need 
f o r a strong, centralised state. Despite the existence of a Scottish 
national i d e n t i t y v^iich was a t times showing i t s strength, a 
p o l i t i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t p r o j e c t had only very marginal support during 
t h i s period. Meanv^ile, the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t movement gained 
support from the broad masses and succeeded t o seize p o l i t i c a l power 
i n Catalonia, as the following section describes. 
7. POPUIAR NATIONALISM IN CATALONIA (1923-1939) 
curing the d i c t a t o r s h i p o f Franco de Rivera, the repression o f 
Catalan nationalism and of the anarcho-syndicalist and the 
Republican p o l i t i c a l organisations created the conditions f o r a 
popular nationalism t h a t was no longer defined by the bourgeoisie. 
A f t e r seven years of di c t a t o r s h i p , popular nationalism brought about 
the f i r s t Catalan government i n 1931, condoned by the new Republican 
Government i n Madrid. 
7.1 The reaction to the Rivera dictatorship in Catalonia 
The m i l i t a r y coup v^i c h the Catalan bourgeoisie had supported i n 
1923 put an end t o parliamentary p o l i t i c s . There were two main 
reasons why the m i l i t a r y decided t o topple the government. F i r s t l y , 
they perceived t h a t the Spanish state was no longer able to contain 
the demands f o r autonomy i n the peripheries. Cambo's assembly of 
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elected Catalan representatives was one indicator. The struggle 
between the d i f f e r e n t regional bourgeoisies f o r supremacy had beccime 
uncontrollable. The second reason was the escalation o f class 
struggle i n the aftermath of the f i r s t world war. 
I n both c o n f l i c t s , Catalonia played a central r o l e . The class 
c o n f l i c t was p a r t i c u l a r l y strong i n the i n d u s t r i a l parts of 
Catalonia. I n order t o crush the working class organisations and t o 
suppress s t r i k e s and r i o t s , the Catalan bourgeoisie was 
collaborating w i t h the govemnient, thus demonstrating t h a t class 
s o l i d a r i t y came before national s o l i d a r i t y . The new d i c t a t o r , Primo 
de Rivera, was welcomed by the leaders of the L l i g a and the 
bourgeoisie. But when he began t o deal w i t h the two roots of " e v i l " , 
many middle and upper class Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t s soon realised t h a t 
they were also considered p a r t of the "dangerous viruses" i n 
society. Rivera prohibited n a t i o n a l i s t and Catalanist 
37 38 organisations and national symbols . Parties, although not 
pr o h i b i t e d as such, could no longer exercise t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
functions. The o f f i c i a l use of the Catalan language, v^ich had been 
promoted under the Mancoraunitat, was now forbidden, and the 
Mancontunitat i t s e l f was abolished i n 1925. The working class 
organisations were more vulnerable and suffered g r e a t l y under the 
repression. The CNT was prohibited i n 1924 and became clandestine. 
The concurrent repression of c i v i l r i g h t s , p o l i t i c a l nationalism and 
the workers' movement created the conditions f o r a broad popular 
opposition t o the au t h o r i t a r i a n regiine, as i t d i d l a t e r under 
Franco. The republican and s o c i a l i s t wing of Catalan nationalism 
This included organisations which were not s t r i c t l y p o l i t i c a l , 
such as the youth organisation Pcmells de Joventut, Catalan choral 
societies (orfeus), and the CADCI (Centre Autonond.sta de D^>endents del 
Caiier9 i de l a Industria) (Jutglar, 1982, v o l . V I I I , 14). 
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The Real Decreto de l a Defensa de l a Unidad Nacional of September 
1923 signalled the beginning of an aggressive type o f Spanish 
nationalism which reached i t s peak i n the 1940's under Franco. I t 
pro h i b i t e d the public display of national symbols such as the Catalan 
f l a g . 
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gained support. The Estat Catala (1922) served as a focal 
organisation f o r the separatist and n a t i o n a l i s t groups and gained 
strength under the leadership of Francesc Macia, who went i n t o 
French e x i l e l i k e other p o l i t i c a l opponents of the regime. A f t e r 
several plans t o overthrow the dictatorship through m i l i t a r y groups 
of separatists, communists and anarchists f a i l e d , the republicans i n 
Catalonia formed an a l l i a n c e which became the centre of oppositional 
. . . -39 a c t i v i t y . The weekly newspaper Opinio became the main voice of 
the opposition on the l e f t (Jutglar, 1982, v o l . V I I I , 27), which i n 
the f i n a l years of the dic t a t o r s h i p t r i e d t o gain p o l i t i c a l control 
over the huge, disparate body of the CNT, the key t o revolutionary 
change (Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 104). 
Even some sectors of the i n d u s t r i a l ard the i n t e l l e c t u a l bourgeoisie 
v^i c h had i n i t i a l l y supported the coup turned away from the regime. 
V i l a r described the atmosphere among the i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n 1927 as 
very Catalanist and anti-Spanish, and observed t h a t close l i n k s 
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existed between the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and the i n t e l l e c t u a l s . By the 
end of the decade, almost the e n t i r e Catalan c i v i l society was 
alienated from the Spanish regime under General Rivera, and favoured 
a democratic.autonomous government f o r Catalonia. 
7.2 The f i r s t Catalan government; h^gitony of popular nationalism 
I n the f i n a l years of the dicta t o r s h i p , several interim governments 
were established and revolutionary plans were formed by p o l i t i c a l 
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This j o u r n a l was the creation of a group of young, wealthy 
professionals who synpathised w i t h the ideas of the Comite Revolucionari 
de Catalmya, led by the republican Companys (v^ ho l a t e r became the 
second president of the Generalitat) (Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 99-100). 
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"Rare were the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and eminent businessmen among those 
whom I v i s i t e d who were not poets or f o l k l o r i s t s ; and few w r i t e r s or 
painters were not regular v i s i t o r s of the Ateneu ( V i l a r , 1980, 532). The 
Ateneu Barcelones was one of the most irtportant c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
Vi±iich the bourgeoisie set up i n the 19th century, and has been an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and s o c i a l centre f o r the educated Barcelonean upper - and 
l a t e r also the middle - classes. 
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groups t o get r i d of them. The negotiations i n Catalonia between 
republicans and n a t i o n a l i s t s made progress i n 1930, when an alliance 
was formed v ^ i c h agreed on a formula of Catalan autonomy. 
Republicans and n a t i o n a l i s t s consisted of rcany small groups many of 
v ^ c h had t h e i r basis i n geographically dispersed c u l t u r a l 
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i n s t i t u t i o n s and other popular meeting places . Macia, the 
separatist leader v^o had gained a reputation as a revolutionary 
hero i n the unsuccessful coup atteitpt i n 1926, was the f i g u r e around 
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which the d i f f e r e n t groups assembled . A loose party organisation, 
the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), was f i n a l l y formed in 
March 1931, j u s t a month before the municipal elections v ^ c h the 
monarchic government was forced t o concede and v^ich brought i t s 
demise. The ERC won the elections, Macia returned from e x i l e and 
declared Catalonia a republic, and L l u i s Coropanys, the new leader of 
the c i t y council i n Barcelona, declared Spain a federal republic. 
The s i t u a t i o n was brought under control by the new Republican 
c e n t r a l government which acknowledged the provisional Catalan 
government (Generalitat) under Macia's leadership i n exchange f o r a 
moderation of Catalan republican and n a t i o n a l i s t aspirations. A 
commission of the Generalitat worked out a Catalan c o n s t i t u t i o n 
(Estatut d'Autoncmia de Nuria) which received the consent of the 
ma j o r i t y of the Catalans (80 per cent p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) i n the 
referendum of August 1931. EXie t o the right-wing and c e n t r a l i s t 
opposition vhich the proposal of Nuria encountered i n the Spanish 
establishment and i n parliament, i t was watered down considerably 
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Inportant Catalan republican nuclei were i n Reus (Andreu i 
Abello's Centre Nacionalista Republica), Lleida (La Joventut Republicana 
under Humbert Torres), Girona (Miguel Santalo) and Sant F e l i u de Guixols 
(Josep I r l a ) , among many others (Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 118). 
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He was described by Ucelay da Cal as "a r i c h land owner vho had 
abandoned comfort and wealth i n order t o defend the national cause and 
the oppressed; he was an elegant gentleman, w e l l connected i n the 
Catalan r u r a l and urban society, and f r i e n d l y with iirportant conpany 
lawyers as w e l l as w i t h anarchists and communists, v^igm he met i n e x i l e . 
He was a revolutionary who embodied reform and self-determination, but 
vdio also served as a guarantee of c i v i c peace. These were natural 
conditions f o r the r o l e of a charismatic leader." (Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 
115) 
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when i t was f i n a l l y approved by the Cortes (the Spanish parliament) 
i n September 1932. The Catalan Generalitat however decided t o accept 
the Statute, even though i t was f a r cry from the separatist ideas 
President Macia had been nurturing during the 1920's. 
Considering the long t r a d i t i o n of Spanish centralism and the recent 
experience of reactionary and anti-autonomist government, neither 
the opposition t o the Catalan desire f o r autonomy, nor ultjimately 
the coirpromise, were surprising. However, there were c r i t i c a l voices 
which p a r t i c u l a r l y resented the lack of l e g i s l a t i v e powers of the 
Republican Generalitat, as Jutglar's assessment shows: 
" I n f a c t , the Catalan autonomy of 1932 was not r e a l 
autonomy, but rather a wide ranging process of 
decentralisation. And despite i t s wide range, t h i s 
decentralisation i n practice ended up becoming something 
s i m i l a r t o what the Manconunitat of Catalonia had been 
during the Restoration (...)". 
(Jutglar, 1982, v o l , V I I I , 89) 
Nevertheless, the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t movement achieved i n 1932 what 
i t s Scottish counterpart could then only dream of: a parliament and 
a government. Despite t h e i r l i m i t e d resources and powers, they 
consolidated national p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y and accentuated the 
distinctiveness of Catalan society. This process, however, was 
acconpanied by c o n f l i c t s and contradictions which only s i x years 
l a t e r erupted i n the Spanish C i v i l War. 
7.3 The sharpening of socio-econcmic and p o l i t i c a l conflicts in 
the 1930^3 
Several levels of c o n f l i c t disrupted Catalan p o l i t i c s i n the 1930's. 
F i r s t l y , there was an ongoing c o n f l i c t over p o l i t i c a l p r i o r i t i e s 
between the Generalitat and the Spanish government. The p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n i n Catalonia was very d i f f e r e n t from t h a t i n the rest of 
Spain, and the same can be said about the economic problems \^^ich 
dominated the 1930's. V'Jhile i n Catalonia the social c o n f l i c t s were 
those of an i n d u s t r i a l society, the most inportant task i n many 
Spanish regions remained agrarian reform. The republicans i n 
Catalonia, and more precisely the ERC, had t o f i n d support among the 
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urban working class, the syndicates and the smallholders, and were 
therefore interested i n quite d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s . I n addition, the 
tensions increased between the Generalitat and the government i n 
Madrid when the l a t t e r became conservative i n the 1933 elections, 
\stiile the ERC maintained i t s power i n Catalonia. Within the Catalan 
context, i t should be remembered t h a t the CNT regained strength very 
r a p i d l y i n the Republic and became increasingly m i l i t a n t as the 
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economic c r i s i s began t o a f f e c t Catalan industry . This sharpened 
the s o c i a l climate i n the c i t i e s , v ^ i l e i n the countryside, the 
demands of the smallholders f o r a land ownership and tenure reform 
became louder. F i n a l l y , the dominant party, ERC, bom as a 
conglomerate of small pa r t i e s , groups and movements, was a 
heterogeneous structure w i t h separatist, f e d e r a l i s t and conservative 
c a t a l a n i s t wings (Gatell, 1983, 78), v ^ i c h were d i f f i c u l t t o keep 
together a f t e r the party leader, Macia, had died i n 1933. 
The c o n f l i c t s erupted i n autumn 1934, a f t e r the Generalitat had made 
an a g r i c u l t u r a l reform law i n order t o accommodate the demands of 
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the r u r a l tenants . I n doing t h i s , the Generalitat took on the land 
owners v\^ich were mainly represented by the Institut AgricxDla Catala 
de Sant Isidre. The right-wing ce n t r a l government disputed the 
conpetence of the Generalitat i n the f i e l d of social l e g i s l a t i o n , 
and thus turned social c o n f l i c t i n t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t . With 
the p a r t i a l support of the Catalan Government, the more radical 
n a t i o n a l i s t s took t h i s as an opportunity t o r e v o l t and declare 
Catalonia an autonomous republic. No spontaneous popular support was 
forthcoming and the central government d i d not f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o 
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Though much less severe than i n the more developed i n d u s t r i a l 
states i n Europe, unemployment rose i n Catalonia from 3.6% i n 1931 t o 
7.4% i n 1933, 7.9% i n 1935 and 10.7% i n 1936 (Jutglar, 1982, v o l . V I I , 
104) . 
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The d e l i c a t e balance between landlords and tenants i n Catalonia 
had been disturbed since the l a t e 19th century, when a wine disease led 
t o the removal of many vineyards and the long-term tenures connected 
w i t h them. Loss of markets and overproduction put increasing pressure on 
the tenants, many of whom became m i l i t a n t s i n the Unio de Rabassaires i 
altres obrers del camp (Union of wine growers and other land labourers), 
formed i n 1922 (Bacells, 1978, 27). 
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thwart t h i s badly organised r e v o l t . As a r e s u l t , the autonomous 
regime was suspended and the Catalan government inprisoned. 
The state of emergency i n Catalonia was not l i f t e d u n t i l mid-1935. A 
governor was appointed by the central government. But i n the 
following elections i n February 1936, the Pc^jular Front won i n Spain 
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and Catalonia . This returned the Catalan government under 
Conpanys, v^o were released from prison. 
I n the few months before the m i l i t a r y uprising began on July 18, 
1936, Catalonia was described as an "oasis of peace" cctipared with 
other parts of Spain which were ri d d l e d w i t h violence (Benet, 1978, 
12). This v i s i o n supports the argument th a t Catalonia, f a r from 
being the cause of the uprising of the right-wing anny, was forced 
i n t o the war because the republican values were so deeply rooted 
there. The r e v o l t of the m i l i t a r y was a t the same tijtte a r e v o l t of 
the Catholic clergy, the Spanish n a t i o n a l i s t s and the upper classes 
vjho f e l t increasingly threatened by the populist government. 
During the c i v i l war, v^ich was triggered o f f by the " n a t i o n a l i s t " 
m i l i t a r y u p r i s i n g i n July 1936, Catalonia was pa r t of the Republican 
zone and put up a vigorous defence of the Republican government. 
This i s not the place t o discuss i n d e t a i l the i n t e r n a t i o n a l , 
Spanish and Catalan implications and conplications of the war. I t 
should be mentioned, however, t h a t the war was acconpanied from the 
beginning by revolutionary changes i n the Republican zone ( i n i t i a t e d 
by the anarchist and s o c i a l i s t syndicates), which were reversed i n 
1937 by the government's recovery of power on the one hand, and the 
r i s e of the communist party under the tutelage of the Soviet Union 
on the other. The communists played an inportant r o l e i n the f i g h t 
against revolutionary s o c i a l i s t s and syndicalists, which was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y f i e r c e i n Catalonia. Only a few days a f t e r the 
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I n Catalonia, the popular f r o n t was called Front d'Esquerres, and 
consisted mostly of Catalan par t i e s , such as the ERC, the Unio 
Socialista de Catal\jnya (USC), the PCP (Partit Catala Proletari), the 
POC (Partit Ccraunista de Catalunya) and the Partit Sindicalista. 
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46 beginning of the c i v i l war, the Catalan communists had merged t o 
form the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) . Thus, apart 
from the war between republicans and the " n a t i o n a l i s t " under the 
leadership of General Franco, there was also f i g h t i n g w i t h i n the 
Catalan Republican zone between revolutionary anarchists and 
• +. 47 communists . 
I n September 1938, the Francoist troops began t o occupy Catalonia, 
reaching Barcelona i n January 1939. The war had disastro\as effects 
on the population and the economy and caused deep divisions i n 
Catalonia. However, the actions of the v i c t o r i o u s Francoists l a t e r 
enabled commentators t o argue t h a t 1939 brought the defeat of a l l 
Catalans, v\iiether Republican or " n a t i o n a l i s t " . According t o Benet, 
even those v*io as individuals saw t h e i r i n t e r e s t s - r e l a t i n g t o 
t h e i r class p o s i t i o n , r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s or ideology - represented by 
the Francoists, soon found out t h a t as members of the Catalan 
nation, they were the losers of the war (Benet, 1978, 16). Ucelay da 
Cal's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n demonstrates how Republican and the autonomist 
experience were welded together i n Catalonia, not least i n the 
perception of the Francoists: 
"The f a l l of Catalonia was objectively the end of the Second 
Republic, and Francoism proved a b r u t a l h i s t o r i c break. 
( ) The m i l i t a r y occupation government vhich was inposed 
i n 1939 had learned the lessons of the past. I t was no 
longer prepared t o act l i k e the dictat o r s h i p under Primo de 
Rivera, v ^ i c h carried out p o l i t i c a l repression v ^ i l e 
allowing Catalan culture t o f l o u r i s h . This [had l a i d the 
foundations which] made a p o l i t i c a l r e v i v a l easy once the 
di c t a t o r s h i p disappeared. The task vhich the Nueva Espana 
took on i n Catalonia entailed precisely the destruction of 
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The PSUC was formed on July 21st, 1936, as a r e s u l t of the fusion 
of four p a r t i e s , the Partit Ccraunista Catala, the Unio Socialista de 
Catalunya, the Federacio Catalana del Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol 
(PSOE) and the Partit Catala Proletari. 
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See Borkenau, 1963; Orwell, 1984; and Chomsky, 1969. 
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everything connected w i t h populist Catalonia." 
(Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 356) 
Thus, the experience of repression under the dictat o r s h i p of Primo 
de Rivera united the Catalans t o an unprecedented degree. Catalan 
nationalism became link e d w i t h the struggle f o r democracy and social 
j u s t i c e , and when the republicans gained power i n 1931, popular 
pressure f o r an autonomous government i n Catalonia was stronger than 
ever. A f t e r the a n t i - s e p a r a t i s t , Spanish n a t i o n a l i s t side had 
brought down the Republican regime, v^ich had given the Catalans a 
l i m i t e d degree of autonomy, repression of Catalan nationalism 
resumed. But t h i s second dictatorship, too, was faced with an 
opposition v\*iich was strengthened by a sense of national i d e n t i t y . 
8. THE CATALANS UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP IN THE 1940'S AND 1950'S 
This section looks a t the ways i n which the Catalans were affected 
by the repression of the Franco regime i n i t s f i r s t two decades, 
when the country was struggling t o get back on i t s feet. I t 
distinguishes between p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l and social repression and 
shows t h a t resistance was d i f f i c u l t and dispersed. Only i n the 
1960's d i d the d i f f e r e n t struggles begin t o emerge i n the open and 
t o converge, and nationalism provided the platform f o r t h i s 
convergence. 
8.1 P o l i t i c a l repression 
The m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y of the " n a t i o n a l i s t " array gave power t o a 
d i c t a t o r i a l regime vAaich stayed f o r almost four decades. Over t h i s 
period, the d i c t a t o r s h i p underwent some changes, but retained i t s 
main ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an extreme personal regime, supported by the 
landed and the i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie, the Church, the array and a 
growing body of c i v i l servants v^o depended on the state 
bureaucracy. A f t e r several years of severe repression of the parties 
and organisations of the Republic, the right-wing p o l i t i c a l groups 
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v*iich were l e f t over - f a s c i s t , reactionary and ultraconservative -
were amalgamated i n t o a single government party, the Movimiento, i n 
1946 (S. V i l a r , 1985, 40). The government r e f l e c t e d the d i f f e r e n t 
conponents of Franco's support and included generals, Falanguists, 
r i ^ t - w i n g monarchists, C a r l i s t s and conservative Catholics; i n the 
l a t e 1950's, Catholic technocrats (Opus Dei) became an inportant 
force i n the government due t o the change i n economic strategy 
(Giner, 1980, 208). 
I n the ideological b a t t l e w i t h the progressive forces of the 
Republic, the right-wing p o l i t i c a l forces had developed the core 
tenets of Francoism: Catholicism and a widely defined anticoramunism, 
vAiich embraced republicanism, socialism and anarchism as w e l l . The 
d i c t a t o r s h i p interpreted the c i v i l v/ar as a crusade against atheism 
and communism. The t h i r d main ingredient was Spanish nationalism and 
the defence of national u n i t y , which the regime regarded as i t s task 
t o achieve through the eradication of - again very widely defined -
separatism i n Catalonia and the Basque Country . I n Ucelay's comment 
quoted above (p. 44), i t becomes clear t h a t the root of the threat 
t o the i n t e g r i t y of the Spanish state was seen t o l i e i n the 
c u l t u r a l p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of the peripheral nations. Therefore, 
eradication of Catalan nationalism had t o involve c u l t u r a l 
repression and an aggressive p o l i c y of " c a s t i l i a n i s a t i o n " . 
"The events confirmed t h a t the "decatalanisation" of 
Catalonia was one of the fundamental aims of the Francoist 
regime, and one of the p r i n c i p a l causes of the Spanish war. 
At the same time, severe repression was exercised against 
anything v^iich stood f o r democracy". 
(Benet, 1979, 96) 
This began w i t h the o c c i ^ t i o n of Lleida i n A p r i l 1938, v*ien the 
Generalitat was abolished and a l l i t s p o l i c i e s and reforms 
48 
annulled , including the p o s i t i o n of Catalan as the second o f f i c i a l 
language i n Catalonia (Benet, 1980, 88). I n replacing the 
Generalitat w i t h m i l i t a r y and p r o v i n c i a l governors nominated by the 
d i c t a t o r , a predominantly non-Catalan p o l i t i c a l s t r a t a was 
48 
Decret of A p r i l 5th, 1938. 
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49 imposed . Although the repression affected a l l the parties and 
syndicates of the Republic, i t was p a r t i c u l a r l y severe i n Catalonia 
v*iere syrxlicalism was deeply rooted and the Esquerra Republicana had 
b u i l t up an administrative structure. Many f l e d t o France, easily 
accessible but s h o r t l y afterwards also under f a s c i s t occupation, and 
tens of thousands emigrated t o l a t i n American countries. Others were 
k i l l e d or put i n t o concentration canps under the "cleaning up" 
cairpaigns o f the new r u l e r s (newer figures supplied by Sole i 
Sabate suggest t h a t the k i l l i n g s affected less people than 
previously assumed) (Sole i Sabate, 1985, 264-268). 
The Generalitat and most of the prohibited p a r t i e s set up 
organisations i n e x i l e , v ^ i l e i n Catalonia the opposition could only 
organise clandestinely and under great d i f f i c u l t i e s . The f i r s t 
n a t i o n a l i s t resistance group, the Front Nacional de Catalxmya (FNC)'; 
was formed i n 1940 by e x i l e d members of Estat Catala, Nosaltres 
Sols, the ERG and P a r t i t Socialista. The FNC was o r i g i n a l l y a 
m i l i t a r y f r o n t but the lack of success of the g u e r r i l l a strategy 
transformed i t i n t o a p o l i t i c a l group i n 1945, Another Catalan 
opposition group, Solidaritat Catalana, was set up by the exiled 
Generalitat i n Paris, but included only the ERC, PSUC and Accio 
Catalana (Molinero, 1981, 63), P o l i t i c a l opposition i n the 1940's 
was l e d by the e x i l e d p o l i t i c a l leaders, the underlying hope being 
t h a t the a l l i e d forces would l i b e r a t e Spain, the f i r s t v i c t i m of 
fascism. The syndicates and the communist party engaged i n sabotage 
and g u e r r i l l a f i g h t i n g but generally lacked support among a 
population Vvtiich was worn out by war and poverty. As a heritage of 
the war, the antagonism between opposition p a r t i e s made i t 
'*^In an examination of the top p o l i t i c a l personnel o f the province 
of Barcelona, Viver Pi-Sunyer and Climent found t h a t only 13,4% were 
bom i n Catalonia (Viver Pi-Sunyer and Climent, 1979, 30) 
^^According t o new decrees, anyone who a f t e r July 1st 1936 had 
impeded the Movimiento Nacional through action or' "grievous p a s s i v i t y " 
was l i a b l e t o imprisonment or execution, as were s p e c i f i c groups such as 
trade u n i o n i s t , members of masonic lodges, republican or l e f t - w i n g 
p a r t i e s , and supporters o f Basque and Catalan nationalism (Gilmour, 
1986, 28). 
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inpossible t o u n i t e i n a Catalan, or, f o r t h a t matter, Spanish 
popular f r o n t . Some attempts were made, such as the Alianza Nau^ional 
de Fuerzas Politicas de Cataluna i n the short euphoric period of 
1945, but soon disintegrated (Molinero and Ysas, 1981, 81-84). 
1948 was a decisive year, as the p o l i t i c a l opposition groups had t o 
come t o terms w i t h the f a c t t h a t the Franco regime woiiLd not f a l l 
through a l l i e d m i l i t a r y action. Some Catalan par t i e s , such as the 
ERC and the FNC faded away, and no e x p l i c i t l y n a t i o n a l i s t 
organisation was able t o maintain a s i g n i f i c a n t presence f o r many 
years t h e r e a f t e r (Viladot i Presas, 1987, 57). Instead, the 
communist party i n Catalonia developed and maintained a s u f f i c i e n t l y 
strong underground organisation. The Communists changed t h e i r 
strategy and began t o clandestinely develop a hie r a r c h i c a l structure 
i n order t o f i g h t the d i c t a t o r s h i p from w i t h i n i t s own i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
From the l a t e 1950's onwards, i t became the hegemonic force of the 
opposition i n Catalonia. This process w i l l be analysed i n more 
d e t a i l i n Chapter f i v e . 
8.2 Cultiiral repression 
I n accordance w i t h the aim of avoiding the errors of Primo de 
Rivera's a n t i - s e p a r a t i s t p o l i c i e s , the special occupation regime i n 
Barcelona i n 1939 prohibited the public use of the Catalan language. 
S i m i l a r l y , the public expression of Catalan i d e n t i t y was prohibited. 
This was pursued down t o the smallest d e t a i l as the names of 
str e e t s , corporations, i n s t i t u t i o n s and even the Christian names of 
people had t o be changed. Catalan books disappeared from the shops 
and pu b l i c l i b r a r i e s v^iich were p u r i f i e d from documents of marxist, 
communist and separatist tendency (Benet, 1979, 248) and the 
p r i n t i n g o f Catalan was suspended conpletely. 
I n the process of c a s t i l i a n i s a t i o n , the schools played an irtportant 
r o l e . As a r e s u l t of the a b o l i t i o n of the Generalitat, the schools 
i t had administrated f e l l under the control of the central state. 
EXrring the Second Republic, Catalan was not coitpulsory i n the 
schools, but despite t h i s , the use of Catalan as a teaching language 
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and the a b i l i t y t o read and w r i t e the language increased 
considerably (Benet, 1979, 304). Not surpr i s i n g l y , many teachers 
were sacked by the Francoist a u t h o r i t i e s and replaced by Castilian 
speakers, hundreds of v^om were sent t o Catalonia from other parts 
of Spain. 
The Catholic Church Establishment i n Catalonia had greeted the 
d i c t a t o r s h i p w i t h evjphoria, not least due t o the a n t i - c l e r i c a l 
m i l i t a n c e of 1936 and 1937. I t accepted the c a s t i l i a n i s a t i o n of the 
Church and inplemented i t v o l u n t a r i l y i n the parishes (Raguer e t 
a l . . 1977, 118; Ferrer i Girones, 1987, 180), although a reaction of 
the lower clergy against t h i s ban of the Catalan language started 
soon and developed i n t o an iirportant p o l i t i c a l issue i n the 1960's. 
The repression of Catalan language and culture affected above a l l 
the Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s , who e i t h e r had t o emigrate or remain i n 
Catalonia vAiere they could not exercise t h e i r profession. 
"Therefore, commentators have referred t o the double-sided 
e x i l e of the Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the post-war period: 
the e x t e r i o r - geographical - e x i l e of those \jho had f l e d 
from Catalonia and now had t o f u l f i l t h e i r function as 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s on the margin of the society v^ich provided a 
meaningful context t o t h e i r work; and the inner - personal -
e x i l e of those v^o had stayed and now saw t h e i r channels of 
communication cut o f f w i t h the people t o which they belonged 
and addressed themselves. They were forced t o l i v e i n 
seclusion or shut themselves up i n closed, p r i v a t e c i r c l e s . " 
(Castellanos, 1977, 28) 
As indicated above, the more active i n t e l l e c t u a l s clandestinely 
formed groups vAiich would publish and d i s t r i b u t e journals and books 
i n Catalan, but d i d not achieve a public r o l e u n t i l much l a t e r . 
Other attempts t o loosen the categorical p r o h i b i t i o n of public 
Catalan were undertaken by r e l i g i o u s publishers vJho managed t o 
produce the odd book i n the early 1940's wi t h special permission 
(Massot, 1979a). A s i g n i f i c a n t step was the foundation of the f i r s t 
Catalan publishing house i n 1946, a r e s u l t of several factors 
including the nomination of a more t o l e r a n t governor f o r the 
province of Barcelona. Throughout the 1950's, small refuges f o r 
Catalan c u l t u r e were created i n semi-legal i n s t i t u t i o n s of c i v i l 
society most of which were i n i t i a t e d by middle class i n t e l l e c t u a l s . 
(Chapter two) (126) 
The "slow break-through" of the 1960's, v*ien Catalan occupied more 
public spaces, b u i l t on t h i s decentralised and varied basis (see 
section two i n Chapter s i x ) . 
8.3 Econcmic situation 
The socio-economic sphere, too, was subjected t o state repression, 
which affected the nature of class r e l a t i o n s i n post-war Catalonia 
w i t h i n the context of p r e v a i l i n g class r e l a t i o n s . Several facts must 
be remembered i n t h i s context. F i r s t l y , Catalonia was s t i l l the most 
inportant i n d u s t r i a l region i n Spain ; only the Basque country 
could show s i m i l a r levels of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . Secondly, the 
p o l i t i c a l party of the Catalan bourgeoisie, the Lliga Regionalista, 
had l o s t influence i n Catalan and Spanish p o l i t i c s since the early 
1920's (McDonogh, 1986, 27). At the same time, the Catalan 
bourgeoisie increasingly made use of the Ca s t i l i a n language and i n 
many cases abandoned Catalan even i n domestic communication 
(McDonogh, 1986, 119). I t was therefore not greatly affected by 
anti - s e p a r a t i s t repression during and a f t e r the c i v i l war. Thirdly, 
during the short period of c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n and workers' occupations 
of f a c t o r i e s i n the f i r s t phase of the war, many c a p i t a l i s t s f l e d t o 
the " n a t i o n a l i s t " zone or abroad and hoped f o r a Francoist v i c t o r y 
which would allow them t o recuperate t h e i r businesses. Since the 
heydays of the Lliga, the Catalan bourgeoisie had retracted from 
nationalism, and t h i s helped the Catalan opposition i n the 1970's t o 
present nationalism as a progressive and popular movement. 
Although the Catalan upper class supported the m i l i t a r y " l i b e r a t i o n " 
- j u s t l i k e i n 1923 - and took back t h e i r enterprises, they d i d not 
regain the strong p o l i t i c a l influence they had enjoyed i n the f i r s t 
I n 1930-31, 53.5% of the Catalan active population worked i n the 
secondary sector, and 27.5 % i n the primary sector. This was an 
i n d u s t r i a l work force coiiparable w i t h the B r i t i s h (54%, but wi t h a much 
larger t e r t i a r y work force and only 6% working i n the primary sector), 
but considerably larger than t h a t of the Spanish, \ ^ i c h had 34% i n the 
secondary and 48% i n the primary sector (Maluquer de Motes, 1987, 170). 
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two decades. The representation of Catalans i n the top levels of the 
Francoist bureaucracy remained low (unlike the disproportionate 
Basque share of p o l i t i c a l posts) (Alba, 1984, 222-226 and 232). Some 
wel l publicised conversions t o Francoism occurred, but the main 
tendency among the Catalan bourgeoisie appears t o have been the 
withdrawal from the p o l i t i c a l scene, while t r y i n g t o keep some of 
i t s associations going (Rihas i Massana, 1978, 25). 
The main losers of the c i v i l war were the Catalan middle and the 
working class. The former was strongly n a t i o n a l i s t and formed the 
bedrock of the Catalan government party, the ERC. The l a t t e r bore 
the brunt of the Francoist repression i n the post-war years which 
brought the destruction of working class organisations and parties, 
and thus produced an easily exploitable work force w i t h no means t o 
f i g h t back. The 1940's and 1950's are remembered as years of 
economic hardship f o r the popular classes i n the v^ole of Spain, but 
i n Catalonia, where the working class had been more developed and 
be t t e r organised, the defeat was f e l t more strongly. 
Thus, i t i s clear t h a t Catalonia experienced a combination of 
c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l repression i n the 1940's and 1950's. 
Much of t h i s also occurred i n the other parts of Spain, but there 
was an add i t i o n a l repression of Catalan nationalism. The Catalans 
l o s t t h e i r autonomous governmental structures, and many i n s t i t u t i o n s 
of Catalan c i v i l society were destroyed. P o l i t i c a l resistance was 
unsuccessful, not least because people were t i r e d of f i g h t i n g and 
deeply divided through the c o n f l i c t s t h a t acconpanied the c i v i l war. 
Catalan nationalism went priv a t e , and i t was only i n the 1960's th a t 
i t re-emerged again i n public as an uncoordinated movement f o r 
c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l . 
The following section gives a b r i e f sketch of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
r e v i v a l i n Catalonia and Scotland, v\hich i s explored i n depth i n the 
following chapters. 
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9. THE REVIVAL OF POLITICAL NATIONALISM IN CATALONIA AND SOOITAND 
I n Catalonia, the c u l t u r a l movement of the 1960's was almost 
n a t u r a l l y p o l i t i c i s e d because Catalan c u l t u r e was repressed through 
laws, decrees and bureaucratic procedures. But the f i r s t o v e r t l y 
p o l i t i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t organisation was the Assemblea de CatsLLunya, 
vMch was clandestinely founded i n 1971. I t was a popular movement, 
and a f t e r the d i c t a t o r had died i t succeeded i n mobilising thousands 
of Catalans t o demonstrate i n favour of Catalan autonomy, democracy 
and amnesty. A f t e r the f i r s t democratic elections (1977) had been 
won i n Catalonia by those parties which had Catalan autonomy on top 
of t h e i r agenda, the newly elected senators and MPs elaborated a 
Catalan s t a t u t e of autonomy vhich was accepted w i t h some changes by 
the Spanish parliament. When i t was submitted t o a referendum i n 
Catalonia i n 1979, i t was accepted by an overwhelming majority of 
the electorate. 
I n Scotland, the f i r s t sign of a n a t i o n a l i s t upsurge came wit h the 
by-election i n West Lothian i n 1962, v^iere the SNP candidate got a 
respectable 23 per cent of the vote. I t was shrugged o f f by most 
p o l i t i c a l observers as a weird coincidence, but i t led t o a massive 
boost o f the SNP membership by 40,000 over the next few years 
(Harvie, 1977, 243). The SNP began t o be taken seriously, however, 
vdien i t s candidate Winnie Ewing won the Hamilton by-election i n 
1967. From then on, the party's fortunes improved i n the general 
elections, too, winning a t o t a l of 30 per cent of the Scottish vote 
and 11 seats i n October 1974 (Table 2.1 and Fig. 6). The r i s i n g 
support f o r the SNP, which was advocating o u t r i g h t independence from 
the UK, forced the r u l i n g Labour Party t o adopt a p o l i c y of 
devolution. This envisaged a Scottish "assembly" - i n contrast t o 
Westminster "parliament" - i n Edinburgh, which would l e g i s l a t e over 
those Scottish a f f a i r s t h a t had already been delegated t o the 
Scottish Office. The f i r s t devolution b i l l (the Scotland and Wales 
Act of 1976) having f a i l e d due t o unionist Labour opponents, the 
government f i n a l l y got a revised Scotland Act through parliament i n 
1978. But i t was abandoned a f t e r a referendum on the Scotland B i l l 
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i n March 1979 f a i l e d t o reach the 40 per cent "yes" votes 
required^^ 
10. CONCLUSION 
Although i t vras not predictable, the upsurge of nationalism i n 
Catalonia and Scotland d i d not come as a coitplete surprise. There 
were inportant events and processes i n the past v^ich l a i d the 
foundations f o r n a t i o n a l i s t demands. And i n both countries, 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements had emerged before, and were operated w i t h 
varying degrees of success throughout the 20th century. 
Although the main focus of t h i s thesis i s the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l 
since the 1960s, there are good reasons f o r looking back on the 
h i s t o r y o f p o l i t i c a l nationalism, and on the h i s t o r y of Catalonia 
and Scotland i n general. F i r s t l y , n a t i o n a l i s t movements themselves 
use h i s t o r y t o l e g i t i m i s e t h e i r existence and t h e i r demands. The 
f a c t t h a t the r i s e o f nationalism i s a revival indicates t h a t the 
contenporary movements have t h e i r roots i n the past, even though 
t h e i r actual growth r e f l e c t s more recent processes. Secondly, i t i s 
iit p o r t a n t t o r e a l i s e t h a t the c i v i l societies and economies of 
Catalonia and Scotland have evolved h i s t o r i c a l l y . The same i s true 
f o r the relationships between the national c i v i l society and the 
ce n t r a l state, vfcLch i s a t the heart of the n a t i o n a l i s t c o n f l i c t . 
T h i r d l y , a h i s t o r i c a l perspective helps t o avoid u n j u s t i f i e d 
generalisations, because i t draws at t e n t i o n t o the v a r i a b i l i t y of 
so c i a l and p o l i t i c a l action. 
There are some p a r a l l e l s i n the h i s t o r i e s of the Scottish and the 
Catalan nation. Both l o s t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l independence i n the early 
18th century, i . e . i n pr e - n a t i o n a l i s t times. Nationalism d i d not 
f i n d si:5)port f o r most of the 19th century, which was the main period 
52 
The 40 per cent clause was squeezed i n t o the B i l l by the unionist 
wing o f the labour Party. I t ensured t h a t Devolution was abandoned 
although a majority of those wtio voted said "yes" (51.4 per cent). 
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of n a t i o n a l i s t struggle i n Europe, but only emerged i n the f i n a l 
decades of the century. And i n both cases, i t d i d not emerge as a 
movement f o r independence, as i n most other 19th century cases, but 
as a r e g i o n a l i s t movement aiming f o r autonomy w i t h i n the ex i s t i n g 
state. But the p a r a l l e l s do not reach very f a r beyond the 1880's. 
I t i s clear t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t movements emerged, gained strength 
and underwent changes i n d i f f e r e n t circumstances. The relationships 
between the ce n t r a l state, the national c i v i l society and the 
economic sphere were rather d i f f e r e n t . I n Catalonia, a widely used 
language became the basis f o r a c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l which formed the 
backdrop t o bourgeois regionalism, while Scotland took part i n the 
Romantic l i t e r a r y movement without attempting t o create a national 
high c u l t u r e . Scotland was therefore not adequately equipped f o r 
19th century nationalism, which centred on c u l t u r a l distinctiveness. 
For various reasons, the vast majority of the Scots believed f o r 
most of the time t h a t , whatever t h e i r national feelings, t h e i r 
economic futu r e l a y w i t h the United Kingdom. Neither the 
bourgeoisie, the middle classes or the working class saw an urgent 
need f o r autonomy. To a c e r t a i n extent, t h i s can be explained by the 
benefits Scotland's p r i v i l e g e d r o l e i n the B r i t i s h enpire gave them. 
I n contrast t o Catalonia, where the i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie saw 
i t s e l f r e s t r i c t e d by lack of i n t e r e s t t o represent t h e i r interests 
i n the governments of Madrid, and therefore forced i n t o a power 
struggle w i t h the centre, the Scottish i n d u s t r i a l leaders d i d not 
f i n d themselves alone i n the UK, and there was no need t o define 
class i n t e r e s t i n n a t i o n a l i s t terms. 
The Catalan national movement, pushed i n t o the p o l i t i c a l realm by 
the increasing economic and social d i s p a r i t i e s between Catalonia and 
the r e s t of Spain, and led by the bourgeoisie, developed i n t o a 
powerful p o l i t i c a l force and was supported by a wide range of 
p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s and associations. Once t h i s movement had been 
granted some of i t s demands by the central state, i t was fur t h e r 
l e g i t i m i s e d through the autonomous Catalan i n s t i t u t i o n s of 
government (the Man<xraunitat and the Republican Generalitat. 
Meanwhile, Scottish nationalism s t i l l had t o struggle t o make i t s 
voice heard against a swelling chorus demanding central government 
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planning. Scottish nationalism thus was a peripheral movement 
without a material base u n t i l the 1960's. 
The fol l o w i n g chaptez^s examine how, and t o what extent, these 
d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i e s converged i n the 1960's, vMch saw a n a t i o n a l i s t 
r e v i v a l i n both countries. 
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Table 2.1 : Resiilts of the referendum on the Catalan Statute of 
Autoncaiy, 1979 
(Per cent of vote) 
Yes No Blan]</Niai 2\bst. Electorate 
(NO.) 
Barcelona 88.1 8.0 3.9 39.0 1,809, 186 Girona 89.0 6.2 4.3 36.4 191, 223 Lleida 90.3 5.6 4.1 41.8 139, 320 Tarragona 86.9 8.6 4.5 45.4 182, 849 
Source: Moreno, 1986, 191. 
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Table 2.2 : The performance of the SNP i n the parliamentary elections 
since 1945 
YEAR VOTES VOTES CANDIDATES MANDATES 
(NO.) (% Of Scottish) (NO.) (NO.) 
1945 30,595 1.2 8 0 1950 9,708 0.4 3 0 1951 7,299 0.3 2 0 1955 12,112 0.5 2 0 1959 21,738 0.8 5 0 1964 64,044 2.4 15 0 1966 128,474 5.0 23 0 1970 306,802 11.4 65 1 1974(Feb.) 633,180 21.9 70 7 1974(Oct.) 839,617 30.4 71* 11 1979 504,259 17.3 71* 2 1983 331,975 11.7 72* 2 1987 416,873 14.0 71 3 
* t o t a l number of Scottish constituencies 
Source: Craig, 1976, 89; Times Guide t o the House of Commons, 1983 and 
1987. 
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Table 2.3: Regional analysis of the Devolution Referendum i n 1979 
"Do you want the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 to be 
put into effect?" 
REGION YES NO ELECTORATE TOTAL VOTE TURNOUT (%) (%) No. NO. (%) 
Borders 40.3 59.6 79 /746 51/ 618 67.3 Central 54.7 45.3 195 ,673 130, 599 66.7 F i f e 53.7 46.3 243 ,485 160, 942 66.1 DumfriesSGalloway 40.3 59.6 104 ,085 67, 515 64.9 Granpian 48.3 51.6 339 ,881 196, 844 57.9 Highland 51.0 49.0 134 ,997 88, 337 65.4 Lothian 50.1 49.9 561 ,234 373, 970 66.6 Strathclyde 54.0 46.0 1750 ,299 1106, 420 63.2 Tayside 49.5 50.5 290 ,076 185, 089 63.8 Orkney 27.9 71.9 13 ,789 5, 439 54.8 Shetland 27.1 72.8 14 ,724 5, 460 51.0 Western I s l e s 55.8 44.1 22 ,127 4, 933 50.5 
SOOTIAND 51.6 48.3 3747 ,112 2387, 672 63.8 
Source: Moreno, 1986, 188. 
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Chapter three: 
E C O N O M I C C H A N G E AND 
T H E NATIONAL E C O N O M I C DIMENSION 
137 
1. XNTPODUCnON 
I n the f i r s t chapter, I looked a t some of the w r i t i n g s of 
researchers who argue t h a t i t i s economic factors which t r i g g e r o f f 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements. This view has i t s roots i n the analysis of 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements of the 19th century and the nation-building 
processes before, which associated nationalism w i t h the interests of 
the bourgeoisie and w i t h the age of capitalism i n general. I t may 
have been useful t o some degree t o explain the leadership and the 
strategies of n a t i o n a l i s t movements of the 19th century, as Chapter 
two found when i t looked a t the reasons f o r the absence of a strong 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Scotland and f o r i t s presence i n Catalonia. 
But economist explanations of nationalism i n the 20th century have 
l e f t many gaps i n our understanding and exposed the weakness of 
economist arguments. 
This was shown i n the review of the l i t e r a t u r e i n Chapter one, v^ich 
revealed t h a t economist explanations p r e v a i l i n much marxist and 
modernisation analysis of contenporary movements. A few exairples 
should s u f f i c e t o demonstrate t h e i r shortcomings i n the context of 
the cases of Catalonia and Scotland. The concept of uneven 
development underlies the theses of Nairn (1977), Blaut (1987) and 
Lasuen (1986), a l b e i t i n d i f f e r e n t versions. Nairn related sub-state 
nationalism t o the uneven nature of c a p i t a l i s t development (Nairn, 
1977, 128), but could not specify how t h i s works out i n the case of 
Scotland. There, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o i d e n t i f y r e l a t i v e c a p i t a l i s t 
under- or overdevelopment w i t h respect . t o the r e s t of B r i t a i n 
(Kendrick, 1983a, 153-203). And even i f a development gap i s found 
t o e x i s t , i t does not automatically lead t o p o l i t i c a l nationalism. 
Blaut's d e f i n i t i o n of nationalism as " f i g h t i n g against foreign r u l e 
not because foreigners 'dominate' but because they e x p l o i t " (Blaut, 
1987, 79) reaches back t o Leninist theories of a n t i - i n p e r i a l i s t 
struggles. Chapter two showed t h a t neither Catalonia nor Scotland 
have been ejqjloited by outside forces; on the contrary, both 
benefited from forming p a r t of an i n p e r i a l state, and although t h i s 
i s no longer the case, i t cannot be maintained t h a t the roles are 
reversed now. Lasuen also adopts an economist perspective by 
r e l a t i n g the phases of Catalan self-government t o periods of 
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depression, during which the economically more dominant Catalonia 
became aware of i t s p o l i t i c a l subordination t o Castile (Lasuen, 
1986, 135-137). This model, too, does not explain the timing of the 
r i s e o f n a t i o n a l i s t movements, or the existence of t e r r i t o r i a l l y 
based economic i n t e r e s t s vhich according t o lasuen determine 
n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c s . 
While there i s no doubt t h a t i n c a p i t a l i s t societies, such as 
Catalonia and Scotland, economic processes play an inportant r o l e i n 
shaping the structure of c i v i l society and the struggles taking 
place w i t h i n i t , there are no sinple causal l i n k s between the 
economic sphere and n a t i o n a l i s t struggles. The inpact o f economic 
changes a t d i f f e r e n t levels ( w i t h i n Catalonia and Scotland, w i t h i n 
Spain and B r i t a i n , and a t the global level) on n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c s 
i s mediated through c i v i l society and state a c t i v i t i e s . At the same 
time, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of economic processes and t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o state and c i v i l society are affected by national 
i d e n t i t y ; and t h i s n a t i o n a l i s t dimension bears on the actions of 
(economic) agents. 
The main body of the chapter i s divided i n two parts, vhich look a t 
the Scottish and the Catalan case respectively. This way of 
proceeding acknowledges the f a c t t h a t economic processes i n Scotland 
were d i s t i n c t from those i n Catalonia. I n each part, the f i r s t 
section outlines the most inportant changes i n the regional economy, 
and shows how i t s autonomy was reduced i n the course of the l a s t few 
decades. The second section looks at the way i n v^ich the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the economic sphere and the central state has 
developed. State intervention i n the economy took d i f f e r e n t forms i n 
Scotland and Catalonia, but i n both cases i t has made people more 
aware of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of governments f o r t h e i r own economic 
and so c i a l well-being or deprivation. I n the case of Scotland, 
c e n t r a l s t a t e planning p o l i t i c i s e d the Scottish economic dimension; 
and v*ien the l i m i t a t i o n s of state intervention became increasingly 
obvious i n the 1960's, these too were seen i n n a t i o n a l i s t terms. The 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of economic processes thus combines w i t h a sense of 
national i d e n t i t y , v*iich together a f f e c t class struggles and 
economic projects of s p e c i f i c social classes. The Labour movement i n 
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Scotland was increasingly under pressure t o modify i t s views on 
centralised economic planning, and t o adopt devolution p o l i c i e s . 
Section three examines how the prospect of large o i l revenues 
provided the n a t i o n a l i s t movement wi t h an a l t e r n a t i v e t o centralised 
economic planning which convinced many Scottish voters of the 
economic v i a b i l i t y of self-government. The l a s t section on Scotland 
analyses the response of the central government t o the 
nationalist/economic c r i s i s i n Scotland. I t argues th a t the Scottish 
Development Agency constituted no fundamental change i n Labour's 
approach t o economic planning, but i t helped the party t o 
re-establish i t s dominant r o l e i n Scottish society. 
2. THE SCOTTISH EOONCMY AND THE NATIONALIST ^S^ VEMEN^  
2.1 Economic developments i n Scotland in the 20th centvury 
Chapter two suggested t h a t Scotland was one of the main p i l l a r s of 
the B r i t i s h manufacturing and trading enpire i n the 19th century. 
Kendrick argued t h a t the Scottish economic structure was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y B r i t i s h because i t was closer t o the B r i t i s h average 
than any other region (Kendrick, 1983a, 164). I t s very success i n 
the heydays of B r i t i s h s t e e l making, shipbuilding and colo n i a l trade 
made i t vulnerable t o the economic recession i n the inter-war 
period, vAien i r r e v e r s i b l e changes i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of 
labour spelled the decline of Scotland's t r a d i t i o n a l manufacturing 
basis (Kendrick, 1983b, 45). The inter-war period witnessed the 
emergence of the regional problem i n B r i t a i n , as the o l d i n d u s t r i a l 
regions such as Scotland were plunged i n t o a long-term recession and 
the South of England began t o assume a status of economic dominance 
(Martin, 1989, 22-25). 
With the i n t e r m i t t e n t decline of the t r a d i t i o n a l industries, the 
Scottish economy became less autonomous. As i n other regions, b i g 
business i n Scotland was family business up u n t i l the Second World 
War. The concentration and r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n measures of the c r i s i s 
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decades of the inter-war period l e f t a handful of families (Lithgow, 
Weir, Yarrow, Stephen, C o l v i l l e ) i n charge of the heavy industries. 
The other industries, many of \^^ich were dependent on shipbuilding 
and s t e e l , were overvAielmingly small conpanies i n the hands of small 
indigenous entrepreneurs. By the mid-193Os, r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and 
disinvestment had reduced shipbuilding capacity by a t h i r d , the coal 
industry had l o s t a s i m l a r proportion of i t s work force, and the 
s t e e l industry had i t s capacity cut by 20 per cent (Harvie, 1981, 
57). The sackings and reductions i n wages which accorrpanied the 
shrinking of Scotland's i n d u s t r i a l basis provoked major s t r i k e s and 
protests. Through the f i r s t h a l f of the 1930s, v^en the economic 
c r i s i s was a t i t s worst, Scots unenployment was twice as high as 
unenployment i n England, and never below 25 per cent (Foster and 
Woolfson, 1986, 86-87). The depth of economic c r i s i s was such t h a t 
both the labour movement and the enployers began t o advocate 
economic planning through the state i n the 1930's (see section 2.2 
below). 
The second world war gave the heavy industries another lease of 
l i f e , but i n the 1950's, economic rest r u c t u r i n g began t o change the 
i n d u s t r i a l landscape of Scotland beyond recognition. And as the 
decline of the t r a d i t i o n a l industries accelerated i n the 1950's and 
1960's, Scotland's b i g business dynasties l o s t economic and 
p o l i t i c a l power. Employment i n the heavy i n d u s t r i a l sectors declined 
s t e a d i l y throughout the post-war period (see table 3.1; Fig. 7). 
Between 1958 and 1972, the nationalised coal industry (NCB) reduced 
i t s work force by 56,600 . At the same time, the shipbuilding labour 
force was cut down from 70,000 t o 47,000 (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 
107). Although the waning i n d u s t r i a l magnates themselves were 
l a r g e l y responsible f o r t h i s rundown of Scottish industry, they made 
an unsuccessful and belated e f f o r t t o expand the heavy i n d u s t r i a l 
branches i n Scotland. I n a " l a s t b i d f o r autonomy" of Scottish 
c a p i t a l , W. Lithgow and R. C o l v i l l e took charge of the Scottish 
"4here were 28,400 coal miners l e f t i n 1972 (Murray, 1973, 59) 
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2 Council (Development and Research) i n 1966 . The Scottish Council of 
those years condemned the slow rundown of older industries and the 
dependence on inflows of Tunerican c a p i t a l , and repeatedly invoked 
the image of a Scottish economy weakened by i n d u s t r i a l 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 115). But the ambitions 
plans t o restructure the shipbuilding and the s t e e l industry i n the 
l a t e 1960's f a i l e d t o materialise. 
Thios, the decades from the f i r s t world war t o the 1960's witnessed 
the decline of Scotland's heavy industries, and consequently, of the 
Scottish b i g bourgeoisie which had t h r i v e d on Union and Enpire. I n 
the post-war period, Scotland d r i f t e d towards an economic structure 
which became increasingly dominated by branch plants and the service 
sector. Transforming industries such as alimentation, electronics 
and metal manufacturing expanded (Table 3.2; Figs. 8-10). 
The new manufacturing industries which came t o Scotland required a 
rather d i f f e r e n t work force - w i t h d i f f e r e n t and often less s k i l l -
than the t r a d i t i o n a l heavy industries. The jobs created i n these new 
i n d u s t r i e s grew a t a much slower r a t e than the losses occurring 
elsewhere i n the econoirr/. For exairple, the electronics industry had 
only 20,000 jobs more i n the mid-1980's than i n 1958 (Hargrave, 
1985, 117). Ninety per cent of the electronics jobs were provided by 
non-Scottish corrpanies'^, which shows how l i t t l e indigenous control 
was exercised i n t h i s sector. F i m pointed out t h a t i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l heartland of Scotland, the c e n t r a l Clydeside conurbation, 
only a t h i r d of the employment created between 1958 and 1968 came 
from l o c a l enterprise; the other two t h i r d s were i n new incoming 
establishments from the r e s t of the UK and overseas respectively 
( F i m , 1975, 397). I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y the larger enterprises and 
2 
The C o l v i l l e s controlled what was l e f t of the Scottish 
s t e e l indiastry. I n l i n e w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l linkages, 
the main product was shipbuilding plate. I n 1966, the Labour 
government nationalised the steel industry. 
•^This i s subdivided i n t o 44 per cent i n firms from the r e s t 
of the UK, 40 per cent i n US finns, and 5 per cent i n European firms 
(Hargrave, 1985, 19). 
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the fa s t e s t growing i n d u s t r i a l sectors (instrument, e l e c t r i c a l and 
mechanical engineering, chemical industries) which tended t o be 
con t r o l l e d e x t e r n a l l y (op. c i t . , 405-407). 
Many of the new branch plants located i n greenfield s i t e s , e.g. i n 
New Towns such as Livingston and Kirkaldy. They were neither able t o 
make up f o r the job losses i n other industries, nor t o provide 
eirployment f o r redundant workers, who were categorised as " d i f f i c u l t 
t o eirploy". A V\*iole new working class was created alongside these 
new i n d u s t r i a l parks, mostly cortposed of young, lonskilled and 
r e l a t i v e l y low paid workers. For example, i n Livingston, which forms 
p a r t o f the hi-tech t e r r i t o r y ( S i l i c o n Glen)^ 
"[ejirployers simply by-pass the l a s t generation w i t h a 
c o l l e c t i v e memory, a h i s t o r y , and a notion o f 
them-and-us." 
(Guardian, 16.8.1989, 19) 
S i l i c o n Glen, vAiich was - and s t i l l i s - enthus i a s t i c a l l y promoted 
by government agencies, proved unable t o solve the chronic 
unemployment problem of post-war Scotland. But i t chcinged the face 
of the Scottish economy and created social structures which are no 
longer characterised by the class consciousness and p o l i t i c a l 
l o y a l t i e s created i n the "old" economic order of stee l and 
shipbuilding. 
The other major change i n Scottish economy concerned the service 
sector. While manufacturing enployment f e l l by 15 per cent between 
1951 and 1981, service sector employment increased by 17 per cent. 
Scotland had been lagging behind i n the s h i f t towards service sector 
eitployment, and i t was only i n the 1960's and 1970's t h a t i t caught 
up w i t h the r e s t of B r i t a i n (Tables 3.3 and 3.4;. Figs. 11 and 12). 
As a r e s u l t , Scotland's previously rather small middle class 
experienced expansion, p a r t i c u l a r l y due t o public sector eitployment. 
This "state-sector middle class" occupied an increasingly 
i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n Scottish c i v i l society i n the 1960's (Harvie, 
1982, 87). 
How are these fundamental changes i n the economic structure of 
Scotland r e l a t e d t o the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l of the 1960's? Although 
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there are no d i r e c t causal connections, i t seems t h a t the economic 
forces which had stood against Scottish nationalism i n the l a t e 19th 
century became weaker. This applies p a r t i c u l a r l y t o the Scottish b i g 
bourgeoisie and the p r i v i l e g e d status of Scottish econcttiy w i t h i n 
B r i t a i n and the Empire. I n the f i r s t h a l f of the 20th century, the 
Scottish economy was losing autonomy and ground, and control over 
Scottish manufacturing was moving abroad. The pos i t i o n of Scotland 
i n the world economy declined even more ra p i d l y than t h a t of the UK 
as a v^iole. But t h i s does not necessarily lead t o nationalism. I n 
order t o understand the connection between the changes i n the 
Scottish economy and the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, i t i s necessary t o 
look a t the way i n v^iich state intervention led t o the 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of the Scottish economic dimension. The following 
section therefore looks a t the h i s t o r y of economic planning i n 
Scotland and analyses how i t s purpose of l e g i t i m i s i n g state control 
backfired i n the form of Scottish nationalism. 
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2.2 The Scottish dimension in econcmic plaiming 
The int e r v e n t i o n of the central state i n the res t r u c t u r i n g of the 
regional economies a f t e r the second world war has promoted a view of 
the Scottish economy as a p o l i t i c a l u n i t . This view added another 
piece t o the puzzle of national consciousness, and thereby another 
f a c t o r i n the p o l i t i c a l nationalism of the 1960's and 1970's, which 
used a great deal of economic arguments t o j u s t i f y Scottish 
independence. The economic planning p o l i c i e s of the B r i t i s h state 
d i d not aim t o produce such a p o l i t i c i s a t i o n process in the Scottish 
economic region. On the contrary, both the Labour and the Tory 
governments approached economic planning from a c e n t r a l i s t point of 
view. I t was p a r t of the Keynesian p o l i t i c s w i t h which post-war 
governments attempted t o cont r o l the process of c a p i t a l i s t 
development. 
I t worked f o r two decades. Then, i n the period from 1965 t o 1973, 
"the i n a b i l i t y of Fordism and Keynesianism t o contain the inherent 
contradictions of capitalism became more and more apparent" (Harvey, 
1989, 141-142). I n Scotland, these contradictions led t o growing 
doubts about the a b i l i t y of a di s t a n t central state t o solve 
Scottish economic problems and gave r i s e t o demands f o r 
self-management and self-government. How these demands grew out of 
the post-war B r i t i s h consensus on economic planning i s analysed i n 
three subsections. The f i r s t describes the r i s e of centralised 
economic planning i n Scotland, which provoked the Labour movement to 
abandon any home r u l e demands i t had developed around the t u r n of 
the century. The second analyses i t s e f f e c t s on the p o l i t i c a l 
discourse o f the 1960's and 1970's. The t h i r d argues t h a t the loss 
of confidence i n the a b i l i t i e s of the state t o plan away Scotland's 
economic problems led t o popular support f o r nationalism. 
2.2.i The beginnings of economic planning 
The new consensus began modestly i n Scotland. I t was the Convention 
of Royal Burghs which f i r s t set up a planning body - the Scottish 
National Development Council (SNDC) - i n 1930 as a Scottish 
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i n i t i a t i v e . Although the f i r s t Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t party had j u s t 
been founded (National Party of Scotland: NPS, 1928), i t i s u n l i k e l y 
t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t pressure had a s i g n i f i c a n t iirpact i n the move 
towards economic planning, because popular support was very l i m i t e d . 
The h i i ^ unenployment irates, and protest actions by the uneiiployed, 
as w e l l as pressure from i n d u s t r i a l i s t s were probably more irrportant 
factors. The i n i t i a t i v e of the Burghs was soon supported by eminent 
Scottish i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , especially Lithgow \Aio controlled i t from 
1931 onwards, and the SIUC. 
I n the eyes of the Labour leaders, the s t r u c t u r a l problems caused by 
the economic c r i s i s could only be ameliorated w i t h state 
intervention. Self-government d i d not make sense i n a s i t u a t i o n 
where world wide economic forces were sweeping across the whole of 
B r i t a i n and the other advanced c a p i t a l i s t countries. Therefore, 
"from the 1930s, the old Home Rule concept i t s e l f 
became redundant w i t h the party's move t o a philosophy 
of state planning and centralised economic management." 
(Keating, 1983, 29) 
I n 1936, the Scottish Economic Committee was set up as a 
subcommittee of the SNDC, and, funded by the government through the 
Scottish Commission f o r Special Areas, i t functioned as an advisory 
body t o the Secretary of State f o r Scotland, John C o l v i l l e . 
Foster and Woolfson see i n these developments a r e d e f i n i t i o n of 
p o l i t i c a l objectives and economic strategies: 
"State planning was now presented as a key vehicle f o r the 
f u l f i l i n e n t of national development. The character of the 
planning was s t a t i s t , c o r p o r a t i s t and pa t e r n a l i s t , owing a t 
least something t o the Presbyterian heritage of previous 
centuries. At the same time, however, i t d i d raise quite new 
expectations about the r o l e of Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s and, 
w i t h i n them, of the leaders of Scottish society." 
(Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 92) 
I n the 1930's, these leaders were s t i l l the Scottish i n d u s t r i a l 
bouDgeoisie. But the f i r s t Labour government during the war 
established the rules of Keynesian economics which had as a centre 
piece the consensus between b i g c a p i t a l , organised Labour and the 
cen t r a l State. Regional planning played an important r o l e , and i t 
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was applied t o the Scottish economy by the Secretary of State f o r 
Scotland, Tom Johnston, who 
"succeeded i n i d e n t i f y i n g the labour Party a t B r i t i s h 
l e v e l and the 1945 administration i n p a r t i c u l a r , w i t h the 
aspirations o f the Scottish people as a Whole f o r f u l l 
n ational development and f o r control over t h e i r economy." 
(Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 97) 
The Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) even voiced demands f o r a 
Scottish cabinet, p a r t i c u l a r l y a t times when the Scottish Convention 
movement grew stronger (see Chapter two, section 6). I t wanted t o 
avoid a resurgence of nationalism, l a t e n t i n i t s own ranks, and 
resolved i n 1948 t h a t i t 
"deplores the trend towards Scottish Nationalism v*iich i s 
revealing i t s e l f i n the Scottish TU movement, and d r i v i n g us 
t o support uneconomic projects. Congress believes t h a t 
Scottish, c u l t u r e and t r a d i t i o n s w i l l be preserved by t h e i r 
own strength and v i r i l i t y without the need f o r e x p l o i t i n g 
N a t i o n a l i s t sentiinents." 
(quoted i n Tuckett, 1986, 323) 
A f t e r the war the Scottish economy was even more geared t o heavy 
industry than before, and since coal, s t e e l , shipbuilding and heavy 
engineering were heading f o r long-term decline, the Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry) attempted t o d i v e r s i f y the economy by 
encouraging for e i g n investment. The errphasis on c e n t r a l l y directed 
economic planning continued through Conservative governments i n the 
1950s i n a weaker form. But tw-zards the end of the decade, MacMillan 
became more committed t o government intervention t o solve the 
economic problems of the peripheries. By now, r i s i n g expectations 
about state intervention i n the Scottish economy had come t o be 
r e f l e c t e d i n p o l i t i c a l discourse, and the government had t o 
demonstrate t h a t i t was also concerned wi t h the well-being of i t s 
Scottish subjects. 
2 . 2 . i i Economic planning and n a t i o n a l i s t discourse i n the 1960^s and 
1970^5 
Although self-government d i d not feature i n the p o l i t i c a l discourse 
during the 1950's and 1960's - the Labour Party had even formally 
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dropped i t s Home Rule po l i c y i n 1958 -, the Scottish ecxanomic 
dimension became f i r m l y established precisely a t t h a t tione. The 
Labour Party i n p a r t i c u l a r often argued t h a t the economic boom had 
been less b e n e f i c i a l t o the Scottish population than t o the rest of 
B r i t a i n , and made special reports on the Scottish economy t o make 
t h e i r point. 
I n 1958, around the time vhen MacMillan claimed t h a t "most of the 
population never had i t so good", the Scottish Council of the Labour 
Party produced a report e n t i t l e d 'Let Scotland Prosper'. I n t h i s 
document, Labour stated the need f o r greater state intervention i n 
the decentralisation of industry. I t argued t h a t 
" t o leave the lo c a t i o n of industry t o the free forces of the 
market i s an u n c i v i l i s e d conception i n t h i s modem age" 
(Labour Party, 1958, 4) 
The report claimed t h a t p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Scotland, such an approach 
t o economic management was based on a broad consensus. I t claimed 
t h a t 
"already i n the inter-war years the S o c i a l i s t view had 
become widely accepted by non-Socialists t h a t the p o l i c y of 
i n d u s t r i a l l a i s s e z - f a i r e was disastrous f o r Scotland." 
(ihid.) 
The parliamentary debates on the Scottish economy around 1960 serve 
as an exairple of labour's use of n a t i o n a l i s t r h e t o r i c , which 
contributed t o recreating a Scottish dimension under new 
circumstances. From t h i s r h e t o r i c the n a t i o n a l i s t s were able t o 
p r o f i t a few years l a t e r . I n these debates Scottish labour MPs 
stressed the f a c t t h a t Scotland's uneitployment and emigration rates 
(see Tables 3.5 and 3.6), together w i t h i t s record of 
d e i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and low growth rates conpared poorly w i t h the 
performance i n the r e s t of the UK. As a r e s u l t they called f o r 
decisive government action. I n the debates following the general 
e l e c t i o n i n 1959 an additional source of pressure was the defeat of 
the Tories i n Scotland due t o Labour gains. I t was argued th a t the 
Secretary of State f o r Scotland had h i s post "only by the grace of 
Tory English votes", and t h a t the Tories were "not the government 
party by the w i l l of Scotland". Conparisons were made with other 
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small, independent nations i n Europe, whose economies were i n a much 
he a l t h i e r state, and Labour MPs speculated i n the Caramons how things 
could be, "had we not been p a r t of the United Kingdom" (William Ross 
and Thomas Fraser MPs, Hansard v o l . 626, 1466-1467). 
The 1960 Labour Party Conference Report duly acknowledged the r o l e 
of the Scottish MPs i n p u t t i n g pressure on the government. The 
f o l l o w i n g comment shows j u s t how demands f o r wider ranging regional 
economic p o l i c i e s were serving an e x p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l purpose. 
"The Scottish Labour Group are masters of the a r t of 
Parliamentary opposition and use t h e i r s k i l l s t o the f u l l 
advantage of the people of Scotland." 
(Labour Party, 1960, 84) 
I n the 1960s therefore the Labour Party i n Scotland had established 
i t s r o l e as " p r i v i l e g e d i n t e r l o c u t o r s f o r Scotland" on a p o l i c y of 
serving Scottish i n t e r e s t s through c e n t r a l l y directed regional 
planning (Keating, 1983, 29). But proposing a self-government p o l i c y 
could not hiave been f u r t h e r from t h e i r minds. Before the general 
elections of 1964, William Ross presented Labour's po l i c y f o r 
Scotland t o the electorate w i t h the following words: 
"Labour respects and welcomes Scotland's distinctiveness -
our t r a d i t i o n s , our own forms of education, law and l o c a l 
government. However, we see no refuge from Scotland's 
troubles i n the l i t t l e n e s s of an archaic separatism. No more 
can we acquiesce i n the Conservative tendency, charitably 
maintained as a useful provider of s k i l l e d man-power or as a 
depopulated playground f o r the r i c h . The objective of 
Labour's Scottish p o l i c y - framed by Scots and approved by a 
Scottish conference - i s t o harness the resources and 
energies of Scotland, so t h a t our people can play t h e i r f u l l 
and d i s t i n c t i v e p a r t i n the regeneration of B r i t a i n . " 
(Scotsman, 5.12.1963, 8) 
Despite labour's n a t i o n a l i s t r h e t o r i c north of the border, central 
planning continued, now under labour con t r o l , i n the second h a l f of 
the 1960's. Despite increased regional a i d (Table 3.7; Fig. 13) and 
h i g h - f l y i n g schemes aimed at a t t r a c t i n g new industries, unenployment 
continued t o grow. A recession made things worse i n the l a s t years 
of the decade, and discredited not only Keynesianism i n general, but 
also the economic p o l i c i e s of the Labour government i n p a r t i c u l a r . 
By t h i s time, the r i s e of the Scottish National Party had already 
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begun. I t was able t o t u r n t o i t s own favour the n a t i o n a l i s t 
discourse of some sectors of the Scottish Labour Party, which was 
never translated i n t o action. To the amazement of the labour Party, 
the Hamilton by-election i n 1967 demonstrated t h a t the SNP could 
4 
threaten labour on i t s home ground . The l i m i t s t o labour's policy 
of economic planning were being exposed i n the economic as wel l as 
i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere. The next subsection examines i n more d e t a i l 
how the Labour Party struggled t o contain the r i s e of popular 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and of support f o r the SNP. 
2 . 2 . i i i The l i m i t s t o regional economic planning i n Scotland 
Under the labour administration (1966-70), Scottish economic 
problems had not inproved notably; unenployment, f o r example, was 
s t i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher than i n B r i t a i n as a whole (Table 3.5; 
Fig. 14). I t i s l i k e l y t h a t Scottish voters f e l t t h a t Labour had not 
been able t o keep i t s promises. The SNP support was ascribed a t 
lea s t t o some extent t o the f a i l u r e of the regional economic 
p o l i c i e s of the post-war period by analysts such as Fim, who found 
a "growing disillusionment" i n Scotland. 
"Despite nearly 40 years of increasingly active government 
intervention, substantial d i s p a r i t i e s s t i l l remain between 
the expanding and prosperous areas such as the Midlands and 
the Southeast, and the older i n d u s t r i a l areas of the North 
of England, Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland. (...) I t 
cannot be disputed t h a t the depressed areas of the United 
Kingdom would have suffered even greater economic and social 
decline i n the absence of regional p o l i c i e s , yet there i s a 
growing r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t such p o l i c i e s t h a t have been 
developed and eiiployed have been essent i a l l y ad hoc and 
pragmatic, and c e r t a i n l y not based on a f u l l understanding 
of the corrponents and processes of regional economic 
development." 
(Fim, 1975, 393) 
The decline o f Scottish manufacturing continued i n the second l i a l f 
o f the 1970's (Table 3.8). The v u l n e r a b i l i t y of an economy wi t h a 
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The SNP candidate Winnie Ewing won the by-election i n Hamilton, 
v\^ich was a t r a d i t i o n a l labour seat. 
(Chapter three) (150) 
s i g n i f i c a n t branch plant sector became soon clear v±ien several 
multinationals began t o r e t r e a t from t h e i r Scottish f i e l d of action. 
Closures of established multinationals such as Singer on Clydebank, 
Rootes/Chrysler/Peugot i n Linwood, Monsanto i n Dundonald and 
Cumnock, and Massey-Fergusson i n Kilmarnock' d i d not only cause 
considerable job losses, but they also shook the confidence of Scots 
i n the state vhich claiined t o manage Scottish i n d u s t r i a l 
development. F t o l i t i c a l l y , t h i s was r e f l e c t e d i n a r i s e of support 
f o r the SNP. 
I t was the Labour Party vMch suffered most from the economic 
discontent exacerbated by the plant closures. I n Cunninghame 
D i s t r i c t , f o r exairple, vhidh. was " s o l i d l y labour" oriented, the 
" f e e l i n g t h a t something i s going wrong" translated i t s e l f i n t o a 
l o c a l e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y f o r the SNP: 
"The e f f e c t was a secondary e f f e c t , because we were a f r a i d 
t h a t the Scottish people, who were not going t o vote Tory, 
were deserting us and were going t o vote f o r the SNP. But i t 
wasn't f o r independence; there was j u s t the f e e l i n g t h a t 
there was something wrong." 
(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988) 
These fears eventually pushed the Labour Party towards a devolution 
p o l i c y . I n the economic planning f i e l d , the new Labour government 
responded t o c a l l s f o r greater Scottish control by s e t t i n g up the 
Scottish Development Agency (SDA) i n 1975. The STUC i n p a r t i c u l a r 
played an itrportant r o l e i n changing Labour's a t t i t u d e on the issue 
of self-government. The trade unions, too, were under pressure, 
f i r s t l y because they were losing 
grass roots demanded more action 
members^, and secondly because the 
" I was affected p o l i t i c a l l y by the closures. They [the 
unions] were affected i n d u s t r i a l l y by the closures, and at 
t h a t tiine the shop steward movement i n Scotland was very 
strong, and i t exerted influence on the o f f i c i a l s of the 
Unions. Therefore the o f f i c i a l s had t o become more 
I n the 15 years since the SIUC organised the "Assembly on 
Unenployment", the unions l o s t 25,000 members. Unemployment rose 
from 60,000 t o 360,000 (Hendry, interview, 25.11.1987). 
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"revolutionary" i n order t o keep ahead of the shop 
stewards." 
(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988) 
I n the atmosphere of growing nationalism, i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y plant closures, took on a more p o l i t i c a l tone v^ich was 
often couched i n terms of Scottish self-determination. The work-in 
of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) i n 1971-72 i s one exanple. The 
UCS had been r e l i a n t on state subsidies, and the Conservative 
government's decision t o no longer support the shipbuilders c l e a r l y 
i d e n t i f i e d the closure th r e a t w i t h the government. The 6,000 
workers enployed i n the UCS fought against the closure by occupying 
the shipyards and staging a work-in vMch they maintained f o r over a 
year, u n t i l a rescue package was accepted. Jimmy Reid, shop steward 
and a Communist coun c i l l o r , pointed out the p o l i t i c a l significance 
of the i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t : 
"The Upper Clyde i s being s a c r i f i c e d on the a l t a r of 
sheer p o l i t i c a l dogma. We refuse t o accept t h a t someone 
s i t t i n g i n Whitehall i s going t o k i l l our industry." 
(quoted i n Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 176) 
The c o n f l i c t became thus p o l i t i c i s e d because the influence of the 
government was c l e a r l y v i s i b l e . Against t h i s remote p o l i t i c a l centre 
which was on the side of b i g industry, a popular al l i a n c e developed 
i n Scotland. The struggle won the support of not only the major 
trade unions, but also other social groups, such as professionals, 
the p e t t y bourgeoisie and the wider community, which saw i t s e l f 
affected by the closure. The national dimension acted l i k e a glue i n 
t h i s a l l i a n c e of common interests. The c a l l f o r Scottish 
self-government acconpanied c r i t i c i s m s of the r o l e of the 
government. Scotland was seen as p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable t o p o l i c i e s 
which favoured monopoly c a p i t a l , and was thought t o occupy a key 
r o l e i n anti-monopoly struggles which then could spread t o other 
regions of B r i t a i n ( i b i d . , 222) . The struggle of the USC produced a 
p o l a r i s a t i o n w i t h the state and (Scottish) b i g c a p i t a l on one side, 
and the Scottish community on the other. 
The Scottish TUC, which was f u l l y i n tune w i t h the post-war 
consensus p o l i c y of "bureaucratic modernisation through state a id" 
and v^ i c h had become involved i n countless government i n i t i a t i v e s 
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and quangos (Kerevan, 1984, 8), picked up t h i s mood and t r i e d t o 
contro l i t . Against the background of the ongoing UCS work-in, the 
STUC organised a "Scottish Assembly on Unerrployment". 1,500 
representatives of Scottish l i f e assembled , including MPs from a l l 
p a r t i e s , representatives of councils, burghs, c i t i e s , industry, 
commerce, and the churches. They demanded a Scottish development 
aut h o r i t y , a d d i t i o n a l grants and incentives f o r industries, the 
acceleration of social i n f r a s t r u c t u r e improvements and 
self-government: 
" I n a statement punctuated by the cheering and applause of 
many of the 1,500 people v*io went t o the Usher H a l l , [James 
Jack of the STUC] said: 'The road we are taking may take us 
f i n a l l y t o a Scottish Parliament (...) I am a l l f o r i t 
because (...) there i s not the s l i g h t e s t doubt i n my head 
t h a t a Scottish Parliament would be a workers' Parliament'." 
(Sootanan, 15.2. 1972, 1) 
Elsev^iere, the Scotsman quoted Raymond Macdonald from the STOC, who 
rejected the "begging bowl image" as outrageously unfair, and 
confirmed t h a t 
"at any rate, North Sea o i l discoveries i n Scottish waters, 
now confirmed as massive and l a s t i n g , make possible the 
d i r e c t i o n of huge resources t o Scotland by r i g h t , i f we 
establish the r i g h t , without creating a single economic or 
i n d u s t r i a l problem f o r the government." ( i b i d . , 9) 
With these o i l resources, Scotland was no longer as a region v^iich 
was subsidised by the state and therefore always begging, but could 
now l e g i t i m a t e l y demand more resources. Meanwhile, Jim S i l l a r s , 
labour MP, warned t h a t the state of c r i s i s i n the Scottish nation 
could not be overestimated, and stressed t h a t "there were the seeds 
of a very dangerous threat t o the un i t y of the UK, i f nothing was 
done about the i n t o l e r a b l e l e v e l of Scottish unenployment" ( i b i d . ) . 
Much of t h i s was p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c which was not followed up by 
concrete action. Looking a t the conposition of the assembly t h i s was 
not surprising. Nevertheless, i t demonstrated t h a t the SIUC was 
prepared t o reconsider the issue of self-government, and t h a t there 
was considerable pressure from various sectors of Scottish society 
t o do so. I n the following years, the SIUC passed t h i s pressure on 
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t o the Scottish labour Party, and pushed f o r increasingly stronger 
devolution b i l l s . 
Thus, sta t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the Scottish economy produced a 
s i t u a t i o n where i n d u s t r i a l struggles became p o l i t i c i s e d i n 
n a t i o n a l i s t terms. I n the 1980's, other examples of i n d u s t r i a l 
struggles were t o follow - such as the canpaign against the closures 
of the Gartcosh and Ravenscraig ste e l plants^ and the C a t e r p i l l a r 
occupation"^ - whic±i went beyond the purely economic and called vpon 
the Scottish public t o defend Scottish manufacturing jobs against 
nationalised or multinational c a p i t a l . Now as i n the early 1970's, 
c a l l s f o r Scottish self-government seem t o emerge alinost n a t u r a l l y 
from economic struggles. But i f the 1960's had proved t h a t 
centralised economic planning was inadequate t o stem the flow of 
c a p i t a l and jobs from Scotland, ;*iat was the altemative? From 1971 
onwards, the N a t i o n a l i s t s claimed the a l t e m a t i v e was North Sea O i l , 
and i t i s t o t h i s claim I t u r n i n the following section. 
2.3 O i l ; fuel for the nationalist movement? 
Considering the seemingly in e v i t a b l e decline of the "old" and the 
i n s u f f i c i e n t investment i n "new" industries, i t i s not surprising 
t h a t the discovery of o i l o f f the Scottish coast played an irrportant 
r o l e i n the public debate on the Scottish economic performance. For 
a short time i t also changed the p o l i t i c a l climate. Some observers 
A f t e r a long struggle, Gartcosh was closed down i n 1984 
\\4iile Ravenscraig was saved. Ravenscraig was on the government's h i t 
l i s t because the Scottish market f o r s t e e l had shrunk w i t h closures 
i n car and other metal ind u s t r i e s ; 90 per cent of the s t e e l produced 
a t Ravenscraig was now sent t o England. The state subsidy f o r the 
p l a n t was £ 50 M i l l i o n per year (Financial Times, 3.12.1982, 21). 
Sadler explains the reprieve f o r Ravenscraig w i t h reference t o the 
massive anti-closure campaign v^ich mobilised MP's from a l l 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and people from a l l sectors of society and 
concludes t h a t t h i s had reinforced Scottish i d e n t i t y and made the 
closiire p o l i t i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y unacceptable (Sadler, 1985, 171). 
"^For f u r t h e r d e t a i l see the f r o n t page of the Scotanan, 15.1.1987 
and the analysis of the occupation by Woolfson and Foster (1988). 
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went so f a r as t o i d e n t i f y North Sea o i l as the main factor i n the 
SNP surge. This argument can be easily refuted, because the SNP 
membership and e l e c t o r a l support was already growing before o i l 
began to h i t the headlines. However, there i s no doubt t h a t the 
issue o f o i l was enployed by the SNP as a shortcut through 
long-winded debates about the economic v i a b i l i t y of an independent 
Scotland. At the same time, the prospect of o i l revenues - v ^ i i d i 
benefited mostly the Conservative governments a f t e r 1979 - enabled 
the Labour Party t o promise more public investment f o r Scotland and 
the other depressed regions of Great B r i t a i n . 
I t was i n 1971 t h a t the f i r s t promises of o i l wealth were publicised ' 
i n the Scottish Press. The Glasgow Herald asserted t h a t a "North Sea 
o i l bonanza" was on the way wit h "'immense' o i l benefit f o r 
Scotland" . The Scottish National Party took up the issue almost 
immediately t o argue f o r a "budget boost f o r Scotland", i n vAiose 
waters most of the o i l was located (Glasgow Herald. 7.3.1972, 19). 
Three weeks before, the same had been demanded a t the "Scottish 
Assembly on Unenployment" (see above, p. 16). As o i l experts 
promised a b r i g h t f u t u r e f o r Scotland and the Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry) put the o i l p o t e n t i a l a t £24,000 9 
M i l l i o n , the SNP recognised the rare opportunity of p u t t i n g a 
clear-cut case f o r independence v^ich would convince even the more 
cautious Scots. They decided t o f i g h t the 1974 electio n on the o i l 
issue (Glasgow Herald, 5.9.1973, 3), and came out w i t h a series of 
memorable slogans such as " I t ' s Scotland's o i l ! " . The opposition was 
outflanked by t h i s aggressive canpaign, which helped t o make the SNP 
the most dynamic p o l i t i c a l force i n Scotland because i t had ' 
something new t o say. A labour Party p o l i t i c i a n interpreted the 
inpact i n the general context of growing nationalism: 
These f r o n t page headlines appeared i n the Glasgow Herald 
on October 8th and November 10th of 1971. 
^Glasgow Herald. 1.10.1973, 3 and 25.9.1973, 3. 
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" I don't t h i n k t h a t these had any e f f e c t on the thinking 
of the Scottish people. I t h i n k the main thi n g t h a t 
affected i t was t h a t we were seeing Scotland running 
down. Scotland's o i l had a second feature because f o r the 
f i r s t time i t was possible t o say t h a t Scotland shouldn't 
be running down. I t h i n k i t was mainly the systematic 
running down of Scottish industry and the f e e l i n g t h a t 
Scotland was being hammered by the South, and t h a t our 
opinions weren't being heard, and t h a t they were j u s t 
ignoring us." 
(lambie, interview, 7.8.1988) 
For the SNP, the cairpaign was the only way t o attack the economic 
pessiMsm among the Scottish population v*iich held back the 
p o l i t i c a l movement f o r self-government. The inpact was not only one 
of r a t i o n a l economic argument, but also psychological, according t o 
one SNP p o l i t i c i a n : 
"After we achieved our i n i t i a l breaJcthrough i n the l a t e 
1960's, the attack t h a t cair^ against us from everywhere, 
from labour, from the Conservatives, was one basic 
attack: "You can't a f f o r d i t . An independent Scotland 
w i l l be poorer." A l l the energies were devoted i n t o 
establishing t h a t case, the government produced Scottish 
budgets t o establish t l i a t Scotland w i l l be much poorer 
were she independent, and so on. (...) Now, i t wasn't an 
easy t h i n g t o argue [against] - not because we didn't 
t h i n k there was a very good case, but i t was a case t h a t 
involved some degree of sophisticated economic argument." 
(Lindsay, interview, 24.2.1987) 
The SNP was also c r i t i c i s i n g the way i n viiich the state had handled 
the o i l business. Unaware and unprepared f o r the task of planning 
the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the new resource, i t was feared by many 
observers t h a t the multinational energy giants would run the o i l 
industry without any consideration f o r l o c a l and national 
communities (Taylor, 1975, 270). There had already been negative 
ejq^eriences w i t h multinationals i n other spheres of the economy. The 
SNP proposed f a r more stringent government control over 
e x p l o i t a t i o n , and claimed t h a t the "Conservative Government has been 
v i r t u a l l y g i v i n g away the o i l r i g h t s away with hardly a squeak of 
complaint from the labour Opposition". The accusation was t h a t both 
major B r i t i s h p a r t i e s were only interested i n the short-term 
economic and p o l i t i c a l benefits (Wolfe, 1973, 159), and the fear was 
t h a t Scotland might lose a unique opportunity t o get out of the 
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downward s p i r a l of economic decline and dependency on foreign 
c a p i t a l . 
So, North Sea O i l gave the Scots the comforting thought t h a t they 
had t h e i r own resources and were not t o t a l l y dependent on the 
i M D i l i c a l cord through viii c h regional a i d and public investment was 
t r i c k l i n g i n from London. At least, Scottish p o l i t i c a l figures could 
now claim i n view of the o i l resources t h a t more public resources 
were a r i g h t o f the Scots. But equally i f not more inportant f o r the 
SNP were the s o c i a l and economic ef f e c t s of the prospected o i l 
revenues i n a future independent Scotland. The party created the 
image of a r a p i d l y expanding economic cake v^ich would meet the 
i n t e r e s t s of the d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l classes and form the material 
basis of a consensus society i n vA:ich class antagonism was 
eliminated and replaced by an ethos of social s o l i d a r i t y (Maxwell, 
interview, 9.2.1987 and Maxwell, 1987, 83). 
But the Labour Party, \ ^ i c h formed the B r i t i s h government between 
1974 and 1979, was able t o e x p l o i t the sense of being part of 
B r i t a i n which many Scots s t i l l f e l t i n order t o destroy the 
N a t i o n a l i s t v i s i o n of an independent and wealthy Scotland. I t s 
appeal t o Scottish s o l i d a r i t y w i t h the deprived i n the r e s t of 
B r i t a i n had success. While an opinion p o l l demonstrated t h a t i n 
1974, a majority of 56-59 per cent believed t h a t the o i l belonged to 
Scotland, a p o l l i n December 1975 showed t h a t opinions were 
changing. 66 per cent of the p o l l and even 50 per cent of the SNP 
voters agreed t h a t "the o i l i n the North Sea should be used t o 
b e n e f i t a l l of B r i t a i n , and not j u s t Scotland alone" (Scotsman, 
18.12.1975, 10-11; see also tables 3.9 and 3.10). 
I n the meantime, the Labour government was making the f i r s t steps 
towards t a c k l i n g the nationalist/economic c r i s i s i n Scotland. I t s 
s o l u t i o n f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t problem was devolution, and the main 
concession t o those who demanded Scottish control over economic 
matters was the Scottish Development Agency (SDA). The following 
section assesses the merits of the nev/ economic planning t o o l v^ich 
labour created. 
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2.4 The Scottish Developnent Agency; Labouranswer to the Scottish 
econcmic and p o l i t i c a l problan 
I n 1974, the Scottish Labour Party was forced t o accept the need f o r 
a devolution p o l i c y . But the White Paper on Devolution (1975) and 
the Devolution B i l l i t s e l f which was drawn up by the Labour 
Government i n 1976 d i d not s a t i s f y the needs perceived by many Scots 
t o b r i n g the Scottish economy under closer co n t r o l . I f most Scots 
viewed devolution f u n c t i o n a l l y i n terms of how good a remedy i t was 
f o r t h e i r greatest plagues - uneirployment, i n f l a t i o n and bad housing 
-, then the B i l l was almost a conplete f a i l u r e , because i t d i d not 
give the Scottish Assembly enough powers over these areas 
(Ascherson, 1976, 735). 
Under pressure from Scottish public opinion, r i s i n g n a t i o n a l i s t 
feelings and the o i l debate \shipped up by the SNP, the labour 
government decided t o create a decentralised regional development 
planning agency i n addition t o the e x i s t i n g regional p o l i c y 
structures. The aim was t o "foster the regeneration of the Scottish 
economy" w i t h a government appointed agency vhich would operate from 
i t s Glasgow headquarters w i t h greater effectiveness than the various 
government departments and agencies had been capable of before. 
Although the SDA depended on government financing, i t was supposed 
t o operate independently and form i t s own p o l i c i e s . However, given 
t h a t the board of d i r e c t o r s was appointed by the Secretary of State 
and the agency accountable t o him, the room f o r autonomy was very 
l i m i t e d . 
When the SDA began i t s l i f e i n 1975, the Times commented t h a t i t 
faced a "daunting task" i n t r y i n g t o reconcile the p o l i t i c a l and 
economic needs i n Scotland (Times, 10.12.1975, 23). I n s e t t i n g up 
the agency and thereby channelling additional funds i n t o Scotland, 
the c e n t r a l government c l e a r l y intended t o win back voters v*io had 
become disenchanted w i t h the remote-controlled economic management 
practiced by previous governments. Thus, one key function of the SDA 
was t o l e g i t i m i s e the government i n Scotland. 
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"The problem [of the SDA's task] l i e s (...) i n the tension 
between the p o l i t i c a l and economic objectives t h a t the 
agency w i l l be expected t o achieve. There are, f i r ^ t of a l l , 
the hopes t h a t i t w i l l reassure a doubting public t h a t an 
i n i t i a t i v e taken by the United Kingdom Government can 
fur t h e r economic prosperity i n Scotland." 
(Times. 10.12.1975, 23) 
The other main function of the SDA was t o undermine the economic 
pro j e c t of the SNP which was based on Scotland's claims t o o i l 
revenues. I t was already mentioned t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t movement was 
c r i t i c i s e d f o r being s e l f i s h . The creation of the SDA fu e l l e d t h i s 
chorus of c r i t i c i s m , as Labour leaders from other depressed regions 
claimed t h a t the government was favouring the Scots. This undermined 
the SNP o i l canpaign, but even more damaging was the economic 
recession which began t o develop f u l l y under the labour 
administration. As the Scottish unenployment l e v e l h i t the 200,000 
mark i n August 1977 f o r the f i r s t time i n 40 years, the o i l argument 
was quickly fading away, even before e x p l o i t a t i o n and revenues 
reached noteworthy levels (Tables 3.11 and 3.12; Figs. 15 and 16): 
"What began t o happen was tha t i n the l a t e r 1970's, the 
r i s i n g expectation which had been f u e l l e d by the o i l 
p u b l i c i t y i n Scotland began t o be undermined by the 
remorseless r i s e i n unenployment. So, the f e e l i n g t h a t Scots 
had developed i n the early 1970's - t h a t perhaps a f t e r a l l 
Scotland could s t r i k e i t lucky and r e a l l y e f f e c t an 
irrprovement i n i t s l i v i n g standards and get out of the r o t 
of decline and i n d u s t r i a l closures -, tha t f e e l i n g began t o 
be undermined by the r i s e of unenployment." 
(Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987) 
Although the SNP had argued th a t " t h i s was precisely what would 
happen i f Scotland didn't actually control the o i l " ( i b i d . ) , 
people's experience of the recession made the Nat i o n a l i s t propaganda 
seem appear l i k e a pipe dream. 
The general economic s i t u a t i o n i n the l a t e 1970's made i t d i f f i c u l t 
f o r the SDA t o prove i t s e l f T h e main a c t i v i t i e s of the SDA have 
Between 1977 and 1980 enployment i n Scottish manufacturing f e l l 
by ca. 10 per cent, 3 per cent more than i n the UK as a whole (Table 
11). Scottish GDP per head (which excludes o i l revenues) remained below 
(Footnote Continued) 
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been the construction of factor i e s and the provision of factory 
s i t e s ; investing i n i n d u s t r i a l conpanies; f o s t e r i n g small 
businesses; and promoting Scotland abroad t o a t t r a c t new conpanies. 
The renewal o f d e r e l i c t land was p a r t i c u l a r l y prominent i n the SDA's 
l i s t of p r i o r i t i e s , because the d e r e l i c t land was stemming from "a 
previous i n d u s t r i a l age v^ich has l e f t a b l i g h t not only on the 
landscape but also upon people's l i v e s " (SDA Annual Report, 1977, 
5). Under labour, the SDA claimed t o adhere t o social purposes, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n maintaining and providing enployment and in 
improving the environment, but stressed t h a t these might not always 
coincide w i t h the overriding aims of making the Scottish economy 
more e f f i c i e n t and productive (SDA Annual Report, 1978, 6-7). 
Under Conservative r u l e a f t e r 1979, the agency began t o put more 
errphasis on the a t t r a c t i o n of new investment from abroad. The f i r s t 
Thatcher government was hardly under way when the SDA claimed t h a t 
"to encourage the expansion of the large e x i s t i n g base of overseas 
corporations i n Scotland constitutes one of the main objectives of 
the Agency" (SDA Annual Report, 1980, 24) . The high technology and 
electronics sector was the f i r s t and foremost target. To achieve 
t h i s , a new body was set up i n 1981 which was appropriately named 
"Locate in Scotland". I n d u s t r i a l investment became an i n s i g n i f i c a n t 
7 per cent o f the SDA t o t a l e>penditure i n 1987, which demonstrates 
t h a t the Agency had given up pretences of i n d u s t r i a l development 
(Table 3.13). However, the SDA's budget had always been seen to be 
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o f u l f i l the tasks set by the l e g i s l a t o r s i n 1975 
(Radical Scotland, April/May 1986, 12), and i t s a c t i v i t i e s could not 
prevent a steeper decline of manufacturing eiiployment i n Scotland 
than i n England. 
Although the labour Government set up the SDA i n order t o quieten 
the demands f o r greater Scottish control over economic development, 
demands v^iich have been voiced w i t h increasing i n t e n s i t y since the 
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the UK l e v e l throughout the 1970's and declined i n the second h a l f of 
the decade. Emigration picked up again and almost reached 15,000 between 
mid-1978 and mid-1979 (Regional Trends, 1981, v o l . 16, 29). 
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1960's, i t nevertheless was reluctant t o give up the central 
economic planning model. The SDA has always been accountable t o the 
Secretary of State f o r Scotland and the Westminster Parliament. The 
Labour Government's plan was t h a t i f the promised Scottish Assembly 
became r e a l i t y , i t s economic a c t i v i t i e s were t o be controlled by 
Westminster and i t s powers determined by the Secretary of State (The 
Scotsman. 28.11.1975, 12). Thus, the SDA remained w i t h i n the old 
framework of economic planning, and d i d not r e a l l y address the more 
fundamental issue of public control over economic development or the 
s t r u c t u r a l economic problems which were underlying the issue i n 
Scotland. 
Before going on t o look a t the l i n k s between economic processes and 
nationalism i n Catalonia, i t i s worth summarising the main arguments 
f o r the Scottish case. The economy mattered t o the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement i n Scotland. This was due t o various developnyents. F i r s t l y , 
i t was due t o the economic restructuring processes as a r e s u l t of 
vdiich the Scottish economic region had l o s t i t s p r i v i l e g e d r o l e i n 
the economic structure of the United Kingdom. Secondly, the 
involvement of the central state i n economic restructuring i n the 
post-war period rendered the economic sphere increasingly p o l i t i c a l , 
and since Scotland was considered an economic u n i t , also national. 
T h i r d l y , v^en the l i m i t s of central economic planning became 
obvious, an a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n appeared wi t h the discovery of 
North Sea o i l . These developments provided favourable conditions f o r 
the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n the 1970's. The next part of 
t h i s chapter investigates the Catalan case, v^ere i t w i l l be seen 
t h a t the l i n k s between the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l and economic change 
are constituted rather d i f f e r e n t l y . 
3. THE CATALAN EOONCMY AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
I n the previous chapter on the h i s t o r y of the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement, the connections between economic development and 
nationalism became clear. A r e l a t i v e l y innovative, export oriented 
a g r i c u l t u r a l sector dominated by owner occupation and long-term 
tenancy, together w i t h i n d i a s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n the 19th century had 
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turned Catalonia i n t o an i n d u s t r i a l - c a p i t a l i s t enclave i n a 
predominantly r u r a l , poverty-stricken state. Catalonia therefore 
developed an i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie and working class v^ich formed 
p a r t of a s p e c i f i c a l l y Catalan c i v i l society. I n the early 20th 
century c i v i l society was dominated by a bourgeois, n a t i o n a l i s t i c 
p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Both the economic inter e s t s of i t s leaders and 
t h e i r s t r i v i n g f o r p o l i t i c a l control i n Spain was r e f l e c t e d i n the 
L l i g a Regionalista. However, i t was also shown t h a t other p o l i t i c a l 
tendencies existed i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement which had increasing 
support from the middle and lower classes. From these emerged i n the 
l a t e 1920's the popular nationalism of the Second Republic. 
I n the earl y phase of Catalan nationalism, the connections between 
economic, p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l control were p l a i n l y v i s i b l e i n 
Catalonia - even i f they were not all-embracing. But d i d such 
connections p e r s i s t or re-emerge a f t e r the c i v i l war? Such an 
examination i s f a r from straightforward, because of the prohibitions 
applying t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and other types of organisation during 
the d i c t a t o r s h i p . But by looking a t the economic development of 
Catalan industry, the f i n a n c i a l and personal involvement of Catalan 
entrepreneurs i n the c u l t u r a l movement of the 1960's, and - t o a 
l i m i t e d extent - from the early p o l i t i c a l programmes and paitphlets 
of the Catalan r u l i n g party today, i t i s possible t o get an 
iirpression of the extent t o which the Catalan bourgeoisie played 
"the f i r s t v i o l i n " i n the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l . On the other side, 
the economic boom and recession from the 1950's t o the 1970's 
brought about changes i n the organisation of labour, v^ich also had 
an iitpact on the n a t i o n a l i s t and other p o l i t i c a l movements of the 
period. 
I n order t o explore the l i n k s between economic development and the 
r i s e of nationalism i n Catalonia, I examine f i r s t the economic 
changes i n the Francoist period, and second, the l e v e l and type of 
s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the economy. Euring the Francoist phase, 
Catalonia maintained a strong p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the Spanish economy, 
and sta t e intervention was experienced as a hindrance t o economic 
progress rather than as b e n e f i c i a l . The t h i r d section i s concerned 
w i t h the way i n which some sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie 
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developed n a t i o n a l i s t strategies t o counterbalance the negative 
e f f e c t s of state action, while the fourth looks a t the touching 
points of i n d u s t r i a l struggles and the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. 
3.1 E)evelopnents i n the Catalan economy under Francoism 
I n the f i r s t two decades of Francoism, the economic p o l i c y of the 
d i c t a t o r s h i p was heavily influenced by p o l i t i c a l considerations. The 
aim was t o create an economy which was s e l f - r e l i a n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
irtportant and s t r a t e g i c sectors such as energy, basic industries and 
food production. Imports and exports were controlled by the state 
bureaucracy, as was the s e t t i n g up of new f a c t o r i e s or the ejq)ansion 
o f e x i s t i n g ones. Under t h i s system of extensive state intervention, 
corruption and black markets flourished; p r o f i t s were used f o r 
speculative purposes rather than investment, and o f f i c i a l growth 
rates were low (Ribas i Massana, 1978, 102). This l a t t e r was due 
p a r t l y t o the d i f f i c u l t i e s of access t o inported raw materials and 
c a p i t a l goods, and p a r t l y t o the lack of stimulus t o iirprove 
p r o d u c t i v i t y , since frozen wages i n h i b i t e d consunption and 
corrpetition was low i n the highly protected market (Flos, Gasoliba 
and Serra, 1978, 15). I n the 1950's, Spain's re l a t i o n s h i p t o the 
Western countries inproved under the conditions of the cold war, and 
foreign investors started t o discover Spain as a paradise of low 
wages, a docile labour force and a stable, reactionary government. 
The Plan de Estabilizacion i n 1959 sealed t h i s process of opening 
and l i b e r a l i s a t i o n of the economic system. 
ThrxDughout the Francoist period, and p a r t i c u l a r l y from the 1950's 
onwards, the differences between the Catalan and the Spanish economy 
became progressively smaller (Tables 3.14 and 3.15; Figs, 17 and 
18) . Spain was transformed w i t h i n only a couple of decades from an 
a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t o a modem i n d u s t r i a l society (S. V i l a r , 1985, 73). 
I n the boom period of the 1960's, the Spanish GDP grew by between 
4.2 and 9.5 per cent every year ( C u l l e l l and Farre-Escofet, 1975, 
55). Whilst i n 1955, 45 per cent of the population was occupied i n 
the primary sector, i t was only 32 per cent i n 1967 and 20 per cent 
i n 1979. Sole and Miguelez pointed out t h a t economic development 
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changed the economic balance between Catalonia and the rest of 
Spain: 
"Contrary t o y i a t went on i n the f i n a l years of l a s t century 
and the f i r s t p a r t of t h i s century, when the Catalan 
productive structure was fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from the 
Spanish, one could speak today of fundamental economic 
in t e g r a t i o n ( — ) . " 
(Sole and Miguelez, 1987, 15) 
However, although Catalonia's r e l a t i v e overdevelopment i s less 
pronounced today as i t was before the c i v i l war, i t i s s t i l l v i s i b l e 
and measurable. I n d u s t r i a l development and the growth of the service 
sector took place i n many parts of Spain, but Catalonia p r o f i t e d 
more from the boom because she already had a higher l e v e l of 
p r o d u c t i v i t y , income and i n d u s t r i a l development (Uuch, 1964, 23). 
I n 1983, f o r exairple, disposable family income per person was s t i l l 
122 per cent of the Spanish average and second highest among a l l 
autonomous communities''""'". 
The structure of the Catalan economy underwent some important 
changes during the boom period. While the Scottish economy was 
geared t o heavy industry, the Catalan economy r e l i e d on t e x t i l e 
production which was the single most s i g n i f i c a n t industry u n t i l f a r 
i n t o the 1950's. By 1979, however, the t e x t i l e sector had shrunk t o 
only 13.4 per cent of the gross added value, and metal processing 
had gone up from 12.4 per cent t o 32.3 per cent i n the same period. 
During the 1960's, the i n d u s t r i a l structure became more d i v e r s i f i e d 
(Flos, Gasoliba and Serra, 1978, 63-65) (Table 3.16; Figs. 19-21). 
However, i n d u s t r i a l investment i n Catalonia i n the l a s t few decades 
has reduced the degree of autonomy of the Catalan manufacturing 
sector. P a r t i c u l a r l y the large enterprises "are increasingly less 
Catalan and more controlled by b i g business i n Madrid" (Flos e t a l . . 
D i s p a r i t i e s are very pronounced among the autonomous 
communities. I f the Catalan disposable family income was 122 per 
cent above the Spanish average, i t was only 68 per cent i n 
Extremadura, the most depressed community, and 80 per cent i n 
Andalucia, Spain's largest community (Banco de Bilbao, 1986, 50). 
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1978, 92-3) . Secondly, many of the large manufacturing enterprises 
w i t h headquarters i n Barcelona are now controlled by foreign 
c a p i t a l . I n 1973, 39 per cent of the large Catalan firms involved 
foreign c a p i t a l which had i n 28 per cent of the cases a c o n t r o l l i n g 
i n t e r e s t . Foreign investment was highest i n the chemical, metal, 
food and - t o a much lesser extent and concentrated i n a r t i f i c i a l 
f i b r e s - t e x t i l e sectors and originated mainly from other European 
countries fop, c i t . . 119-120). According t o Sole and Miguelez, t h i s 
concentration of foreign c a p i t a l i n the main growth sectors, and 
increasing investment i n Catalonia from other parts of Spain, have 
reduced the l e v e l of control of the Catalan bourgeoisie over the 
manufacturing sector (Sole and Miguelez, 1987, 27). 
Although large enterprises, mostly dominated from outside Catalonia, 
played an iitportant r o l e i n the regional econonr^ i n the 1960's and 
1970's, they were f a r less prevalent i n terms of enployment than i n 
the UK""^. Medium sized enterprises accounted f o r much of the 
eitployment and the i n d u s t r i a l production, and was predominantly 
Catalan owned and controlled. Although often subordinated t o the 
large conpanies, i t appears t h a t t h i s "Catalan sector" was linked t o 
the s o c i a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y dominant groups. The i n d u s t r i a l middle 
bourgeoisie was " s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l l y relevant, but economically 
subjected t o the power of the b i g foreign c a p i t a l " (Sole and 
Miguelez, 1987, 35-6). 
Thus, although economic changes i n Spain and i n the world economy 
have reduced the r e l a t i v e autonomy of the Catalan economy during the 
Franco period, i t seems t h a t they generally benefited Catalonia. 
Bearing i n mind the c o n f l i c t s w i t h the state which the Catalan 
bourgeoisie had i n the 19th century, and the f i e r c e anti-separatism 
of the Franco regime, the next question concerns the affects of 
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I n 1972, 68 per cent of manufacturing ertployment i n the UK 
was i n large enterprises w i t h over 500 errployees. Six years l a t e r , 
s t i l l only 20 per cent of Catalan manufacturing enployees were 
working i n large conpanies (Sole and Miguelez, 1987, 38). 
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s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n on the economy. Did t h i s have any influence on 
the n a t i o n a l i s t movement? 
3.2 Ecxpnonic planning 
The new economic doctrine of the Franco regime a f t e r i t s v i c t o r y i n 
1939 was influenced by several factors. The most important i n t e r n a l 
ones were: the "counterrevolution" (reversal of changes i n the 
economic structure t h a t occurred during the 1930's); the f a s c i s t 
theories and ideologies ( s t i l l s i g n i f i c a n t during the 1940's); and 
the new mechanisms of state intervention. The s i t u a t i o n of the 
Spanish state during and a f t e r the Second World War ( i s o l a t i o n and 
Western trade embargo) was the most relevant external factor. The 
di c t a t o r s h i p was a reaction t o the c r i s i s of capitalism i n the l a t e 
1920's, and t o the revolutionary unrest of the 1930's, therefore the 
economic and the p o l i t i c a l were d i f f i c u l t t o separate. 
I n any case, the mixture of the above factors favoured an economic 
model i n v^ i c h the state played the central r o l e . However, i t was 
not the type of state intervention developing a t the same time i n 
other countries, such as B r i t a i n . While i n B r i t a i n , state 
i n t e r v e n t i o n aiiiied a t keeping the c a p i t a l i s t econoiry going, 
Francoist s t a t e intervention was guided by other ideological 
considerations, and t o some extent i n h i b i t e d c a p i t a l i s t accumulation 
(Ribas i Massana, 1978, 43). 
One of the main objectives of state intervention i n the 1940's was 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y both i n food and i n d u s t r i a l production (Theberge, 
1976, 12-14). Foreign trade was r e s t r i c t e d and state controlled. 
This on the one hand protected Spanish industries against outside 
competition, but one the other disrupted the supply o f imported raw 
material and machinery and led t o severe underinvestment. This 
affected Catalonia, which was r e l a t i v e l y i n d u s t r i a l i s e d and r e l i e d 
on imported cotton and machinery f o r her t e x t i l e industry. 
Throughout the 1940's, Catalan t e x t i l e industries could only get 
around 65 per cent of the cotton they needed (Minguella, 1979, 38). 
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At the same time, the government had frozen wages ( u n t i l 1958). The 
e f f e c t was t h a t much of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of raw materials and end 
products was done on the black market, which allowed the producers 
t o rake i n b i g p r o f i t s . Despite frozen wages, prices were r i s i n g , a 
s i t u a t i o n v s ^ i i c h created a b a r r i e r t o economic growth. 
New instruments of economic intervention were created such as the 
Institute Nacional de I n d u s t r i a (INI) i n 1941 t o f u r t h e r the 
creation of industries, "especially those v^ich are essential t o the 
defence of the country", and t o lead the economy i n the d i r e c t i o n of 
autarchy (Ribas i Massana, 1978, 95) . I n t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n , j u s t as 
i n other organs of economic intervention, the representation of 
Catalans was minimal. Economic planning and investment carried out 
by IKE d i d not usually b e n e f i t Catalonia, v^ich was regarded as a 
congested i n d u s t r i a l zone i n need of decongestion. Many of INI's new 
i n d u s t r i e s were located i n the Madrid area, and l o c a t i o n of state 
investment seemed t o have been guided f a r more by consideration of 
personal p o l i t i c s than of national development. State i n s t i t u t i o n s 
such as INI, and state enterprises provided Franco wi t h excellent 
opportunities f o r "rewarding" f a i t h f u l followers w i t h l u c r a t i v e 
posts (Abella, 1985, 134). 
The scarce public investment i n the Catalan i n f r a s t r u c t u r e was the 
source of a widespread f e e l i n g of neglect. The drain of f i n a n c i a l 
resources from Catalonia t o the r e s t of Spain - more precisely 
Madrid - was a r e s u l t of Catalonia's r e l a t i v e wealth, but Catalan 
economists d i d not consider t h i s t o be the nation's contribution t o 
the deprived regions of Spain. Rather, i t was regarded as a subsidy 
f o r the enormous bureaucracy of central government, and therefore 
something v ^ i c h only benefited the p o l i t i c a l classes. 
The bureaucracy established i n the period of autarchy was extensive, 
and i n many ways obstructive t o c a p i t a l i s t development. Although the 
jungle of permits, authorisations and controls became l i g h t e r w i t h 
the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n of the economy, the intimate linkages between 
business and p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e were not broken down. Corruption 
flourished during the economic boom, and c e n t r a l , p r o v i n c i a l and 
l o c a l government was often involved i n land speculation etc.. The 
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negative e f f e c t s on i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , p r o d u c t i v i t y and competitiveness 
were increasingly noted and c r i t i c i s e d by those sectors of the 
bourgeoisie which were th i n k i n g ahead and beyond the boundaries of 
the Spanish economiy. The Catalan bourgeoisie, more d i s t a n t from the 
dominant p o l i t i c a l cadres, had some i n t e r e s t i n l i b e r a t i n g t h e i r 
economic sphere from the paralysing influence o f the state, and t o 
r e b u i l d t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Catalonia. I t was p a r t l y 
f o r t h i s reason t h a t somie sectors of the bourgeoisie helped t o 
construct the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l , as the next section explains. 
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3.3 Catalan business and nationalist projects 
3.3.i Money f o r c u l t u r e 
The Catalan bourgeoisie played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the Catalanist 
r e v i v a l . But t h i s timie, i t was not so much b i g bourgeoisie v ^ c h 
provided the resources f o r c u l t u r a l projects and associations, but 
rather the p e t t y and medium bourgeoisie \ihich. had remained more 
f a i t h f u l t o the Catalan heritage. 
From 1960 onwards, c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s such as publishing, music, 
and teaching contributed a great deal t o the slow recovery of the 
Catalan language and culture. Under the Franco regime, no public 
resources were available f o r such a c t i v i t i e s . Furthermore, 
censorship, repressive l e g i s l a t i o n and a d r a s t i c a l l y and forcedly 
shrunken market made them p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous and economically 
unfeasible. Most of these c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s therefore had constant 
f i n a n c i a l problems and r e l i e d on sponsors from the w e l l - o f f 
professional and business sectors. 
Whilst no s t a t i s t i c s are available t o quantify t h i s involvement, 
many examples demonstrate the intimate involvement of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie i n n a t i o n a l i s t a c t i v i t i e s . F i r s t of a l l , the countless 
associations and p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s \jhich played such a 
s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the surv i v a l of the Catalan culture and national 
heritage had t o be financed. To some extent, membership fees 
accounted f o r t h i s , but sponsorship was also required. I n the 
absence o f public resources, everything - Catalan teaching, the 
numerous l i t e r a t u r e prizes, prestigious i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the 
I n s t i t u t d'Estudis Catalans (lEC), etc. - had t o be financed 
p r i v a t e l y . The sponsors were n a t u r a l l y found i n the ranks of the 
Catalan business and professional e l i t e , and some of them were 
d i r e c t l y involved as o f f i c e holders i n these c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
One high p r o f i l e association dedicated t o fostering Catalan culture 
was the Qimim Cultural. Founded i n 1961, i t helped t o finance the 
lEC, the Obra del Ballet Pop\ilar, the Agrtpacio Dramatica de 
Barcelona, etc., and financed c u l t u r a l prizes such as the Nit de 
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Santa Llucia, etc. (GEC, 1988). Apart from several hundred members. 
Omnium Cultxaral had among i t s presidents well-established 
entrepreneurs viho were committed t o supporting Catalan culture, such 
as Cendros i Carbonell, a-mer of the factory Hangron C i e n t i f i c a l 
S.A.; L l u i s Carulla, w i t h shares i n various food industries; and 
M i l l e t i Maristany, involved i n banking and insurance. 
I n many other cases, the involvement of the Catalan bourgeoisie was 
as shareholders. A case i n point was the Catalan publishing houses, 
v^ i c h were a t the f o r e f r o n t of the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l i n the 1960's, 
but always i n need of cash. The most successful Catalan publisher 
today, Edicions 62, began as a small c u l t u r a l project i n 1962 v^^ich 
was set up by Max Cahner and other i n t e l l e c t u a l s v^o had been 
involved i n the jour n a l Serra d^Or. The necessary s t a r t i n g c a p i t a l 
came from the Cahner family, who had sold t h e i r shares i n a paint 
factory. Subsequently, more shareholders were recruited f o r Edicions 
62, most of whom had only a small stake i n the coirpany (Cahner, 
interview, 11.2.1988). The same system operated i n other Catalan 
publishing firms. Whatever t h e i r ideological stance - many of the 
Catalan publishing houses were le f t - w i n g oriented under the Franco 
regime, and a l l were opposed t o i t - they r e l i e d on shareholders. 
Another example was the publishing house Laia: 
I n those days, the publishing house was fonned by a very 
large number of share holders. There were many people, 
over a hundred, who held a small number of shares each. 
They were economically powerful people from the world of 
industry and finance i n Catalonia, which i n a way 
channeled t h e i r resistance t o the positio n of the Franco 
regime w i t h respect t o the Catalan culture i n t o the 
publishing sector. This kind of thin g was quite common i n 
Catalonia, and occurred i n the cases of Edicions 62, La 
Magrana, Publicacions de Montserrat as wel l as l a i a ; 
journals as w e l l (...), such as "Oriflama", "Presencia", 
and others formed pa r t of t h i s form of c u l t u r a l 
opposition i n order t o maintain the language. " 
(Pages, interview, 25.4.1988) 
The investors i n Catalan c u l t u r e under Franco were mostly from the 
professional class and from (mainly medium sized) industry. They 
were people \A\o would not have taken the r i s k involved i n d i r e c t 
p o l i t i c a l action, but they were prepared t o use some of t h e i r money 
as a kind of voluntary tax. 
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" I f we look a t them soc i o l o g i c a l l y , they were the same: 
people from the Catalan bourgeoisie, top professionals v*io 
had s u f f i c i e n t inccme t o invest money without expecting any 
f i n a n c i a l returns. Maybe they even d i d i t f o r t h e i r own 
image." 
(Pages, interview, 16.5.1989) 
Capital was not only needed t o set up such c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
but also t o keep them going. Making Catalan books was not a 
p r o f i t a b l e business because many people had never learned t o read 
and w r i t e Catalan, and the market was very l i m i t e d . Also, the 
p o l i t i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n s meant t h a t fines and bribes had t o be paid t o 
the Spanish a u t h o r i t i e s t o miake the publication of t h i s or the other 
volumie possible. Capital f o r reviv i n g Catalan cult\ire was mostly 
p r i v a t e ; only the Banca Catalana was prepared t o lend money f o r such 
purposes, and only because the bank i t s e l f i s a product of the 
movemvent of "rebuilding the Catalan nation". One of i t s founders was 
J o r d i Pujol, a "man of the bourgeoisie", and the present leader of 
the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t party, CiU. 
While many members of the Catalan bourgeoisie r e s t r i c t e d t h e i r 
n a t i o n a l i s t a c t i v i t i e s t o the c u l t u r a l f i e l d , some extended them t o 
the economiic sphere. State neglect and mismanagemient had produced 
some l i m i t s t o econondc growth i n Catalonia, and therefore, a small 
sector o f the Catalan bourgeoisie argued t h a t a n a t i o n a l i s t project 
was necessary t o r e b u i l d the nation's economic structure. The next 
section looks a t the arguments involved. 
3 . 3 . i i Rebuilding the nation's economy 
"Fer Catalunya" or "construir Catalunya" ("make Catalonia") was the 
slogan o f somie sectors of the n a t i o n a l i s t moven^ent v^ich aimed a t 
re b u i l d i n g the national i d e n t i t y and consciousness by strengthening 
the economuc, so c i a l and c u l t u r a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of the coiantry. I t 
was coined by Pujol, who interpreted investment i n Catalonia as a 
p a t r i o t i c act, and coincided w i t h the economic boom period of the 
l a t e 1950's and 1960's. Catalan entrepreneurs were generally doing 
w e l l under the regime and had adapted t o the p o l i t i c a l system. The 
c u l t u r a l repression constituted a dilemima f o r some, but those 
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entrepreneurs v^o put t h e i r national and c u l t u r a l r i g h t s before 
t h e i r business i n t e r e s t s were rare. According t o P. Nadal (a Catalan 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t ) , the p a t r i o t i c c a p i t a l i s t tendency was i n f l u e n t i a l 
only i n Catalanist c i r c l e s and of l i m i t e d significance (Pere Nadal, 
interview, 27.1.1988). 
The foundation of the Banca Catalana, however, was inspired by 
n a t i o n a l i s t considerations. Pujol considered a Catalan bank 
necessary i n order t o keep the resources i n Catalonia and t o create 
new enterprises. Without a bank of her own, 
"Catalonia w i l l always l i v e i n danger of losing her best 
i n d u s t r i a l and commercial creations t o foreigners. She w i l l 
always l i v e i n danger of being colonised." 
(Pujol, 1980, 97) 
I n short, i t was seen as a way t o strengthen the control of the 
Catalan bourgeoisie over the regional economy a t a c r u c i a l time of 
economic expansion and rapid s t r u c t u r a l change. The b i g t e x t i l e 
c a p i t a l i s t s had l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n such a proj e c t , because they had 
13 
c u l t u r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y adapted t o the Franco system . But there 
was i n t e r e s t i n a b i g autochthonous bank among the younger manager 
generations and the up and coming manufacturing sectors, such as 
metal manufacturing, construction, chemicals, as w e l l as the growing 
service sector (Llarch, 1985, 56) . The idea of Catalan 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , induced some i n d u s t r i a l i s t s t o advocate the 
introd u c t i o n of heavy industry t o provide a secure basis f o r the 
transforming industries t h a t dominate i n Catalan industry. Such 
demands were presented as p a t r i o t i c goals i n the s p i r i t of "making 
country", j u s t l i k e many other entrepreneurial a c t i v i t i e s . 
According t o Ernest Lluch, t h i s was j u s t a fashionable cover f o r 
The general opinion i s t h a t the Catalan b i g bourgeoisie 
had betrayed Catalonia. I n 1957, the exiled w r i t e r Tasis accused the 
Catalan bourgeoisie of s e l l i n g out. Rather than attenpting t o 
safeguard Catalan economic in t e r e s t s , the great c a p i t a l i s t s came t o 
i n d i v i d u a l arrangements w i t h the new regime. "There has never been a 
c o l l e c t i v e action, a u n i f i e d f r o n t , a common programme i n defence of 
Catalan i n t e r e s t s - not even of those of the bourgeoisie" (Tasis, 
1979, 37). 
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Catalan c a p i t a l i s t s t r y i n g t o protect t h e i r i n t e r e s t s against 
outside competition (Ernest Lluch, 1970, 67; see also Trias i 
Fargas, 1965, 25-26). 
Certainly, these " p a t r i o t i c a l l y inspired" ventures were only a small 
p a r t of the t o t a l economiic investment, and were pulled along w i t h 
the great economic boom t h a t v/as happening anyway. Nevertheless, 
they were i n d i c a t i v e of a cert a i n current i n Catalan nationalism 
v ^ c h became stronger i n the 1960's. As new industries sprung i:^ and 
investment was surging, the Catalan bourgeoisie became more 
assertive. A f t e r decades of p o l i t i c a l and economiic determination 
through the Franco regime, during which the Catalans had l o s t the 
p o l i t i c a l influence gained i n the f i r s t decades of the century, 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s arose f o r a change i n the balance of forces. The Banca 
Catalana exemplifies the nascent organisation of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie i n t h a t period. Not only was the futur e leader of 
Convergencia Democratica deeply involved w i t h the bank, but i t also 
provided an opportunity t o gather other p o l i t i c a l l y and economically 
ambitious entrepreneurs and professionals around a commion goal. I n 
t h i s sense, the c r e d i t i n s t i t u t e performed the function of a 
p o l i t i c a l party a t a time when they were s t i l l i l l e g a l . Even before 
Oonvergencia Deroocratica was formed as a party, the interests i t 
represented were already i n f l u e n t i a l i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. As 
the former General Secretary of the Comrounist Party pointed out, 
"in a c e r t a i n way, the branches of Banca Catalana were 
important sources of support f o r J o r d i Pujol. He placed 
friends i n s t r a t e g i c positions i n the Catalana ..." 
(Lopez Raimundo, interview, 16.5.1989) 
I n Pujol's own v i s i o n o f the reconstruction of the Catalan nation, 
the bourgeoisie played a fundamental r o l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y those 
sectors of the p e t t y and muddle bourgeoisie v^ich were "reformist, 
modem and w i t h a soc i a l and national conscience" (Marcet, 1987, 
286-7). This importance can be traced back t o other periods, and i s 
indeed the miain b u i l d i n g stone of the nation: 
"Without the bourgeoisie [ . . . ] , our modem, dynamic 
Catalonia would not e x i s t today. I mean t h a t Catalonia \^hich 
r e f l e c t s a w i l l t o e x i s t and t o create, and not j u s t t o be 
passively accepted, almost suffered, l i k e other nations such 
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as the Provence, Galicia, and u n t i l recently Valencia [ ] . 
I n our case, the economic strength, - the indigenous 
economic potency -, has been a decisive influence on Catalan 
p o l i t i c s and r e a l i t y . " 
(Pujol, 1976, 25) 
I t follows from t h i s argument t h a t economic strength i s a 
precondition f o r p o l i t i c a l influence and autonomy. At the same time 
as r e v i v i n g the Catalan culture and national consciousness, i t was 
therefore necessary t o develop the economic' p o t e n t i a l of the 
country. Another consequence of t h i s approach t o n a t i o n a l i s t 
a f f i n n a t i o n i s t h a t the bourgeoisie i s not only leading the economic 
advance of the country, but assumes also social and p o l i t i c a l 
leadership. This i s precisely what occurred i n the 1970's, even 
though the bourgeoisie - and even Pujol, f o r t h a t matter - took a 
backseat i n the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t movement during the 1960's and 
early 1970's. 
Having exajnined the influence of the booming s i x t i e s on Catalan 
nationalism w i t h respect t o the bourgeoisie, I now look a t the 
e f f e c t s economic processes and state intervention had on workers. 
The next section argues t h a t i n d u s t r i a l struggles i n the Francoist 
period became increasingly p o l i t i c i s e d , and Catalan nationalism was 
one aspect of t h i s new p o l i t i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y . 
3.4. Industrial s t r i f e , p o l i t i c a l organisation and autoncany 
The support of the workers' movement f o r Catalan self-deterrdnation 
i n the 1970's was inportant f o r the success of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. Although Catalan nationalism had a popular appeal i n the 
past, working class organisations never v^^oleheartedly embraced the 
national issue. During the Second Republic, t h i s uneasy relationship 
deteriorated r a p i d l y , and the repressions during and a f t e r the C i v i l 
War -which h i t the working class more than others - disrupted the 
f r a g i l e t r a d i t i o n there was of working class support f o r Catalan 
self-determination. I n the post-war period, the Barcelona region 
became a magnet f o r Spanish migrants who were absorbed in the 
economic expansion. A large part of the immigrants landed i n the 
hard and badly paid manufacturing jobs, and soon formed the hard 
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core of the working class i n Catalonia's i n d u s t r i a l b e l t . This i s 
where the new working class organisations started i n the 1960's, 
v*ien c o l l e c t i v e bargaining was no longer prohibited (Miguelez, 1985, 
599). Given the strong immigrant presence i n the working class and 
i t s emerging organisations, the question arises t o vtiich extent the 
econcmic r e a l i t y i n Catalonia favoured the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the 
workers w i t h n a t i o n a l i s t demands. 
As a hig h l y i n d u s t r i a l i s e d region, Barcelona was - together with 
Madrid and the t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l centres of Guipuzcoa, Viscaya 
and Asturias - a t the f o r e f r o n t of working class mobilisation. This 
14 
m o b i l i s a t i o n had already started i n the early 1950's and involved 
several Catholic workers' organisations (HOAC and JOG) as w e l l as 
15 
the Oposicion Sindical Obrera , but i t s main source were the 
Workers' Commissions (CC.OO.). The CC.OO. became promiinent f o r the 
f i r s t time i n the Asturian muners' s t r i k e s i n 1962 and from then on 
sprung up i n other i n d u s t r i a l centres. However, since these 
organisations emerging on the miargin of the o f f i c i a l V e r t i c a l 
Syndicate developed i n a ce r t a i n haphazard manner and originated 
mainly i n i n d u s t r i a l disputes a t enterprise l e v e l , they progressed 
i n d i f f e r e n t ways i n the various i n d u s t r i a l regions. The conditions 
f o r t h e i r development were shaped by the working class t r a d i t i o n s of 
the region, the composition of the working class, and the already 
e x i s t i n g organisational structures and oppositional p o l i t i c a l nuclei 
(Miguelez, 1985, 606-608). One of the spe c i f i c developments i n 
14 
I n h i s h i s t o r y of the Catalan workers' movement under 
Franco, Ludevid pointed out t h a t i n the larger metal and t e x t i l e 
manufacturing enterprises, working class a c t i v i s t s began t o use the 
V e r t i c a l Syndicate t o defend workers' r e a l i n t e r e s t s already i n the 
1950's (Ludevid, 1977, 12). This followed a decision by the 
ComoHMnist Party i n 1949 t o i n f i l t r a t e the Syndicate w i t h the aim of 
overthrxjwing i t from w i t h i n . 
•'"^ The OSO were comrnmist influenced, but rather spontaneous 
and nuclear manifestations of workers' opposition t o the V e r t i c a l 
Syndicate. The labour leader and CC.OO. veteran Cipriano Garcia gave 
exaitples o f Terrassa, i n the i n d u s t r i a l b e l t of Barcelona province, 
where a l o c a l group campaigned against the r i s e o f bycicle 
r e g i s t r a t i o n fees and f o r equal wages (Garcia, interview, 
29.3.1988). 
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Catalonia was the early c o n s t i t u t i o n of a CC.OO. regional structure. 
I n 1964, the Comision Central de Barcelona was formed and a strategy 
adopted t o establish workers' commissions i n other Catalan provinces 
and d i s t r i c t s . Two years l a t e r , the Ctomissii Obrera Nacional de 
Catalvinya (OONC) was set up. The Catalan Communist party (PSUC) was 
involved i n t h i s attenpt t o inpose a hierarchy and d i r e c t i o n on the 
new movement v*iich d e l i b e r a t e l y confined i t t o a Catalan framework 
of reference. The creation of a national structure was a p o l i t i c a l 
decision by labour leaders who wanted t o avoid a s p l i t between 
national and class issues which could divide the workers (Garcia, 
interview, 29.3,1988), I n t h e i r f i r s t congress i n 1978'''^ , the 
Ccmissions Obreres de Catalunya stressed t h e i r national i d e n t i t y and 
support f o r the struggle f o r Catalan autonomy. 
The OC.OO. a c t i v i s t s were encouraged t o take part i n n a t i o n a l i s t 
demonstrations on the 11th of September already i n the l a t e 1960's, 
and the CONC decided t h a t i t would send representatives t o 
organisations such as the Taula Rodona and the Assemblea de 
Catalunya . The Catalan CC.OO leadership's concern f o r p o l i t i c a l 
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struggles was not r e f l e c t e d t o the same extent i n the interests of 
the rank and f i l e , which centred on concrete inprovements a t the 
workplace (Clemente, interview, 21.3.1988). Tensions w i t h i n the 
OC.OO. about strategies and p r i o r i t i e s affected the Catalan labour 
movement, and some accused the PSUC of using the CC.OO. t o establish 
Sfliile during the dic t a t o r s h i p CC.OO. constituted the 
workers' movement, the appearance of other trade unions a f t e r 
Franco's death forced them t o define themselves as a trade union. 
The f i r s t congress i n May 1978 was held under a slogan which 
r e f l e c t e d the strong presence of communists i n i t s ranks: 
"For a strong class syndicate - leading Catalonia out of the 
c r i s i s " . 
(Ccmissions Obreres de Catalxmya, 1978, 1) 
•'"^ The reference t o the sp e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l struggles i n 
Catalonia, such as th a t of the Assemblea de Catalunya and the 
students' movement of the University of Barcelona, cropped up i n the 
underground press of the CC.OO time and again, Coirparisons were 
drawn between repressive actions of the government. against s t r i k i n g 
workers and protesting students, and messages of s o l i d a r i t y w i t h 
workers i n i n d u s t r i a l disputes, such as those of SEAT i n 1971 and 
subsequent years, were p r i n t e d fCcmisiones, 1972, no, 1, 5-11), 
(Chapter three) (176) 
i t s hegemiony i n Catalonia, and call e d f o r a miore economist and 
autoncmous strategy (Que hacer?, 1969, no. 6, 7). While the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the labour movement on the factory f l o o r were very 
l i m i t e d i n the 1960's (Ludevid, 1977, 52), they took on a f a r 
greater inportance i n the 1970's, v^en i n d u s t r i a l disputes in the 
large r enterprises such as SEAT, Termica, Pegaso and O l i v e t t i became 
more frequent and more widespread. These were related to the 
economic c r i s i s which the country was experiencing a f t e r the " f a t " 
years of the previous decade. The creation of the Assemblea de 
Catalxmya a t a time of widespread s t r i k e s i n Barcelona (Novemiber 
1971) was celebrated as the most relevant act of the Catalan 
opposition against the di c t a t o r s h i p (Nous Horitzons, 1971, no. 23, 
1-3). 
There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t the strong presence of the Catalan 
communist party (PSUC) i n both the CC.OO. and the p o l i t i c a l 
opposition movement was the main l i n k between the struggles in the 
fa c t o r i e s and the more p o l i t i c a l struggles v^ich involved a broad 
spectrum o f Catalan society. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the 
PSUC was t r y i n g t o r a l l y support amrang workers f o r the demancJs for 
demKxar^cy and self-government around which the Catalan opposition 
was gathering strength. I t v/as rather successful i n i t s attempt to 
r e l a t e national and social oppression and t o i d e n t i f y the government 
as the main source of both. DenK)cracy, freedom and amnesty were seen 
t o be i n everybody's i n t e r e s t , and promised t o make possible 
autonomous trade unions as wel l as self-govemmient. 
To conclude, the combination of rapid economic development i n the 
1960's, sta t e repression and a r e l a t i v e l y active working class 
underground organisation led t o i n d u s t r i a l struggles which edged 
closer t o the n a t i o n a l i s t movement as the state was i d e n t i f i e d with 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l repression. I n t h i s process of p o l i t i c i s a t i o n 
of economiic struggles, the working class organisations played an 
important r o l e . 
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4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter lcx)ked a t relationships between econcmic processes and 
the p o l i t i c a l manifestation of nationalism. I t found t h a t economic 
development took d i f f e r e n t paths i n Scotland and Catalonia, i n spite 
of general trends such as the increase of foreign investment and 
c o n t r o l and of state intervention i n the econcariy. 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , both countries have a d i s t i n c t i v e economic structure. 
I n i t s e l f , the existence of these "regional" economies i s not 
remarkable, because the "national" economies of vAiich they are part 
are constituted by a patchwork of more or less d i s t i n c t i v e economic 
regions. What makes the difference i n the cases of Scotland and 
Catalonia i s the peculiar l i ^ t under which t h e i r economies are 
seen. I n t h i s l i g h t , v ^ i c h passes through a f i l t e r of national 
consciousness, the Scottish economy, marred by emigration, 
i n d u s t r i a l decline and chronic unenployment, i s seen as the deprived 
adopted brother t o i t s wealthier neighbour t o the South. Economic 
planning as a way of p u l l i n g the Scottish economy out of i t s 
downhill t r a j e c t o r y gave i t an additional p o l i t i c a l dimension v^tiich 
has featured strongly i n p o l i t i c a l discourse. I n Catalonia, i t i s 
the other way round: i t has a t r a d i t i o n of creating more wealth than 
most other regions i n Spain. I n recent decades, the development gap 
has narrowed, but Catalonia has s t i l l more industry and a h i ^ e r 
l i v i n g standard than most of the other Spanish autonomous 
communities. 
While i t i s not possible t o ascribe causal powers t o economic 
structures and "necessities", as some economist approaches do, some 
processes can be i d e n t i f i e d which helped t o shape and t o constrain 
the n a t i o n a l i s t movements. I n the case of Scotland, t h i s was the 
f a i l u r e of economic planning and the discovery of o i l resources. 
Once the Scottish economy had become a national p o l i t i c a l issue, 
major i n d u s t r i a l struggles also took on board n a t i o n a l i s t 
perspectives, and i n t u r n became part of the general process of 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n . However, Vi^en the economic s i t u a t i o n deteriorated i n 
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the l a t e 1970's, the v i s i o n of an independent Scotland and the 
prospect of p o l i t i c a l change i n general becairte less a t t r a c t i v e . 
I n Catalonia, the economic boom of the 1960's under conditions of 
economic l i b e r a l i s a t i o n made both Capital and Labour more confident 
about gaining more p o l i t i c a l . cont r o l . Both i d e n t i f i e d - from 
d i f f e r e n t perspectives - the Franco regime as a hindrance t o 
economic and s o c i a l well-being, and t o p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i s a t i o n . 
Catalonia being the economically most advanced region i n Spain, i t 
f e l t the contradictions of c a p i t a l i s t growth faster and more 
intensely, and t h i s provided favourable conditions f o r the 
a n t i - F r a n c o i s t / n a t i o n a l i s t struggle i n the 1970's. 
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Table 3.1: Employment decline i n Scottish heavy intJustry, 1958-78 
(in thousands) 
HEAVY INDUSTRY TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
1958 1968 1978 
Metal manufactxare 58 4 40.6 33. 9 
Mechanical engineering 104 0 101.0 80. 2 
Shipbuilding and marine eng. 67 1 37.6 37. 6 
Vehicles 36 3 38.0 20. 6 
Sources: Census of Production. 1958; 1968 and 1978. 
Table 3.2: Production of Scottish manufacturing by 
industry, 1958-78 
(Percentage of net output) 
1958 1968 1978 
Mining 9.1 4.9 4.9 
Water, gas 
el e c t r i c i t y 6.5 9.4 7.6 
Food, drink 
& tobacco 14.1 18.0 21.6 
Textiles 8.3 7.7 6.0 
Leather, shoes 2.2 2.3 2.8 
Timber, fixmiture 2.0 2.2 2.6 
Paper, printing 6.4 7.0 6.8 
Chemicals 6.5 6.7 7.5 
Glass, cement 2.6 2.8 2.9 
Metal (light ind.) 7.2 13.5 12.3 
Metal (heavy ind.) 33.3 23.2 22.4 
Other 6.5 2.2 2.6 
Sources: Census of Production, 1958, v o l . 134, 96-111; 
i b i d . . 1968, v o l . 157, 230-249; i b i d . . 1978, 
158-171. 
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Table 3.3: Enployed population i n Scotland, 1951-81 
(Per cent) 
EOONCMIC SECTORS 1951 1966 1981 
Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing 7.4 5.0 
Maniifacturing 42.2 38.8 
Construction 6.9 8.6 
Services 43.5 47.6 
3.3 
27.4 
8.5 
60.9 
Source: Census 1951 (Scotland); Census 1966 (Scotland); 
Census 1981 (Scotlarid). 
Table 3.4: Errployed population i n Great Britain, 1951-81 
(Per cent) 
EOONQMIC SECTORS 1951 1966 1981 
Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing 5.1 3.2 
Manufacturing 43.1 39.0 
Construction 6.3 7.8 
Services 45.5 50.1 
2.2 
30.1 
7.0 
60.6 
Source; Census 1951 (England and Wales); Census 1966 
(England and Wales); Census 1981 (England and 
Wales). 
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Table 3.5 : uneitployment i n Scotland and GB, 1949-79 
(Percentage of ec»noinically active) 
YEAR SC30TLRND GREAT BRITAIN 
1949 2.7 1.3 
1950 2.7 1.4 
1951 2.2 1.0 
1952 3.1 1.9 
1953 2.7 1.4 
1954 2.8 1.3 
1955 • 2.4 1.1 
1956 2.4 1.2 
1957 2.6 1.4 1958 3.8 2.1 
1959 4.4 2.2 
1960 3.6 1.6 
1961 3.1 1.5 
1962 3.8 2.0 
1963 4,8 2.5 
1964 3.6 1.6 
1965 3.0 1.4 
1966 2.9 1.5 
1967 3.9 2.4 
1968 3.8 2.4 
1969 3.7 2.4 
1970 4.2 2.5 
1971 5.9 3.4 
1972 6.6 3.8 
1973 4.7 2.7 
1974 4.1 2.6 
1975 5.8 4.1 
1976 7.0 5.6 
1977 8.1 6.0 
1978 8.2 6.0 
1979 8.0 5.6 
Sources: Department of Employment Gazette, Oct. 1949, 351; 
Oct. 1950, 345; Oct. 1951, 396; Oct. 1952, 351; 
Oct. 1953, 359 (September f i g u r e s ) ; 
Employment and Productivity Gazette^ 1969, no. 77, 
70-82; 
Department of Employment Gazette. May 1974, 
450-462; Dec. 1975, 1312-1324; Nov. 1980, 
si^pleraent, 18-24. 
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Table 3.6: Intercensal estimated net migration, 1900 -
1981, for Catalonia and Scotland 
(Thousands) 
CATALONIA 
Population Migration SOOTIAND Population Migration 
1900 1,966.4 
33.6 
4,472.1 
-254.1 1910 2,084.9 
224.3 
4,760.9 
-238.6 1920 2,344.7 
322.0 
4,882.5 
-391.9 1930 2,791.3 
110.1 
4,843.0 
-220.0 1940 2,891.0 
256.7 
— 
1950 3,218.6 
454.2 
5,096.4 
-282.0 1960 3,888.5 
742.8 
5,179.3 
-326.5 1970 5,107.6 
244.4 
5,229.0 
-59.3 1975 5,666.4 
22.6 
5,206.2 
-82.9 1981 5,958.3 5,180.2 
Sources: Scottish Abstract of St a t i s t i c s , vol. 15, 1986, 7; 
Consorci d'Informacio i Documentacio de Catalunya, 
E s t a t i s t i c a i Societat. 1981, nos. 10-11, 3. 
The S c o t t i s h census are held one year i n t o each decade, i . e . 
1901, 1911 e t c . . There was no census i n 1941. 
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Table 3.7 : Regional Aid i n Scotland, 1960-1982 
YEAR TOTAL 
(£ Mio) 
SHARE OF GB 
(Per cent) 
1960/61 3.3 27.9 
1961/62 18.4 56.0 
1962/63 14.3 23.9 
1963/64 8.0 48.2 
1964/65 10.1 33.4 
1965/66 27.2 36.4 
1966/67 29.5 43.3 
1967/68 51.4 32.2 
1968/69 88.1 32.8 
1969/70 96.3 32.9 
1970/71 94.3 31.3 
1971/72 84.2 33.4 
1972/73 3.0 37.0 
1973/74 32.0 29.8 
1974/75 61.6 29.0 
1975/76 98.5 30.3 
1976/77 193.2 29.9 
1977/78 113.1 26.4 
1978/79 32.7 16.3 
1979/80 30.9 20.6 
1980/81 48.0 24.5 
1981/82 60.0 25.0 
Sources: Abstract o f Regional S t a t i s t i c s , vols. 5-8; 
Regional S t a t i s t i c s . 9-15; Scotsman. 28.3.1975. 
Table 3.8: Enployees i n enployraent by sector i n Scotland 
(Thoxisand) 
SECTOR 
1974 1976 1978 1980 1983 
Agriculture, 
forestry and fishing 50 49 48 45 43 
Mining and quarrying 34 35 39 44 44 Manufac±uring ind. 676 608 604 554 431 Construction 170 171 160 159 121 Gas, electr. & water 28 29 28 29 27 Servic:€s 1,125 1,179 1,188 1,243 1,216 
Source: Scottish Abstract of S t a t i s t i c s . 1984. v o l . 13, 57. 
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Table 3.9 :(pinions on North Sea o i l belonging to Scotland 
(in per cent) 
"The o i l i n the North Sea belongs to Scotland, and tax 
revenues from i t shoiild be used for the benefit of the 
Scottish pec^le" 
May 
1974 
May 
1975 A l l 
December 1975 
Con. Labour SNP Lib. 
Agree 59 56 44 20 36 72 31 
Disagree 38 39 51 77 58 25 62 
Don't know 3 5 4 3 6 7 3 
Source: ORC P o l l quoted i n Scotsman, 18.12.1975, 10-11 
Table 3.10: Opinions on North Sea o i l : who i s to benefit? 
(in per cent) 
"The o i l i n the North Sea should be vised to benefit a l l 
of Britain, and not jvist Scotland alone." 
May 
1974 
May 
1975 M l 
December 1975 
Con. Laboiur SNP Lib. 
Agree 60 68 66 79 75 50 84 
Disagree 37 27 29 20 21 45 14 
Don't know 3 5 5 1 4 5 2 
Source: ORC P o l l quoted i n Scotsman. 18.12.1975, 10-11 
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Table 3.11 : U.K. O i l Production, 1975-88 
(Mio. tonnes) 
YEAR TOTAL PRODUCTION 
1975 1.1 
1976 11.6 
1977 37.3 
1978 52.8 
1979 77.9 
1980 80.5 
1981 89.5 
1982 103.2 
1983 114.9 
1984 125.9 
1985 122.1 
1986 120.7 
1987 117.1 
1988 114.4 
Source: Development of O i l and Gas Resources of the United 
Kingdom. 1980, 31; 1985, 68; 1989, 112. 
Table 3.12 : UK Government Oil and Gas revenues, 1976-89 
(in £ Mio) 
YEAR REVENUES 
1976-77 80 
1977-78 240 
1978-79 520 
1979-80 2,334 
1980-81 3,882 
1981-82 6,461 
1982-83 7,761 
1983-84 8,821 
1984-85 12,028 
1985-86 11,349 
1986-87 4,790 
1987-88 4,670 
1988-89 3,200 
Source: Development of O i l and Gas Resources i n the United 
Kingdom. 1980, 18; 1985, 30; 1989, 84. 
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Table 3.13 Ejipenditure of the Scottish Development Agency 
and Government grants provided, 1976-89 
(Million £) 
Years Total Investment Government E}5>enditure C^>eration Grant 
1976-77^ 19.7 2.5 12.0 1977-78 51.0 8.2 43.2 1978-79 67.2 4.6 48.1 1979-80 92.9 5.7 58.4 •1980-81 94.8 3.9 76.9 1981-82 104.4 5.8 76.4 1982-83 69.0 3.7 94.0 1983-84 72.6 5.0 83.6 1984-85 91.4 7.2 75.6 1985-86 114.9 5.4 91.4 1986-87 113.8 5.6 87.2 1987-88 125.9 8.0 91.3 1988-89 122.8 9.4 87.6 
Source: Kirwan, 1981; Annual Retxarts (Scottish Development 
Agency), 1982-89. 
'The f i n a n c i a l y e a r ends on March 31st, 
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Table 3.14 : Econcsnically active population i n economic 
sectors, Catalonia, 1955-79 
(Percentage of total econcanically active) 
EOOtOaC SECTORS 1955 1967 1979 
Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing 19.4 11.7 7.3 
Manufacturing 38.0 41.7 37.5 
Construction 6.6 9.2 9.1 
Services 35.0 35.7 46.1 
Sources: Banco de Bilbao, 1978, 123-132; i b i d . , 1982, 180. 
Table 3.15 : EcxDncmically active popvdation i n econcstiic 
sectors, Spain, 1955-79 
(Percentage of total econonically active) 
EOQlOCtC SECTORS 1955 1967 1979 
Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing 46.0 32.4 20.4 
Manxifacturing 21.6 26.1 25.6 
Construction 6.5 8.4 8.9 
Services 25.8 33.1 45.2 
Sources: Banco de Bilbao, 1978, 123-32; i b i d . . 1982, 180. 
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Table 3.16 : Production of Catalan manvifacturing by 
industry, 1955-79 
(Percentage of gross value added) 
INDUSTRY 1955 1960 1967 1973 1979 
Mining 1.7 2.1 1.3 0.8 2.6 Water, gas & 
e l e c t r i c i t y 4.8 5.5 4.7 4.6 6.2 Food, drink & 
tobacco 5.7 7.8 8.2 7.4 9.4 Textiles 42.9 32.3 22.5 17.6 13.4 Leather, shoes 6.8 6.4 9.2 7.0 6.4 Timber, furniture 5.7 5.0 4.2 3.6 3.5 Paper, printing 
& graphics 3.9 4.1 4.3 6.5 8.2 Chemicals 12.1 12.2 14.4 14.5 13.5 Glass, cement 3.9 3.0 4.4 4.4 3.9 Metal 12.4 21.4 26.5 33.6 32.3 
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (Departament d'Industria i 
Energia), 1987, 27. 
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Chapter four: 
S O C I A L C L A S S E S AND T H E NATIONALIST M O V E M E N T S 
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1. INTRDDUCTION 
The preceding chapters on the history and the p o l i t i c a l economy of 
nationalist movements often made reference to social classes i n 
order to connect structures and p o l i t i c a l agency. So far, however, 
no explanation has been given of the relationship between social 
class and nationalist movements. This chapter atteirpts to f i l l that 
gap. 
Since Catalonia and Scotland are capitalist societies, social and 
p o l i t i c a l struggles are fundamentally constrained by the class 
divisions which are characteristic to capitalism. This i s also true 
for nationalist struggles. But the role of social classes i n 
nationalist movements i s not governed by economic interest or any 
iron rule inherent i n the capitalist mode of production, as some 
classical marxist theorists believed (see chapter one, section 
2.3.i). Grounded i n this heritage (which shares i t s economistic 
outlook with modernisation approaches), class based approaches to 
nationalism are often based on the idea that nationalism can be 
d i s t i l l e d to class interest, v^dch i n turn i s reducible to economic 
interest. Gramsci t r i e d to s h i f t away from th i s kind of 
reductionism, but many Marxists s t i l l find i t d i f f i c u l t to agree 
that nationalist struggle i s not necessarily determined by class 
antagonism. As R. Williams explains. 
"[w]hat socialism offered was the p r i o r i t y of one kind of 
bonding - trade unionism, the class bond - thi s cancelled 
a l l other bonds. This, of course, accounts for the h o s t i l i t y 
to nationalism and the irrelevance of religious movements, 
as well as the unions' attitude towards the family on the 
part of some socialists. So there are other bonding 
mechanisms i n r e a l i t y which are beyond either national 
consciousness or class consciousness. (...) i t seems to me 
more and more true that v^ere centres of proletarian 
consciousness developed, thei r strength really drew from the 
fact that a l l the bonds were holding i n the same direction." 
(quoted in Cooke, 1984, 372) 
I t i s not only cxDntenporciry sub-state nationalism v^ich requires a 
rather more flex i b l e approach. Ever since the f i r s t appearance of 
Scottish and Catalan nationalism, the roles of social classes i n 
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these p o l i t i c a l movements were ambiguous and conplex. Qiapter two 
demonstrated that several social classes have been wrapped up i n 
nationalist p o l i t i c s simultaneously or at different times, and that 
ccmparable classes i n Scotland and Catalonia had disparate attitudes 
towards the national question. But the revival of nationalism i n the 
1960's exposed the weaknesses of traditional class based analyses 
nrare than has previously been the case. One reason for t h i s i s the 
changes i n the class structure, ^ i c h are to some extent related to 
the economic changes described i n chapter three (i.e. the 
internationalisation of production processes, deindustrialisation, 
and the growth of the service sector). The other reason i s the 
mounting evidence that struggles between workers and capitalists are 
neither the only, nor always the most iirportant c onflict i n advanced 
ca p i t a l i s t societies. As a result of increasing state intervention, 
many struggles now focus on the state. Nationalist movements, too, 
are more usefully conceived as struggles involving "the people" 
versus "the State", rather than as class struggles. 
I n reaction to these changes, there has been an ongoing debate over 
the l a s t two decades about the (re-) definition of social classes and 
about t h e i r constitution (e.g. Giddens, 1973; Poulantzas, 1975; 
Urry, 1981; Wright, 1978; Wright, 1985). Ihe most irrportant lesson 
for t h i s thesis i s that social classes should not only be considered 
i n an economic context, but also i n their relationship to the state, 
t h e i r position i n c i v i l society and their cultural constitution. 
Seen i n t h i s way, classes are no longer monolithic agents wtiich are 
guided by the same fundamental class interests no matter v^ere and 
v^en. How they are constituted depends on several other 
interpellations or "bonding mechanisms", including national and 
t e r r i t o r i a l identity, and on the struggles i n vvtdch they are 
involved. The second irrportant aspect of the debate on class i s the 
concern with the constitution and role of the middle classes, v^iich 
have variously been acknowledged t o play a key role i n nationalist 
movements . 
Vor exairple, Kieman writes about the relationship between 
(Footnote Continued) 
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This chapter aims to demonstrate that while contenporary nationalist 
movements cannot be conceived as class struggle, the "national 
interest" with which they legitimise themselves cannot be conceived 
of without reference to the - often antagonistic - interests of 
different classes (J. Anderson, 1988, 28-30). Drawing on Gramsci's 
writings, and rather selectively on the more recent class debate, 
the next section atteitpts to achieve an understanding of social 
classes i n the context of nationalism. The aim i s not to determine 
social classes s t a t i s t i c a l l y , but rather to show that they develop a 
context of cultural, t e r r i t o r i a l , and other types of consciousness. 
There are obvious l i m i t s to abstract definitions of social classes 
and t h e i r involvement i n nationalist movements. Sections three and 
four therefore look at the Scottish and Catalan case studies. Based 
on a threefold class division, they examine i n greater detail the 
relationship between the working class, the middle class and the 
bourgeoisie i n the nationalist movements. 
2. REOOIJSIDERING CLASSES IN NATIONALIST hSDVEMENTS 
In t h i s section, I argue that nationalism i s not necessarily 
connected with the interests of a particular social class and cannot 
therefore be defined i n class terms. But social classes, which are 
based on a specific economic structure and constituted i n c i v i l 
society, require a national identity i n order to claim a hegemonic 
role i n that society. ^ 
(Footnote Continued) 
nationalism and social classes: 
"Support was nearly always forthcoming from the loose bundle 
of lower-middle-class groupings - teachers, small traders, 
artisans and many more - v^ich have been luitped together as 
the ^petty bourgeoisie'." 
Because these are "unattached, unanchored individuals or clusters" 
(i.e. without class consciousness), they welcome nationalism more 
than any other class (Kieman, 1976, 115-116). From a different 
perspective, Montcalm has argued that contenporary nationalism i s a 
class movement based on the emergence of a new middle class 
(Montcaljn, 1983, 342-351). 
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While nationalist movements are not class struggles as such, they 
often assume the characteristics of class struggle; t h i s i s because 
social classes (or sectors of social classes) participate and take 
sides i n nationalist struggles i n order to identify with 
national-popular t r a i t s of c i v i l society. In the construction of 
hegemony and of national identity, intellectuals (in the Gramscian 
sense) play an inportant role. They also form the leadership i n many 
nationalist movements, and therefore deserve particular attention i n 
t h i s analysis. I t i s suggested here that intellectuals are not 
classifiable i n fundamental classes, but usually occupy v ^ t Wright 
calls "contradictory class positions" (Wright, 1978). 
In recent decades, such contradictory class positions have increased 
i n number and size, and the class structure of advanced capitalist 
societies has become increasingly coirplicated to define. Although 
sections three and four use the basic distinction of working class, 
middle class and bourgeoisie, i t i s clear that a great deal of 
differentiation has taken place within these classes, v^ich is 
reflected i n contradictory positions with respect to the national 
question. 
2.1 Classes, nationalism and heganony 
Chapter one claimed that nationalism had no necessary class 
character. However, a l l social classes of a national community have 
a national identity, which can be mobilised into p o l i t i c a l 
nationalism. The problem with many Marxist approaches i s that they 
f a i l to acknowledge the sinple fact that even though capitalism i s a 
global phenomenon, concrete class interests are usually manifested 
i n national tenns. The classes themselves are constituted i n c i v i l 
societies which have national t r a i t s . Gramsci's observation that 
middle classes varied from country to country and from one period to 
another (Gramsci, 1971, 216 footnote 6) i s correct, but t h i s also 
applied to the working class and the bourgeoisie. When some sections 
of the Labour movement i n Scotland c r i t i c i s e d Scottish nationalists 
as bourgeois and anti-socialist because they were only thinking i n 
terms of Scotland's interests, they often ignored the fact that 
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throughout the 20th century the Labour movement had i d e n t i f i e d 
i t s e l f w i t h the B r i t i s h national i n t e r e s t . This B r i t i s h national 
i n t e r e s t was more or less d i f f e r e n t from the national i n t e r e s t 
advocated by B r i t i s h c a p i t a l , but seen from the perspective of an 
outsider, i t could have easily been i d e n t i f i e d as n a t i o n a l i s t and 
a n t i - s o c i a l i s t ( i f socialism i s taken t o mean the fundamental 
i n t e r e s t of the vtniversal p r o l e t a r i a t ) . 
Gramsci argues t h a t a class can gain and maintain i t s dominant 
p o s i t i o n only by becoming a national-popular force, i . e . by 
embracing the p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l and national t r a d i t i o n s and values 
which are the sedimentation of everyday experience i n the national 
t e r r i t o r y (see chapter one, section 3.3). This view, however, 
i n p l i e s a r e j e c t i o n of economist theories of p o l i t i c a l action, V;^ich 
according t o Cohen s t i l l inhabit much Marxist class theory^. Cohen 
argues t h a t Marx' reduction of c i v i l society t o production relations 
i s the urderlying cause of economist reductionism (Cohen, 1982, 
109). Middle classes d i d not f i t i n t o t h i s scheme of fundamental 
class contradictions. The petty bourgeoisie, a strong social group 
i n Marx' times, had t o be defined as a t r a n s i t i o n a l class between 
c a p i t a l and labour. According t o Marx, i t s p o s i t i o n between the 
fundamental classes led i t t o believe t h a t i t stood above class 
antagonism and claimed the r e a l d i v isions t o l i e between the 
"people" and t h e i r oppressors; many of i t s representatives became 
protagonists of nationalism and democracy"^ (Cohen, 1982, 117) . But 
2 
Cohen argued t h a t Poulantzas f a i l e d i n t h i s f i e l d by hanging on t o 
the concepts of "old" and "new petty bourgeoisie which lead t o a 
s t e a d i l y diminishing working class. Wright t r i e d t o overcome the problem 
by inventing corrplicated and ambiguous "contradictory locations between 
classes". Neither of the two transcended the r i g i d d e f i n i t i o n s of class 
i n terros of "fundamental class i n t e r e s t " (Cohen, 1982, 12). 
•^In the Communist manifesto, Marx put i t l i k e t h i s : 
"But the democrat, because he represents the petty 
bourgeoisie, t h a t i s , a t r a n s i t i o n class, i n v^ich the 
in t e r e s t s o f the two classes are simultaneously mutually 
blunted, imagines himself elevated above class antagonism, 
generally. The democrats concede t h a t a p r i v i l e g e d class 
confronts them, but they, along with a l l the rest of the 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Cohen argues t h a t i t was not only the petty bourgeoisie which f a i l e d 
t o express i t s objective class interests d i r e c t l y through p o l i t i c a l 
action. To make sense of the p o l i t i c a l actions of the fundamental 
classes and bridge the gap between economic i n t e r e s t and p o l i t i c a l 
action, Marx was forced t o nrave t o the domain of social imagery 
(symbols, h i s t o r i c t r a d i t i o n s , b e l i e f systems, p r i n c i p l e s , c u l t u r a l 
values, etc.) (Cohen, 123-126). This social imagery, which coincides 
w i t h the concept of the national-popular, serves t o u n i f y c i v i l 
society and i s a necessary ingredient i n the mobilisation of the 
masses f o r any p o l i t i c a l purpose, and through any p o l i t i c a l class. 
Because social classes have national-popular conponents, they are 
present i n n a t i o n a l i s t struggles. Since these struggles involve two 
c o n f l i c t i n g national and t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t i e s , the social classes 
of the sub-state nation can be e i t h e r part of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement, or on the side of the state; often the classes are divided 
i n t e r n a l l y , but there i s no neutral position. Whether a social class 
(or a p a r t of i t ) i s supportive of a n a t i o n a l i s t movement shapes 
several other relationships; f o r exarrple, the degree t o which i t has 
been integrated i n t o the state structure (see chapter f i v e ) , and the 
r o l e i t plays i n the reproduction of national culture and the 
structures of c i v i l society. These are contingent factors and depend 
on s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c circumstances. What remains t o be done before I 
go on t o discuss the Catalan and Scottish circumstances i n greater 
d e t a i l i s a b r i e f o u t l i n e of the class structure I am adopting here. 
2.2 Class structure i n advanced capitalist societies 
(Footnote Continued) 
nation, form the people. What they represent i s the people's 
rights; what in t e r e s t s them i s the people's interests. 
Accordingly, v\^en a struggle i s inpending, they do not need 
t o examine the i n t e r e s t s and positions of the d i f f e r e n t 
classes. They do not need t o weigh t h e i r own resources too 
c r i t i c a l l y . They have merely t o give the signal and the 
people, w i t h a l l i t s inejdiaustible resources, w i l l f a l l upon 
the oppressors." 
(quoted i n Cohen, 1982, 117) 
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Many of the problems w i t h the class structure of advanced c a p i t a l i s t 
countries, which Marxists have debated i n the l a s t decades, concern 
the middle classes. The persistence and actual growth of those 
s o c i a l groups v^ich l i e between the manual working class and the 
bourgeois owners of the means of production ( i . e . the fundamental 
classes t h a t are defined by c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s of production), and 
the emergence of new ones have led t o new e f f o r t s i n modifying or 
replacing the Marxist dual class theory. Recent examples of such 
e f f o r t s i n the B r i t i s h context include Giddens, who argued th a t 
there was a t h i r d fundamental c r i t e r i a (the possession of 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and s k i l l s ) v^ich i s the basis f o r the middle class 
(Giddens, 1973, 107-10). Abercrombie and Urry also came up with a 
th r e e f o l d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of contemporary c a p i t a l i s t society i n v^iich 
the new class emerged i n the service sector and i s determined by 
market and work sit u a t i o n s (Abercrombie and Urry, 1983, 119-24). 
Thus, there i s an irrportant re-evaluation of those sectors v^ich 
were often referred t o as the "petty bourgeoisie". 
The p e t t y bourgeoisie, or middle class, includes those social groups 
vAiich have been growing i n size throughout t h i s century: 
professionals, technicians, bureaucrats and other non-manual public 
sector eirployees, c l e r i c a l enployees, as wel l as shopkeepers, the 
self-eirployed and the clergy. According t o Hroch, these are exactly 
the s o c i a l groups v*dch were the most active i n the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements of the 19th century (Hroch, 1985, 161). What these social 
groups have i n common i s the fa c t t h a t they l i v e from t h e i r 
i n t e l l e c t u a l labour and are therefore i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the Gramscian 
sense. As Gramsci argued, the function of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n c i v i l 
society i s t o create and disseminate ideologies, t o establish 
consensus and hegemony around the national-popular values and 
structures. Therefore, i n t e l l e c t u a l s operate both i n c i v i l society 
and i n the state apparatus (Gramsci, 1971, 12 and 60-61). When 
consensus breaks down and a c o n f l i c t develops between a sub-state 
national community and a central state, the imbeddedness of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s and structures of c i v i l society 
almost predestines them t o become key actors i n the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement, as the exanple of catalanism i n the l a t e 19th century and 
i n the 1920's demonstrated. But some middle class sectors may opt t o 
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defend state hegemony, i f they are f i r m l y integrated i n t o the state 
apparatus. The Scottish case shows t h a t the assimilation of Scottish 
and English national i n s t i t u t i o n s led t o the integration of Scottish 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n t o the B r i t i s h system; they became an "extensive, 
civil-based, autonomous corps de chiens de garde" of the state 
(Nairn, 1977, 39; see also Mackintosh, 1982, 95-99). I n general, 
however, middle classes are more responsive t o national-popular 
struggles, such as n a t i o n a l i s t movements, due t o the f a c t t h a t they 
occupy a p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o the means of production v*iich does 
not e n t a i l d i r e c t antagonism wi t h another social class (Urry, 1981, 
67). 
I n contrast, the working class does oca^y an antagonistic position 
i n the economic sphere, and unless i t s class enemy i s dissociated 
w i t h the national coraraunity, t h i s antagonism i s bound t o become part 
of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. However, the way i n vdiich the class 
struggle component i s expressed through nationalism depends on the 
i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s - not only of economic interests, but also i n 
terms of r e l i g i o n , culture, language, and place - w i t h i n the working 
class. I n advanced c a p i t a l i s t societies, the working class has 
become more d i f f i c u l t t o define. Deindustrialisation, 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of key industries, the growth of a service working 
class, etc. have led t o a fragmentation of the old p r o l e t a r i a t . 
Also, i t has been argued t h a t the " a b i l i t y of advanced capitalism t o 
meet the v i t a l needs of the population undermines the formerly 
explosive contradiction between the old working class and 
capitalism" (Cohen, 1982, 6-7). Chapter three showed tha t i n 
B r i t a i n , the Labour movement i t s e l f contributed t o undermine t h i s 
contradiction. However, there are signs t h a t the destructive effects 
on comorainities of d e i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and increasing m o b i l i t y of 
c a p i t a l have brought about a t e r r i t o r i a l i s a t i o n of working class 
p o l i t i c a l action (Cooke, 1984, 373), v^iich i s i n some cases 
a r t i c u l a t e d i n n a t i o n a l i s t terms. A f t e r a l l , control over space i s 
an inportant element i n the power re l a t i o n s between the fundamental 
classes (Harvey, 1989, 234), and n a t i o n a l i s t movements are concerned 
w i t h c o n t r o l over a s p e c i f i c t e r r i t o r y . 
(Chapter four) (213) 
The bourgeoisie, too, has undergone changes i n conterrporary 
capitalism. Chapter three demonstrated t h a t before the f i r s t world 
war, the bourgeoisie was rooted i n p a r t i c u l a r economic regions, and 
was more easily i d e n t i f i a b l e as those v^o own and control the means 
of production i n t h a t region. Now, as c a p i t a l has become 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y itrabile, so has the bourgeoisie. Those involved i n 
c o n t r o l l i n g and managing the operation of production are no longer 
necessarily the owners of the factory, but are l i k e l y t o be 
employees themselves (Giddens, 1973, 161-162). Thus, the d i v i d i n g 
l i n e between middle class and bourgeoisie has softened and been 
replaced by contradictory class positions. The concentration of 
c a p i t a l i n fewer hands has divided the bourgeoisie i n t o those mostly 
smaller eitployers who are s t i l l l a r gely bound t o a sp e c i f i c place, 
and multinational corporations which control an increasingly larger 
pa r t of the economy, but are able t o s h i f t around the globe i n 
search of higher p r o f i t s . To what extent c a p i t a l i s t class interests 
coincide w i t h n a t i o n a l i s t demands, depends at least i n part on the 
question of v^iether indigenous c a p i t a l i s s t i l l s i g n i f i c a n t , both i n 
the sphere of production and i n c i v i l society. The other important 
c r i t e r i a i s i t s relati o n s h i p w i t h the central state. Although i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o imagine a regional bourgeoisie i n control of a 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement, there i s no doubt t h a t i t w i l l influence the 
n a t i o n a l i s t struggle, because i n order t o maintain hegemony, i t 
needs t o incorporate i n t o i t s discourse the national-popular 
elements of t h a t national society. 
I f the aim i s t o abandon economistic concepts of classes and of 
p o l i t i c a l action, i t i s counterproductive t o make abstract comments 
on the re l a t i o n s h i p between classes and n a t i o n a l i s t movements. How 
class and national i d e n t i t i e s intersect, and how class struggles 
i n t e r a c t w i t h n a t i o n a l i s t struggles, cannot be determined 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y , but has t o be examined i n each case separately. The 
next two sections look a t Scotland and Catalonia respectively. They 
aim t o show t h a t class matters t o n a t i o n a l i s t movements, but th a t 
nationalism cannot be reduced t o class interests, even i f we assume 
- w i t h a dose of economic reductionism f o r the sake of s i n p l i c i t y -
t h a t the p o l i t i c a l class based organisations act u a l l y represent the 
i n t e r e s t s of the class t o v^i c h they correspond. 
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3. SOCIAL CLASSES AND NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND 
This section deals w i t h the Scottish case, beginning w i t h the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the working class (and the Labour movement) and 
the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Chapter three already discussed the 
u n i o n i s t t r a d i t i o n of the Scottish working class and showed how i t s 
organisations were strongly involved i n corporate economic planning. 
Nevertheless, there has always been a home r u l e strand w i t h i n the 
Scottish labour movement, and a t least a formally separate trade 
union organisation, around v^ i c h working class nationalism could 
c r y s t a l l i s e . And as the economic developments i n the 1960's and 
1970's exposed the l i m i t a t i o n s of economic planning i n Scotland, 
support f o r n a t i o n a l i s t a lternatives increased. However, the move 
towards a d e v o l u t i o n i s t p o s i t i o n was not a uniform process; there 
are i n t e r n a l class d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the working class v^ich 
influenced the a t t i t u d e of d i f f e r e n t working class sectors towards 
self-government. The f a c t t h a t both the Labour Party and the 
Scottish N a t i o n a l i s t Party ( p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 1979) wooed the 
working class w i t h n a t i o n a l i s t proposals t e s t i f i e s t o i t s important 
r o l e i n c i v i l society. 
3.1 The workers' movement and nationcilism in Scotland 
3.1.i A working class nation? 
There are c o n f l i c t i n g ideas about the strength, the l e v e l of 
consciousness and the distinctiveness of the working class i n 
Scottish society which demonstrate t h a t social class cannot be 
determined s t a t i s t i c a l l y . Although s t a t i s t i c i a n s and sociologists 
i n s i s t t h a t i n contenporary B r i t a i n , the working class i s s h i f t i n g 
ground and r a p i d l y becoming a minority i n society, i t seems t h a t i n 
Scotland the r e a l i t y i s d i f f e r e n t . I n p o l i t i c a l struggles and i n 
c i v i l society as a vAiole, the working class i s s t i l l w e l l 
established. Part of the national-popular s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n of the 
Scottish community i s the notion t h a t Scotland s t i l l i s a working 
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class nation which adheres t o r a d i c a l egalitarianism. Scottish 
n a t i o n a l i s t s and home r u l e r s have appealed t o what some called the 
" e g a l i t a r i a n myth" (McCrone, Bechhofer and Kendrick, 1982, 127). 
Egalitarianism i n the 18th century referred t o the opportunities of 
s o c i a l m o b i l i t y v^^ich community oriented i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e the 
parish schools offered t o some. The ra d i c a l t r a d i t i o n stems from 
15th century anti-feudal peasant movements i n Scotland, and i t 
re-en^rged i n various guises, such as i n the Highland land struggles 
i n the l a t e 19th century. But i t was also applied t o the developed 
i n d u s t r i a l society of t h i s century. The idea t h a t , i n coirparison t o 
England, Scotland's working class was stronger and more class 
conscious, and endowed w i t h "an aggressive s p i r i t of independence 
and egalitarianism" was re-enforced i n periods of r e l a t i v e strength 
of the Scottish labour movement (e.g. the Red Clydeside), and 
through arguments of a stronger working class component i n Scottish 
society. The most recent exaitple i s the r e l a t i v e strength of the 
Labour Party i n Scotland since the 1950's, coitpared w i t h i t s 
weakness i n many pa2±s of England, v*iich i s manifested i n a greater 
s o c i a l or s o c i a l i s t consciousness and p o l i t i c a l awareness across 
Scotland. 
Chapter three showed t h a t there i s only scant s t a t i s t i c a l evidence 
t o back up the claim t h a t the Scottish working class i s bigger. 
Kerxirick used census data on occupational structure and sectional 
enployment t o defuse i t , arguing t h a t Scotland was a miniature 
version of B r i t a i n i n terms of her manufacturing and i n d u s t r i a l 
enployment structure (Kendrick, 1983, 175). However, he conceded 
t h a t during the f i r s t h a l f of t h i s century, some differences 
developed which were redressed only i n the 1960's v^ien e l e c t r i c a l 
engineering and electronics moved i n t o Scotland, service sector 
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I n h i s analysis of the data, Kendrick conpared Scotland e i t h e r 
w i t h the v^ole o f B r i t a i n (including Scotland) or w i t h other UK regions. 
This approach intended t o be objective i n the sense of avoiding t o 
regard Scotland as a d i s t i n c t i v e economic (and p o l i t i c a l ) u n i t , but i t 
had the e f f e c t of diminishing any material differences there were. 
Besides, Scots are u n l i k e l y t o conpare t h e i r own social and economic 
perfonnance w i t h other depressed regions, but rather w i t h the booming 
South East, v i i i c h i s the p o l i t i c a l and economic centre of B r i t a i n . 
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eirployment ej^ianded, and England "caught up w i t h Scotland's 
unenployment leve l s . Harvie found evidence - though f a r from i r o n 
c lad - t h a t the middle class declined between 1934 and 1949 i n 
Scotland vdiile the working class grew i n proportion, vMch 
"shows a more p r o l e t a r i a n country, and one l i k e l y t o show 
strong evidence of class consciousness." 
(Harvie, 1981, 85) 
Notions of a r a d i c a l Scotland v ^ c h , i f i t were independent, m i ^ t 
set the pace f o r progressive social transformation i n the r e s t of 
the B r i t i s h state, remained a l i v e i n the 1960's and 1970's 
p a r t i c u l a r l y > among l e f t - w i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Labour MP Lambie 
p u b l i c l y stated h i s conviction t h a t he wanted a s o c i a l i s t republic 
i n Scotland. But Nairn argued t h a t Scotland's egalitarianism d i d not 
derive from Jacobinism or Bolshevism, but rather from Scottish 
protestantism. He said t l i a t " [ i ] t stands f o r the democracy of souls 
before the A l l Mighty, rather than an explosive, popular e f f o r t t o 
do anything" (Nairn, 1968, 11). Although Scottish radicalness may 
not have manifested i t s e l f i n revolutionary action, i t i s a part of 
the Scottish i d e n t i t y which can be mobilised f o r a p o l i t i c a l 
p r o j e c t . I t combines w i t h the experience over the past decades of 
the f a i l u r e o f Labour's reformist unionism and the detachment of 
indigenous b i g c a p i t a l from the Scottish economy, v^ic h formed the 
basis f o r working class support f o r Scottish self-government i n the 
1970's (Foster, 1989, 50-53). 
I n the past, the un i o n i s t p o s i t i o n of the Scottish Labour movement 
f o r most of i t s h i s t o r y was i n l i n e w i t h class i n t e r e s t s , argues 
Foster, i n order t o combat atterrpts by Scottish c a p i t a l t o i s o l a t e 
Scottish workers from those i n England, and t o drive wedges i n t o the 
f a b r i c o f the Scottish worJcing class (Foster, 1989, 48-49). For the 
Scottish working class i s not e t h n i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y uniform, as 
i s ejq)lained below w i t h reference t o r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s . 
3 . 1 . i i Religious d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the working class 
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The reluctance of the labour movement i n Scotland t o promote 
self-government was connected t o fears t h a t i t would e n t a i l serious 
d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the working class along r e l i g i o u s l i n e s . While the 
majority of working class Scots were part of the Church of Scotland, 
the i n d u s t r i a l centres i n the West and along the East coast 
a t t r a c t e d many Catholic immigrants from Ireland, vAiich usually made 
5 
up the lowest ranks of the working class . I n the 1920's, the 
Catholic Scots became a strong p i l l a r of support f o r the Labour 
Party. I n the depressed inter-war years, the relationship between 
Protestants and Catholic i n Scotland was characterised by deep 
seated prejudices and sometimes even v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t . A f t e r more 
than a century of I r i s h immigration, the post-war era saw increasing 
i n t e g r a t i o n of the two communities^. The Labour Party was an 
inportant i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h i s process, and s t i l l r e l i e s on the 
Catholic vote f o r many of t h e i r seats i n the West of Scotland 
(Gallagher, 1987, 352). 
While under SNP leadership, the n a t i o n a l i s t movement had l i t t l e 
support among the Scottish Catholics, p a r t l y because the Church of 
Scotland and the education system, which grew under i t s wings, are 
two of the main symbols of Scottish nationhood. B i l l y Wolfe 
recounted t h a t i n the 1970's, sermons were preached against him i n 
Catholic churches i n West Lothian during elect i o n campaigns, 
especially when Labour started t o f e e l threatened (Wolfe, interview, 
25.2.1987). Also, the experience of the catholic community i n 
Northern Ireland made the Catholics i n Scotland h o s t i l e t o the home 
5 
Catholics i n Scotland not only were mostly working class up u n t i l 
recent decades, but also occupied r e l a t i v e l y lower ranks w i t h i n t h a t 
class. Gallagher pointed out t h a t several reasons accounted f o r t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n , not least discrimination ba r r i e r s set up by the Protestant 
m a j o r i t y and the lack of an upwardly mobile reference group (Gallagher, 
1987, 348). 
^"After 1945, large numbers of Catholics i n Scotland gravitated 
towards the public sector, and the service sector of the economy 
generally, once i t was clear t h a t r a c i a l or r e l i g i o u s c r i t e r i a were not 
p a r t of the entry q u a l i f i c a t i o n s as i n many of the s k i l l e d trades. The 
income gap between the cat h o l i c minority and the re s t of the society 
began t o close as the o u t l i n e of a middle-class took shape i n the 
1960's." (Gallagher, 1987, 351 (commas mine)). 
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r u l e ideas put forward by Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t s , and the eruption of 
inter-community c o n f l i c t i n Northern Ireland i n 1968 rekindled fears 
of a Protestant backlash i n nearby West of Scotland, where the 
Protestant orange movement was indeed re v i v i n g f o r a b r i e f period 
(Gallagher, 1987, 292-293). 
However, some sectors of the Protestant working class were strongly 
u n i o n i s t , and even less i n c l i n e d t o self-government, as David 
Lambie, the current Labour MP f o r Cunninghame South, explained: 
"That was always the problem i n Scotland. We had a very 
strong orange t r a d i t i o n , who are Unionists (The Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Party). You only need t o go up t o 
Ibrox Park and go t o a b i g f o o t b a l l match there , and see 
the number of union jacks t h a t are f l y i n g , and then t e l l me 
t h a t the Scottish Protestant population are wanting t o break 
up the Union. Because there i s a d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n . We 
also have a very strong Catholic t r a d i t i o n , especially i n 
the West of Scotland. The reason why the Labour party has 
been able t o stand against serious inroads by the SNP i s 
because our s o l i d core of votes i s the working class 
Catholic. The working class Catholic, [v^en]. looking a t 
devolution as w e l l as independence, they look across t o 
U l s t e r (...)• [D]oes an independent Scotland mean t h a t the 
Protestant, the Unionists, the orangemen are going t o take 
c o n t r o l of Scotland the way they have done i n Ireland? That 
trend never comes up i n public, but t l i a t i s an underlying 
trend. And t h a t i s why we didn't get the support f o r the 
referendum f o r devolution t h a t we should have got." 
(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988) 
Thus, the a t t i t u d e of the Scottish working class towards nationalism 
has been affected by other bonding mechanisms, v^ich are not 
determined by e i t h e r class or national i d e n t i t i e s . However, 
r e l i g i o u s t i e s are weakening, and material i n e q u a l i t i e s between 
Catholics and Protestants have been decreasing r a p i d l y over the past 
decades. As a r e s u l t , n a t i o n a l i s t and devolutionist p o l i t i c s have 
become acceptable t o large sectors of the working class. The outcome 
The two Glasgow f i r s t d i v i s i o n f o o t b a l l clubs, C e l t i c and Rangers, 
t h r i v e on a t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l r e l a t i o n s h i p v^ich i s rooted i n t h e i r 
respective Catholic and Protestant communities. As the Catholic 
community i n Glasgow cent r a l i s mostly of I r i s h o r i g i n , the I r i s h 
T r i c o l o u r i s a symbol of C e l t i c . The mostly Protestant following of 
Rangers use the Union Jack. 
(Chapter four) (219) 
of the devolution referendum demonstrated not only t h a t some 
Catholic sectors were s t i l l opposed t o devolution, but also that 
support i n the i n d u s t r i a l working class Strathclyde region was 
higher than i n most others (see Table 2.3 i n Chapter two). 
Also, there was l i t t l e doubt t h a t the SNP succeeded i n a t t r a c t i n g 
some of the working class electorate i n the l a t e 1960's and early 
1970's. From a Labour unionist perspective, t h i s was a sign of class 
d i s i n t e g r a t i o n and declining class consciousness. The next 
sub-section therefore looks a t the way i n v>tiich social and s p a t i a l 
m o b i l i t y contributed i n s h i f t i n g working class i d e n t i t y towards 
Scottish nationalism. 
3 . 1 . i i i Social and s p a t i a l m o b i l i t y 
Sociological research r e l a t e d the new working class sectors, vtiich 
emerged w i t h new industries, and the new working and middle classes 
t o the growth of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Scotland, using 
arguments of weakening class consciousness and a more functional and 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t approach of these social groups. Kendrick claimed t h a t 
the people v*io voted f o r the SNP i n the 1970's were those who had 
"done w e l l " , e i t h e r w i t h i n the working class or by moving out of the 
working class (Kendrick, 1983, 282). Dickson made a si m i l a r 
connection by r e l a t i n g the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of national i d e n t i t y with 
economic and social restructuring, as a consequence of which the old 
inner c i t y working class communities were dispersed (Dickson, 1980, 
311). As chapter three mentioned, the new i n d u s t r i a l centres had 
often very l i t t l e connection w i t h trade union or other t r a d i t i o n a l 
working class structures. 
To Labour MP Mackintosh, the 1967 by-election v i c t o r y of Winifred 
Ewing i n Hamilton against the Labour candidate favourite, a 
middle-aged miner backed by the NUM, served as an exaitple of how 
socio-economic changes i n Scottish communities affected t h e i r 
p o l i t i c a l outlook: 
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"Hamilton was once a miner's seat but now there are only 
2,000 miners i n the constituency. The r e s u l t was t o confirm 
Labour's Scottish image as an elderly party of special 
i n t e r e s t s stemming from the old and declining heavy 
industry". (Mackintosh, 1982, 138) 
I n the 1970's, a general d r i f t t o the SNP was noticeable among 
working class voters who were hard h i t by the process of 
d e i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . As a general f e e l i n g was spreading that 
"something was going wrong", Labour Party o f f i c i a l s i n Scotland 
became frightened: 
"We were the establishment here, and suddenly realised, "my 
God, the Scots f o l k i s goirtg t o desert us!"." 
(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988) 
Of course, social and s p a t i a l m o b i l i t y as a source of weakening 
working class cohesion was not new i n the 1970's. One must also 
remember t h a t several other, already mentioned, factors contributed 
t o the growing national p o l i t i c i s a t i o n i n the Scottish population as 
a whole, including the working class. But i t i s important t o realis e 
t h a t a l l these tendencies put increasing pressure on the Labour 
movement t o adopt devolution, v;hether f o r str a t e g i c p o l i t i c a l 
reasons, or i n response t o an undeniable s h i f t of a t t i t u d e among the 
Scottish working class. Once Scottish Labour had decided t o adopt a 
dev o l u t i o n i s t stance, the SNP advance i n t o the Labour vote becaine 
more d i f f i c u l t . 
3.1.iv Nationalism i n Labour p o l i t i c s 
At f i r s t , the Scottish Labour Party was a reluctant campaigner f o r 
self-government. Between the two general elections i n 1974, i t s 
executive refused t o support devolution and then was coerced by the 
National Executive i n London i n t o supporting i t . This was a f i n e 
exanple o f Labour's centralism, and a necessary move i f Labour 
wanted t o win the election. There were clear signs t h a t devolution 
was what the Scottish people wanted t o see. 
"They weren't supporting independence, but they were w i l l i n g 
t o support devolution, under the influence of the SNP vdiich 
was a c t i v a t i n g opinion i n Scotland. When the [Scottish] 
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Labour Party took t h i s decision against devolution, a c t i v e l y 
against i t , then t h a t sent shock waves through the vdiole 
Labour and Trade Union movement." 
(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988) 
Labour's decision t o take on board devolution f o r Scotland was then 
due both t o pressure from the rank and f i l e of the labour movement, 
and t o e l e c t o r a l pressure exerted by the SNP (Canavan, interview, 
17.9.1988). There was always a sector w i t h i n the Labour 
establishment v^^ch was r a d i c a l l y opposed t o i t . Some argued that 
the SNP's n a t i o n a l i s t project was betraying working class s o l i d a r i t y 
w i t h slogans. asking what people would rather be, poor Britons or 
r i c h Scots. A r i s i n g s t a r i n the Scottish Labour Party, Gordon 
Brown, said t h a t the true sources of oppression, namely "uneven and 
uncontrolled development of capitalism and the f a i l u r e of successive 
governments t o challenge and transform i t " , were shared by the v^ole 
of B r i t i s h working class. Scotland's problems required "planned 
c o n t r o l of our economy and a transformation of democracy a t a l l 
l e v e l s " (Brown, 1975, 8). This, of course, was not a new idea. 
The Scottish Trades Union Council (SIUC) claimed comnaitment t o a 
"meaningful" devolution, i . e . the "establishment of a Scottish 
Assembly having the power and a b i l i t y t o influence the economic, 
p o l i t i c a l and social decision-making process i n Scotland" (STUC 
Annual Report, 1977, 334). I t was i n favour of a regional fund 
financed w i t h o i l revenues which would assist depressed areas i n the 
United Kingdom, but the Labour Party refused t o give i n t o t h i s 
demand (Labour Party Cairpaign Handbook Scotland, 1979). Creating a 
Scottish Assembly with "economic teeth" might have s a t i s f i e d the 
STUC, but the Labour Party leadership feared a worsening English 
backlash. The r e s u l t was a labour devolution b i l l i n 1978 vAiich d i d 
not meet the widespread demands f o r more l o c a l control over economic 
decision-making, but succeeded i n buying o f f nationalism from the 
SNP (Keating, 1983, 30), 
Since the f a i l u r e of the Devolution B i l l i n the 1979 referendum, the 
Scottish Labour Party has maintained and strengthened i t s devolution 
p o l i c y w i t h every l o s t general election. This suggests t h a t Labour 
i n Scotland no longer seems t o believe t h a t self-government i n 
Scotland would be a blow t o the working class. To the contrary, the 
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neo-nationalist section of the Labour Party believe t h a t "Scotland 
i s r i p e f o r socialism but held back by England" (Keating, 1983, 30), 
v*iich adds another aspect t o the national-popiiLar element of 
radicalism (see section 3.1.1). Not only i s nationalism increasingly 
working class, but more working class people than members of the 
middle classes or the bourgeoisie profess t o be Scottish, rather 
than B r i t i s h (Table 4.1). 
This 1980's combination of s o c i a l i s t and n a t i o n a l i s t strands finds 
i t s expression i n the pages of Radical Scotland. While c r i t i c i s i n g 
the B r i t i s h Labour leadership f o r t h e i r " p o l l s t e r - l e d r e t r e a t from 
S o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e " and deploring t h a t no ra d i c a l attack was being 
planned on "the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income, wealth and concentrated 
economic power", the journal demanded t h a t Labour should 
"permit the development of p o l i c i e s t a i l o r e d t o the state o f 
progressive t h i n k i n g i n Scotland and the Scottish e l e c t o r a l 
s i t u a t i o n , instead of the v*iole country being forced t o 
pander the i n t e r e s t s of the South-East of England homeowner 
on £15,000 a year." 
(Radical Scotland. 1985b, 9) 
I n the 1980's, a strong aspect of the increasingly s o l i d working 
class support f o r Scottish self-government was anti^Ihatcherism . 
Grass roots pressure forced the Labour Party t o j o i n the multi-party 
Scottish Constitutional Convention, and Donald Dewar had t o admit i n 
hi s speech a t the f i r s t meeting of the Convention i n March 1989: 
"Throughout my p o l i t i c a l l i f e there has been a need t o 
recognise and harness the f e e l i n g of Scottish i d e n t i t y v*iich 
has grown and strengthened over the years." 
(Dewar, 1989) 
The STOC, too, acknowledged t h a t unlike i n the previous decade, i n 
the 1980's, the "bulk of the Labour movement i n Scotland i s now 
Q 
SNP p o l i t i c i a n Isobel Lindsay saw the basis o f a p o l i t i c a l 
consensus developing around Scottish nationalism as a r e s u l t of the 
Thatcher governments. Apart from Tories and t h e i r business a l l i e s , 
"almost everyone else [ i s ] i n t h a t end of the spectrum v^ich goes from 
support f o r a f a i r l y strong Scottish l e g i s l a t u r e t o f u l l independence" 
(Lindsay, 1987, 14). 
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(...) enthusiastic about the establishment of a Scottish Assembly" 
(Radical Scotland. 1984, 14). 
Since the mid-1970's, the a t t i t u d e of the Scottish labour movement 
towards self-government has changed considerably. I t s 
representatives no longer speak of working class u n i t y being 
destroyed through nationalism and devolution; t o the contrary, the 
Scottish L e f t argues t h a t a self-governing, s o c i a l i s t Scotland could 
set an exanple f o r the working class i n the r e s t of B r i t a i n . As the 
image of radicalism and egalitarianism became once more interwoven 
w i t h national i d e n t i t y , the n a t i o n a l i s t movement broke out from the 
SNP t o embrace large parts of the l a b o u r i s t working class. As the 
next p a r t w i l l show, the SNP t r i e d t o adapt t o t h i s by moving t o the 
l e f t . 
3.1.V The wor3<±ng class i n N a t i o n a l i s t projects 
By the 1970's, the SNP had established a social-democratic i d e n t i t y 
vAiich i n p l i e d the r e j e c t i o n of class based p o l i t i c s and claimed t o 
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represent the Scottish people as a vAiole . However, u i Westminster 
Parliament i t s emphasis on popular consensus gave r i s e t o 
inconsistencies i n p o l i t i c a l decision making which contributed t o 
the erosion of i t s working class support i n the l a t e r years of the 
decades. Now t h a t labour offered devolution, the SNP had no longer 
the monopoly on popular nationalism. When the working class came out 
strongly i n favour of Scottish autonomy i n the 1979 referendum 
(Nairn, 1979, 313), and the SNP vote slunped t o 17 per cent i n the 
following general elections, the l e f t - w i n g of the party saw a need 
t o l i n k the n a t i o n a l i s t project t o socialism. I n t h e i r view, the 
referendum had shown t h a t nationalism was i n the i n t e r e s t of the 
working class, rather than any other social class. I f the SNP wanted 
9 
I n the words of party Ghainnan, B i l l y Wolfe, 
" [ t ] h e National Party stands f o r the nation; a l l sections, 
a l l people i n i t ; welded i n a common purpose; devoted, 
dedicated t o the s o c i a l and economic improvement of a l l " . 
(Wolfe, 1973, 55) 
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t o maintain i t s leadership of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, i t had t o 
focus on working class i n t e r e s t s . 
This p o l i c y was represented most f o r c e f u l l y by the "79 Group" vdiich 
formed w i t h i n the SNP i n 1979. The group's p r i n c i p l e s were: f u l l 
independence, a republic state, and a " s o c i a l i s t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
power, wealth and income" (Maxwell, 1985, 11). I n order t o gain 
c r e d i b i l i t y i n the eyes of key agents of the trade union and labour 
movement, the "79 Grovp" backed up i t s s o c i a l i s t r h e t o r i c w i t h c i v i l 
disobedience and anti-closure cairpaigns (the Scottish Resistance 
Cairpaign). Although i t brought scsiie yoiang a c t i v i s t s i n t o the party 
(Doig, interview, 27.10.1987), i t f a i l e d t o b r i n g the SNP 
s i g n i f i c a n t working class sipport i n the elections. I n 1982, the 
Group was banned by the SNP leadership because i t was believed 
responsible f o r the increasing l e f t - r i g h t p o l a r i s a t i o n i n the 
Thus, t h i s attempt t o r e l a t e working class i n t e r e s t s t o n a t i o n a l i s t 
p o l i t i c s d i d not succeed, p a r t l y because i t was based on an 
economist notion of class, and p a r t l y because working class 
nationalism was already being absorbed by the Scottish Labour Party. 
I t was easier f o r Labour t o grasp the t h i s t l e w i t h a barge pole from 
a p o s i t i o n of hegemony, than f o r the SNP t o win over sceptical 
working class people w i t h red carnations. I n any case, the SNP had 
already been c l a s s i f i e d as a p o l i t i c a l force of the middle class or 
p e t t y bourgeoisie. The next section examines the middle class basis 
of Scottish nationalism, and argues t h a t a class i n t e r e s t i n 
nationalism i s d i f f i c u l t t o i d e n t i f y . 
When the "79 Group" was dissolved by the 1982 SNP conference and 
seven members expelled, some a c t i v i s t s , l i k e Margo MacDonald, l e f t 
p o l i t i c s . A few (Kevin EUnion, Chris Cunnin^iam and Digi Robertson) 
jo i n e d the p o l i t i c a l magazine Radiccil Scotland, v i i i c h i s Scotland's only 
l e f t - w i n g n a t i o n a l i s t magazine today. Radical Scotland i s not a SNP 
j o u r n a l , but sees i t s e l f as a l i n k between nationalism and the Labour 
movement, according t o i t s e d i t o r , Allan Lawson (interview, 29.10.1987). 
Other ex-members, such as Jim S i l l a r s , Kenny MacAskill, Alex Salmond and 
Chris MacLean now occupy inportant leadership positions i n the SNP. 
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3.2 The middle classes and nationcilism 
Section two already ii:>entioned t h a t the middle classes are seen by 
many marxist w r i t e r s t o be the p r i n c i p a l basis f o r struggles vMch 
inobilise the "people" or the "nation" against the "oppressors". Marx 
believed t h a t t h i s was because they stand between the two 
fundamental class i n t e r e s t s , vtiich suggests t h a t the class interests 
of the middle classes do not e n t a i l d i r e c t class struggle. Gramsci 
pointed out t h a t the function of i n t e l l e c t u a l s - vtiich form the bulk 
of the middle class as defined above - as creators and reproducers 
of s o c i a l imagery and national-popular t r a d i t i o n s , i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
etc. gives them a key r o l e i n so c i a l and p o l i t i c a l struggles over 
hegemony and c o n t r o l ; a r o l e v,*iich i s not economically determined, 
nor necessarily i n the i n t e r e s t o f a s p e c i f i c class. I n n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements, v ^ i c h are centred more than most other struggles around 
national-popular elements, the pairticipation of middle class 
a c t i v i s t s i s therefore t o be expected. But does t h i s mean tha t 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements pursue t h e i r class interests? I f not, vAiat 
does i t mean i f n a t i o n a l i s t movements are based mainly on middle 
class support? 
I n order t o explore t h i s question, I w i l l look a t the Scottish 
National Party's support, because i t was the main force of Scottish 
nationalism up u n t i l the l a t e 1970's. Though i t s core support i s 
middle class, there are many middle class sectors V i ^ i c h do not f l o c k 
t o the SNP. Instead of defending t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n Scotland, many 
middle class Scots have opted t o emigrate, and many of those v^o 
stay are involved i n Scottish c i v i l society i n s t i t u t i o n s v^ich have 
increasingly come under the control of the central state. 
3.2.i The Scottish National Party: a middle class party? 
The SNP i s widely regarded as a middle class party. For exanple, 
Foster and Wool f son described the a c t i v i s t s i n the national 
movement's foremost ejqxsnent, the SNP, as t y p i c a l conponents of the 
middle classes: small business people, professionals, vAiite c o l l a r 
workers, who had become the victims of the monopoly r u l e i n the 
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1960's (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 89). T r a d i t i o n a l l y , s n a i l towns 
and r u r a l society provide a f e r t i l e grovand f o r the SNP and even i n 
the 1970's, the SNP vote was strongest i n the r u r a l constituencies 
on the Western periphery and i n the North East"*""^ , where Labour was 
never successful, but where an anti-landlord and therefore anti-Tory 
sentiment was present (Kellas, 1975, 130). This can be regarded as 
the skeleton of the SNP support, v,^ch becanie v i s i b l e again v^en i t s 
vote collapsed i n 1979. 
New i n the 1970's was the support of the vM t e c o l l a r workers and 
the so-called "new" workers. Kreckel and collaborators pointed out 
t h a t the surge of the SNP i n the mid-1970's was due t o these social 
class sectors, Drucker and Brown explained t h e i r emergence and 
p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n by the economic development of the 1960's and 
1970's vv^ich had broken the backbone of the Labour movement and 
given r i s e t o a middle class. While the entrenched Tory and Labour 
voters re s i s t e d the SNP i n the 1970's elections, those who had 
benefited from economic progress and f e l t cheated by i t s l i m i t s , 
supported the SNP (Drucker and Brown, 1980, 48-50). 
The a c t i v i s t s i n the SNP had the same values and attitu d e s as 
Scottish society as a whole (Maxwell, interview). I t i s par t of the 
claim of a n a t i o n a l i s t xiravement t o represent the whole nation. At 
the peak of i t s support, the SNP supporters were evenly d i s t r i b u t e d 
over the d i f f e r e n t social classes (Kreckel e t a l . , 1984, 135). This 
was demonstrated by Brand with opinion p o l l s carried out i n 1975 
(Table 4.2) (Brand, 1978, 146-147). Brand argued t h a t the 
t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h system of class p o l i t i c s had been broken up by 
the SNP, and t h a t people increasingly considered econoirdc and social 
problems w i t h i n a national framework rather than a class based point 
of view. I t turned out t o be not quite so, because the deflated SNP 
of 1979 came t o r e l y t o a large extent on t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l middle 
I n the February elections of 1974, the SNP won majorities i n 
Aberdeenshire East, A r g y l l , Banffshire, and Moray and Nairn. I n October 
of the same year, Angus South, Dunbartonshire East, Galloway, and Perth 
and East Perthshire were added. 
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class voters. But the f a c t i s t h a t from 1960s onwards, p o l i t i c s 
could no longer be seen only i n terms of class - and Labour vs. Tory 
- antagonism. 
Class i n t e r e s t was seen by the SNP's p o l i c i e s as secondary t o the 
people's i n t e r e s t (see p. 187). According t o SNP p o l i c i e s , thrashed 
out i n the mid-1970's under the irtpact of North Sea o i l discoveries, 
independent Scotland would be classless and painlessly radical 
(Maxwell, 1982, 7). However, i t s social-democratic p o l i c i e s c a l l i n g 
f o r a mixed economy under a strong independent Scottish state, land 
reform and decentralisation were not fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from 
those t h a t the Labour Party was pursuing. I n the 1970's and today, 
the SNP and the Labour Party have been wooing f o r the support of the 
"popular classes", i . e . the working and middle classes (Lindsay, 
12 13 interview, 24.2.1987 ; Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988 ). 
The t r a d i t i o n a l middle class, whose class i n t e r e s t the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement supposedly represented, showed i n the devolution debate 
t h a t i t d i d not care much f o r devolution or independence. Mackintosh 
found t h a t a majority of teachers, lawyers, u n i v e r s i t y s t a f f , etc. 
opposed the aims of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement (Mackintosh, 1982, 
130-133), and Nairn commented a f t e r the referendum: 
"After decades of pious blethering about 'More say i n our 
own a f f a i r s ' , much of the Scottish middle class sidled 
f u r t i v e l y i n t o the booths and placed i t s cross firmLy on the 
'No' square." 
(Nairn, 1979, 313) 
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" I t h i n k [the SNP] has developed a p o s i t i o n i n which i t 
accepts t h a t there i s a substantial body of i n t e r e s t i n common 
between the Scottish working class and the Scottish middle 
class, but t h a t there i s l i t t l e i n common i n many cases 
between the Scottish working and middle class and the Scottish 
upper class." (Lindsay, interview, 24.2.1987) 
"'""^  "We are sure of a proportion of the middle class voting f o r 
us, so t h a t we can beat the Tories i n the Tory areas i f the 
working class vote comes out." 
(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988) 
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This demonstrates the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n ascribing middle class 
i n t e r e s t s t o the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. The support f o r the SNP i n 
r u r a l areas and medium sized towns i s not sirnply explained by a 
s p e c i f i c class i n t e r e s t , but rather by a conplex mixture of l o c a l 
c u l t u r e and place s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y where the economic 
classes are less segregated and the B r i t i s h p arties less entrenched. 
Just l i k e n a t i o n a l i s t support i n Scotland i n general, the phenomenon 
of the SNP i s not reducible t o middle class interests. The next 
section ejq)lores other factors v^ich a f f e c t the r o l e of the middle 
class i n Scottish nationalism i n general. 
3 . 2 . i i Emigration, the state and middle class nationalism 
I n the 18th and 19th century, the middle class - then t o a large 
extent constrained t o professionals and c l e r i c s - was embedded 
w i t h i n the c a p i t a l i s t class (Maclaren, 1989, 138-139). This means 
t h a t despite the preservation of Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s which were 
the domain of the middle classes, there was no vested i n t e r e s t i n 
independence or home r u l e among the middle classes. Another factor 
was the f a c t t h a t the empire provided middle (and working) class 
Scots w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y t o climb up the social ladder through 
emigration. Nairn has explained the absence of nationalism i n 19th 
century Scotland w i t h reference t o the i n p e r i a l i s t outlook and 
i n t e r e s t s of the Scottish i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The same argument would 
hold f o r much of the 20th century. Between 1951 and 1971, an average 
of 30,000 people l e f t Scotland every year, and alinost 50% of these 
migrants went overseas (Table 4.3). The migrant population had a 
higher socio-economic p r o f i l e and was better educated than the 
Scottish average (H. R. Jones, 1979, 8). Thus, instead of leading 
the n a t i o n a l i s t movement t o change the causes f o r t h e i r 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , many of the more dynamic middle class people l e f t 
Scotland. I n h i s discussion of the "diverging paths of the emigrant 
and the n a t i o n a l i s t " , Smith argues t h a t i t i s the underprivileged, 
those excluded from the p r i v i l e g e s of the advanced U2±an classes and 
"but l i g h t l y touched by t h i s c u l t u r e " vAio are most prone t o 
emigration (Smith, 1983, 119 and 139). I n contrast, the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s ( f o r which he uses Gellner's description as the "class 
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v*iich i s alienated from i t s own society by the very f a c t of i t s 
education") i s the d r i v i n g force i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
(Smith, 1983, 133-134). But t h i s i s not the case i n Scotland, vAiere 
emigration also affected the highly educated sectors of society. 
However, emigration also served as an eye-opener t o sane v*io worked 
abroad temporarily and returned l a t e r . Several n a t i o n a l i s t s related 
t h e i r own p o l i t i c i s a t i o n t o a stay i n England vdiere they realised 
t h a t " B r i t i s h " i s often equated w i t h "English", v t i i l e Scottishness 
i s excluded from both. Others saw the legacy of the B r i t i s h eirpire 
i n A f r i can states and f e l t less pride i n being B r i t i s h and more i n 
being Scottish. Returning Scots then became involved i n the r i s i n g 
n a t i o n a l i s t wave w i t h a stronger consciousness of t h e i r national 
i d e n t i t y . 
The B r i t i s h s t a t e affected the a t t i t u d e o f Scottish middle class 
sectors i n other ways. Throu<^ increasing state intervention i n 
c i v i l society, the i n s t i t u t i o n s \ ^ i c h were the p i l l a r s of Scottish 
i d e n t i t y and a t the same time the mainstays of Scottish 
professionals ( i . e . education, le g a l system, l o c a l government and 
administration) became more and more anglicised (eg. Carty, 1983; 
Turner, 1984). Other sectors of the Scottish middle classes, which 
are connected w i t h the public sector, owed -their very existence and 
t h e i r considerable growth t o the expansion of the state, and were 
therefore ambiguous i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e t o p o l i t i c a l nationalism. This 
i s discussed i n more d e t a i l i n the next chapter, v^ich concentrates 
on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between state and c i v i l society. But i t i s 
already clear t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p of Scottish i n t e l l e c t u a l s t o the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i s not e}q)lained w i t h reference t o a class 
i n t e r e s t , vtiich Marxists have been struggling t o define i n the f i r s t 
place. 
To conplete the analysis o f relationships between so c i a l classes and 
nationalism i n the Scottish case, the next si±>-section looks a t the 
Scottish bourgeoisie. While various sectors of the Scottish working 
and middle classes were involved i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement since 
i t s r e v i v a l i n the 1960's, the indigenous bourgeoisie remained 
l a r g e l y uninterested. Why has the bourgeoisie f a i l e d t o take an 
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i n t e r e s t i n nationalism, or even i n the strand of nationalism 
represented by the - i n Nairn's view - bourgeois SNP (Nairn, 1979, 
313)? 
3.3. The bo:irqeoisie and natioricilism 
I n the second chapter, i t was argued t h a t the union was closely 
l i n k e d t o the process of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and benefited the upper 
classes. Also, the new B r i t i s h i d e n t i t y vAiich the Scots gained i n 
1707 was inherently i n p e r i a l i s t . Access t o the English - now B r i t i s h 
- i n p e r i a l markets gave Scottish c a p i t a l i s t s and large landowners 
economic power and enabled them t o promote the i n t e r n a l reproduction 
of c a p i t a l i n Scotland. I t was not by accident t h a t shipbuilding -
c r u c i a l t o overseas trade - became one of the p i v o t a l Scottish 
i n d u s t r i e s . Chapter three showed t h a t the 20th century witnessed the 
decline of large-scale indigenous industry, the i n f l u x of 
multinationals and the merger f o r Scottish w i t h B r i t i s h c a p i t a l . 
This e x t e m a l i s a t i o n of c a p i t a l and economic control strengthened 
the national consciousness of the working and middle classes, v^o 
became increasingly aware of the erosion of Scotland's i n d u s t r i a l 
base. The class c o n f l i c t between labour and c a p i t a l has come t o 
coincide w i t h the national c o n f l i c t between Scots and the B r i t i s h 
s t a t e , as c a p i t a l i s increasingly conceived as English controlled 
(see Fig. 22) Events such as the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders' work-in 
mobilised Scottish people i n "national class alliances" against 
B r i t i s h c a p i t a l and the state (Foster and Woolfson, 1986; Foster, 
1989). 
As Scottish c a p i t a l increasingly l o s t autonomy i n the economic 
sphere, and i n iirportance i n Scottish c i v i l society during the 
1960's and 1970's, the Conservative Party began t o lose popular 
support. The Tories, which represented unionism not only f o r the 
Scottish bourgeoisie, but also f o r many working and middle class 
people, s t i l l commanded i n 1955 a sizeable vote v^ich put them a t 
the same l e v e l as the Labour Party. Their seven Glasgow seats i n 
1955 were a l l l o s t by the mid-1980's. From 30 Scottish seats under 
the MacMillan government, only 10 were l e f t i n 1987, without great 
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Fig. : T H E P R O B L E M IS NOT SO MUCH T H E FNOT.ISH 
Source: Radical Scotland, April /May 1984, 9. 
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hope of increasing the share i n the near future. The Tories were 
extremely r e l u c t a n t t o si:$)port devolution i n the 1970s' although the 
SNP also munched i t s way i n t o the Conservative vote. 
The i n c a n p a t i b i l i t y of Scottish nationalism w i t h bourgeois interests 
14 
was r e i t e r a t e d many times i n the 1970's and 1980's . Under 
Thatcher's leadership, the Tories turned decidedly against 
devolution, vdaile independence had always been an anathema t o the 
party. George Younger explained the Tories' case against 
independence i n September 1977 by claiming t h a t i t would lead t o a 
15 
lack of investment and t o unenployment . The same argument was 
applied t o devolution. Tory opposition t o nationalism and 
devolution mirrored the response of the Scottish i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . 
They were strongly represented i n the "Scotland says no" (SSN) 
campaign v i i i c h emerged i n 1978 t o f i g h t the Scotland B i l l i n the 
referendum cairpaign (Macartney, 1981, 21). The SSN included Labour 
and Conservative MPs, but - more s i g n i f i c a n t l y - also leading 
business figures such as the former Scottish CBI Chairman Douglas 
Hardie, Viscount Weir (Chairman of the Weir Group and of the Great 
Northern Investment Trust), Lord Polwarth (Director of the Bank of 
Scotland and various other banking and insurance conpanies), S i r 
T o o t h i l l (Coirpany d i r e c t o r of F e r r a n t i ) , and Harold Whitson 
(Director of the Scottish Mutual Insurance Group and former d i r e c t o r 
of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce). The l a s t four were a l l members 
of the Scottish Council (Development and Industry), supposedly the 
spearhead of Scottish i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' e f f o r t s t o address the 
maladies of the Scottish economy and t o a f f i r m Scottish control over 
i t s economic development. The opposition of Scottish c a p i t a l against 
devolution was r e f l e c t e d i n the press, which came out with 
14 
L i t t l e has changed since. Through the mouth of o l d i n d u s t r i a l i s t 
Lord Weir, the Tory Party started the 1990's w i t h an attack on Scottish 
home r u l e (Guardian, 16.1.1990, 6). 
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He asked: "Who would want t o set up business i n a t i n y country 
w i t h only f i v e m i l l i o n people v^ien there are numerous s i t e s available i n 
England w i t h a home market ten times as large and much nearer t o the 
mainland of Europe?" (quoted i n Ascherson, 1986, 52). 
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headlines such as "Weir warns: Home r u l e would cost us business" 
(Glasgow Herald. 17.11.1977, 3)-'-^. 
The fear of home r u l e and independence was not ejqplicable only i n 
terms of economic int e r e s t s . The SNP d i d not aim t o alienate 
Scottish industry w i t h s o c i a l i s t p o l i c i e s and "the old class 
warfare", but i t d i d want t o c u r t a i l the influence of non-Scottish 
business and spoke of " l e g i s l a t i o n which ensures more p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
and a much f a i r e r d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth" (Wolfe, 1973, 133). I n i t s 
p o l i c y documents, the SNP stressed the needs and interests of the 
Scottish people, v*iich had t o be s a t i s f i e d by Scottish industry 
rather than any sectional i n t e r e s t s . Presumably, Scottish 
c a p i t a l i s t s feared increased state intervention from a powerful, o i l 
endowed Scottish government w i t h social-democratic ideals of 
workers, enployers and the state a l l collaborating f o r the benefit 
of the nation (SNP pol i c y document Manpower and I n d u s t r i a l 
Relations). SNP plans f o r r e s t r i c t i n g landownership t o family size 
Other headlines i n the Glasgow Herald t o the same e f f e c t were 
"Leading companies might consider a move south" (6.4.1977, 7 ) ; "Cautious 
Scots bosses switch HQs t o England" (6.5.1977, 4); "Independence frowned 
on by businessmen" (20.8.1977, 11) and "CBI gets tough on devolution". 
(9.12.1977). 
"'"'^The document anticipated t h a t Scotland would be less dependent on 
foreign investment, as the independent government would assist small 
indigenous enterprises i n various ways. I t envisaged "enployee 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i c y making" i n a l l enterprises \*iere a majority of 
eirployees are i n favour of such a scheme. More generally, the SNP 
"believes t h a t the primary function of industry i s t o 
produce the goods and services which the nation requires, 
and t o do so i n an manner \*iich benefits the Scottish people 
as a whole and not, as presently happens, i n a manner which 
benefits the unbalanced and often c o n f l i c t i n g sectional 
i n t e r e s t s . " 
Some kind of mixed economy was envisaged, w i t h the party having "no 
objection i n p r i n c i p l e t o e i t h e r public or pri v a t e enterprise", but 
wi t h a grea t l y increased r o l e f o r co-operatives (which remained 
undefined) (SNP Policy document Industry). 
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18 holdings and f o r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of large estates , d i d not do very 
much t o appease the large landowners among Scotland's upper class. 
Though i t appears t h a t the Scottish bourgeoisie saw n a t i o n a l i s t 
demands as contravening i t s own class i n t e r e s t s , these cannot be 
reduced t o economic in t e r e s t s alone. Ascherson pointed out t h a t the 
economic arguments of the ant i - d e v o l u t i o n i s t lobbies were 
contradictory, because the Tories and the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s were 
claiming t h a t Scotland would became poorer, and Labour opponents 
were saying t h a t devolution would give Scotland an u n f a i r economic 
advantage over the English regions (Ascherson, 1986, 53). 
Independent Scotland under an SNP leadership would hardly have got 
r i d o f capitalism, and neither would a weak devolved Scottish 
Assembly under Labour domination. The missing l i n k s i n the 
re l a t i o n s h i p between Scottish c a p i t a l and the n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
are found i n t h e i r respective positions w i t h regards t o the B r i t i s h 
s t a t e (see chapter f i v e ) . 
To conclude, the r o l e of the d i f f e r e n t classes i n Scotland i n the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i s ambiguous, w i t h the exception of the 
bourgeoisie, v^ i c h has rejected Scottish nationalism out of hand. 
The working class and the middle class were divided over the issue 
i n the 1970's, although the n a t i o n a l i s t movement as a v^ole counted 
w i t h growing popular support. I n the 1980's, n a t i o n a l i s t demands are 
embraced by the popular majority, and the leadership of the movement 
has s h i f t e d t o the l e f t . Any p o l i t i c a l party or social class which 
claims hegemony i n Scotland today has t o make the demand f o r 
self-government i t s own. Economic inter e s t s alone f a i l t o explain 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between classes and the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, which 
have been variously interpreted i n contradictory terms. 
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The SNP had strong p o l i c i e s on land ownership, vhich go back t o 
the nationalism .of the c r o f t e r s a t the end of l a s t century (see chapter 
two). I t i s party p o l i c y t h a t "the land o f Scotland belongs inalienably 
of the people of Scotland" and t h a t estates not used t o the benefit of 
the nation or the l o c a l community should be nationalised (SNP po l i c y 
document Land Ownership and Use). 
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I n the next. section, I examine the same relationships f o r the 
Catalan case. 
4. SOCIAL CLASS AND NATIONALISM IN CATALONIA 
I n Catalonia, social classes have h i s t o r i c a l l y played d i f f e r e n t 
roles i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement than i n Scotland. Indeed, the r o l e 
of s o c i a l classes i n conterrporary nationalism cannot be understood 
separately from the h i s t o r i c developments i n c i v i l society before 
the c i v i l war. Since the end of the 19th century, various strands of 
nationalism have dominated Catalan p o l i t i c s and gained popular 
support. Although the bourgeoisie has shaped n a t i o n a l i s t ideology 
more than other classes, the sometimes irrportant r o l e o f the middle 
classes and the working class are not t o be ignored i n the analysis 
of conteitporary Catalan nationalism. They have became more prominent 
since the 1920's, v*ien the Catalan bourgeoisie l o s t touch w i t h the 
r e s t of c i v i l society. Then, the c o l l i s i o n between the Catalan 
bourgeoisie and the working class organisations destroyed the 
i l l u s i o n s of the former t o maintain i t s hegemony wi t h the help of a 
national-popular ideology. I t was l e f t t o the middle classes t o t r y 
and establish a popular n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n the 1930's by 
incorporating the working class and elements of social and p o l i t i c a l 
reform. But under the exceptional h i s t o r i c a l circumstances of the 
1930's, t h i s was only p a r t i a l l y successful. One of the problems of 
the Catalan republican government was precisely the fa c t t h a t the 
bulk of the working class was detached from p o l i t i c a l nationalism 
(Pujol, 1980, 115). The repression which followed the occupation of 
Catalonia (chapter two, section 10) was directed both against the 
aspirations of the working class and the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n 
Catalonia. Therefore, the linkages between classes and nationalism 
were modified again under Francoist r u l e . 
The n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l i n the 1960's was characterised by 
cross-class support f o r Catalan autonomy. A l l social classes 
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, v*iich became the b a t t l e 
ground f o r the f i g h t over hegemony a f t e r Franco's death (1975). This 
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does not mean t h a t classes were not divided on the issue of 
nationalism. However, neither these d i v i s i o n s nor the support f o r 
nationalism can be e j ^ l a i n e d w i t h reference t o economic class 
i n t e r e s t s . As i n the case of Scotland, I w i l l analyse the social 
classes separately, s t a r t i n g w i t h the working class. The next 
sub-section argues t h a t the main problem i n the relationship between 
the working class and nationalism i s the h i ^ l e v e l of immigration 
t o Catalonia. Divided along c u l t u r a l and ethnic l i n e s , the working 
class was also s p l i t on the national issue, not least because 
nationalism was also cherished by some sectors of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie. I t was the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Spanish nationalism with 
the Franco regime v±iich enabled the working class leadership t o 
j u s t i f y working class support f o r Catalan autonomy. 
4.1 Immigration, nationalism and working c l c t s s strategies 
4.1.i Immigration during the Franco period 
I f immigration was perceived by middle and upper class n a t i o n a l i s t s 
i n the f i r s t few decades of the century as a possible threat t o the 
u n i t y of the Catalan community, t h i s fear was even greater i n the 
post-war period. Eue t o poor economic performance i n southern and 
c e n t r a l Spanish areas as corrpared t o Catalonia (chapter three), 
immigration t o Catalonia picked up soon again i n the 1940's. Already 
i n the 1950's i t surpassed the high levels of the 1920's, and the 
strong performance of the Catalan economy attra c t e d even more 
workers once Franco decided t o open up the country t o outside 
investors. The peak of immigration was reached i n the 1960's, vtien 
720,000 came t o work i n Catalonia (Termes, 1983, 292-293) (see 
chapter three. Table 3.6). By 1970, almost 38 % of the population 
was bom outside Catalonia, most of them l i v i n g i n and around 
Barcelona (the i n d u s t r i a l comarques of Barcelones, Valles 
Occidental, El Maresme and Baix LLobregat) (Miguelez and Sole, 1987, 
(Chapter four) (237) 
101). Thus, the i n d u s t r i a l and general economic development a f t e r 
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the c i v i l war re-enforced the o l d patterns of uneven development . 
Although a p a r t of the immigration from other parts of Spain boosted 
the p u b l i c sector middle class (functionaries and state o f f i c i a l s as 
w e l l as p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y personnel) i n Catalonia, the bulk of the 
immigrants of the 1950's and 1960's joined the manual working class, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s lower ranks (Miguelez and Sole, 1987, 111). By the 
time of the Catalan c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l (1960's), there existed thus a 
siobstantial non-Catalan working class sector on the very bottom of 
the s o c i a l hierarchy. As one Catalan p o l i t i c i a n explained, the 
immigrants of the 1940's and 1950's were mostly a g r i c u l t u r a l workers 
v*io became u n s k i l l e d workers i n Catalan fact o r i e s (Ferrer, 
interview, 22.3.1988) . The immigrant community was not only s o c i a l l y 
i s o l a t e d from the other sectors of Catalan society, but due t o the 
anti-Catalan c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s of the Franco regime they were also 
denied the opportunities t o learn the language and the ways of l i f e 
of t h e i r Catalan equals. As Candel explained, 
"The immigrant of today finds himself among a vast majority 
of non-Catalans. There i s only a small contingent of natives 
i n those areas where he would end up l i v i n g i n most cases. A 
long period would pass before he would come i n t o contact 
w i t h the Catalan sector, and t h i s contact could w e l l t u r n 
out t o be sporadic through a l l h i s l i f e . " 
(Candel, 1974, 85) 
P a r t i c u l a r l y those immigrants \Aio l i v e d i n the urioan i n d u s t r i a l 
zones of Barcelona province had l i t t l e opportunity t o learn 
Catalan; i n the comarca of Baix Llobregat, only 17 per cent of the 
non-Catalan immigrants could speak Catalan i n 1975, and less than 40 
per cent understood the language (Table 4.4). There were suspicions 
t h a t the C a s t i l i a n speaking working class immigrants were not on an 
equal f o o t i n g w i t h the Catalan workers. The l a t t e r found i t easier 
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See chapter three f o r social and economic di v i s i o n s i n Spain. But 
also w i t h i n Catalonia, previous tendencies of uneven development 
established themselves more f i r m l y i n the period of economic growth of 
the 1950's and 1960's. At the same time as the population explosion 
occurred i n the i n d u s t r i a l comargues. the i n t e r i o r areas of Catalonia 
ejq)erienced depopulation and economic decline. 
(Chapter four) (238) 
t o move on t o b e t t e r jobs and were less marginalised i n social and 
c u l t u r a l terms, even though the C a s t i l i a n culture dominated the 
o f f i c i a l structures. Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s perceived t h a t these 
structures could lead t o a p o l a r i s a t i o n of C a s t i l i a n workers and the 
r e s t o f Catalan c i v i l society and the discrepancies i n Catalan 
pr o f i c i e n c y between upper and lower social status positions i n the 
mid-1970's j u s t i f i e d t h i s fear (Table 4.5). I n the phase of 
n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l , v^iich was led by Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s , the 
in t e g r a t i o n of C a s t i l i a n immigrants was regarded as one of the main 
tasks, i f a popular n a t i o n a l i s t movement was t o succeed. 
4 . 1 . i i Catalanists and the immigrant problem 
Among Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s , the danger of e x t i n c t i o n of Catalan 
language and c u l t u r e was perceived as imminent, because t h e i r public 
reproduction had been prohibited by Franco. Catalonia was 
" c a s t i l i a n i s e d " , and the Catalan i d e n t i t y had retreated t o the 
p r i v a t e sphere. Therefore, the o f f i c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n of immigrants 
i n t o Catalan society and cul t u r e was not possible. The f a c t t h a t 
many immigrants a r r i v e d a t the bottom of the social hierarchy could 
also lead t o a s i t u a t i o n i n v^iich class b a r r i e r s and c u l t u r a l 
b a r r i e r s were superiitposed and re-enforcing each other, provoking a 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of the national question i n terms of social class. I t 
i s not su r p r i s i n g t h a t among the Catalan middle class, creating the 
conditions f o r s o c i a l m o b i l i t y (social iirprovement of the i n d i v i d u a l 
rather than of the working class as a vhole) o f the immigrant 
workers was regarded t o be a primary concern. More conservative 
n a t i o n a l i s t s believed t h a t the root of the problem lay i n the 
regions o f o r i g i n . Pujol was arguing as early as the 1950's t h a t 
Andalucia and Extremadura required economic investment so t h a t 
Catalonia would not need t o absorb poorly educated immigrants 
(Ainaud de Lasarte, interview, 30.3.1988). I n the t r a d i t i o n of 
pre-war nationalism, some n a t i o n a l i s t s made immigration i n t o the 
single most iitportant problem f o r Catalan society. J o r d i Pujol, \iho 
i s now president of the Generalitat, argued i n 1964 t h a t 
(Chapter four) (239) 
"our main problem, as f a r as the country i s concerned, i s 
not the language or the social question, nor economic 
progress or any p o l i t i c a l problem; our main problem i s the 
immigration, and as a consequence, the in t e g r a t i o n . " 
(Pujol, 1964, 33) 
I n other words, immigration stood f o r a l l these problematic aspects; 
p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l cleavages. But the main inpact of the 
immigrant issue on Catalan nationalism was the introduction of a 
s i g n i f i c a n t dose of soc i a l concern. Catalan cit i z e n s h i p was now 
being more widely defined t o include the immigrant population, and 
" a l l those who l i v e and work i n Catalonia" were considered as 
Catalans. This national "egalitarianism" required values which had 
t o be applicalDle t o everyone. I t i s i n t h i s context t h a t one can 
i n t e r p r e t the i n t e r e s t and concern about the miserable, dangerous 
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and cramped l i v i n g conditions t o v*iich the "other Catalans" - as 
the C a s t i l i a n immigrants were cal l e d - were submitted i n the 
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sprawling fringes of the i n d u s t r i a l c i t i e s . Cultural demands (to 
allow teaching i n Catalan a t school, etc.) were linked t o demands 
f o r s o c i a l change i n order t o abolish b a r r i e r s t o social 
i n t e g r a t i o n . Thus, the ultimate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r class c o n f l i c t s , 
s o c i a l tensions and marginalisation i n the society was put on the 
the doorstep o f the cent r a l state (see chapter f i v e ) and linked t o 
the a n t i - f r a n c o i s t struggle. When n a t i o n a l i s t s l i k e Pujol argued 
t h a t only p o l i t i c a l power and autonomy f o r Catalonia could solve the 
c u l t u r a l and the s o c i a l problems (Pujol, 1976, 29; 40-1)^^, i t was a 
The term "els a l t r e s Catalans" was the t i t l e of a widely read and 
discussed book by Francesc Candel (Candel, 1964). I t depicted the 
experiences o f immigrants i n Catalonia from an insider's perspective and 
t r i e d t o portray the immigrants as keen t o integrate w i t h the Catalan 
population. 
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I n several a r t i c l e s of Serra d'Or. the housing c r i s i s was 
analysed and the s o c i a l structures and economic system were pointed out 
as not being geared t o the elementary needs of the people, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the immigrants. There were also strong attacks against the 
government's i n a b i l i t y t o produce the necessary s o c i a l and physical 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e (e.g. Matabosch, 1962, 21-22; LLuch and Estrada, 1962, 
26-28; Anonymous, 1962, 14-15). 
22 
Pujol argued f o r soc i a l m o b i l i t y of the marginalised working 
class sectors i n order t o integrate them i n t o the Catalan society. At 
(Footnote Continued) 
(Chapter four) (240) 
message t o the immigrant population, pointing t o the central state 
as the " r e a l " c u l p r i t . A f t e r autonomy was achieved and Pujol became 
president of the Genereilitat, the argument was turned on i t s head. 
But there was another motive f o r integrating the immigrant working 
class. I n the 1950's, the f i r s t signs of social unrest and working 
class organisation appeared i n the fac t o r i e s , i n the working class 
suburbs of Barcelona and i n the neighbouring i n d u s t r i a l towns, as 
chapter three showed (section 3.4). The workers' protests, which 
were ej^ressed from w i t h i n the V e r t i c a l Syndicate and increasingly 
through the Workers' Commissions (CC.OO.), concentrated mainly on 
s o c i a l and economic issues, and were therefore directed against the 
(mostly Catalan) enployers. The development of a predominantly 
Castilian-spea3cing working class movement which confronted Catalan 
entrepreneurs, would have had a damaging e f f e c t on the u n i t y of 
Catalan society - which was a f t e r a l l the claim underlying 
autonomist and n a t i o n a l i s t aspirations. On the other hand, the 
working class leadership became increasingly aware th a t i t would be 
inpossible f o r the workers' movement t o gain hegemony without 
embracing the national-popular aspects of Catalan i d e n t i t y . The next 
sub-section looks a t the p o s i t i o n of the wor3cing class leadership on 
Catalan nationalism. 
4 . 1 . i i i Working class organisations and the national problem 
For the s o c i a l i s t and Marxist opposition forces, the danger of a 
permanent d i v i s i o n of c u l t u r a l communities and of the working class 
was a daunting prospect which had t o be avoided. For the Catalan 
communist party (PSIIC), from the 1950's onwards the most inportant 
clandestine party, i t was therefore necessary t o incorporate the 
demand f o r p o l i t i c a l autonomy i n t o the struggle f o r democracy and 
socialism. Soon a f t e r the Franco regime was i n s t a l l e d , the Communist 
(Footnote Continued) 
the same time, he asked the working class t o accept the leading r o l e of 
other, more progressive social groups, such as the Catalan middle class 
and bourgeoisie (Pujol, 1980, 140). 
(Chapter four) (241) 
leader Comorera claiined t h a t the Catalans - and i n p a r t i c u l a r the 
Catalan working class - had the "sacred duty" of f i g h t i n g against 
the f a s c i s t State of Franco, i n order t o lead Catalonia t o even 
greater national self-determination than i n 1931 (Comorera, 1977, 
139) . This view was based on the three stages theory, according t o 
which nationalism started o f f as a bourgeois ideology, which then 
became democratised and popular under the petty bourgeoisie and was 
now the propert:y of the working class. 
I n order t o form a popular f r o n t against the dictatorship v^ich had 
t o include not only workers but also w r i t e r s , academics, 
professionals, enployees etc., the national issue and the 
socio-economic issues had t o be linked together. I t was clear that 
the Coinmunist Party could not r e s t r i c t i t s e l f t o the interests of 
the working class alone, but had t o speak f o r the people as a whole. 
The people i n Catalonia were s t i l l mostly Catalan, so embracing 
nationalism was a t least f o r some Communists a t a c t i c a l guestion t o 
do w i t h f i n d i n g a l l i e s (Ribo, 1986, 27). 
The agreement of a l l p o l i t i c a l opposition forces t o regard autonomy 
as a cent r a l demand was an indicator as t o t h e i r p o l i t i c a l strategy 
i n what was t o be the conversion of a clandestine opposition i n t o an 
open popular opposition. I t i s not surprising t h a t a selection of 
Catalan p o l i t i c i a n s and i n t e l l e c t u a l s , interviewed by Mercade i n the 
aftermath of the dic t a t o r s h i p , coincided i n considering national 
consciousness e i t h e r i n t e r c l a s s i s t or popular (Mercade, 1982, 
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160-162) . VJhile the p o l i t i c a l regime was regarded as the p r i n c i p a l 
eneiry, the conditions were favourable t o an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
national movement as being i n the interests of a l l popular classes. 
The Catalan high bourgeoisie could be excluded on the grounds of 
t h e i r economic function as wel l as t h e i r dissociation from Catalan 
language and hence i d e n t i t y . 
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Mercade found t h a t generally, the att i t u d e s of d i f f e r e n t social 
classes towards the Catalan question was not a topic of debate and 
t h e o r e t i c a l analysis i n Catalonia (Mercade, 1982, 160. 
(Chapter four) (242) 
I n the l a s t t e n years of Francoism, v*ien the an t i - f r a n c o i s t 
opposition groups i n Catalonia began t o cxsllaborate, the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the national issue w i t h any p a r t i c u l a r class was 
not pursued. While i t i s inpossihle t o assign a p a r t i c u l a r class 
i n t e r e s t t o the national movement, i t does not mean t h a t there were 
no class i n t e r e s t s involved. However, the f a c t t h a t a l l relevant 
opposition forces adopted the demand f o r autonomy must s i g n i f y t h a t 
i t was considered an issue v^ich was indeed able t o transcend class 
d i v i s i o n s . 
The a l l i a n c e , which the PSUC and other Catalan s o c i a l i s t forces were 
seeking between some progressive sectors of the Catalan middle 
classes and the working class, convinced some working class leaders 
of the need t o adopt a favourable a t t i t u d e towards Catalan 
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autonoriT/ . As chapter three maantained, t h i s was the main objective 
i n creating the Catalan organisation of the OC.OO. (Ccsnision Obrera 
Nacional de Catalunya (OONC)), vtiich was not lananimously supported 
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by a l l the worker's representatives . As the co-founder of the 
OONC, Cipriano Garcia, explained, the Catalan Communists realised 
t h a t i f they d i d not want t o leave the national question t o the 
boiargeoisie, they had t o take the i n i t i a t i v e themselves (Garcia, 
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I f the CC.OO. were never a Communist syndicate during the 
fr a n c o i s t period (v^en i t was the only powerful workers' movement), the 
PSUC has always had a strong influence on i t , not least because i t was 
the only a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l party. A f t e r being legalised i n 1977, the PSUC 
said t h a t i t had supported the OC.OO. throughout, and t h a t the syndicate 
came closer than any other workers' movement t o the PSUC's ideal of a 
democratic, national, u n i t a r i a n mass movement (PSUC, 1977b, 4-5). 
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Cipriano Garcia, one of the founder members of the OONC i n 1966, 
claimed t h a t the debates vtiich preceded the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the OONC, 
and ^diich took place i n a Jesuit i n s t i t u t e i n Barcelona, lasted f o r 48 
hours. The trade unionists w i t h c a t h o l i c backgrounds (eg. i n HQiVC) 
r e s i s t e d the adoption of a p o l i c y on Catalan autonomy on the grounds 
t h a t such a p o l i c y would amount t o a betrayal of the inte r n a t i o n a l 
working class. Given the ca t a l a n i s t tendencies of the Catalan Church, 
t h i s was interpreted by some as an attenpt t o prevent the OC.OO. t o take 
on the national issue, and therefore t o i s o l a t e the working class i n 
Catalonia (Garcia, interview, 29.3.1988). 
(Chapter four) (243) 
26 interview, 29,3.1988) . The decision of trade union leaders t o take 
on board the struggle f o r national self-determination won the PSUC 
and the CC.OO support from large sections of the Catalan 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s and middle classes (Garcia, interview, 29.3.1988), 
vi i i c h was not so easy t o get i n other parts of Spain. 
Garcia claimed t h a t by l i n k i n g the social and the national struggle 
against the c u l t u r a l and the social repression which the state 
exercised, the n a t i o n a l i s t movement was prevented from being 
dominated by the bourgeoisie or "incompetent and s t e r i l e 
separatists" (Garcia, 1976, 33). An inportant consideration was also 
the r e a l i t i e s of uneven development v*iich had given Catalonia a 
p i v o t a l r o l e i n the struggle f o r s t r u c t u r a l (social and economic) 
change. I t was therefore necessary t o grant a c e r t a i n autonomy t o 
the regional and national working class organisations, so t h a t the 
workers of every nation/region could attack the s p e c i f i c problems 
v^iich arose from t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the c a p i t a l i s t system (Garcia, 
1980, 10). 
Although the Communist Party seemed t o have assumed the leadership 
of p o l i t i c a l nationalism during the l a s t years of the Franco regime, 
i t d i d not manage t o convert t h i s i n t o a hegemonic p o s i t i o n i n the 
t r a n s i t i o n period t o democracy. I n the f i r s t elections, the PSUC had 
only 20 per cent of the Catalan vote, and i n subsequent autonomous 
elections, more and more workers r a l l i e d t o Pujol's increasingly 
right-wing party, Convergencia, vMch came t o dominate Catalan 
nationalism i n the 1980's. The former General Secretary of the PSUC, 
Lopez Raimundo, said t h a t t h i s was because 
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So c o i t p e t i t i v e was the PSUC i n t h i s respect t h a t i t immediately 
reacted t o the p u b l i c a t i o n of the Catalan language journal Serra d'Or. 
vdiich was the i n i t i a t i v e o f c a t a l a n i s t middle class i n t e l l e c t u a l s w i t h 
close l i n k s t o the Catalan Church (chapter seven). I n 1958, the 
Communist Catalan language jou r n a l Nous Horitzons was started, but i t s 
production i n Marseille and i t s clandestine nature .never allowed i t t o 
become as s i g n i f i c a n t and widely read as Serra d^Or. 
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"Coiwergencia sabia roejor como presentar e l teraa nacional. 
Tal vez por_ las tradiciones, o t a l vez porque daban mas 
confianza." 
(Lopez Raimundo, interview, 16.5.1989) 
According t o Marin and Tresseres, the reason f o r the Comraunists' 
f a i l u r e t o establish themselves as the n a t i o n a l i s t party was i t s 
function a l a t t i t u d e towards nationalism. 
"Jugan l a carta del catalanisme formal, perque en d e f i n i t i v a 
es una manera de conquerir l a hegemonia. En l a societat 
catalana no es potg conquerir l a hegemonia jugant una part 
a n t i - c a t a l a n i s t a . " 
(Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988) 
A f t e r Franco's death, the Catalan L e f t came t o be seen as not r e a l l y 
n a t i o n a l i s t , but only using nationalism as a strategy t o win the 
support of the middle classes and as a step towards a democratic 
state . I t got caught up i n the dilemma of class versus nationalism. 
Marin and Tresseres claimed t h a t the PSUC d i d not use the 
opportunity t o r e w r i t e the h i s t o r y of Catalan nationalism by 
appreciating the r a d i c a l popular elements of Catalan h i s t o r y , e.g. 
the anarchist t r a d i t i o n or the revolution of 1937 ( i b i d . ) . 
To conclude, the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the working class was very 
inportant i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, not only i n the eyes of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s who feared f o r the future of Catalan language and 
c u l t u r e , but also f o r working class organisations themselves and f o r 
t h e i r u n i t y . An active r o l e by the working class organisations and 
t h e i r members i n the n a t i o n a l i s t struggles (or a t least t h e i r 
consent) was a necessary, but not a s u f f i c i e n t precondition t o gain 
hegemony i n Catalan c i v i l society. The n a t i o n a l i s t struggle was not 
p r i m a r i l y seen i n class terms by the working class and i t s 
organisations, but rather i n terms of the people struggling against 
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"Convergencia was most s k i l l f u l a t presenting the national issue. 
Maybe because of the t r a d i t i o n s , or maybe because they i n s t i l l e d more 
confidence." 
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"They play the n a t i o n a l i s t card, because i t d e f i n i t i v e l y i s a way 
of winning hegemony. I t i s not possible t o win hegemony i n Catalan 
society by ta k i n g an anti-Catalanist p o s i t i o n . " 
(Chapter four) (245) 
a repressive state. This brought the working class organisations 
closer t o the Catalan middle class i n t e l l e c t u a l s , v*io were the key 
protagonists i n the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l . I t i s t o the r o l e of the 
middle class i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement t h a t I w i l l now tur n . 
4.2. Middle classes and the nationalist movement 
The Catalan middle classes had a strong involvement w i t h Catalan 
nationalism wliich goes back t o the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l i n the 19th 
century. I n the 1960's, the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l was the f i r s t sign of 
p o l i t i c a l nationalism, and i t was led by those v^io were most aware 
o f c u l t u r a l repression, namely the i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Mostly from the 
Catalan middle class, they were able t o reproduce a sense of Catalan 
i d e n t i t y i n a vAiole range of c i v i l society i n s t i t u t i o n s viiich were 
separate from the state. The f a c t t h a t middle class n a t i o n a l i s t s and 
workers saw the same enemy i n the Franco regime, radicalised some 
sectors of the middle class, and created favourable circumstances 
f o r a n a t i o n a l i s t opposition movement. The following sections look 
a t the r o l e of various sectors of the Catalan middle class i n the 
construction of the n a t i o n a l i s t and anti-Francoist movement, v^ich 
spanned across the d i f f e r e n t social classes. 
4.2.i The Catalan middle class and c u l t u r a l nationalism 
The middle classes, v ^ i c h had been the stronghold of the republican 
p a r t i e s and developed the populist version of Catalan nationalism 
during the Second Republic, were also the p r i n c i p a l force i n the 
c u l t u r a l movement during the dictatorship. As members of Esquerra 
R^jublicana or o f f i c e holders i n the Catalan administration, many 
suffered p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l repression a f t e r the occupation or 
were driven i n t o e x i l e . For the Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s ^fiho stayed i n 
the country, the repression and the i n t e n t i o n t o inpose the new 
f a s c i s t ideologies on c i v i l society lead t o a conplete break w i t h 
the republican c u l t u r e , and i n many cases pushed them i n t o 
clandestine existence or i n t o the pri v a t e sphere (see chapter two, 
section 8.2). I t was i n those c i r c l e s v^ich were linked t o Christian 
(Chapter four) (246) 
p a r t i e s (e.g. Unio Democritica de Oatalunya) or t o the church, and 
which were economically secure i n the hunger years of the 1940's, 
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t h a t the n u c l e i of the c u l t u r a l movement emerged which served as a 
f r a g i l e l i n k t o the republican Generalitat, and generally the 
ca t a l a n i s t t r a d i t i o n (Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988). 
The Catalan middle classes held a concern f o r Catalan culture and 
the h i s t o r i c claim t o autonony a l i v e throughout the dictatorship. 
The Front Universitari de Catalunya (FUC), f o r exanple, v^ich i n i t s 
f i r s t national congress i n 1944 i n the monastery of Montserrat 
demonstrated both i t s l i n k s t o Christian democracy and the special 
function of Montserrat i n r e l a t i o n t o n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c s , 
consisted of students from t l i e University of Barcelona who demanded 
the recognition of Catalan nationhood"^*^. "Ihe FUC d i d not survive the 
post-war c r i s i s i n the opposition, but can serve as an example f o r 
the type of nationalism which, invested w i t h a sense of social 
j u s t i c e , was based on the idea of national u n i t y vAiich transcended 
differences between social classes. Josep Benet said i n h i s 
inaugural speech as the president of the FUC: 
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I n 1941, some young, mostly upper middle class Catalans formed a 
group which l a t e r adopted the name of the conservative bishop and 
devoted c a t a l a n i s t , Torres i Bages. They organised meetings with 
h i s t o r i a n s , geographers and other i n t e l l e c t u a l s of the Republican era, 
Catalan language classes etc., and had a democratic. Christian and 
cat a l a n i s t outlook. Some present figures of the n a t i o n a l i s t CDC, such as 
Pujol, and las a r t e were part of t h i s group (Sanper i Triedu, 1987, 
123-125). Another example f o r t h i s type of c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y , v^ich was 
l i m i t e d t o small groups i n the Catalan middle classes, i s the Acadeniia 
de Ller^ua Catalana, formed i n 1953, which engaged i n a va r i e t y of 
symbolic acts (putting up stone plates commemorating h i s t o r i c events and 
figures of the Catalanist past), published a children's journal i n 
Catalan (Caball Fort) and organised public caiipaigns i n favour of 
Catalan masses and Catalan bishops i n the I960's ( i b i d . , 1987, 61-62; 
Sayrach, interview, 23.2.1988). 
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At the time, there was s t i l l widespread hope i n oppositional 
c i r c l e s t h a t the fran c o i s t nightmare would end wit h the v i c t o r y of the 
a l l i e d forces over the f a s c i s t regimes. The popular f r o n t was a t o o l 
v ^ i c h several oppositional groups, including the Front Nacionalista de 
Catalunya as the main n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l organisation, considered 
appropriate i n the early years of the dictatorship. 
(Chapter four) (247) 
"Remember t h a t despite autonomy, we di d not manage t o leave 
behind us the party p o l i t i c s copied from Madrid. A l l 
Catalans had t o belong t o the l e f t or the r i g h t . They did 
not understand t h a t , as Catalans of the new Catalonia, they 
had t o transcend the p o l i t i c s of l e f t and r i g h t . " 
(Benet, 1978, 104) 
Catalan culture, the return t o the moral p r i n c i p l e s which formed the 
basis of Catalan c i v i l i s a t i o n , was thought t o be able t o b u i l d a 
harmonic r e l a t i o n s h i p between the classes. Without class struggle, 
the workers would t u r n t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o the problems of t h e i r 
country. The roots i n the ideologies of bourgeois catalanism are 
obvious, and so are the s i m i l a r i t i e s with the SNP l i n e i n Scotland. 
But what i s also s i g n i f i c a n t i s the attenpt t o achieve "national 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n " by appealing t o a deeper sense of national unity. 
The significance of these small-scale, p r a c t i c a l l y private 
i n i t i a t i v e s , often under the protection of the Church, l i e s i n t h e i r 
e f f e c t on the p o l i t i c a l formation of the participants, and t h e i r 
i n t e g r a t i o n i n an oppositional culture. Some members of the FUG of 
the mid-1940's, such as Josep Benet, L l u i s Casassas, Alexandre 
C i r i c i and Joan Ainaud de Lasarte, were a l l involved i n subsequent 
c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l organisations, and were inportant a c t i v i s t s 
i n the Catalan r e v i v a l of the 1960's (see chapter s i x ) . 
4 . 2 . i i The social background of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a 
The world of the educated Catalan middle class, from v^^ich many of 
the p o l i t i c i a n s and catalanists l a t e r emerged, was rather small 
u n t i l the growth of the s o c i a l groups of the middle classes i n the 
boom period of the 1960's. When considering the p o l i t i c a l 
developments i n the student population i n Barcelona, whose 
r a d i c a l i s a t i o n contributed t o the n a t i o n a l i s t and the a n t i - f r a n c o i s t 
movement according the histo r i a n s (v^o also emerged from t h i s 
m i l i e u ) , i t i s inportant t o remember the social background and small 
size of the young i n t e l l i g e n t s i a during the f i r s t two decades of the 
d i c t a t o r s h i p . I n the l a t e 1950's, vmiversity education was the 
p r i v i l e g e of the a f f l u e n t middle classes and the upper classes, and 
less t h a t 0.2 % of the population had access t o i t (P e t i t i 
(Chapter four) (248) 
Fontsere, 1962, 24) - though t h i s eJ55anded f a s t i n the 1960's and 
1970's. 
Secondary schooling was p r a c t i c a l l y reserved f o r these social 
groups, because i t was almost exclusively i n the hands of the church 
and p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s (Ernest Lluch i Martin, 1962, 25-27) and 
served therefore as a very e f f e c t i v e preserver of the e x i s t i n g class 
d i v i s i o n s . Catalan middle class families regarded education as one 
important means t o social success, and were prepared t o make 
s a c r i f i c e s f o r t h e i r children's future prospects and prosperity. 
Private and r e l i g i o u s schools were also more l i k e l y t o have a t least 
some autonomy i n t h e i r teaching, and t o be more sympathetic t o 
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Catalan language and h i s t o r y than the few e x i s t i n g state schools . 
The r o l e of the clergy thus must be seen i n context w i t h the 
p o s i t i o n of Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s and middle classes towards the 
Catalan question. I t s relevance was of course greatest a t the 
c u l t u r a l l e v e l , v ^ i c h i s examined i n chapter s i x , but i t also played 
a s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l r o l e as a pa r t of the t r a d i t i o n a l middle 
class i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . 
4 . 2 . i i i The clergy and Catalan nationalism 
The Catalan Church looked back on a t r a d i t i o n of Catalanist 
syirpathies, which could long be characterised by the conservative 
v i s i o n of Catalan regional distinctiveness i n bishop Torras i Bages' 
essay on La Tradicio Catalana. published i n 1892. P a r t i c u l a r l y the 
•^•^liaguer e t a l . suggested t h a t the r e l i g i o u s schools were keen t o 
conply w i t h the regulations iirposed on them by the Franco regime, and 
generally were very e f f i c i e n t inst2nm:ients i n the c a s t i l i a n i s a t i o n of the 
Catalan population (Raguer e t a l . , 1977, 120). But Cahner argued t h a t 
the Church was an inportant i n s t i t u t i o n i n the s u r v i v a l of the Catalan 
language i n many parts of r u r a l Catalonia (Cahner, interview, 
11.2.1988). I n Barcelona c i t y , Jesuits and other r e l i g i o u s orders were 
running schools which were known t o be sympathetic t o Catalan culture, 
and the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of p r i e s t s and Jesuit and Capuchine monks i n the 
p o l i t i c a l events of the 1960's svpport the view t h a t p r i v a t e r e l i g i o u s 
schools were more sympathetic t o Catalan issues than state schools, 
ii±iere no such l i b e r t i e s were possible. 
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monasteries o f the Capuchines, Benedictines and the Jesuits, which 
had a t r a d i t i o n of teaching and science, were conscious of t h e i r 
Catalan i d e n t i t y (Raquer e t a l . , 1977, 65). A f t e r the c i v i l war, 
vi i i c h many francoists described as a crusade against atheism, the 
pre-republican extent o f econcanic power and s o c i a l influence of the 
Church was restored by Franco. The Church and organisations related 
t o i t such as the Unio Democratica de Catalvmya provided the only 
spaces - often l i t e r a l l y - i n v ^ c h Catalan c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s 
could take place and Catalanist syitpathies be expressed during much 
of the Franco period. While the Church hierarchy was replaced by 
non-Catalans, the lower clergy remained l a r g e l y Catalan, and a 
schism developed w i t h i n the Catalan Church between the two str a t a . 
On the one hand, the Church was occipying an inportant r o l e i n 
l e g i t i m i s i n g the di c t a t o r s h i p as part of i t s hegemonic apparatus, 
but on the other hand, the close contact of i t s lower clergy - as 
p r i e s t s or teachers - w i t h the people ejqjosed the repression of 
Catalan language and culture as a problem v^ich was very close t o 
the bone. As the Church became a key i n s t i t u t i o n i n the survival and 
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the r e v i v a l of Catalan c u l t u r e , the Montserrat monastery was made 
i n t o a symbol of Catalanism. 
The Catalan church not only had a strong influence on c i v i l society 
t h r o u ^ the provision of education t o middle and upper class 
o f f s p r i n g , but also through youth organisations vtiich developed 
under i t s pro t e c t i v e umbrella and constituted an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the 
f a s c i s t youth organisation of the state. The scouts movement, 
l a r g e l y lead by young p r i e s t s , was p a r t i c u l a r l y popular among the 
xictan middle class and bourgeoisie w i t h c a t a l a n i s t syiipathies, v^o 
wanted t o give t h e i r children a c i v i c formation i n the catala n i s t 
and Christian s p i r i t . 
"The lack o f sta t e schools, the r e s t r i c t i o n s iirposed on 
p r i v a t e schools vhere defiant a t t i t u d e s emerged only very 
slowly, and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n 
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I n i t i a t i v e s began i n the 1940's w i t h the groups such as Grup 
Torras i Bages, Ccmmissio Abat Oliba, and was continued i n the 1950's 
w i t h the Catalan journals Questions de l a Vida Cristiana and Serra d^Or. 
(Chapter four) (250) 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t ideals v i a the o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the 
regime, a l l contributed t o the f a c t t h a t i n 1974 (...), more 
than 10,000 were a f f i l i a t e d t o the scouts movement. The 
progressive bourgeoisie, s k i l l e d workers (menestralia) and 
some small sectors of immigrants who were already integrated 
joined the i n s t i t u t i o n looking f o r catalanism, d i s c i p l i n e 
without a u t h o r i t y , outdoor a c t i v i t i e s (...)." 
(Vanquardia, supplement, 3.5.1987, 78) 
33 Many of the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s and future p o l i t i c a l leaders 
emerged from the scouts movement and the social and c u l t u r a l m i l ieu 
v^iich supported i t . Catalan nationalism of the 1970's and 1980's was 
strongly invested w i t h t h i s type of church related, " c u l t u r a l i s t " , 
middle class based i n s t i t u t i o n s and associations which preserved 
Catalan t r a d i t i o n s during the dictatorship. But i t must also be 
mentioned t h a t the Church had an inpact on Catalan Communism and on 
the working class movement. The lower clergy i n working class 
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parishes and the workers' catholic associations provided an 
organisational framework from v^ich many m i l i t a n t s of the communist 
workers' movement and communist and s o c i a l i s t parties emerged. As 
sections of the lower clergy became more p o l i t i c i s e d and took part 
i n the a n t i - f r a n c o i s t movement, churches, convents and monasteries 
served as meeting places f o r clandestine reunions of the OC.OO and 
the Assetiblea de Catalunya. 
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Narcis Serra, Pascual Maragall, Raimon Obiols and L l u i s Armet now 
occupy posts i n the social-democratic party PSC-PSOE. Josep-Maria 
C u l l e l l , Joan Ainaud de lasarte, Raimon Gali, Josep Miro i Ardevol are 
connected w i t h the CDC or UDC, and Rafael Ribo i s the current leader of 
the PSUC (Vanguardia, supplement, 3.5.1987, 66). 
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The PSUC acknowledged the r o l e of active Christians i n i t s ranks 
i n declaration i n 1976 where i t said: 
" I n many working class parishes, the pr i e s t s and the 
Christian communities have expressed t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y with 
the popular working class movement i n many d i f f e r e n t ways, 
and many of these Christians became active i n p o l i t i c a l and 
syndical organisations i n t h e i r community (...). Apostolic 
workers' movements such as the HOAC, JOG, AOO, VDJ JARC 
(...) and other movements v*iich were orientated more towards 
the middle classes (...) have been catalysts of 
democratisation and social transformation." 
(PSUC, 1979, 13) 
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I n Barcelona, the u n i v e r s i t y was also a place of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
and n a t i o n a l i s t mobilisation. The next sub-section w i l l examine the 
significance of i n t e l l e c t u a l s and professionals as key a c t i v i s t s i n 
the n a t i o n a l i s t movement and as bridges between the s o c i a l i s t and 
the n a t i o n a l i s t wing of the Catalan opposition i n the 1960's and 
1970's. 
4.2.iv I n t e l l e c t u a l s and professionals i n the Catalan opposition 
Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s had not only an inportant impact on the 
c u l t u r a l movement i n the 1960's (see chapter s i x ) , but also played a 
key r o l e i n creating the anti-Francoist consensus v ^ c h developed i n 
the l a t e 1960's and early 1970's. 
The students' protests i n the 1950's were one of the f i r s t signs of 
p o l i t i c a l discontent"^^. By the mid-1960's, they had grown i n t o a 
strong democratic movement against the Francoist students' 
The radicalism of the students, v^o were mostly from Catalan 
middle and upper class backgrounds, i s rather i r o n i c a l l y described i n 
Juan Marse's novel which i s set i n the days of student unrest i n the 
second h a l f o f the 1950's i n Barcelona: 
"The prestige which Luis Trias de G i r a l t enjoyed i n those 
days was fabulous. Imprisoned already twice, he was always 
surrounded by the aura of melancholic torment (sometimes he 
was even seen absorbed i n expressive silences and holding 
intimate conversations w i t h himself). I n the University he 
was taken t o be an inportant figure - a strange praise 
v i i i c h , i f i t meant anything, was precisely t h a t . A year ago, 
Teresa Serrat had f e l t drawn t o collaborate w i t h him on a 
iTT^iad o f c u l t u r a l and e x t r a - c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s , as i f she 
had sensed or guessed the adoration t o vfeLch t h i s prestige 
would soon become subject: Lais Trias de G i r a l t was said t o 
be " p o l i t i c a l l y connected". A talented student of economics, 
grandson of Mediterranean p i r a t e s and son of a very capable 
businessman who made m i l l i o n s by inporting t e x t i l e s i n the 
early 1950's, he was t a l l , good-looking, but w i t h f l a c c i d , 
dishonest and fundamentally p o l i t i c a l features, a reddish 
ccnplexion, c u r l y h a i r without strength, sparkling but 
unsteady eyes; he (...) gave the inpression of a somewhat 
perplex, gentle seminarist on vacations ...". 
(Marse, 1971, 106) 
(Footnote Continued) 
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organisation, and the regime as a vdiole. There were connections 
between the students movement, progressive academics, professionals 
and clergy, which indicated t h a t the middle classes became 
increasingly a c t i v e against the Franco regime. One exanple f o r the 
type o f a c t i v i t i e s pursued by students and i n t e l l e c t u a l s i s the 
canpaign o f Taula Rodona (1966) (a loose organisation of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s from opposition parties and social associations i n 
support of the democratic students' movement) against the t o r t u r i n g 
of p o l i t i c a l prisoners v ^ i c h was signed i n 1968 by scores of 
u n i v e r s i t y teachers, members of the clergy, w r i t e r s , lawyers, 
a r t i s t s , publishers and other professionals (S. V i l a r , 1984, 403). 
Middle class i n t e l l e c t u a l s , vAao had become radicalised against the 
Franco regime, swelled the ranks of the PSUC (Table 4.6), vfcLch was 
i n the 1960's and the early 1970's the only e f f e c t i v e opposition 
organisation. 
"En aquel moment c a l t e n i r en conpte qu'el groip mes 
i n f l u e n t era e l Comunista. El PSUC a Catalunya era e l que 
t e n i a e l predomini sobre e l s i n t e l . l e c t u a l s , sobre e l mon de 
professions l i b e r a l s . Aquest mon sentia t r e t pel PSUC, 
curiosament. Per l a seva a c t i t u t antifranquista r a d i c a l , 
aixo v a l recordar-ho, pero tambe per una gran capacitat 
d ' i n f i l t r a c i o que havia t i n g u t . E l f e t de ser clandesti 
permitia i n f i l t r a r - s e a t o t s e l s l l o c s . I aleshores e l PSUC 
estava i n f i l t r a t desde les parroquies catoliques f i n s a l mon 
de professionals i de a r t i s t e s , a t o t arreu. Aixo potser va 
f e r creure ^ e l PSUC que ten i a mes incidencia popular de l o 
que t e n i a . " 
(Ainaud de Lasarte, interview, 30.3.1988) 
(Footnote Continued) 
Two year l a t e r , he had l e f t the University and started t o work i n 
hi s father's factory, now " i n harmony, i f not w i t h the country, then 
a t l e a s t w i t h himself", d e p o l i t i c i s e d and forgotten without regrets. 
"^ "^Qne has t o bear i n mind t h a t a t t h a t time, the most i n f l u e n t i a l 
group were the Communists. The PSUC was dominant among the i n t e l l e c t u a l s 
and the l i b e r a l professions i n Catalonia. For some reason, these c i r c l e s 
were i n sympathy w i t h the PSUC. Ma^^ f o r i t s r a d i c a l a n t i - f r a n c o i s t 
a t t i t u d e , v4iich i s worth remembering, but also because the PSUC had a 
great a b i l i t y t o i n f i l t r a t e . I t s clandestine existence allowed i t t o 
i n f i l t r a t e everyv^ere. And a t t h a t time, the PSUC had i n f i l t r a t e d 
everything, from the Catholic parishes t o the c i r c l e s of professionals 
and a r t i s t s . This probably created the inpression t h a t the PSUC had more 
popiiLar support than was ac t u a l l y the case." 
(Chapter four) (253) 
The strategy o f the Communists t o form popular alliances and t o 
concentrate on the c o n f l i c t of people versus oppressive state d i d 
much t o a t t r a c t the middle class c l i e n t e l e . But the main reason was 
the f a c t t h a t t h i s c o n f l i c t involved two n a t i o n a l i t i e s and two 
d i s t i n c t i v e cultures. Pages suggested t h a t therefore, 
"50% de los m i l i t a n t e s del PSUC en estos dias procedieron de 
l a universidad y de las capas profesionales, y no de l a 
clase obrera. Ellos no habian nacido en los barrios obreros 
n i habian tenido una educacion p r o l e t a r i a . Esa gente tenia 
c i e r t o s objetivos c u l t u r a l e s , y en las circunstancias 
especificas del franquismo, e l l o s se vieron radicalizados de 
alguna manera. Yo supongo que se puede especular que e l 
er r o r d el parti d o ccammista^^fue ahi. Parecia tener una 
fuerza que luego no e x i s t i a . " 
(Pages, interview, 16.5.1989) 
That i t was the national question, and i m p l i c i t l y the c a l l f o r 
democracy, v\^ich activated many i n t e l l e c t u a l s and professionals, i s 
made obvious i n the f i r s t reunion of the i n t e l l e c t u a l s , 
professionals and a r t i s t s f o r the v*iole of Spain i n 1977. I n the 
inaugural speech, i t was stressed t h a t 
" [ t ] h e h i s t o r y o f the resistance of [the peoples of Spain] 
t o l o s i n g t h e i r national i d e n t i t y i s one of the most 
iirportant phenomena i n the l a s t 40 years" 
(Benet, 1978, 61) 
- during which Franco t r i e d hard t o achieve the opposite. The 
Catalan Assemblea Permanent d'Intel-flectuals. Professionals i 
Artistes was the outcome of the canpaign against the t r i a l s of s i x 
ETA m i l i t a n t s i n Burgos i n 1970, which pronpted 300 Catalan 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s t o organise a s i t - i n i n Montserrat as a sign of 
protest. 
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"50 % of the a c t i v i s t s of the PSUC i n those days were from the 
u n i v e r s i t y and from the professional sector, not from the working class. 
They had not been bom i n working class d i s t r i c t s , nor had undergone a 
p r o l e t a r i a n formation. These people had c e r t a i n c u l t u r a l aims, and i n a 
s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n such as the Franco regime, they had become 
ra d i c a l i s e d i n a c e r t a i n way. I suppose t h a t one could speculate t h a t 
the e r r o r o f the the Comraunist Party l i e d here. I t seemed t o have a 
strength which l a t e r turned out not t o e x i s t . " 
(Chapter four) (254) 
VJhen we t r y t o explain the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of professionals and 
technicians during the d i c t a t o r s h i p i n general, and t h e i r 
n a t i o n a l i s t tendencies i n p a r t i c u l a r , Miguelez and Sole's account of 
t h e i r growth and changing p o s i t i o n i n the r e l a t i o n s of production 
proves useful. P a r t i c u l a r l y since the change of economic strategy i n 
1957, the economic development i n the i n d u s t r i a l regions of Spain 
produced rapid changes i n technology and organisation of work 
processes, which required many new technical and professional s k i l l s 
and generally p u l l e d these occipations increasingly i n t o salaried 
employment. Although t h e i r influence on decision making processes 
and t h e i r s o c i a l and economic power was greater than t h a t of the 
working class, these processes brought the "new middle classes" 
closer t o i t (Miguelez and Sole, 1987, 137). The militance of some 
Catalan middle class sectors can be explained by t h e i r contradictory 
class p o s i t i o n as the spearheads of modernisation and reorganisation 
of capitalism, vAiich was not matched by social and p o l i t i c a l power 
i n the p o l i t i c a l and c i v i l society. The shared lack of p o l i t i c a l and 
decision making power was an important factor i n the popular 
opposition movement. 
" [ T ] h i s brings them t o adopt a n t i - f r a n c o i s t positions, t o 
i d e n t i f y w i t h the p r o ject of modernising Catalonia v^iich had 
been truncated by the c i v i l war, and t o look f o r an a l l i a n c e 
t o pursue t h i s p r o j e c t w i t h the working class, because they 
were aware of the weakness of the modernisation project of 
the democratic sector of the Catalan bourgeoisie." 
(Miguelez and Sole, 1987, 144) 
The roots of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n t h e i r culture and t h e i r r o l e i n the 
reproduction of t h i s c u lture e n t a i l a central r o l e i n the opposition 
movement, \*i i c h assumes a strong n a t i o n a l i s t character. The younger 
and more p o l i t i c i s e d sectors of the i n t e l l e c t u a l s and professionals 
adopted i n the 1960's and 1970's a p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e v^ich linked 
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n a t i o n a l i s t demands wi t h social concern (see the a r t i c l e s on 
38 
"The technical and s c i e n t i f i c development, v^ich despite adverse 
conditions i s also manifest t o a c e r t a i n extent i n our country, has 
i n f l a t e d the middle s t r a t a - technicians, functionaries and 
professionals - and a t the same time caused a higher l e v e l of 
p r o l e t a r i a n i s a t i o n . These two interdependent tendencies have led these 
(Footnote Continued) 
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unequal opportunities i n the education system, c u l t u r a l and class 
segregation i n the housing market, etc. i n "Serra d'Or" i n the early 
1960's). But as Miguelez and Sole observed, t h i s was not an a t t i t u d e 
shared by the majority of the middle classes, and i n the course of 
the 1970's, more i n t e l l e c t u a l s and professionals moved back i n t o the 
t r a d i t i o n a l vein of catalanism and abandoned projects of s t r u c t u r a l 
change. The t y p i c a l party f o r the "new middle classes" became the 
Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya, which i s discussed below i n 
connection w i t h the Catalan bourgeoisie. 
The n a t i o n a l i s t and anti-Francoist movement also included some 
sectors of the bourgeoisie, v^ich chapter three (section 3.3) argued 
were s i g n i f i c a n t i n the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l i n the 1960's. Although the 
bourgeoisie showed l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l activism under the Franco 
regime, i t rose r a p i d l y t o iiiportance i n the second h a l f of the 
1970's. 
4.3 The bourgeoisie and nationalism 
Since the p o l i t i c a l project of the Lliga had been overtaken by the 
h i s t o r i c developments of the 1920's and 1930's, the Catalan 
bourgeoisie seemed t o have opted out of Catalan nationalism. The 
Catalan b i g bourgeoisie welcomed Franco, because t h i s was a way of 
g e t t i n g back v*iat had been expropriated and occupied by workers 
during the C i v i l War. But i t was not prominent i n the Franco regime; 
indeed, i t had very l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l influence. But as Jutglar 
pointed out, t h i s d i d not mean t h a t the Catalan bourgeoisie was a 
v i c t i m of the regime. 
"What happened was sinply t h a t Madrid was now i n charge of 
p o l i t i c s - w i t h the help of an increasingly sinuous and 
omnipresent state apparatus -, and the bourgeoisie per se 
had the function of reproducing the economic system, i . e . t o 
(Footnote Continued) 
s o c i a l groups t o f i g h t together with the working class". (Garcia, 1976, 
32). 
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amass fortunes. However, the rules f o r g e t t i n g r i c h were 
l a i d down by Madrid." 
(Jutglar, 1982, 247) 
The o l d i n d u s t r i a l families (as described i n Donogh, 1986) were 
regarded as " c a s t i l i a n i s e d " and therefore no longer part of the 
Catalan nation. By excluding the " c a s t i l i a n i s e d " and the b i g 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t from the national consensus, the small and medium 
bourgeoisie became acceptable t o many progressive middle class and 
even working class a c t i v i s t s . A f t e r Franco's death, the CDC (founded 
i n 1974 by Pujol) came t o be Catalonia's self-defined n a t i o n a l i s t 
party v*iich "was closest t o bourgeois int e r e s t s . I t said i n a 
panphlet i n 1977 t h a t "CDC does not believe i n the p o l i t i c a l 
leadership of the b i g bourgeoisie of our country v^ich has 
demonstrated too often t h a t i t s interests were above the interests 
of Catalonia" (CDC, 1977, 1) . But there were also the "good" Catalan 
entrepreneurs \\ho claimed t o be operating i n the i n t e r e s t of the 
nation. I n any case, the changes i n the economic system brought 
forward new types of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and managers •who were no longer 
i d e n t i f i a b l e w i t h the closely k n i t Catalan i n d u s t r i a l families. 
The p a t r i o t i c a l l y inspired " f e r pais" movement (Chapter three, 
section 3.3), which c e r t a i n a f f l u e n t n a t i o n a l i s t c a p i t a l i s t s and 
also i n t e l l e c t u a l s were advocating i n the 1960's, was pulled on t o a 
more e x p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l plane i n the mid-1970's, vihen the power of 
the Francoist e l i t e s was crumbling away. The middle and upper 
classes w i t h c a t a l a n i s t t r a d i t i o n s , 'who had helped t o "rebuild" 
Catalan c i v i l society and economic structures, now needed a new 
n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l organisation separate from the communists and 
s o c i a l i s t s , i n which they would be the dominant force. With the 
Franco regime on i t s l a s t leg, "making p o l i t i c s " was a project which 
followed almost n a t u r a l l y from "making the country". I t was l o g i c a l 
t h a t , a t a time when the p o l i t i c a l future was insecure, the 
bourgeoisie protected i t s p o l i t i c a l and economic int e r e s t s . 
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4 , 3 . i i Convergence of Catalans - the CDC as the h e i r t o n a t i o n a l i s t 
t r a d i t i o n 
Ctonvergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CDC) organised those sectors 
\ft*iich had kept a low p r o f i l e u n t i l then. But i t also attracted many 
people v*io were p o l i t i c a l l y active i n l e f t - w i n g parties vAiile only 
those were operating, and who were driven i n t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y by 
t h e i r n a t i o n a l i s t consciousness. Now t h a t the end of the 
d i c t a t o r s h i p was i n sight, i t became inportant t o separate 
n a t i o n a l i s t concerns f o r culture and language from aims t o 
restructure the economic and social basis of society. From the 
beginning, the party was very concerned t o keep at a distance from 
the l e f t - w i n g , and p a r t i c u l a r l y the communist party, v^iich were 
dominating the p o l i t i c a l nravement. I n the Assesnblea de Catalvinya, 
the Catalan conservative democrats d i d not play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e 
because i t smacked of Communist dominance. Instead, they went f o r 
changing the p o l i t i c a l regime from w i t h i n : 
"At the same time as the "Assemblea" was formed, the 
" p u j o l i s t e s " and the social democrats lead by Josep Pallach 
(PSC-R) and He r r i b e r t Barrera (ERC) cairpaigned f o r a series 
of candidates who were standing f o r the francoist elections 
t o the Cortes i n Barcelona, Lleida and Tarragona." 
(Colomer, 1981, 20) 
I n the founding conference of the CDC, which not surprisingly took 
place i n Montserrat, Pujol described the electorate he was aiming 
at . His aim was t o t r y and integrate the bourgeoisie and the middle 
classes, whom he considered the dominant classes i n Catalan society, 
but also t o incorporate a part of the working class: 
"This programme, I believe, f u l f i l s the expectations of a 
great Catalan sector, more precisely the most central sector 
of Catalonia. A sector which i s catalanist and democratical, 
not communist and s o c i a l i s t . I t i s a sector w i t h a 
constructive a t t i t u d e and the mentality of " f e r pais". I t 
embraces a large p a r t of the bourgeoisie w i t h a national 
consciousness and of the so-called popular s t r a t a - middle 
classes, l i b e r a l professions, employees, management, 
developed sectors of the working class ["sectores obreros 
evolucionados" ] -, p a r t of the catholic community - but 
neither "Christians f o r Socialism" nor the "brotherhood of 
Padre Claret"-, of the comarcal society - v^iich has a 
c e r t a i n i n t e r c l a s s i s t u n i t y -, of the cooperatives, of the 
sectors - which have a c e r t a i n weight i n Catalonia - with 
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But already two years before, the cx>nservative tendencies of the CDC 
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were apparent. The Manifest per l a Ri^jtura (June 1976) of the 
J^semblea de Catcilunya d i d not f i n d support among the leaders of the 
CDC (Sellares, 1981, 47), who had no i n t e r e s t i n r a d i c a l changes i n 
society. Rather than i n t e g r a t i n g theinselves i n t o a movement which 
was l a r g e l y dominated by the Communist Party, the CDC and the other 
c e n t r i s t Catalanist parties concentrated on the Consell de Forces 
Politiques where only p o l i t i c a l parties were represented, and 
negotiated separately w i t h the regime, adopting an a t t i t u d e v^ich 
Colomer described as " t r a d i t i o n a l " of the Catalan bourgeoisie: 
renouncing any plans t o s t r u c t u r a l changes of society and 
negotiating p a r t i c u l a r advantages f o r the Catalans (Colomer, 1981, 
23). This p o l i t i c a l strategy gave them a powerful p o s i t i o n i n the 
l a t e 1970's. The CDC pooled those social groups \A\o wanted t o 
maintain i n p r i n c i p l e the economic strategy of the f i : ^ c o i s t state 
and the c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s of production. 
A survey of the delegates t o the 5th Congress of the CDC (1978) 
demonstrated t h a t most of them - 94 % - had not been p o l i t i c a l l y 
a c t i v e before they joined the pa3rty ( t h i s a t a time when Franco's 
death was imminent), but t h a t on the other hand, many were members 
of c u l t u r a l , sport, or neighbourhood associations (Marcet, 1987, 
223; 228). The socio-economic characteristics of the voters of CDC 
i n 1978 show t h a t more than 50 % of the economically active were i n 
two occupational categories, entrepreneurs and middle and lower 
management (Marcet, 1987, 240; Table 4.7). 
Thus, the Catalan middle and upper classes who had benefited from 
the economic boom and expanded over the 1960's and 1970's, were the 
cen t r a l forces i n the n a t i o n a l i s t party v\*iich emerged i n the 
mid-1970's, and succeeded i n establishing i t s version of nationalism 
i n Catalan society i n the 1980's. Those reached the top viho were 
40 
This manifesto expressed the aha of the Assemblea t o not j u s t 
reform and democratise the Franco state, but t o break w i t h i t and t o 
establish a new society from scratch. I t was i n l i n e w i t h Communist and 
OC.OO. p o l i c i e s , v*iich were however abandoned i n 1977 i n favour of the 
reformist approach of the Euro-Communists. 
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from those sectors v^ich had money, time, and economic power and 
were therefore predestined t o play a r o l e i n society, and v^o 
followed Pujol's c a l l t o move on from romantic and i n t e l l e c t u a l day 
dreaming and begin w i t h r e a l p o l i t i c s by a c t i v e l y forming the future 
of the country (Pujol, 1967, 23). The f a c t t h a t many of the CDC 
a c t i v i s t s had been active i n the c u l t u r a l movement legitimised the 
CDC as the core of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Even though i n the 
f i r s t elections, the CDC (which formed pa r t of the Facte Democratic 
per Catalimya) was no more autonomist and n a t i o n a l i s t than most of 
the other p a r t i e s and less so than the PSXX: (Tables 4. 8a and 4. 8b), 
i t managed t o capture the n a t i o n a l i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s and therefore 
the hegemony i n Catalunya. 
This account of the r o l e of social classes i n the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement i n Catalonia demonstrates t h a t t o a greater or lesser 
extent, the support f o r Catalan autonomy came from a l l three 
classes. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine how w e l l the various 
underground p a r t i e s and p o l i t i c a l bodies r e f l e c t e d the p o l i t i c a l and 
soc i a l aspirations of the social classes. However, i t appears t h a t a 
potent national-popular opposition al l i a n c e emerged a t the end of 
the 1960's which included sectors of the organised working class, 
the middle class i n t e l l e c t u a l s , and the n a t i o n a l i s t elements of the 
small and middle bourgeoisie. This alliance was held together by 
Catalan nationalism and anti-Francoism. The fa c t t h a t the vast 
majority of the Catalan parties i n the f i r s t elections opposed 
centralism showed t h a t support f o r Catalan autonomy was hegemonic. 
Once these short term aims had been achieved, the alliance f e l l 
apart i n the l a t e 1970's, as the struggle f o r hegemony i n Catalonia 
revealed antagonistic p o l i t i c a l projects. The CDC emerged as the 
winner i n t h i s struggle, because i t s bourgeois and middle class 
leadership succeeded i n c a p i t a l i s i n g on t h e i r leading r o l e i n the 
h i s t o r y of Catalan nationalism and the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l of the 
1960's. 
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from those sectors which had money, time, and economic power and 
were therefore predestined t o play a r o l e i n society, and v^o 
followed Pujol's c a l l t o move on from romantic and i n t e l l e c t u a l day 
dreaming and begin w i t h r e a l p o l i t i c s by a c t i v e l y forming the future 
of the country (Pujol, 1967, 23). The f a c t t h a t many of the CDC 
a c t i v i s t s had been active i n the c u l t u r a l movement legitimised the 
CDC as the core of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Even though i n the 
f i r s t elections, the CDC (which formed part of the Pac±e Democratic 
per Catalimya) was no more autonomist and n a t i o n a l i s t than most of 
the other pa r t i e s and less so than the PSUC (Tables 4. 8a and 4. 8b), 
i t managed t o capture the n a t i o n a l i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s and therefore 
the hegemony i n Catalunya. 
This account of the r o l e of social classes i n the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement i n Catalonia demonstrates t h a t t o a greater or lesser 
extent, the support f o r Catalan autonomy came from a l l three 
classes. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine how w e l l the various 
underground p a r t i e s and p o l i t i c a l bodies r e f l e c t e d the p o l i t i c a l and 
social aspirations of the social classes. However, i t appears t h a t a 
potent national-popular opposition al l i a n c e emerged a t the end of 
the 1960's which included sectors of the organised working class, 
the middle class i n t e l l e c t u a l s , and the n a t i o n a l i s t elements of the 
small and middle bourgeoisie. This alliance was held together by 
Catalan nationalism and anti-Francoism, The f a c t t h a t the vast 
majority of the Catalan parties i n the f i r s t elections opposed 
centralism showed t h a t support f o r Catalan autonomy was hegemonic. 
Once these short term aims had been achieved, the alliance f e l l 
apart i n the l a t e 1970's, as the struggle f o r hegemony i n Catalonia 
revealed antagonistic p o l i t i c a l projects. The CDC emerged as the 
winner i n t h i s struggle, because i t s bourgeois and middle class 
leadership succeeded i n c a p i t a l i s i n g on t h e i r leading r o l e i n the 
h i s t o r y of Catalan nationalism and the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l of the 
1960's. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter argued t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n Catalonia and 
Scotland can not be regarded as a p o l i t i c a l e>$)ression of any 
fundamental class i n t e r e s t . I f i t was possible t o associate 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements of the 19th century with the material 
i n t e r e s t s of the bourgeoisie - without being able t o explain them 
exclusively on t h i s basis (Hroch, 1985, 7) -, t h i s was no longer 
possible i n the second h a l f of the 20th century. I n the recent phase 
of popular nationalism, the question of fundamental class in t e r e s t 
became even more thorny as the class boundaries were increasingly 
d i f f i c u l t t o define. The middle classes appeared as the key force i n 
the n a t i o n a l i s t movements, especially i n Catalonia v^iere the 
c u l t u r a l bonds were r e i n f o r c i n g the national i d e n t i t y . I n both 
countries, the n a t i o n a l i s t movement involved sectors of the popular 
classes, and t o a lesser extent, of the bourgeoisie, v^ich were held 
together - f o r a l i m i t e d time span - by the i n t e l l e c t u a l s . I n the 
case of Catalonia, the i n t e l l e c t u a l s were t i e d t o the state t o a 
lesser extent than was the case i n Scotland, and were therefore more 
i n f l u e n t i a l i n the national movement evolving i n c i v i l society. 
Gramscian concepts provide the p o s s i b i l i t y of moving away from 
s i m p l i s t i c nxxiels of the relationship between class interests and 
p o l i t i c a l nationalism, t o look a t social groups w i t h i n the context 
of c i v i l society. The concept of " i n t e l l e c t u a l s " i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
define i n terms of fundamental classes, but catches the 
contradictory r o l e of middle class sectors which form the core of 
the n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n Catalonia and Scotland. Any social 
class v ^ i c h s t r i v e s f o r national hegemony has t o embrace key 
elements of popular nationalism, therefore the n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
involve c o n f l i c t i n g class sectors, and fragment when t h e i r demands 
f o r autonomy have been met. 
I t r i e d t o demonstrate t h a t the a t t i t u d e of d i f f e r e n t social class 
sectors t o the national question depended on many circumstances 
which were not reducible t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the economic r e l a t i o n s 
of c a p i t a l i s t society. One of the main influences v^^ich emerged i n 
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t h i s chapter i s the r o l e of the d i f f e r e n t social classes i n the 
stat e apparatus, and the form and nature of the state i n general. I n 
the next chapter, the focus i s therefore turned on the state, v ^ c h 
i s the main opponent of n a t i o n a l i s t movements. I n both cases, 
tensions between the state and c i v i l society are a fundamental 
source of u n i t y among the social classes w i t h i n c i v i l society. The 
strength o f n a t i o n a l i s t movements therefore i s ejqjlained t o a large 
extent w i t h reference t o the changes i n form and function of the 
stat e and t o i t s t i g h t e n i n g g r i p on c i v i l society. 
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APPENDIX: Tables 
Table: 4.1 : C^inion poll on national identity and social class i n 
Scotland, 1986 
(per cent) 
C L A S S NATIONMilTY AB CI C2 DE 
Scottish not B r i t i s h 23 35 40 47 More Scottish than B r i t i s h 31 32 31 27 Equally Scottish and Br i t i s h 26 21 17 17 More B r i t i s h than Scottish 9 4 5 1 B r i t i s h not Scottish 9 7 5 5 Don't know 2 2 3 2 
Total nvmiber 145 203 280 338 
Source: System Three Scotland, 1986. 
Table 4.2 : P o l i t i c a l Party Vote and Social Class 
(per cent) 
Conservative 
Labour 
Liberal 
SNP 
other 
A & B 
56* 47+ 
14 20 
10 11 
20 22 
01 02 
40* 40+ 
23 21 
6 7 
30 32 
23* 20+ 
39 32 
6 4 
32 43 
D & E 
22* 20+ 
48 36 
6 3 
23 40 
1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*) Survey c a r r i e d out f o r the "Scotsman" by the Opinion Research Centre 
during June 1975 (Brand, 1978, 146). 
+) Survey c a r r i e d out by the Opinion Research Centre during December 
1975 (Brand, 1978, 147). 
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Table 4.3: Intercensal changes i n migration, Scotland, 1921 - 1981 
(in thousands) 
Censvis year Population 
Estimated net migration 
Remainder of 
Total United Kingdom Overseas 
1921 4,882.5 
1931 4,843.0 
-391.9 -330.0 -60.0 
1951* 5,096.4 
-220.0 -210.0 -10.0 
1961 5,179.3 
-282.0 -140.0 -142.0 
1971 5,229.0 
-326.5 -169.0 -157.5 
1981 5,130.7 
-144.2 -52.1 -92.1 
*) Note the twenty year gap 
Source: Scottish Abstract of S t a t i s t i c s , 15, 1986, 7, 
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Table 4.4 : Non-catalan Spjanish immigrants eind familiarity of Catalan 
language i n the province of Barcelona, 1975 
Immigrants Understand Speak Family''" 
(per cent of 
total pc^.) (per cent of inmigrant pop.) 
Osona 16.0 82.2 34.3 15.1 Bergueda 18.4 78.3 32.2 12.2 Alt Penedes 21.3 63.0 26.1 11.3 Bages 25.2 76.5 32.1 11.8 Anoia 28.6 67.1 24.9 11.3 Maresme 32.7 63.4 27.1 10.0 Garraf 34.1 59.0 21.4 8.3 Valles Oriental 37.2 59.4 22.2 6.4 Valles Occidental 39.1 54.4 18.3 6.0 Baix Llobregat 46.2 45.0 13.0 4.3 Barcelones 
(excl. Barcelona) 47.2 45.2 12.7 4.1 
TOTZ^ (excl. B.) 39.9 52.1 17.1 6.0 
Source: Reixach, 1985, p. 71. 
This denotes those v^o p r i m a r i l y use Catalan i n t h e i r family. 
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Table 4.5 : Familiarity with the Cateilan language according to 
social status i n Baixrelona province, 1975 
(per cent of total sanple) 
SOCIAL STATUS Understand Speak Family Write 
Professionals and 
technicians 91.8 74.2 59.5 41.4 
Managers (private & 
public enterprises) 97.1 88.6 80.0 45.0 
Administrative personnel 91.4 73.3 55.2 30.5 Salespersons etc. 88.3 72.5 57.4 24.4 Service sector 
esiployees 71.7 44.7 30.9 9.2 Fanners, fishermen etc. 91.2 84.6 81.4 20.0 Workers (skilled 
and vinskilled) 71.8 44.4 30.5 9.4 Armed forces 54.4 16.6 9.1 2.6 Inactive 59.7 44.4 38.1 8.6 Undefined 69.1 46.3 37.3 10.7 
TOTAL 68.3 48.0 38.2 11.5 
Source: Reixach, 1985, p. 121. 
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Table 4.6 : Social ccsiposition of the delgates to the IV Congress 
of the PSUC 
(per cent) 
Occupations^, graapa PSUC delegates 
Cultural forces 17.8 
Students 3.2 
Professioncil and administrative enployees 21.7 
Self-enployed workers 3.4 
Agricultural workers 1.6 
Industrieil workers 30.1 
Service sector eirployees 3.2 
Entr^reneurs 1.1 
Other 17.1 
TOTAL NUMBER 1140 
Source: PSUC, 1977a, 377, 
Table 4.7 : Social conposition of the voters of Convergencia i Uhio 
i n March 1979 
(per cent) 
Occi:5>ationcil groups CiU vote 
Liberal professions 2.7 
Self-enployed 9.6 
Entr^renexars 28.3 
Managers 7.6 
Middle management and admin. 26.9 
Skilled workers 15.9 
unskilled workers 9.0 
Total 100.0 
Source: Marcet, 1987, 240. 
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Table 4.8a : Attitudes of voters i n the f i r s t elections (15.6.1977) on 
self-government 
(per cent) 
Voted party Centralism Autonomy Federeilism Indqjendence TOTAL 
Extreme Left — 51 34 8 92 Catalan Left 2 23 55 21 101 PSUO 8 52 29 11 100 PSC-PSOE 13 49 28 8 98 PDC 19 45 33 4 101 
UDC-OC 31 37 32 - 100 UCD 26 49 20 3 98 AP 69 13 17 - 99 Others 11 26 44 19 100 Didn't vote 21 32 22 23 98 No answer 25 45 7 22 99 Under voting age 19 36 26 18 99 
Source: Linz (ed.), 1981, 546 (DATA opinion p o l l , 1978) 
Table 4.8b : Attitudes on Self government according to party vote i n the 
f i r s t elections (15.6.1977) 
(per cent) 
Voted party Centralism Autonomy Federalism Ind^jendence TOTAL 
VOTE 
Extrane Left — 2 3 1 2 
Catalan Left - 1 4 4 2 PSUC 6 17 17 15 15 
PSC-PSOE 16 27 26 17 24 
PDC 6 6 7 2 6 
UDO-OC 2 1 1 - 1 UCD 27 23 16 6 20 
AP 12 1 2 - 3 Others 1 1 2 3 2 
Didn't vote 14 10 11 28 13 
No answer 8 7 2 13 6 
Under voting age 6 5 6 10 6 
TOTAL 98 101 97 99 100 
Source: Linz (ed.), 1981, 547 DATA Opinion p o l l 1978) 
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Chapter five: 
T H E S T A T E AND NATIONALIST M O V E M E N T S 
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1. XNTPDDUCTION 
I n the previous chapter, i t was argued t h a t although n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements involve class i n t e r e s t s and class struggles, they cannot 
be defined purely i n those terms. What i s more iitportant t o the 
genesis and dynamics o f n a t i o n a l i s t movements i s the relationship 
between the c e n t r a l state and and "the people", whereby "the people" 
are not an amorj^ous mass, but rather structured i n classes, 
c u l t u r a l groups, nei^ibourhoods, families etc.; i n short, the 
re l a t i o n s h i p between state and c i v i l society. 
N a t i o n a l i s t movements are a challenge t o the state vMch t r i e s t o 
correspond t o the i d e a l of the nation state and claims t o act i n the 
i n t e r e s t o f i t s e n t i r e population. With t h e i r base i n c i v i l society, 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements are antagonistic t o the state vMch i s seen as 
separate from the c i v i l society of the nation. Disputing the 
legitijnacy of the state as the centre of p o l i t i c a l power, 
n a t i o n a l i s t s demand changes i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n vsiiich they see as 
allowing a s h i f t of power t o the nation, and i n the case of 
separatist movements, the establishment of an independent state. To 
v*iat extent the claim of p o l i t i c a l power f o r the nation i n p l i e s 
democratisation and "power t o the people" i s another question. 
There have been developments i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between state and 
c i v i l society i n the l a s t decades which doubly j u s t i f y such an 
approach. Two aspects of change influenced the r e v i v a l of 
nationalism i n the post-1945 era and gave r i s e t o the spe c i f i c 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements which are examined here. The f i r s t concerns 
changes i n the form of the state. Here, differences between the 
Spanish and the B r i t i s h state emerge. The Spanish state had problems 
of l e g i t i m i s a t i o n because i t was authoritarian. The legitimacy of 
the B r i t i s h state c o n s t i t u t i o n has been fading i n the eyes of the 
Scots only since the 1980's due t o the widening gap i n p o l i t i c a l 
a t t i t u d e s between Scotland and England. This aspect of the 
re l a t i o n s h i p between state and c i v i l society i s discussed i n section 
two. The second aspect arises from the changes i n the relationship 
between sta t e and c i v i l society v*iich correspond t o general trends 
i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t states. These changes involve an increase i n 
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state i n t e r v e n t i o n and a related increasing need f o r sources of 
l e g i t i m a t i o n . As the state touches more and more aspects of c i v i l 
society, and people experience the arm of the state w i t h great 
frequency, popular con t r o l over, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , state 
structures are seen as increasingly necessary. How such developments 
a f f e c t the Catalan and Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movements i s the concern 
of the t h i r d section. I t also discusses the l e g i t i m a t i o n a r i s i n g 
from the challenge of the n a t i o n a l i s t movements. Ihe Catalan 
movement was l i n k e d t o the broader anti-Francoist movement, which 
existed i n other parts of Spain as w e l l but had i t s own organisation 
and peculiar _ ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n Catalonia. I n both Scotland and 
Catalonia, arguments concerning i n e f f i c i e n t government, i n a b i l i t y t o 
solve s o c i a l probleits and the remoteness of government from the 
people fed i n t o the n a t i o n a l i s t debate, but they were not seen from 
the same angle and had a varying impact. 
The strategies of the n a t i o n a l i s t movements and the a b i l i t y of the 
stat e t o respond t o t h e i r demands are the to p i c of the fourt h 
section. I n t h i s context, the degree of autonomy of c i v i l society, 
the nature of the demands of the n a t i o n a l i s t movements, and the 
general conditions outlined i n the three previous sections together 
determined the outcome of 1979, when the referendum i n Scotland was 
l o s t and t h a t i n Catalonia won. 
2. REIATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
2.1. Forms of st a t e , forms of n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
I t i s argued here t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n of a state and i t s forms of 
l e g i t i m a t i o n condition the way i n which the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i s 
organised, what i t s demands are and who part i c i p a t e s i n i t . The 
differences between the Catalan and the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement v ^ i c h we have already encountered i n previous chapters are 
t o some extent explicable w i t h reference t o the d i f f e r e n t nature of 
the states involved. 
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When the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l occurred, Spain was under the r u l e of 
General Franco, v^o had l e d the m i l i t a r y COL^ against the Republican 
government and won the three year war i n 1939. Francoist Spain i s 
v a r i a b l y q u a l i f i e d as a " f a s c i s t d i c t a t o r s h i p " (Molinero and Ysas, 
1981, 22), a "reactionary despotic state" (Giner and S e v i l l a , 1980, 
201) and a "modernising a u t h o r i t a r i a n regime" (Bemecker, 1984, 396; 
Hansen, 1977, 4 ) , a v a r i e t y of terms which r e f l e c t s both the 
authors' p o l i t i c a l outlooks and the - l i m i t e d - changes vMch the 
regime underwent i n the course of almost four decades, without ever 
undergoing ideological n a t u r e s (Miguel, 1985, 91). 
The Francoist state was forced upon Catalonia, v^ich counted among 
the losers of the war, and was not able t o claim majority support 
and l e g i t i m a t i o n as a r e s u l t . Coercion rather than consent 
characterised the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Spanish state and Catalan 
society. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the f i r s t decade, the repression of people 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s associated w i t h the Republic and the autonomous 
government was c a r r i e d out r e l e n t l e s s l y , and the control over the 
Catalan c i v i l society was geared t o the e x t i n c t i o n of Catalan 
national i d e n t i t y . From the f i r s t actions of the Franco regime, 
Catalan autononr/ and democracy were connected t h r o u i ^ the repression 
of both, and t h i s l i n k manifested i t s e l f i n opposition movements of 
the 1970's. 
Giner's and Sevilla's analysis of the Francoist "despotic state" 
focuses on four c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The f i r s t concerns the class 
character of the state, v^^ich functioned as a guardian of 
uninhibited c a p i t a l accumulation and c a p i t a l i s t development i n the 
i n t e r e s t of the r u l i n g classes. From t h i s perspective, the working 
class had l o s t the c i v i l war "as a class". I n the f i r s t years of the 
d i c t a t o r s h i p , working class organisations were systematically 
destroyed. Deprived of organisations, the workers were now 
i n d i v i d u a l s , " i s o l a t e d i n the extremely d i f f i c u l t struggle of 
solving everyday problems" (Molinero and Ysas, 1981, 20). 
Secondly, the s t a t e excluded ideologies of a l l the subordinate 
classes, be they communist, l i b e r a l , separatist or democratic. This 
repressive a t t i t u d e also affected the middle classes v*iich had 
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supported the democratic republican state, and according t o Benet, 
the persecution of "separatism" amounted t o a repression of the 
Catalan nation as a whole, regardless of class belonging (Benet, 
1978, 16). The remaining two features concern the ways i n which the 
st a t e controls c i v i l society. Giner and. S e v i l l a argue t h a t v ^ i i l e 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and movements vMch were not sanctioned by the state 
suffered t i g h t surveillance and repression, the majority of 
i n d i v i d u a l s vMch were not organised were l e f t alone: 
"Cautious non-interference w i t h vast areas of social l i f e 
thus becomes the hallmark of modem despotic regimes, 
coupled w i t h a keen protection and encouragement of 
recognised " a p o l i t i c a l " i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the "orthodox" 
national church and other associations devoted t o the 
c o n t r o l of the means of emotional production, especially of 
those geared towards popular d i s t r a c t i o n and the sponsorship 
of p a t r i o t i c n o t o r i e t y i n sport." 
(Giner and S e v i l l a , 1980, 205) 
These gaps i n st a t e c o n t r o l over c i v i l society became wider a f t e r 
the economic l i b e r a l i s a t i o n i n 1959, and were increasingly used f o r 
the formation of oppositional movements, including the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. As f a r as the state i s concerned, i t achieved the passive 
obedience rather than active p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the subordinate 
classes. Therefore, i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r popular movements such as 
the workers' movement or the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t movement t o 
mobilise people vAio had over the decades become rather a p o l i t i c a l . 
B r i t a i n , on the other hand, has been a democratic parliamentary 
st a t e w i t h c o r p o r a t i s t features since the second world war, and as 
such has found acceptance by the vast majority of the people. The 
B r i t i s h state never had an e x p l i c i t p o l i c y of reducing Scottish 
distinctiveness, although Chapter three showed t h a t regional 
p o l i c i e s aimed a t reducing a t least the economic and social 
differences between the B r i t i s h regions, including Scotland. A good 
case can be itade f o r the argument t h a t Scotland grew i n t o a nation 
only a f t e r the loss of independence, because i t was a f t e r 1707 t h a t 
the j u x t a p o s i t i o n of Gaelic and lowland culture, and differences i n 
the l e v e l of development w i t h i n Scotland were deconstructed under 
the B r i t i s h state l e g i s l a t i o n . 
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Nairn has drawn a t t e n t i o n t o the "presence" of the B r i t i s h state, 
v ^ i c h i s based on the revolution of 1688, and which has not 
experienced any f u r t h e r r a d i c a l changes. Instead, the state has been 
able t o gradually adapt t o changes i n the economy and society and t o 
broaden i t s social basis through a p o l i c y of containment and 
concession. Thus evolved a p o l i t i c a l system v^ich "both Cukes and 
dustinen could l i k e , or a t least f i n d t o l e r a b l e " (Nairn, 1981, 51). 
The strength of the state l i e s i n the r e l a t i v e l y unchallenged 
acceptance of Westminster as the soul of the UK commanding hegemony 
over c i v i l society i n England and Scotland (Nairn, 1981, 375). I t i s 
therefore not sur p r i s i n g t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t challenge t o the state 
i n the 1970's took the parliamentary road. The SNP's strategy 
consisted i n standing f o r elections and hoping t h a t the very 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of the state would bring about independence"^. Foreign 
observers and j o u r n a l i s t s ej^ressed sxarprise about t h i s approach of 
the SNP Na t i o n a l i s t s : 
"Almost without exception they thought t h a t the Scottish 
National Party was a t once the nicest and the most t o t a l l y 
i n e f f e c t u a l n a t i o n a l i s t party they ever had come across. I n 
the sense t h a t they were very nice, but they act u a l l y 
suffered from the delijsion t h a t i f they won a majority i n 
Scotland, B r i t i s h government would immediately say: "Oh, 
w e l l , i f the Scots want independence, they can have i t . " And 
t h i s v a s t l y i n t r i g u e d other people, p a r t i c u l a r l y people i n 
your own country [West-Germany] brought up i n a rather more 
r e a l i s t i c t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c s . " 
(Jim Ross, interview, 9.8.1988) 
Given these differences i n the forms of state i n Spain and the UK, 
i t i s only l o g i c a l t h a t the relationships between c i v i l society and 
the state, and between the n a t i o n a l i s t movement and the central 
government, also show great differences. Not only does t h i s mean 
t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y of containment was greater i n Scotland and the 
l i k e l i h o o d o f open struggle and r a d i c a l change greater i n Catalonia. 
I t also had an inpact on the ways i n which the national i d e n t i t y was 
^The idea o f a neutral state which does whatever the majority of 
the people want was also the basic assunption underlying the Labour 
Party's social-democratic p o l i c i e s of the post-war era. Only here i t was 
assumed t h a t the state could be "captured and turned t o s o c i a l i s t 
purposes" (Hudson, 1990, forthcoming). 
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p o l i t i c i s e d , and on the structure and strategy of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. I n Scotland, p o l i t i c a l nationalism was largely 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n p a r t i e s - above a l l i n the SNP -. I n the case 
of Catalonia, v*iere p a r t i e s were prohibited u n t i l 1976, i t surfaced 
i n a broader and more popular movement vfeLch r e l i e d on spontaneous 
action and mass demonstrations. 
2.2. Consensus, repression, a l i e n a t i o n 
Tensions i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between state and c i v i l society can 
give force t o n a t i o n a l i s t movements, i f the hegemony of the state 
seems t o break along e x i s t i n g national boundaries. Collective 
experiences of a l i e n a t i o n , discrimination or repression contribute 
t o t h i s . 
I n the case of Catalonia, p r o h i b i t i n g the public use of the native 
language, which had o f f i c i a l status during the Republic, was j u s t 
such an exanple of c o l l e c t i v e repression, f e l t by a l l members of the 
nation - v^ether p o l i t i c a l l y active or not - who were used t o 
communicating i n Catalan. The Spanish state attertpted t o replace the 
Catalan national i d e n t i t y w i t h Spanish nationalism, and d i d not t r y 
t o win synpathies or consent by connecting w i t h the national-popular 
2 
ideologies i n Catalan society. Even when publishing i n Catalan was 
expanding again i n the 1960's, censorship was s t i l l applied 
rigorously t o the issue of Catalan nationalism; a reference t o the 
Catalan speaking t e r r i t o r y or references t o the i n s t i t u t i o n s of 
Catalan autonomy and t o p o l i t i c a l Catalanism generally could 
jeopardise the publication of an a r t i c l e or a book (Massot i 
Muntaner, interview, 29.1.1988). 
2 
National-popular i n t h i s context has two meanings. I n the f i r s t , 
i t i s a c u l t u r a l concept which i s applied t o culture rooted i n the 
national t r a d i t i o n and popular experience of a s p e c i f i c society. The 
second meaning, here more relevant, concerns interests and feelings 
V\*iich d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l agents, groups, and classes share; the 
national-popular evokes the p o s s i b i l i t y of alliances. Both aspects are 
connected because the c u l t u r a l i s the ground on v ^ c h a p o l i t i c a l 
a l l i a n c e can be constructed (Forgacs, 1984, 94-95). 
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The national-popular elements of Catalan i d e n t i t y were repressed, 
silenced and excluded from the realm of p o l i t i c s , along w i t h the 
vast majority of the population. Catalans were also excluded from 
governing. The positions of power i n the Franco regijnne were occupied 
mostly by non-Catalans, the e l i t e s of the regime being 
over^elitdngly r e c r u i t e d from central and southern Spain . This 
p r a c t i c e was i n keeping w i t h the pre-republican system of r e c r u i t i n g 
governmental e l i t e s and meant t h a t the Franco regime represented the 
i n t e r e s t s of the t r a d i t i o n a l upper and middle classes, and only 
those sectors of the new i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie vAiich had become 
pa r t of the establishment i n Madrid (Hansen, 1977, 9). Not only d i d 
t h i s exclude the Catalan bourgeoisie from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n 
government under Franco, but i t also brought non-Catalan 
functionaries t o Catalonia v^o occupied many of the higher echelons 
of s t a t e apparatus there (Jones, 1976, 249; Alba, 1984, 232). From 
the perspective of the Catalan people, therefore, the Franco regime 
was a st a t e which inposed i t s w i l l by force on a p o l i t i c a l l y 
iitpotent people (Hansen, 1977, 11), and i t s representatives i n 
Catalonia v*io irrplemented the numerous "organic laws" the regime 
produced were not from t h e i r c ulture . 
I n Scotland, the increasing appeal of the SNP t o the voters i n the 
1960's and 1970's ej^ressed d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the government and 
the two main p a r t i e s V\^ich have monopolised p o l i t i c s i n the UK since 
the f i r s t world war. Though the share of voters v^ich favoured 
independence was a minority and the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l and 
I n the higher echelons of the Franco bureaucracy, Catalans were 
underrepresented, as were people from other peripheral regions (Alba, 
1984, 232). 
4 . . . 
Interviewees maintained t h a t Catalans d i d not occupy public 
functions or worked as teachers i n the state school sector (Cahner, 
interview, 11.2.1988), and t h a t "there i s no policeman v*io speaks 
Catalan" (Ferrer, interview, 22.3.1988). Though these statements do not 
stand up t o rigorous i n v e s t i g a t i o n - since not a l l enployees of the 
p u b l i c sector were immigrants -, they do r e f l e c t a tendency f o r Catalans 
not t o seek work i n the state sector; more in p o r t a n t l y , they show the 
degree t o v±iich the state sector was " c a s t i l i a n i s e d " and considered 
a l i e n by many Catalans. 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework was s t i l l accepted, i t was clear t o some 
t h a t a l i e n a t i o n from the central government was widespread i n 
Scotland. I n h i s analysis of the Hamilton bye-election i n 1967, 
Mackintosh pointed out t h a t one of the winning arguments of the SNP 
was based on the "theory t h a t Scotland i s governed from London by 
Englishmen who e i t h e r do not understard the problems or who do not 
care" (Mackintosh, 1982, 139) . Government was considered as too 
remote, too conplex and d i f f i c u l t t o influence. "Capturing the 
st a t e " turned out t o be inpossible f o r labour. Therefore, s h i f t i n g 
power t o the periphery through devolution was an alt e r n a t i v e with 
\vhich the labour government i n the l a t e 1970's seemed t o s a t i s f y the 
demands of many Scots. 
Vlhile the SNP had challenged the assuirption t h a t B r i t a i n was a 
nation state, i t was l e f t t o the Labour Party t o put forward an 
a l t e r n a t i v e organisation of the state without substantially a l t e r i n g 
the p o l i t i c a l framework. Unlike the Spanish state, i t s B r i t i s h 
counterpart was able t o respond t o the n a t i o n a l i s t challenge, and t o 
the demonstration of popular alienation, w i t h a strategy which was 
designed t o reassert i t s hegemony over Scottish society^. The 
precondition was the f a c t t h a t b e l i e f i n democracy was not 
profoundly shaken^, and the Scots d i d not experience any policy of 
national repression ^ i c h could have led t o an open c o n f l i c t of the 
people w i t h the state. As Lambie said, there was j u s t a f e e l i n g t h a t 
"something was going wrong" (Lambie, 7.8.1988). Thus, the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements threw up rather d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
questions. This was, however, not only a consequence of the form of 
By adopting a devolution policy, the labour Party wanted t o regain 
l o s t ground i n Scotland i n 1978, Ascherson wrote t h a t the party was 
"committing almost a l l t h e i r energies ahead t o the winning and planning 
of a Scottish Assembly and i t s programme" (Scotsman, 7.11.1978, 11). 
Si m i l a r l y , the Labour controlled Scottish Office was busy working out a 
provis i o n a l structure f o r the future Scottish Assembly before i t had 
even been passed by Parliament (Ross, interview, 9.8.1988). 
S i l l y Wolfe (Chainnan of the SNP, 1968-78) suggested th a t i n the 
1970's the SNP nurtured an u n j u s t i f i e d belief i n B r i t i s h democracy, 
t h i n k i n g t h a t i f the Scots really wanted independence, the English would 
l e t them go (Wolfe, interview, 25.2.1987). 
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the state and the ijipact i t had on the people, but also a r e s u l t of 
h i s t o r i c a l processes. 
2.3. Constitutional cmestions 
The Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t and the democratic opposition movement were 
not faced w i t h problems of f i n d i n g a fomiula v^ich would capture the 
Catalan desire f o r autonomy. Since Franco had abolished the 
Generalitat and the Estatut d'Autonomia^, i t was only l o g i c a l t h a t 
the r e s t o r a t i o n of the statutes of 1932 would serve as a focus of 
n a t i o n a l i s t and democratic demands. One of the main reasons f o r the 
inclusion o f the p r i n c i p l e of autonomy i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n was the 
f a c t t h a t the Catalan opposition forces had agreed on the 
re-establishment of the Generalitat, v^ich had "disappeared" with 
the a r r i v a l of the Francoist troops (Benet, interview, 17.4.1988). 
The recognition of the national r i g h t s of the Catalans was a major 
u n i f y i n g factor i n the clandestine opposition from 1969 onwards. The 
AssCTiblea de Catalunya (1971-77) defined t h i s aim as one of the four 
basic demands w i t h v^ich the opposition canpaigned f o r popular 
g 
support . I n i t s "rupture manifesto" of June 1976, the Assonblea 
argued t h a t the precondition f o r the restoration of the p o l i t i c a l 
and national l i b e r t y of Catalonia was a global strategy of 
democratic rupture f o r the v^ole of Spain (Colomer, 1981, 22). I n 
the end, however, democracy was a process of t r a n s i t i o n , brought 
about by negotiations between the Francoist government and the 
leaders of the opposition pa r t i e s , although some degree of mass 
mobilisation helped t o put pressure on the government. The autonomy 
f o r Catalonia arrived i n a s i m i l a r way, as section four below w i l l 
show. 
I n the Ley de 5 de A b r i l de 1938 de Deroqacion del Estatuto de 
Cataluna, Franco stated t h a t the statute had l e g a l l y ceased t o ex i s t on 
the f i r s t day of the m i l i t a r y coup (17.7.1936) (Lluch and Nel.lo, 1984, 
v o l . I I , 1115). 
g 
The other three demands were: amnesty, democratic l i b e r t i e s and a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l parliament. 
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Although the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l aspect of Catalan autonomy seemed 
r e l a t i v e l y straightforward, there were also r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t 
organisations v^iich were aiming a t independence. The most irrportant, 
PSAN (Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional), demanded a 
s o c i a l i s t state of the Catalan countries , but regarded the defeat 
of the Francoist regime and the establishment of democratic - both 
p o l i t i c a l and national - l i b e r t i e s as t h e i r immediate goal (Colomer 
e t a l . , 1976, v o l . 2, 115). Therefore, the party participated i n 
Catalan m u l t i - p a r t y p o l i t i c a l organisations such as the Assemblea de 
Catcilunya and the Consell de Forces Politiques , subscribing t o 
t h e i r minimalist demands. Thus, the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t movement's 
main demand was the r e s t o r a t i o n of the Catalan government of 1932. 
I n the case o f Scotland, the n a t i o n a l i s t movement - while dominated 
by the SNP - related i t s perspective on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes t o 
the pre-1714 status, when Scotland was an independent state. I n 
1963, the SNP drew i:p a p o l i c y statement v ^ c h confirmed the party's 
struggle f o r independence w i t h i n the framework o f the B r i t i s h 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n the opinion of the SNP, the occupation of the 
maj o r i t y of parliamentary seats i n Scotland would l e g i t i m i s e t h e i r 
demand f o r independence. Aware of the conservatism of the Scots and 
the general tendency t o equate democracy w i t h Parliament a t 
Westminster, the former chairman of SNP B i l l y Wolfe said: 
"When the people of Scotland give power t o the Scottish 
National Party they must be confident of a t least two things 
- the a b i l i t y of the Scottish National Party leadership, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s Parliamentary candidates, t o form a 
provis i o n a l Government capable of being responsible t o the 
people of Scotland i n an e f f e c t i v e way and, secondly, the 
people must have confidence i n the Party's i n t e g r i t y i n 
r e l a t i o n t o i t s a t t i t u d e t o democracy. I n other words, we 
must continue t o give a guarantee, as the party has always 
guaranteed, t h a t when the people of Scotland vote f o r 
9 
The PSAN defined the futur e Catalan state i n terms of c u l t u r a l 
boundaries, and therefore included the Catalan speaJcing p a r t of France, 
Valencia, the Balearic Islands and Catalonia. 
•""^ The Council of the P o l i t i c a l Forces was formed i n 1976 and 
included two representatives of each of the Catalan democratic 
opposition p a r t i e s . 
(chapter f i v e ) (280) 
independence by voting f o r the SNP, they know t h a t a 
thoroughly democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n w i l l be submitted t o the 
people and t h a t a General Election w i l l be held immediately 
th e r e a f t e r . " 
(Wolfe, 1973, 42) 
The r a d i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change a t which the SNP aimed had t o come 
through the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the B r i t i s h state, because the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legitimacy of the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s e t i p was not 
questioned i n p r i n c i p l e , but only i n i t s geographical l i m i t s . The 
SNP wanted a state based on the same p r i n c i p l e s , but i t should be 
Scotland's own. 
Another side of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t approach t o nationalism i s 
r e f l e c t e d i n the SNP's refusal t o be associated with other 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements which include m i l i t a r y groups, f o r fear they 
could be seen as condoning v i o l e n t means i n the struggle f o r 
independence (Ascherson, 1986, 9). The SNP's reluctance t o step 
outside a narrowly defined c o n s t i t u t i o n a l strategy was highlighted 
during the i n t e r n a l debate about the Scottish resistance catipaign of 
the '79 Group''"''" (see Chapter four, section 3.1.iv). S i l l a r s , then a 
member of the '79 Group, maintained t h a t 
" [ i ] n responding t o Scotland's claim o f self-determination, 
Westminster's parliament w i l l always cheat and change the 
rules, and not hesitate t o t r e a t the p r i n c i p l e s of democracy 
w i t h conteitpt. (...) The ol d , cosy, quiet, parliamentary 
ways s i i t p l y have Westminster i n charge, delighted t o stand 
democracy on i t s head by iitposing on Scotland a government 
we d i d not e l e c t . " 
( S i l l a r s , 1981, 2) 
"Non-violent d i r e c t action up t o the point of planned mass scale 
c i v i l disobedience" was an answer viiic h d i d not f i n d majority 
^ e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s i n the party were opposed t o c i v i l 
disobedience, and the party chairman, Gordon Wilson, stated t h a t h i s 
personal p r i n c i p l e s d i d not allow him t o support any such campaign. 
Wilson i s a lawyer by profession. 
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support i n the SNP f o r very long"'"^. However, i t was a f i r s t sign of 
more active and d i r e c t challenging of state structures. 
The a l t e r n a t i v e t o the SNP stance - independence through Westminster 
- can be subsumed under the concept of devolution advocated by the 
Labour Party. The devolution b i l l s of 1976 and 1978 foresaw the 
s e t t i n g up of a Scottish Assembly vAiile leaving the sovereignty of 
Westminster Parliament - and i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o override the 
decisions of the Assembly - untouched. Jim Ross, undersecretary of 
sta t e f o r devolution i n the Scottish Office between 1975 and 1979, 
maintained t h a t the Labour leadership and Parliament were not 
enthusiastic about the idea of changing the state structures. 
"Whatever they said i n public, t h e i r p r i v a t e a t t i t u d e s were 
t h a t t h i s was something t h a t they j u s t had t o do, and i t was 
h i g h l y regrettable, and t h e i r objective was t h a t i t should 
be as l i t t l e difference as possible t o the established 
government i n Great B r i t a i n . And the whole a t t i t u d e was t h a t 
' B r i t i s h democracy i s wonderful, chaps, but we are going t o 
make i t ever so s l i g h t l y more wonderful by having a Scottish 
Asseii±)ly.'" 
(Ross, interview, 9.8.1988) 
But nevertheless, even though the b i l l s t r i e d t o i n s t i l l confidence 
t h a t devolution would not lead t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes, they 
represented a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change s i g n i f i c a n t enough t o encounter 
vigorous opposition from unionists, who tended t o overeitphasise the 
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radicalness of the reform . Ttie Queen, too, joined the unionist 
scaremongers v^en she expressed her worry about the continued 
existence of the Union i n 1977 (Ascherson, 1986, 11). What 
12 
A motion a t the Annual Conference i n 1981, declaring t h a t 
"Conference recognises t h a t a r e a l Scottish resistance and defence of 
jobs demands d i r e c t action up t o and including p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e s and 
c i v i l disobedience on a mass scale" was accepted. But only one year 
l a t e r , the '79 Group, the d r i v i n g force behind the concept, was banned, 
a f t e r bad r e s u l t s i n the Regional Elections (Salmond, 1982, 2). 
"'"'^Tam Dalyell's "West Lothian Question" i s one exanple of the kind 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problems thrown up i n the 1970's. I t concerned the 
representation of Scots a t Westminster a f t e r devolution. Dalyell argued 
t h a t the Scottish MPs a t Westminster should be reduced numerically, and 
t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n those l e g i s l a t i v e matters be r e s t r i c t e d which d i d 
not concern Scotland. 
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devolution meant and involved was much more open t o debate than 
e i t h e r the independence option of the SNP or the Catalan statute of 
autonomy, because there was no previous experience on v*iich the 
government and the B r i t i s h people could have based t h e i r opinions 
(apart from the Stormont, v^ich had already demonstrated i t s 
i n a b i l i t y t o solve the s i t u a t i o n i n Northern I r e l a n d ) . At the end of 
f i v e years of struggling over the contents and the possible 
consequences of devolution, the unio n i s t side of the devolution 
debate registered a v i c t o r y . Iirpressed by the range of c o n f l i c t i n g 
arguments against devolution, so many Scots voted against the 
Devolution B i l l , or d i d not vote a t a l l , t h a t the po s i t i v e outcome 
14 
of the 1979 referendum was almost t o t a l l y ignored . 
However, the way i n v^iich Westminster Parliament and the government 
had gone about granting Scotland even the l i m i t e d amount of 
self-government contained i n the devolution b i l l s , helped t o 
undermine confidence i n the representative i n s t i t u t i o n s of the 
B r i t i s h state. At least those v^o were i n favour of Scottish 
self-government became increasingly doubtful as tinne wore on t h a t 
the B r i t i s h parliament would allow Scotland t o set up her own 
representative assembly. 
These doubts about the democratic nature of the B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n 
have been voiced w i t h increasing frequency since the election i n 
1983. I t was the second general elect i o n running t h a t the Scottish 
voters saw a Tory government being formed despite a clear majority 
o f Labour seats i n Scotland. No d e f i n i t i v e conclusions can be drawn 
as yet about the significance of t h i s challenge t o the legitimacy of 
the representativeness of the B r i t i s h government and the democratic 
natixre of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system as a v^iole. I t seems t h a t these 
c r i t i c i s m s have strengthened the case f o r self-government i n 
Scotland. I n f l u e n t i a l commentators such as Neal Ascherson have 
c a l l e d f o r d r a s t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes i n order t o move power t o 
the people. looking back a t the h i s t o r y of the B r i t i s h state. 
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See Chapter two table 2.3 f o r the regional breakdown of the 
referendum r e s u l t s . 
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Ascherson argues t h a t the English Revolution sinply transferred 
absolutism from the king t o Parliament. Without a doctrine of 
popular sovereignty or a w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n t o which the subject 
could appeal, 
" [ t ] h e r e i s no way i n v ^ c h Parliament can share i t s 
absolute power, except by lending i t as a loan revocable a t 
any moment - a lesson we i n Scotland learned during the 
devolution debates." 
(Ascherson, 1988, 148-149) 
A "war against the State i s waiting t o be fought by a mass ^freedom 
party' of the L e f t " t o achieve immediate c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change v^ich 
would t r a n s f e r power t o the people (Ascherson, 1988, 156). Demands 
f o r self-government f o r Scotland i s seen by many l e f t i s t 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s as a case i n point, part and parcel of the recovery of 
i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e l i b e r t i e s , vAiich have been undermined i n 
a decade of au t h o r i t a r i a n Conservative r u l e . I n the p o l i t i c a l 
magazine Radical Scotland. Thatcher was even compared t o Franco 
(Fig. 23). 
The Scottish National Party has been t r y i n g t o convert the fading 
legitimacy of the B r i t i s h government i n Scotland i n t o a c r i s i s of 
the state. The SNP's ele c t i o n campaign i n 1987 pivoted around the 
"doomsday scenario" (New Stateanan, 20.3.1987, 15), i n v^ich the 
Scottish electorate would be faced with yet another Tory government 
despite an overwhelming anti-Tory vote. As t h i s scenario became 
r e a l i t y , the deficiencies of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l society was l a i d open 
once again. I n 1988, the manifesto "Claim of Right f o r Scotland" 
suggested t h a t the p o l i t i c a l opinions of people i n Scotland no 
longer found adequate room f o r expression i n the B r i t i s h state. The 
f i r s t sentence of the document stated t h a t "[p]arliamentarY 
government under the present B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n had f a i l e d 
Scotland and more than Parliamentary action was needed t o redeem the 
f a i l u r e " (Constitutional Steering Committee, 1988). The manifesto 
f o r a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention represents an atteirpt t o establish 
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an a l t e r n a t i v e forum i n wtiich Scottish c i v i l society would be able 
f i n d p o l i t i c a l expression. I n t h i s way, the Constitutional 
Convention can be coitpared with the Assenblea de Catalimya, because 
both pursued c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform t o achieve national autonomy, and 
both claimed t o be representative of the Scottish people. Like the 
Assemblea, the Constitutional Convention (set up i n 1989) involves 
a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s who are i n favour of Scottish self-government, 
and has representatives of many i n s t i t u t i o n s of Scottish c i v i l 
society (eg. l o c a l government. Churches, trade unions, e t c . ) . 
I n conclusion, section two argued t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n 
Catalonia and Scotland were shaped by the form of the state and i t s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o c i v i l society. I n the case of Catalonia, the central 
state had irrposed i t s power by force, and against the manifested 
w i l l of the majority of Catalans. State and Catalan c i v i l society 
were separated by a c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l cleavage, because the 
state repressed Catalan culture and governed Catalonia mostly 
through Castilians. The Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t movement presented a 
challenge t o the Francoist state by the siirple f a c t t h a t i t 
disturbed the reign of p o l i t i c a l apathy on V i ^ i c h the regime was 
r e l y i n g . The demand f o r self-determination undermined several 
p r i n c i p l e s which epitomised Francoism, and presented a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge. I n the case of Scotland, the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement accepted the legitimacy of the B r i t i s h state i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The t r u s t i n B r i t i s h democracy was so great t h a t the SNP decided t o 
go the parliamentary road t o achieve independence. At the 
devo l u t i o n i s t end of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, the Labour Party 
believed t h a t some n a t i o n a l i s t demands could be granted w i t h i n the 
e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework. Only i n the 1980's has the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Scotland adopted a more c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e 
towards the B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n and expressed doubts about the 
l i k e l i h o o d of the Scottish people t o obtain self-government. I n t h i s 
sense, the s i t u a t i o n of the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement today 
resembles t h a t of the Catalan movement i n the 1970's more than ever 
before. 
(chapter f i v e ) (286) 
I n the next section, I examine how changes i n the relationship 
between sta t e and c i v i l society gave r i s e t o more and more c o n f l i c t s 
between people and state. As the state i n t e r f e r e s more frequently i n 
more aspects of c i v i l society and i n the l i v e s of i t s c i t i z e n s , i t 
p o l i t i c i s e s those aspects of social l i f e . One consequence of t h i s 
process of p o l i t i c i s a t i o n are demands by people t o t a t e control of 
t h e i r own a f f a i r s , and of the a c t i v i t i e s of the state. I n the cases 
of Scotland and Catalonia, such demands were ejq^ressed i n 
n a t i o n a l i s t terms. 
3. STATE ENCRDACHMENr ON CIVIL SOCIETY 
Of course, s t a t e and c i v i l society do not represent cleairly 
distinguishable, autonomous e n t i t i e s , and v*iat separates them must 
therefore necessarily be overeirphasised f o r the sake of better 
understanding. I t i s mostly i n the context of studies of "new social 
movements" t h a t changes i n the state - c i v i l society relationship 
have been discussed. To \iha.t extent n a t i o n a l i s t movements can be 
considered under t h i s category i s a question v*iich i s open t o debate 
(Melucci, 1988; Touraine, 1985; see Chapter one, section 2.4). 
Melucci developed t h i s approach t o n a t i o n a l i s t movements, regarding 
the recent r e v i v a l of ethnic-national movements as a combination of 
soc i a l and p o l i t i c a l movements, 
"These movements synthesise the heritage of concern w i t h the 
national question and the new i d e n t i t y problems posed by the 
development of conplex societies." 
(Melucci, 1988, 246) 
However, i f the new social movements are a n t i - s t a t i s t and want t o 
restore the independence of spheres of c i v i l society from the 
in t r u s i o n o f state bureaucracy, as Offe suggested (Offe, 1985, 820), 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements cannot be easily included i n t h i s category 
since they are s t r u g g l i n g t o establish a new state or l e v e l of state 
administration which i s closer, more representative and 
con t r o l l a b l e . Indeed, i n both case studies, i t appears t h a t the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements were based on rather conventional ideas about 
the r o l e o f the s t a t e i n a futur e autonomous society. But on the 
other hand, there are also indicators t h a t the expansion of state 
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bureaucracy f u e l l e d demands f o r autonomy. I n assessing the inpact of 
the changes i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between state and c i v i l society on 
the Catalan and Scottish p o l i t i c a l discourse, i t i s suggested below 
t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t movements can be n e f i t from l e g i t i m a t i o n crises 
v*iich derive from the expansion of the state. This expansion 
occurred both i n the sphere of c i v i l society, and i n the economic 
sphere of production, as the following two subsections show. 
3.1. Shifts of power between state cind c i v i l society 
The reorganisation of c a p i t a l i s t societies a f t e r the Second World 
War involved growing state intervention i n processes of reproduction 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n which form part of c i v i l society. This 
intervention, and the bureaucratisation of many aspects of everyday 
l i f e v*iich i t entailed, have become a source of inequality and 
c o n f l i c t , and thus of what Laclau and Mouffe c a l l "new forms of 
subordination" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 160). The ejp)ansion of 
st a t e bureaucracy s h i f t e d the boundaries between public and pr i v a t e 
and rendered new domains of c i v i l society p o l i t i c a l . Keane maintains 
t h a t the growth of state power i n the developed c a p i t a l i s t world 
over the past 50 years fostered the di s s o l u t i o n of the o l d dualism 
of s t a t e and c i v i l society which was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the l i b e r a l 
c a p i t a l i s t state"^^. State sanctioned p o l i c i e s draw closer and closer 
t o l i v e s of ordinary c i t i z e n s , and p o l i t i c a l decision making moves 
beyond t h e i r immediate con t r o l (Keane, 1984, 23). 
Increasing i n t e r v e n t i o n can give r i s e t o movements vAiich aim f o r 
autonomy ( f i g h t i n g manipulation, control dependence and 
bureaucratisation) i n areas of social l i f e affected by state 
in t e r v e n t i o n . To some extent, n a t i o n a l i s t movements can also be 
interp r e t e d i n t h i s way because they have some concerns i n common 
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I n l i b e r a l capitalism c i v i l society i s defined as a sphere of 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s emancipated from coercive, personal power. The state's 
function i s mainly reduced t o securing the unhindered market rela t i o n s 
and sphere of reproduction by laws. 
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\ * i i c h are not "described adequately i n the t r a d i t i o n a l language of 
class struggle alone" (Rosanvallon, 1988, 215). However, we must 
bear two things i n mind v^liich d i s t i n g u i s h n a t i o n a l i s t movements from 
other s o c i a l movements. F i r s t l y , more than i n other social 
movements, autonomy refers t o a s p e c i f i c t e r r i t o r y . Secondly, 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements do not aim a t autonomy from p o l i t i c a l 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n general, but rather from a s p e c i f i c state, and i n 
t h i s sense seek t o redefine the boundary between state and c i v i l 
society. 
I n looking a t the e f f e c t s of state intervention on the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements, i t i s necessary t o deal w i t h the two case studies 
separately. I n B r i t a i n , state intervention was p a r t and parcel of 
the Keynesian approach, while i n Spain, intervention was used mostly 
as a t o o l t o keep the population under con t r o l . 
3.1.i S h i f t s of power between the state and Catalan c i v i l society 
The Franco regime i n t e r f e r e d w i t h c i v i l society i n an a u t h o r i t a r i a n 
manner, abolishing or r e s t r i c t i n g c i v i l r i g h t s , p o l i c i n g the public 
sphere, censuring books, c o n t r o l l i n g society through organs such as 
the sindicato v e r t i c a l , the Movimiento and the Fascist youth 
organisation (Frente de Juventudes). I t also placed people who were 
synpathetic t o the regime a t the top of inportant i n s t i t u t i o n s such 
as the Church, the u n i v e r s i t i e s , etc.. These acts of intervention 
resulted i n a s h i f t of power t o the state. But when the Franco 
regime decided t o integrate the Spanish economy i n t o the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic system, i t was no longer possible t o keep 
people ignorant about the d i f f e r e n t state - c i v i l society 
relationships i n neighbouring countries. Since Catalonia had a 
border w i t h France and received a large p a r t of the European 
t o u r i s t s t o Spain, i t had b e t t e r opportunities than others t o notice 
the differences. From the l a t e 1950's onwards, c r i t i c i s m s , 
concerning the corrupt bureaucracy and the general lack of i n t e r e s t 
of the state a u t h o r i t i e s i n the needs of the people, became louder. 
The uncontrolled growth during the economic boom exposed these 
a t t i t u d e s of government i n s t i t u t i o n s and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , vMch 
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prevented tcfwn planners and architects frcm inplementing planning 
regulations. Looking a t atteirpts t o plan the development of the c i t y 
of Baixelona, Nay Ion observed t h a t e x i s t i n g development plans were 
never put i n t o practice because the a u t h o r i t i e s lacked the necessary 
f i n a n c i a l icieans and w i l l , and above a l l , a democratic l e g i t i m a t i o n 
(Naylon, 1984, 77). 
A growing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h a state, \jho only seemed t o intervene 
f o r i t s own good but not f o r the good of the people, became manifest 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Associacions de Veins (AA.W., i . e . 
Neighbourhood Associations) vrtiich acted as l o c a l pressure groups i n 
the 1970's. I n Catalonia, the AA.W. became increasingly p o l i t i c i s e d 
and involved i n the p o l i t i c a l struggle f o r national autonomy and 
democracy. Directed p a r t i c u l c i r l y a t the l o c a l government l e v e l , the 
AA.W. addressed urban planning and environmental problems, but also 
voiced concrete p o l i t i c a l demands , carrpaigning f o r democratic 
government structures. By 1976, there were over 100 such AA.W. i n 
the c i t y of Barcelona alone, but the movement had also spread t o 
other towns. The canpaigns "Salvem Catalvmya" ("Save Catalonia") and 
I t should be noted t h a t the AA.W. were a l a t e atteirpt of the 
Franco Regime t o establish formal l i n k s t o the people, vAiile a t the same 
time c o n t r o l l i n g s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s by channelling them i n t o i n s t i t u t i o n s 
which were approved by the a u t h o r i t i e s . The Catalan communist party, 
PSUC, was strongly involved i n these associations, as one a c t i v i s t 
remembered: 
"The AA.W. were i n practice organised by the Cmmunist 
Party. They represented a very iirportant structure f o r i t s 
clandestine social a c t i v i t i e s . Because the AA.W were used 
t o develop p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , t o p o l i t i c i s e , and 
p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the [Communist] a c t i v i s t s were involved i n 
them." 
(Ortega, interview, 23.2.1988) 
The AA.W. were strong i n the r e s i d e n t i a l zones of the middle 
classes. Professionals v^o advised AA.W. were often ir^embers of the 
PSUC, or a t l e a s t l i n k e d i n some ways t o the party: 
"Since the 1950's there existed t e r r i b l e planning problems 
i n the i n d u s t r i a l b e l t [ o f Barcelona], where whole towns 
were b u i l t without proper services, without green areas, 
etc.. The movements, which aimed a t pressurising the 
government and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o get things sorted out, 
needed technical and professional groups, and the PSUC was 
the only organisation \\hich provided those people." 
(Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988) 
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"SalvCTi Barcelona" ("Save Barcelona") took up issues such as the 
contamination of the Llobregat r i v e r by industry i n Prat (Codina, 
1976, 27) ; the " i i r r a t i o n a l " b u i l d i n g developments on the Costa Brava 
(Marc, 1977, 31) ; land speculation i n Sant Cugat (Luzan, 1977, 33) 
and i n Balaguer (Ballaster, 1977, 30); the d e f i c i t of primary 
schools i n Santa Coloma de Grainenet (Madueho, 1976, 29) ; and against 
the planned "urbanist inonster" housing estate of Sant Joan Despi 
(Arreu, 1976, No. 6, 30-31) . Naylon argued t h a t the AA.W. becan^e a 
power f a c t o r a f t e r the death of Franco (1975) and put pressure on 
government a u t h o r i t i e s and p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t groups t o inprove the 
l i v i n g conditions of the population (Naylon, 1984, 90). I t should be 
remembered t h a t t h i s movement drew considerable membership and 
support from the ranks of i n t e l l e c t u a l s , professionals and 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , who acted as advisors and provided facts, figures 
and a l t e r n a t i v e solutions. Mismanagement and chaotic growth affected 
not only the l i v i n g conditions of the immigrant workers (though 
these suffered most) , but also those of the middle and upper 
classes. The J^ A.W. movement therefore united the d i f f e r e n t classes 
of c i v i l society against the state, and often also against b i g 
business. 
While the coiiplaints were mainly directed against l o c a l authorities 
or the state departments responsible f o r the objectionable p o l i c i e s , 
the c u l p r i t s were also seen as the c a p i t a l i s t s who benefited from 
the laws, or from the tendency of the a u t h o r i t i e s t o ignore e x i s t i n g 
l e g a l regulations. I n a s i t u a t i o n of great demand f o r urban land and 
weak planning a u t h o r i t i e s , land speculation was raitpant and d i d not 
go unnoticed (Naylon, 1984, 82). Demands f o r popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n p o l i t i c s were linked i n Catalonia with demands f o r autononr/ from 
a thoroughly corrupt p o l i t i c a l system. I t was therefore argued th a t 
a new p o l i t i c a l framework was ca l l e d f o r , 
"a framework i n which autonomy provides the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r 
a balanced development strategy [and] f o r the r a t i o n a l 
investment of public resources i n t o areas of p r i o r i t y (..)." 
(Marc, 1977, 31) 
Due t o the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of the AA.W. through the PSUC, the AA.W. 
constituted a substantial p a r t of the membership i n the f i r s t years 
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of the Assemblea de Catalunya'^^. l a t e r , when the Asseitiblea began t o 
decentralise, neighbourhood associations formed e i t h e r part: of the 
l^semblees Democratiques, or were involved a t l o c a l l e v e l i n the 
movement f o r democratic l o c a l government (Ayuntaments Democratics). 
The connection between movements which arose from new demands on the 
sta t e as a provider of services on the one hand, and the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement's p r i n c i p a l organ i n the 1970's, the Assemblea de Catalunya 
on the other, i s thus established. 
The other area of st a t e intervention which affected the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement i s i n the area of Catalan culture. Here, the state was 
a c t i v e l y intervening i n a dis r u p t i v e and repressive way. As Ribo 
(the present leader of the PSUC) argued i n 1977, Franco's e f f o r t s t o 
eliminate Catalan language, or t o a t least confine i t t o the 
functions of a d i a l e c t i n the pr i v a t e sphere, constituted an assault 
on Catalan values and ideals i n the wider sense (Ribo, 1977, 28). 
From the moment the Francoist troops began t o occupy Catalan 
t e r r i t o r y , governmental orders were issued v^i c h aimed a t removing 
the language from the public sphere, including Catalan names i n 
c i v i l r e g i s t e r s , church services and a l l w r i t t e n communication 
(Ferrer, 1987, 180-182). Self-evidently, public functionaries could 
only use the C a s t i l i a n language, and could lose t h e i r post i f they 
used Catalan (Ferrer, 1987, 186-88). 
I n the 1960's, these p o l i c i e s were gradually undermined by the 
cu l t i a r a l r e v i v a l (see Chapter s i x ) , but i t was not u n t i l the 
t r a n s i t i o n period t h a t the repressive laws were changed. Despite 
caitpaigns f o r the re t u r n of Catalan language teaching i n schools 
18 
(1966-68) , the state made no p o s i t i v e steps t o s a t i s f y these 
demands. 
I n 1972, AA.W. accounted f o r alitrast 36% of the 45 member 
organisations. By May 1977, t h e i r weight was diminished t o 10%, but i n 
the meantiine, the number of associated organisations had grown t o 195 
(Marcet e t a l . . 1981, 29). 
18 
See Garcia Grau, J.:"Una enquesta sobre I'ensenyament. Horn v o l 
catala a l e s escoles", Serra d'Or, June 1966, 22-24). 
(Footnote Continued) 
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" I n f a c t , i t was the Catalan society vhich started t o adopt 
courageous a t t i t u d e s and introduced the Catalan language 
i n t o the education system, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n private schools." 
(Ferrer, 1987, 203) 
The n a t i o n a l i s t movement was of course concerned w i t h the 
re-establishment of Catalan c i v i l culture. This meant t h a t the 
cen t r a l state had t o be pushed out of the realm of Catalan c i v i l 
society, and an autonomous Catalan government created which would 
protect Catalan culture. The Assonblea de Catalvtnya organised a 
canpaign demanding o f f i c i a l status f o r the Catalan language (1973), 
19 
and the Congres de Cultura Catalana declared t h a t the Catalan 
language should be f u l l y r e h a b i l i t a t e d , arguing t h a t 
" [ t ] h e f u l l recuperation of the Catalan language i s today a 
demand vAiich enjoys increasingly strong support by wide 
sectors of our society, including large numbers of men and 
women v*io have migrated from other areas and are now l i v i n g 
and working i n the Catalan Countries." 
(Congres de Cultura Catalana, 1978, v o l . IV, 73) 
The connection between lack of democracy and c u l t u r a l repression i s 
also observable i n the censorship practices of the regime. While 
publishing i n Catalan was not e x p l i c i t l y prohibited, i t was 
subjected t o censorship and surveillance l i k e C a s t i l i a n language 
publications, and r e s t r i c t e d i n additional ways . Most of the 
(Footnote Continued) 
The campaign was supported by p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the Catalan i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
from the Ateneu Barcelones t o the Barcelona f o o t b a l l teams, and exerted 
great pressure on the schools and the government. I n 1970, a law of 
primary education acknowledged the presence of other native languages i n 
the school curriculum, which opened some l i m i t e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r 
introducing Catalan i n t o the curriculum (Benet, interview, 17.4.1988). 
19 
The CoiKfres de Cultura Catalana was a movement consisting of 
1,500 i n s t i t u t i o n s , enterprises, unions, etc. and 15,000 individual 
members. I t was founded i n January 1975 f o r a l l Catalan speaking 
t e r r i t o r i e s and organised public meetings and conferences i n order t o 
promote Catalan culture. I t s main task consisted the investigation of 
the s tate of Catalan c u l t u r e a f t e r four decades of repression, and t o 
o u t l i n e the path towards normalisation (Congres de Cultura Catalana, 
1978, 11-12). 
20 
"Fast" publications such as newspapers and journals d i d not e x i s t 
i n Catalan, w i t h the exception of Serra d'Or v^ich was published by the 
monastery of Montserrat. Catalan issues which could be interpreted as 
(Footnote Continued) 
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publishers were forced t o operate i n the grey area of semi-legality, 
faced w i t h an unpredictable administrative system vtiich treated 
everything v*iich was not e x p l i c i t l y allowed as p o t e n t i a l l y forbidden 
(see Massot i Muntaner, interview, 29.1.1988; Ainaud de Lasarte, 
interview, 30.3. 1988). 
Government intervention i n the c u l t u r a l sphere i n Catalonia, 
therefore, was c r u c i a l i n encouraging anti-Francoist and 
pro-Catalanist a c t i v i t i e s . The regime was a c t i v e l y undermining the 
basis f o r i t s l e g i t i m a t i o n , which rests precisely i n the 
socio - c u l t u r a l system (Habermas, 1976, 68-77). On the other hand, i t 
was the f a i l u r e of the state t o intervene on behalf of the 
well-being of i t s c i t i z e n s which brought some sections of the 
Catalan population t o c r i t i c i s e the a u t h o r i t i e s and demand a 
d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l framework t h a t was democratic and autonomous. 
3 . 1 . i i S h i f t s of power between state and Scottish c i v i l society 
I n Scotland, as i n B r i t a i n as a v^ole,. the main changes i n the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between state and c i v i l society were due t o the 
in t r o d u c t i o n of the welfare state. This i s demonstrated by a recent 
p u b l i c a t i o n on the state i n B r i t a i n which begins l i k e t h i s : 
"No one i n B r i t a i n today l i v e s beyond the reach of the 
state. I n i t s numerous d i f f e r e n t guises i t intervenes i n a l l 
of our l i v e s . " 
( H i l l y a r d and Percy-Smith, 1988, 1) 
That t h i s can throw up demands about changes i n the p o l i t i c a l 
s t r u cture i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the findings of the Kilbrandon 
Commission. I t was set vp i n the wake of the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l t o 
examine the case f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. The Kilbrandon Report 
saw the ejqsansion of the state as an inportant reason f o r devolution 
tendencies i n B r i t a i n , and pointed out th a t 80-90 per' cent of the 
(Footnote Continued) 
remotely p o l i t i c a l , and p a r t i c u l a r l y those concerning Catalan 
nationalism, were barred from publication. 
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questions dealt w i t h i n the House of Commons i n the 1970's would not 
have been considered government concern i n 1900. 
"The cumulative e f f e c t of government e^q^ansion on people's 
l i v e s and a c t i v i t i e s has been considerable. The i n d i v i d u a l a 
hundred years ago hardly needed t o know t h a t the central 
government existed. His b i r t h , marriage and death would be 
registered, and he might be conscious of the safeguards f o r 
h i s security provided by the forces of law and order and of 
i n p e r i a l defence; but, except f o r the very l i m i t e d 
provisions of the poor law and factory l e g i s l a t i o n , h i s 
welfare and progress were matters f o r vtiich he alone bore 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . By the t u r n of the century the p o s i t i o n 
was not much'changed. Today, however, the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n 
submits himself t o the guidance of the state a t a l l times. 
His schooling i s enforced; h i s physical well-being can be 
looked a f t e r i n a conprehensive health service; he may be 
helped by government agencies t o f i n d and t r a i n f o r a job; 
he i s obliged v ^ i l e i n employment t o insure against 
sickness, accident and unemployment; his house may be l e t t o 
him by a public authority or he may be assisted i n i t s 
purchase or inprovement; he can a v a i l himself of a wide 
range of government welfare allowances and services; and he 
draws a state pension on h i s retirement. I n these and many 
other ways unknown t o h i s counterpart of a century ago, he 
i s brought i n t o close and regular contact with the 
government and i t s agencies." 
(Kilbrandon, 1973, 76) 
The expansion of the Scottish Office i n Edinburgh t e s t i f i e s t o the 
expansion of state intervention over the past decades. The effects 
of these s h i f t s of inner state boundaries on the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement are varied and contradictory. 
Although the Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s are often described as the 
p i l l a r s of the Scottish nation, i t i s clear t h a t t h e i r 
distinctiveness and separateness from the B r i t i s h state have been 
progressively reduced as the state took on more conpetences. 
According t o Brian Turner, the r i s e of Scottish nationalism i s 
explained w i t h reference t o the erosion of the distinctiveness of 
Scottish c i v i l society i n the context of economic decline (Turner, 
1984, 175). However, f i r s t l y , t h i s erosion was already under way i n 
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the 19th c e n t u r y ^ a n d secondly, as Turner claims, t h i s explanation 
i s flawed because w i t h the exception of the Kirk, the i n s t i t u t i o n s 
of Scottish c i v i l society are e l i t i s t , not popular: 
"What we have witnessed i s not the decline of popular 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and cult u r e , but the erosion of bourgeois 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n a s i t u a t i o n vAiere the " p a t r i c i a n bargain" 
has been under considerable threat. ( ) The sanctity of 
Scots law, higher education, administrative i n s t i t u t i o n s and 
Royal Burghs are not exactly promising s i t e s of mass 
attachment and popular enthusiasm." 
( i b i d . . 175-176) 
The undeniable f a c t t h a t Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s generally were not 
strongly involved i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i s , however, not 
si n p l y reducible t o t h e i r bourgeois roots ; ^ i c h are p a r t i c u l a r l y 
noticeable i n the legal system. F i r s t l y , i t must be bom i n mind 
t h a t the state took on r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and intervened i n the 
administration of these i n s t i t u t i o n s . Their independence v i s a v i s 
the s t a t e has therefore become reduced. The huge expansion of 
enployment vihich i s d i r e c t l y dependent on the state (eg. i n loc a l 
22 
government and the education system ) t e s t i f i e s t o t h i s . Chapter 
four already mentioned the close t i e s between the Scottish public 
sector itdddle class and the state. 
I n the 1970's debates about the devolution b i l l s (Scotland and Wales 
B i l l , 1977; Scotland B i l l 1978), the Scottish u n i v e r s i t i e s d i d not 
want t o be devolved (W. B. Johnston e t a l . , 1977, 48). They were 
la r g e l y assimilated t o the English model (Maxwell, interview, 
9.2.1987). Neither were the teachers very keen on devolution, and 
the Church of Scotland played a reactive, rather than a leading. 
For exanple, i n 1845, Westminster Parliament changed the 
framework of Scottish Poor Law which was previously under the control of 
the Church of Scotland. The schools were also secularised i n 1872 and 
brought under the cont r o l of the state, and i n 1929, the loc a l 
government system was also reorganised by law. 
22 
"Scotland has i t s own educational system. • But the inportant 
decisions (school leaving age, conprehensive structure etc.) are taken 
elsewhere and pressures f o r assimilation w i t h the larger English system 
i s a pervasive force" (Scotsman, 8.2.1979). 
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r o l e i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement (W. B. Johnston, e t a l . , 1977, 4). 
As f a r as Scottish l o c a l government i s concerned, the president of 
OOSIA (Convention of Scottish Local Authorities) i n 1978 advocated a 
p o s i t i v e vote i n the devolution referendum, but many of the newly 
constituted l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s were h o s t i l e t o the idea of a Scottish 
Assembly v^i c h might assume l o c a l government catpetences (Scotsman. 
22.10.1978, lO^"^). The phantasm of overload - i . e . the tendency of 
the Government "to provide, t o f i x , t o pay f o r , t o s e t t l e 
everything" (Scotsman, 15.8.1977) -, the perceived remoteness of the 
24 
government from the people, and the lack of democratic control of 
the ever expanding Scottish Office are contradictory c r i t i c i s m s . But 
they are a l l i n t e r l i n k e d and the r e s u l t of the intervention of the 
State i n t o new spheres of c i v i l society. 
But v*io was i n favour of devolution? The professionals and middle 
classes who owed t h e i r posts t o the state? While awaiting the 
Government's devolution proposals a f t e r the 1974 elections, 
Ascherson found evidence t h a t the professions - many of which i n the 
Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s - were i n favour of autonomy. He interpreted 
t h i s as a sign t h a t the middle-class and professionals were 
divorcing t h e i r desire t o control the bureaucratic apparatus from 
the c o n t r o l of the means of production (Scotsman, 14.7.1975). 
Whereas i n Scotland, more and more i n s t i t u t i o n s became advocates of 
23 
Councillor James Anderson, convener of Central Regional Council, 
predicted chaos and higher l o c a l taxation of regions were abolished 
under a Scottish Assembly t e r r i t o r i a l reorganisation (Scotsman, 
20.2.1979). 
24 
Pointing out t h a t the Scottish Office should not be singled out 
as being p a r t i c u l a r l y remote from the c i t i z e n s . Labour MP Dalyell 
defended the p r e v a i l i n g structure of administration: 
"Are we saying t h a t 150 Assemblymen i n Edinburgh would be 
able t o do the job of the Dental Estimates Board, the 
H i s t o r i c Buildings Council and the Highlands and Islands 
Development Board? These are a l l jobs b e t t e r done by the 
experts v^o s i t on these bodies." 
(Scotsman. 22.10.1978, 10) 
Faced w i t h considering the p o s s i b i l i t y of l e t t i n g democratically 
elected representatives make the decisions, Dalyell chose the c u l t 
of professionalisation. This i s t y p i c a l of the centralised planning 
approach of the Labour Party. 
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autonomy, the Scottish p i l l a r s of nationhood (local government, 
le g a l system, education system) were becoming increasingly 
integrated i n t o the state apparatus, and - at least under the Labour 
Government (1974-79) - divided over the devolution issue. 
Whatever the e f f e c t s of government intervention on the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement, i t i s clear t h a t the movement was not advocating curbing 
back the state along the l i n e s of the Conservative governments i n 
the 1980's. 
While the Tory Government claims t o release more and more 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o the "free" market, the Scottish people are 
increasingly opposed t o "devolution of power" of t h i s type. The 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Scotland then and now i s not about devolving 
power t o those who can a f f o r d i t , but rather about making the state 
more accountable t o the people. 
3.2. State intervention in the economy 
The involvement of the state i n the economic system was already 
discussed i n Chapter three. I t was made clear t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n 
must be made between the a u t h o r i t a r i a n intervention of the Spanish 
sta t e i n the economy on the one hand, and the (non-wairtirae) economic 
strategies of the B r i t i s h state on the other. I n the f i r s t two 
decades or so a f t e r the c i v i l war, the Spanish state exercised 
strong control over the economy t o achieve autarchy, and was the 
d r i v i n g force i n modernising the economy along the li n e s of 
developed c a p i t a l i s t countries from the l a t e 1950's onwards. The 
B r i t i s h welfare state of the postwar period can be defined by the 
goal of c r i s i s management, involving not only the regulation of the 
processes of s o c i a l i s a t i o n and reproduction mentioned i n the 
previous section, but also economic p o l i c i e s aimed a t minimising the 
self-paralysing tendencies of p r i v a t e l y controlled exchange 
processes (Keane, 1984, 13). I n the Scottish context, increased 
involvement of the B r i t i s h state i n the r e l a t i o n s of production and 
the economic sphere - e.g. through nat i o n a l i s a t i o n of heavy 
industries (coal 1949; s t e e l 1967), investment aids, tax r e l i e f , and 
various other types of economic planning strategies - produced new 
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demands on the state. The solutio n of each economic contradiction 
through the state eventually raises new ones, and drives the state 
f u r t h e r along the road of cont r o l . Thus, the post-war era witnessed 
more active state intervention i n the economy precisely a t a time of 
increasing interdependence between c a p i t a l i s t economies (Warren, 
1971, 86-88). I n a previous chapter, I already explained how 
increasing state intervention p o l i t i c i s e d the Scottish economic 
dimension, and argued t h a t i t was because of the prominent r o l e of 
the s t a t e i n the Scottish economy t h a t the economy mattered t o the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement (Chapter three, section 3.2). 
Based on the analyses i n chapters three and four, t h i s section 
maintains t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t movements d i d not challenge the 
concept of state intervention i n the economy, but rather pointed out 
t h a t the ce n t r a l state was not able t o make p o l i c i e s which suited 
the s p e c i f i c economic problems i n the national t e r r i t o r y ; i n short, 
the state was not where the economy was. 
3.2.i Links between economic interventionism and Scottish 
nationalism 
Chapter three pointed out t h a t the r i s e of the SNP began when the 
c r e d i b i l i t y of state economic planning was no longer pervasive among 
the Scottish electorate. The reason was t h a t the promises i t 
involved could not be kept. Mackintosh's r e f l e c t i o n s on the f a i l u r e s 
of economic planning showed t h a t some i n t e l l e c t u a l s ' b e l i e f i n the 
power of the state and the p o l i t i c i a n s t o influence the economy had 
started t o dissolve. He argued t h a t since the Government had no 
influence on inportant forces i n the economic sphere, i t was unable 
t o f i n d long-term solutions. I t s dependency on popular support made 
t h i s even less l i k e l y , because long-term solutions were bound t o go 
against the i n t e r e s t s of some social groups. He advocated therefore 
the l i m i t a t i o n of sta t e intervention, saying t h a t 
" [ i ] t would be f a r better, i n my view, i f Government more 
often announced t h a t they would do nothing about ce r t a i n 
problems." 
(Scotsman. 15.8.1977) 
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This, of course, i s \*iat happened under Conservative r u l e i n the 
1980's. I n the 1970's, however, there were many signs t h a t people 
d i d not question the a b i l i t y of the state t o intervene i n the 
economy i n p r i n c i p l e . This was demonstrated both by the alte r n a t i v e 
s o l u t i o n put forward by the SNP, and the reaction of the Labour 
Party, both of which d i d not involve a reduction of state 
involvement. The public debate on devolution and independence 
focused on the argument of remoteness, suggesting t h a t i t was not so 
much the p r i n c i p l e of interventionism, but i t s q u a l i t y and the 
effectiveness which f u e l l e d the demands f o r autonomy. After the 
pub l i c a t i o n of the White Paper on devolution i n 1975, James Gilvray 
(Director of Research a t the Eraser of Allander I n s t i t u t e ) supported 
the " s h r i v e l l i n g b l a s t of c r i t i c i s m " (Scotsman, 28.11.1975) i n the 
Scottish press: 
"[H]owever meritorious the Government's proposal f o r the 
devolution of non-economic functions, these w i l l tend t o be 
ignored i f the proposed economic functions do not go some 
way towards s a t i s f y i n g vhat John Mackintosh has described as 
the ^maximalist' solution.To put i t i n cruder p o l i t i c a l 
terms, the White Paper proposals w i l l f a i l t o stem the 
advance of the Nationalists unless the Government can 
convince the electorate t h a t the Assembly w i l l exercise 
s i g n i f i c a n t economic powers." 
(Scotsman, 10.12.1975) 
The Labour government reacted t o Scottish d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the 
re s u l t s of state economic planning by o f f e r i n g even more 
intervention. The Scottish Development Agency (SDA) was Labour's 
acknowledgment of the f a c t t h a t Scotland's economic problems needed 
special a t t e n t i o n . But Chapter three already pointed out tha t the 
SDA was not geared up t o solving the problems i n the way ej^jected, 
or t o increase Scottish control over the economic sphere. 
The SNP, too, envisaged an increase i n state intervention a f t e r 
independence. The SNP's po l i c y paper on post-independence economic 
strategy envisaged an even greater r o l e of the state i n the economic 
sphere than previously. Not only d i d i t have t o repair the damage 
caused by "economic mismanagement and neglect by successive London 
governments", but also t o lay "a f i r m foundation f o r economic 
prosperity" based on ra d i c a l i n d u s t r i a l restructuring, iitproved 
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economic p r o d u c t i v i t y , income p o l i c i e s , etc. (SNP Economic Policies 
Document, 1975). 
I n the Report of the Constitutional Steering Committee, state 
involvement i n Scotland's economy i s considered inevitable. I t 
maintains t h a t the problem of r e l a t i v e decline of the North had not 
iitproved considerably and l a s t i n g l y , and asks: "Does t h i s mean t h a t 
the wrong regional p o l i c i e s have been chosen, or t h a t the r i g h t 
p o l i c i e s have been i r r e s o l u t e l y applied, or t h a t regional p o l i c i e s 
can never do more than suppress symptoms of the disease?" I t 
concludes t h a t "past regional p o l i c i e s have proved inadequate 
because they have been inadequately conceived and executed" and that 
" f o r Scotland w i t h i n the framework of the United Kingdom, strong 
regional economic p o l i c i e s are essential". When Scotland d i d well 
economically under the Union (between 1770 and 1870), the Report 
argues, i t was a t a time of f a r less i n t r u s i o n from foreign c a p i t a l 
and London governments. Although the h i s t o r y of government 
inter v e n t i o n i s judged less than p o s i t i v e l y , the Report does not 
present an a l t e r n a t i v e . But i t goes against the economic pri n c i p l e s 
of the present neo-conservative central government (Habermas, 1985, 
153-156) by advocating a Scottish Assembly vhich would be able t o 
devise p o l i c i e s which are suited t o Scotland's needs (Constitutional 
Steering Committee, 1988, 8-9) . 
The upshot of government intervention i n the economic sphere i n 
Scotland i s t h a t i t e f f e c t i v e l y helped t o u n i f y the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. This i s because economic c o n f l i c t s and problems involve a t 
least t o some extent the state, and therefore assume the a i r of a 
c o n f l i c t between people and the state. They are no longer only class 
c o n f l i c t s . As the discussion of i n d u s t r i a l struggles i n Chapter 
three (section 2 . 2 . i i i ) showed, t h i s can lead t o a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of i n d u s t r i a l struggles as c o n f l i c t s between national c i v i l society 
and the state, which receive widespread popular support and help t o 
f u e l the n a t i o n a l i s t struggle. 
I n Catalonia, the l i n k s between state, economy and nationalism were 
constructed i n a d i f f e r e n t way, because the Francoist state was not 
a welfare state. Catalan nationalism can be seen at least i n part as 
(chapter f i v e ) (301) 
a reaction of c i v i l society t o the f a i l u r e of the central state t o 
cope w i t h the social contradictions whose roots l i e i n the 
c a p i t a l i s t mode of production. As i n the case of Scotland, the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement (or the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s v^ich formed part of 
i t ) d i d not envisage less state intervention, but rather the 
contrary. 
3 . 2 . i i Economic interventionism arx3 nationalism i n Catalonia 
Chapter three (section 3.2) maintained t h a t state involvement i n the 
economy was stronger during the d i c t a t o r s h i p than ever before Two 
main influences on the Catalan economy were mentioned: f i r s t l y , the 
e f f e c t of state intervention on Catalan industry through the 
Institute Nacional de Industria (INI), and secondly, the repression 
of the working class through the Sindicato Vertical. 
However, despite an i n f l a t e d state bureaucracy, the pattern of 
growth during the economic boom period was not i n any way guided by 
government p o l i c y (Flos et a l . , 1978, 187). Waldmann suggested th a t 
Catalonia's economic growth a f t e r 1955 was not supported by the 
state, but rather happened despite i t . The central state was seen as 
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a parasite, draining c a p i t a l away from Catalonia , subsidising the 
development i n other regions - or rather, the private enterprises of 
those sectors of the r u l i n g class v^ich were we l l connected i n 
government c i r c l e s - and leaving Catalonia w i t h a substandard 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e (Waldmann, 1984, 183-184). The c a l l f o r control over 
Catalan resources and the ideology of self-help have been strong, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the ranks of conservative n a t i o n a l i s t s ever since 
the 1960's, and are s t i l l p art of n a t i o n a l i s t r h e t o r i c today. They 
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Trias Fargas calculated a Catalan annual d e f i c i t of 32 - 41 
m i l l i o n pesetas between 1968 and 1971. Only 50 % of the money taken from 
Catalonia was reinvested i n Catalonia (Cahellas et a l . , 1975, 152). 
(Trias Fargas i s a leading p o l i t i c i a n of Convergencia. His family 
background portrays an upper middle class n a t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . His 
grandfather was a founding member of the Lliga Regionalista, and h i s 
father was an a c t i v i s t of Accio Catcilana during the Second Republic 
(Cahellas et a l . . 1975, 139). 
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are an expression of the old resentments against a state v*iich does 
not represent Catalan i n t e r e s t s , but takes advantage of Catalonia's 
advanced state of development i n the i n t e r e s t of a p o l i t i c a l class 
v^iich was mostly based i n other Spanish regions. 
But there was also a reaction against the state from the working 
class. I t was argued above t h a t the Workers' Commissions, v^ich 
constituted the main strand of the workers' movement, and the 
workers' struggles became increasingly p o l i t i c i s e d i n the 1970's 
(Chapter three, section 3.4) . One main reason was the f a c t t h a t the 
Sindicato Vertical, i n t o which the workers and employers were 
corrpulsorily integrated, was under state con t r o l , and any other, 
independent, workers' organisation was i l l e g a l . State control over 
the working class did, of course, not only apply t o Catalonia, but 
t o the vAiole of Spain. However, since Catalonia was one of the most 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d regions, i t s e f f e c t was f e l t p a r t i c u l a r l y strongly i n 
Catalonia. 
However, from the mid-1950's onwards, the Sindicato Vertical began 
t o move under the g r i p of the dictatorship. For the f i r s t time i n 
1955, the SV promised t o f i g h t f o r better working conditions and 
wage increases, i n an attempt t o increase i t s c r e d i b i l i t y among i t s 
conpulsory membership. I n 1958, c o l l e c t i v e bargaining was 
introduced. Nevertheless, the perfonmnce of the Sindicato Vertical 
remained severely constrained by i t s r o l e i n the p o l i t i c a l and 
economic system. Because workers' organisations outside the SV were 
inpossible t o establish, the oppositional movements slowly developed 
w i t h i n the SV. 
" I t was a well-known f a c t t h a t the only way t o make an 
inpact on the workers' movement was through the Sindicato 
Vertical. They had i t under f i r m c o n t r o l , the Francoists. I t 
was a very dangerous area, and therefore they operated w i t h 
great caution and [made sure] they kept i t t i g h t l y 
c ontrolled. At t h a t time, the only p o s s i b i l i t y t o promote 
the workers' consciousness lay w i t h i n the syndicate. The 
main task was t o create consciousness (...), and t h i s was t o 
a c e r t a i n extent possible w i t h i n the [structures o f ] the 
Sindicato Vertical." 
(Ortega, interview, 23.2.1988) 
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Labour c o n f l i c t s i n the increasingly tense p o l i t i c a l climate of the 
l a t e 60's and the 70's were no longer only directed against the 
enployers, but happened i n defiance of the Sindicato Verticcil and 
the state administration. Therefore, there was an i n b u i l t p o l i t i c a l 
corponent i n i n d u s t r i a l struggles during the dictatorship . 
Discontent w i t h s t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s was directed by the Communist 
Party towards pro-democracy and pro-autonomy demands. Thus, the 
repressive p o l i c i e s of the Franco regime i n the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s made the workers' movement more inclined t o fe e l 
s o l i d a r i t y w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s t cause, vhich was directed against a 
common enemy, the Francoist state. 
As i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t s v/ere sharpening i n the 1970's and the 
workers' organisations were s l i d i n g out of the control of the state, 
the Catalan enployers also became aware t h a t the Francoist state no 
longer served t h e i r own inte r e s t s . A d i f f e r e n t , more caring state 
was now needed. I t was even acknowledged i n the more progressive 
quarters of the bourgeoisie t h a t the workers needed organisations, 
structure and leadership i n order t o be f u l l y integrated i n t o 
Catalan modem society (Pujol, 1980, 80). And l a s t l y , cooperation 
w i t h the labour movement was necessary t o cope w i t h the economic 
recession which began t o a f f e c t Catalonia i n the early 1970's. I n 
the aftermath of Franco's death before the f i r s t democratic 
elections, the p o l i t i c a l party manifestoes of the centre and the 
r i g h t i n Catalonia which represented mostly the bourgeoisie and the 
upper middle class advocated e g a l i t a r i a n d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth and 
The SEAT s t r i k e s i n the f i r s t years of the 1970's are an example 
f o r the increasingly p o l i t i c a l confrontation between the state and the 
enployers on the one hand, and the workers on the other. Miguelez argued 
t h a t 
"the interferences i n the negotiations, the presence of the 
public sector i n the f i r m , and the p o l i t i c a l repressions of 
the more m i l i t a n t workers gave the i n d u s t r i a l disputes the 
aspect of confrontation w i t h the regime i t s e l f . The 
continuing c o n f l i c t s converted wage demands i n t o p o l i t i c a l 
demands." 
(Miguelez, 1978, 193) 
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a welfare s t a t e ^ ^ (Colomer et a l . . v o l . I , 69; 115; 171-173). A l l 
the p a r t i e s from the r i g h t t o the l e f t which participated i n the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Catalonia demanded state intervention i n the 
econorry, and t h e i r proposals orientated themselves more or less 
along Keynesian p r i n c i p l e s . 
The evidence presented i n t h i s section supports a now f a m i l i a r 
argument t h a t "the i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between 
socio - c u l t u r a l and economic processes on the one hand, and p o l i t i c a l 
processes on the other, v^ich was ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of the West i n the 
nineteenth century, has lar g e l y ceased t o operate i n our own" 
(Pocci, 1978, 121). The r e s u l t i s l e g i t i m a t i o n problems f o r the 
state. What i s more, the n a t i o n a l i s t movements were able t o e x p l o i t 
these problems of l e g i t i n a t i o n . 
3.3 Legitimation problCTS of the state 
I n Scotland, the post-war state sought legitimacy "through acts of 
r u l e t h a t a s s i s t the economic system i n producing an ever increasing 
flow of goods and services f o r the consumer", thus lending private 
concerns public significance (Pocci, 1978, 134). The inadequacy of 
the state t o steer and iiiprove the Scottish economy therefore 
diminished i t s c r e d i b i l i t y . The r i s i n g l e v e l of demand, v^tiich i s 
proportional t o the growing need f o r l e g i t i m a t i o n , i s not s a t i s f i e d 
28 
w i t h rewards (Habermas, 1975, 73 ) . 
27 . . 
Oonvergencia Democratica de Catalvmya, which came t o be the party 
of the Catalan bourgeoisie, said; 
"The economy must be organised f o r the benefit of the people 
w i t h the help of planning and state subsidies t o those 
economic sectors and establishments which condition the 
nation's economic and so c i a l l i f e i n an important way." 
(Colomer, e t a l . , 171) 
The party manifesto suggested nat i o n a l i s a t i o n and worker's 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n as possible ways of gaining public c o n t r o l . 
28 
"Because the economic c r i s i s has been intercepted and transformed 
i n t o a systematic overloading of the public budget, i t has put o f f the 
mantle of a natural f a t e of society. I f governmental c r i s i s management 
(Footnote Continued) 
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since the B r i t i s h welfare state intruded i n the c u l t u r a l system as 
w e l l as i n the economic sphere, the boundaries between the p o l i t i c a l 
and the c u l t u r a l spheres s h i f t e d i n such a way t h a t c u l t u r a l 
a c t i v i t i e s previously taken f o r granted have f a l l e n i n t o the area of 
administrative planning. This had the e f f e c t t h a t new areas of l i f e 
became p o l i t i c i s e d and led t o new demands. 
Jim S i l l a r s ' description of h i s canvassing experiences i n Govan i n 
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1973 can serve as an exanple f o r the e f f e c t these developments 
have on the l e g i t i m a t i o n of the state: 
"Women electors calmly discussed with me the problem of the 
r a t s which r^n around the closes and backyards and t h e i r 
fear t h a t one would attack the children. ( ) Another took 
roe outside t o show how, wi t h a huge pool of undrained water 
covering the whole backyard, she and her neighbovirs had t o 
walk across a bridge of old bricks. A man pointed t o the 
rubble of broken glass, o l d cans, and other rubbish i n the 
streets and t o a bumed-out car l y i n g a t the comer." 
( S i l l a r s , 1986, 42) 
Disenchantment w i t h the government, or the p o l i t i c a l system as a 
whole, comes as a r e s u l t of the r i s i n g demands on the state, and the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of f u l f i l l i n g them. But v ^ i l e the welfare state has 
ceased t o be a vi a b l e sol u t i o n t o the socio-economic problems of 
l a t e c a p i t a l i s t societies, the f r o n t i e r s of the state can not be 
r o l l e d back (Keane, 1984, 27). The Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
advocated a so l u t i o n t o t h i s fundamental contradiction which 
consisted i n redrawing the boundaries between c i v i l society and 
state by moving the l a t t e r closer t o the former. I t argues th a t 
p o l i t i c a l mobilisation, and more public and democratic control over 
one's own state structures can solve the problems of legitimation. 
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f a i l s , i t lags behind programmatic demands that i t has placed on i t s e l f . 
The penalty f o r t h i s f a i l u r e i s withdrawal of le g i t i m a t i o n . Thus, the 
scope f o r action contracts precisely a t those moments i n vtiich i t needs 
t o be d r a s t i c a l l y expanded". (Haberroas, 1975, 69) 
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Jun S i l l a r s was then an MP f o r the Labour Party. At the time, the 
Conservative Party was i n government, but Govan was t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
staunchly Labour, and the l o c a l government was under Labour control. 
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An Opinion Research Centre P o l l i n December 1975 suggested t h a t 43% 
of the p o l l wanted t o have far-reaching autonomy or independence f o r 
Scotland, while an additional 27% wanted t o keep the present 
p o l i t i c a l system provided t h a t more decision making was transferred 
t o Scotland (Scotsman, 16.12.1975; Table 5.1). But the up and down 
of opinion p o l l s and the tendency t o associate nationalism only w i t h 
the SNP make i t d i f f i c u l t t o assess the r e a l popular support f o r 
autonomy i n Scotland. I n conparison w i t h Catalonia, and considering 
the democratic l i b e r t i e s i n Scotland, i t remains remarkable how 
l i t t l e p ublic support was shown spontaneously. This was p a r t l y due 
t o the f a c t t h a t people were able t o express t h e i r national i d e n t i t y 
through the b a l l o t box. But there was also a general inpression t h a t 
the Scots d i d not f i n d the arguments of the n a t i o n a l i s t s convincing 
enough. 
The Franco regime was also confronted with r i s i n g demands concerning 
the q u a l i t y of l i f e and the e f f e c t s of the economic c r i s i s v^ich 
started t o be f e l t i n 1973 (Triunfo, 8.2.1975 and 15.3.1975). 
Organisations of professionals i n Catalonia joined the opposition i n 
defence of a more democratic society v^ere professionals' interests 
can be safeguarded (Triunfo, 29.3.1975), and ertployers began t o f i n d 
the Francoist state a hindrance t o t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . Among middle 
and upper class Catalans, there was resentment about the central 
state's neglect of public services and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and about the 
p o l i t i c a l class w i t h business interests v^ich benefited from the 
corrupt system, and which t r a d i t i o n a l l y excluded most of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie (P. Nadal, interview, 27.1.1988"^^). I n various social 
"Someone who denounced a case, a problem v^i c h went against the 
i n t e r e s t s of Catalonia, of a l o c a l i t y , or of Barcelona, would be faced 
w i t h a stone w a l l . I n my family, f o r example, I was involved i n a case 
where we defended our town against some barbaric a c t i v i t i e s which were 
going on: the sale of a green zone by the municipal authority. But a 
green zone cannot be sold. Very w e l l . We denounced (...) a l l these 
barbaric a c t i v i t i e s v i a the o f f i c i a l conplaints procedures. Denounced 
them t o the a u t h o r i t i e s , and t h i s was i n 1973. And i n 1973, we found 
t h a t the c i v i l governors, the housing department, the whole 
administrative system was one monolithic block. And everything was due 
t o "orders from Madrid". ( ) Therefore the growth of Catalonia and of 
(Footnote Continued) 
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groups, therefore, the i n a b i l i t y of the state t o create the kinds of 
services and conditions appropriate f o r a developed i n d u s t r i a l 
society was recognised, and seen as a good reason f o r opposing the 
regime openly by j o i n i n g the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t opposition. Since 
the c u l p r i t f o r mismanagement of public resources was i d e n t i f i e d as 
the c e n t r a l government and i t s t e r r i t o r i a l s tate apparatus, 
self-government was regarded as a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r s e t t i n g up a 
p o l i t i c a l structure v*iich was untainted by the a t r o c i t i e s of the 
di c t a t o r s h i p . The Assenblea de Catalunya became the spearhead of the 
struggle f o r p o l i t i c a l change and Catalan autonomy. 
I n the l a s t years of Franco, the Assemblea was subjected t o state 
repression, but t h i s only served t o mobilise more people. When 113 
p a r t i c i p a n t s of the Assanblea's tenth clandestine meeting were 
arrested and kept i n the prison of Barcelona f o r several weeks i n 
1973, i t was publicised through the grapevine. The f a c t t h a t many of 
the arrested were known p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s and members of the 
middle class f a c i l i t a t e d widespread concern among the more 
i n f l u e n t i a l groups of Catalan society. Thus, repressive reactions of 
the Franco regime t o the n a t i o n a l i s t opposition i n t h i s period 
served t o undermine the legitimacy of the state even further. The 
a l i e n a t i o n of the Catalan middle class from the regime played an 
important r o l e i n t h i s context (see Chapter four, section 4.2). 
Ortega argued t h a t 
"aqui en Catalunya era mas f a c i l estar en l a clandestinidad 
que fuera de Catalunya. Porque sieirpre habia un c i e r t o 
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Barcelona from the point of view of urban planning, and the v^ole 
development of the Costa Brava, was a disaster. ( ) They destroyed the 
ecology, the urban landscape, the beauty of the coastline, the beauty of 
the towns. This of course happened with the consent of the c i v i l 
governors, housing o f f i c i a l s , etc, because i f so many things go wrong, 
i t was due t o some gentlemen viho were corrupt, e i t h e r because they were 
part of the system or because they were a f r a i d of a sector v^ich was 
powerful, wealthy and i n f l u e n t i a l . I t was a system of corruption, of 
corruption through and through. (...) Furthermore, there was a t o t a l 
lack of c o n t r o l from a f i s c a l point of view. There was no taxation, and 
everyone d i d what they wanted. But t h i s was a b i l l v^^iich had t o be 
footed one day, because i f things are badly made i n the f i r s t place, 
they soon s t a r t r o t t i n g . " 
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sector de l a sociedad que apoyaba de alguna manera. No se 
querian cca^^meter, esto no, pero tanpoco t e 
denunciaban." 
(Ortega, interview, 23.2.1988) 
Asked whether he meant the bourgeoisie, he became more concrete: 
"Yo d i r i a mas bien de l a pequena burguesia. Eran con este 
sentimiento nacionalista, sobre todo frente a l franquismo, y 
aunque a e l l o s se les iha bien, economicamente les iha bien, 
no estaban de acuerdo con e l franquismo, no todos, o un 
sector de esa burguesia, y tenia esa ventaja que no t e 
denunciaban. Si sabian que habia un piso que era sospechoso, 
en donde se hacian actividades clandestinas, no iban a 
denunciarlo a l a p o l i c i a ; algunos s i , pero normalmente no. 
Siitplemente callaban y l o ignoraban, y t e dejaban hacer. Eso 
era l a a c t i t u d . " 
(i b i d . ) 
Although throughout Franco's dictato r s h i p mass manifestations were 
of l i m i t e d size and generally rare, i t was i n Catalonia v^ere such 
events were more l i k e l y t o occur than i n other regions of Spain 
(apart from the Basque Country). I f p o l i t i c a l demonstrations were 
rare, mobilisations around c u l t u r a l issues were not uncommon i n 
Catalonia. They included large concerts of the Catalan protest 
singers of the Nova Cancpo ", cairpaigns i n favour of Catalan a t 
school, and the Congres de Cultura Catalana, launched clandestinely 
31 . . . 
"Here i n Catalonia, i t was easier m the underground than 
elsewhere. Because there was always a ce r t a i n sector of society which 
gave i t s support. They d i d not want t o s t i c k t h e i r neck out, but at 
l e a s t they d i d not denounce you." 
32 
" I would rather say the bourgeoisie. They had t h i s n a t i o n a l i s t 
sentiment, p a r t i c u l a r l y v i s -a-vis Francoism, and although they were 
doing w e l l - economically, t h a t i s -, they d i d not agree w i t h Francoism, 
at l e a s t a sector of the boungeoisie didn't, and t h i s had the advantage 
t h a t d i d not denounce you. When they r e a l i s e d . t h a t there was a 
suspicious f l a t , where clandestine a c t i v i t i e s were going on, they would 
not inform the police. Some would, but not normally. They j u s t kept 
quiet amd ignored i t , and they l e t you carry on. This was the 
predominant a t t i t u d e . " 
•^ "^ The Nova Cantpo i s a Catalan f o l k song movement vAiich emerged i n 
the early 1960's and became a sort of symbol of Catalan c u l t u r a l 
r e v i v a l . Singing i n Catalan was a p o l i t i c a l act i n i t s e l f , but singers 
l i k e Raimon, Maria del Mar Bonet and L l u i s Llach also made p o l i t i c a l 
p rotest songs which became popular a t p o l i t i c a l r a l l i e s and 
manifestations i n the 1970's (Pradas i Canps, 1968, 31-33). 
(chapter f i v e ) (309) 
i n 1975 and involving many thousands of members and i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
A f t e r Franco's death, large-scale demonstrations took place over the 
demands of the Assemblea de catcavmya. 
"When the di c t a t o r s h i p disappeared and the t i m i d 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c i e s began, a broad popular, democratic 
and autonomist movement emerged from clandestinity; t h i s 
sxarprised those v^o were ignorant of the intensive p o l i t i c a l 
and syndical u n i t a r y f r o n t \M.ch had developed i n the 
Principat [Catalonia] despite the repression, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
since the apj^arance of the Asssnblea de Catalunya. The 
lairge popular demonstrations on the f i r s t two Siandays i n 
February 1976 [ t e s t i f i e d t o t h i s ] . " 
(Benet, 1980, 285) 
Benet mentioned the unauthorised demonstrations i n February f o r 
"freedom, amnesty and autonomy" i n vviiich tens of thousands took 
part. The demonstration on the National Cay of 1977 was even larger. 
More than a m i l l i o n people took t o the streets of Barcelona with 
Catalan flags and party banners, led by the elected members of the 
two chambers. I t was the biggest demonstration f o r autonomy ever 
seen i n Catalonia, and the f r o n t page of the Diario de Barcelona 
read: "United Catalonia demands the Statute" (Diario de Barcelona. 
13.9.1977). These mass demonstrations by Catalans put the central 
government under pressure t o change. I n contrast t o Scotland, the 
Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t movement had a r e l a t i v e l y clear source of 
l e g i t i m a t i o n f o r i t s demands which was based on Catalan culture and 
the i n s t i t u t i o n s of Catalan c i v i l society (see Chapter s i x ) . This 
was one reason f o r the greater i n t e n s i t y of the n a t i o n a l i s t struggle 
i n Catalonia. I n contrast, Scottish nationalism lacked a siirple 
s o l u t i o n t o the problems a r i s i n g from the e x i s t i n g relationship 
between state and c i v i l society, and the weakness of Scottish 
c u l t u r e made i t d i f f i c u l t t o present i t as a source of 
socio - c u l t u r a l l e g i t i m a t i o n f o r nationalism. 
Given the differences between the two n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n terms 
of the state they were facing and the le g i t i m a t i o n problems they 
were addressing, i t comes as l i t t l e surprise t h a t the strategies of 
both sides i n the n a t i o n a l i s t struggle also varied i n Catalonia and 
Scotland. The next section looks at the way i n v^ich the struggles 
developed, and argues t h a t the popular f r o n t approach of the Catalan 
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movement was more successful than the parliamentary approach of the 
Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t s . 
4. STRATEGIES OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND STATE RESPDNSES 
4.1 Catalonia; unitary strategy and power vacuum 
Many d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s of c i v i l society joined t o 
form a united f r o n t against Francoism and i n favour of autonomy. 
Since the beginning of the 1970's p o l i t i c a l nationalism was 
represented by the Assemblea de Catalunya, which held the claim of 
representing the Catalan people, although considerations of formal 
representation were obsolete then. I t embraced a wide enough range 
of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , organisations and popular movements, 
par1:icularly on the l e f t of the p o l i t i c a l spectrum, and apart from 
basic p r i n c i p l e s of democracy and autonomy f o r Catalonia, no 
s p e c i f i c ideas about the p o l i t i c a l future a f t e r Franco were 
elaborated. The Estatut d'AutoxKsnia of 1932 served as an al t e r n a t i v e 
t o the Francoistt state, and the presidents of the Republican 
Generalitat, Macia, Conpanys and the exiled Tarradellas were called 
upon as the symbols of the movement (Benet, 1978, 100) . Since there 
was no way t o express one's p o l i t i c a l opinions through the b a l l o t 
box, popular manifestations and extra parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s were the caramon c a r r i e r of the message of the l^sanblea 
de Catalimya. 
Unitarianism prevailed i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement u n t i l the f i r s t 
general elections, although the f i r s t differences between the 
d i f f e r e n t sectors of the movement had already become v i s i b l e . For 
exaitple, the n a t i o n a l i s t party of the centre, Oonvergencia 
DenK>cratica de Catalunya, favoured negotiations i n high places t o 
organised pressure through mass movements, and therefore i n i t i a t e d 
the creation of the Consell de Forces Politiques de Catalunya 
(Catalan Council of P o l i t i c a l Forces) i n December 1975. This s h i f t e d 
the eitphasis from popular struggle and p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o negotiation 
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through (often self-appointed) representatives \s*iich were mostly 
middle class i n t e l l e c t u a l s . 
However, p u b l i c l y the unit a r y struggle was s t i l l on. I n 1977, the 
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recently (January 1976) formed Partit Socicilista de Catalmya 
(PSC) suggested t h a t the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t opposition should go 
i n t o the f i r s t democratic elections on a unitary platform. I t argued 
t h a t "vtotever the p o l i t i c a l and ideological objectives or class 
i n t e r e s t s of individuals or groups, i t i s an absolute p r i o r i t y t o 
establish the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework [Generalitat and Estatut of 
1932] and the p o l i t i c a l power required t o f u l f i l the national w i l l 
i n order t o enable the people t o decide f r e e l y " (Sobreques, 1988, 
20) . This quote shows j u s t t o vihat extent the Catalan Socialists had 
tuned t o the n a t i o n a l i s t discourse, and come t o regard autonomy as a 
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more urgent issue than social reform or rupture . I h i s unitary 
platform f o r the f i r s t elections (June 1977) was the Entesa dels 
Catalans. Although the c e n t r i s t Convergencia and the government 
party UCD d i d not j o i n the Entesa"^^, i t nevertheless gained 12 out 
of 16 senator seats . I n the elections t o the Spanish parliament 
(Cortes), which took place on the same day, the parties of the Left 
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I.e. the Catalan s o c i a l i s t party which was l a t e r t o merge with 
the Catalan wing of the Spanish s o c i a l i s t party t o form the PSC-PSOE of 
today. 
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I s i d r e Molas, a leading fi g u r e i n the PSC, explained t h a t the 
strategy of the s o c i a l i s t s then coincided i n practice w i t h t h a t of the 
Communists. They wanted t o form a progressive al l i a n c e w i t h the PSUC and 
Oonvergencia i n opposition t o the UCD v^iich was i n government i n Madrid 
(Molas, interview, 21.3.1988). 
"^^Convergencia d i d not want t o be i n a pact w i t h the Communists, 
because t h i s would mean t h a t the right-wing Catalans would refuse i t 
t h e i r support. Unitarian Catalan p o l i t i c s located Convergencia on the 
c e n t r e - l e f t of the p o l i t i c a l spectrum (Molas, interview, 21.3.1988). 
With increasing dissociation of the party from the Catalan l e f t during 
the second h a l f of the 1970's, i t succeeded i n increasing i t s share with 
the a i d of the conservative vote. 
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The other Catalan p a r t i e s , who d i d not want t o make an alliance 
w i t h the communists, formed another el e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e , Danocratica i 
Catalxmya and got two senators, and the UCD one.In the Senate, a l l 
Catalan representatives, except f o r the UCD senator, formed a group and 
threw t h e i r weight behind the demand f o r autonomy. 
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won a resounding v i c t o r y i n Catalonia; meanwhile i n the rest of 
Spain, the post-Francoist Union del Centro Deraocratico (UCD) got the 
majority of the vote and became the government party (Table 5.2). 
A f t e r the 1977 elections, the elected representatives devoted t h e i r 
e f f o r t s t o negotiating w i t h the central government about the 
re-establishment of the Generalitat under Tarradellas. But by 
l i m i t i n g i t s e l f t o t h i s aspect of p o l i t i c a l change, the Catalan 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement handed over the i n i t i a t i v e t o the central 
government under the conservative UCD. I t was the Spanish president 
Suarez and the president of the Generalitat i n e x i l e , Tarradellas, 
v*io became the main protagonists i n the provisional re-establishment 
of the Generalitat. Tarradellas was not only a symbol f o r the 
c o n t i n u i t y of the Generalitat, as some Catalan p a r t i e s claimed, but 
he was permitted by the leaders of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement t o 
become the only p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e vho could lay claim t o legitimacy 
i n Catalan p o l i t i c s . I n the summer of 1977, Tarradellas was brought 
back from e x i l e by the Suarez government. 
While many interviewees and commentators from the v^iole p o l i t i c a l 
spectrum argued t h a t the unitary and moderate approach of the 
Catalan opposition was responsible f o r the central government's 
decicion t o cave i n and p r o v i s i o n a l l y restore the Generalitat under 
Tarradellas, J u t g l a r provided a more c r i t i c a l opinion. He noted t h a t 
a f t e r the general elections of 1977, public p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 
n a t i o n a l i s t struggle declined, both i n demonstrations and i n 
elections. He saw the reason f o r t h i s i n the increasing d i v i s i o n 
between the Catalan " p o l i t i c a l class" and the people. The 
p o l i t i c i a n s were so obsessed with u n i t a r i t y and negotiated solutions 
t h a t the more r a d i c a l contents of the Left's p o l i t i c a l programme 
" f e l l under the table". The a c t i v i t i e s behind the scenes which 
surrounded the establishment of the provisional Generalitat, and the 
subsequently emerging party p o l i t i c a l struggles f o r hegemony, were 
not reported . t o the public. Instead, a l l the parties involved 
maintained the myth of national unity. Many negotiations w i t h the 
UCD government, the elaboration of the Spanish c o n s t i t u t i o n and of 
the Catalan statute of autonomy were a l l conducted i n absolute 
secrecy, without grass roots debates and p a r t i c i p a t o r y mechanisms, 
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This lack of democratic mechanisms i n the p o l i t i c a l reform process 
heralded the beginning of popular disenchantment w i t h the new 
democracy (Jutglar, 1982, 300-302). 
Without asking t h e i r supporters, Catalan p o l i t i c a l parties from 
r i g h t t o l e f t abandoned t h e i r claims t o change through p o l i t i c a l 
rupture. Rather than pressing f o r the a b o l i t i o n of a l l Francoist 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and laws, because "democracy must base i t s e l f on 
i n s t i t u t i o n s created by the people and on laws made by a democratic 
parliament elected by the people" (Colomer e t a l . , v o l . I I , 1976, 
135), they s e t t l e d f o r a negotiated t r a n s i t i o n t o co n s t i t u t i o n a l 
democracy. Even the Communist party leadership decided i n 1977 t o 
j o i n i n the negotiations f o r a reform of the state (Clemente, 
interview, 21.3.1988). 
Thus, the "people" became the audience and the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s 
i n leading party posts the actors on the p o l i t i c a l stage w i t h the 
curtains drawn. The Union del Centro Desnocratico was able t o present 
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themselves as the "men who made democracy and autonomy possible" 
I n the eyes of a memlDer of the provisional Catalan government i n the 
l a t e 1970's, i t was a quiet, well-behaved revolution (Pi-Sunyer, 
interview, 8.4.1988). But c r i t i c s l i k e Josep Benet c l a i n t h a t the 
strong p o s i t i o n of the Catalan opposition i n the period of 
t r a n s i t i o n could have been used t o achieve a greater degree of 
autonomy and more f i n a n c i a l concessions from the central state, 
precisely during the t r a n s i t i o n period (Benet, interview, 
17.4.1988). Although the new Statute of Autonomy received 
overwhelming support from the electorate i n the 1979 referendum 
(Moreno Fernandez, 1986, 191; see Chapter two. Table 2.1), the 
autonomous structures of government i t created d i d not provide the 
conditions f o r people t o become ac t i v e l y involved i n governing 
38 
This slogan epitomised the change i n the p o l i t i c a l climate. The 
same men had only a couple of years before been referred t o as 
Francoists. Now, they were post-Francoist reformers, instrumental i n the 
t r a n s i t i o n t o democracy. 
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themselves. Instead, the Catalan Generalitat and i t s organs became a 
new bureaucracy i n the 1980's. 
4.2. Scotland! parliamentary cul-de-sac to devolution 
Meanwhile, the demands f o r autonomy and independence were p r i m a r i l y 
channelled i n t o e l e c t o r a l si:pport, f i r s t f o r the SNP, and from 1977 
onwarxJs increasingly f o r the labour Party, From the beginning i t was 
obvious t h a t the Scottish public regarded the Parliament a t 
Westminster as the proper place f o r pursuing self-government and/or 
f i n d i n g a way t o save the legitimacy of the state. As events showed, 
the state proved amazingly capable of dealing with t h i s challenge 
without d e l i v e r i n g autonomy, a t least i n the short term. 
The Labour Party managed t o control the n a t i o n a l i s t t i d e by make 
concessions, as the U-tum of the Scottish Labour Party under the 
influence of the B r i t i s h party leadership demonstrated i n 1974 
( S i l l a r s , 1986, 45). Secondly, the state engaged i n delaying 
t a c t i c s . The Scotsman^ which was rather sympathetic t o the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement, argued i n a leader i n 1975: 
"For a t least eight years - since the Hamilton by-election 
i n 1967 - devolution has been a l i v e l y issue, one very hard 
f o r professional p o l i t i c i a n s t o neglect. Yet t h a t i s a feat 
v ^ i c h English Ministers and MPs are quite capable of 
achieving." 
(Scotsman. 29.10.1975) 
Time-wasting, c a l l s f o r a "great debate" and a referendum on the 
devolution issue, lack of urgency and commitment on behalf of the 
government, and demands f o r "the same f o r England" were accusations 
the pro-devolutionist labour back bencher John Mackintosh made, and 
he asked a n g r i l y : 
"With 80 per cent of the electorate wanting e i t h e r 
independence (20 per cent) or more devolution (60 per cent), 
w i t h 30 per cent having voted SNP l a s t year, w i t h a majority 
of the Scottish labour Party a t a l l levels i n favour of 
devolution and the Conservatives limping along behind, Vs*aat 
more can be done t o demonstrate t o the London-based 
establishment t h a t t h i s demand exists and w i l l not 
evaporate?" 
(chapter f i v e ) (315) 
(Scotsman. 24.11.1975) 
However, the Scottish people did not take the issue i n t o t h e i r own 
hands and feet, as there was no mass demonstration or popular 
canpaign worth entering the h i s t o r i c a l records. The f i r s t devolution 
b i l l was so weak and incoherent t h a t i t d i d not have popular or 
party p o l i t i c a l support and f e l l through i n 1977. The second b i l l , 
launched i n autumn 1977, only got throu<^ the Commons w i t h 
considerable concessions t o the group of anti-d e v o l u t i o n i s t Labour 
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rebels, and intensive pressure on them . 
The SNP, on the other hand, no longer seemed t o be on the crest of 
the n a t i o n a l i s t wave (Scotsman, 26.10.1977). I t s presence i n the 
House of Commons damaged i t s popularity i n Scotland (Wolfe, 
interview, 25.2.1987). 
The referendum r e s u l t , and the way i t was treated i n Scotland and i n 
government c i r c l e s r e f l e c t e d the deep divisions among the p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s and the lack of imagination of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement as 
regards t o ways of mobilising the Scottish people. The lessons from 
the 1970's f o r today's n a t i o n a l i s t s i n Scotland are tha t the 
movement needs a body representing a l l sections of Scottish c i v i l 
society v ^ i c h could express the strong feelings i n favour of 
self-government. Since the establishment of the Constitutional 
Convention i n 1989, such a body exists, but i t i s too early t o judge 
on i t s performance. The Constitutional Convention i s an i n p l i c i t 
acknowledgement t h a t the assembly i s u n l i k e l y t o come through the 
parliamentary way (Jim Ross, interview, 9.8.1988). But f o r 
extra-parliamentary action. Radical Scotland argued, " t h e r e ' l l have 
t o be some serious public canpaigning t o raise support (...). This 
w i l l require a type of campaigning v^iich a) a t t r a c t s the broadest 
possible support, and b) enables public f e e l i n g t o be expressed 
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I n a f r o n t page a r t i c l e headed "Callaghan ultimatum t o Labour's 
rebel MPs - Devolution or General Election", the Scotsman reported t h a t 
the prime minister had "c l e a r l y embarked on a high-power campaign t o put 
tremendous, i f not unbearable pressure on p o t e n t i a l rebels" (Scotsman. 
13.10.1977), a t a time when opinion p o l l s put the Scottish labour vote 
second t o the SNP. 
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spontaneously, rather than channelled (controlled?) through e x i s t i n g 
formal structures" (Radical Scotland, 29, Oct./Nov. 1987, 9). 
I f the actual p o l i t i c a l trends indicate a departure of the Scottish 
national movement from the parliamentary road - t r i e d and f a i l e d i n 
the 1970's - arxi the antagonism between Scottish society and the 
B r i t i s h state has grown t o the extent suggested above, then i t would 
be possible t o see a c o a l i t i o n movement i n favour of self-government 
s i m i l a r t o t h a t observed i n Catalonia i n the 1970's. Whether i t w i l l 
have the same l i m i t a t i o n s i s another question. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The influence of the changes i n , and the expansion of, the state 
over the past decades on the n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n Scotland and 
Catalonia was the t o p i c of t h i s chapter. I t has been argued th a t the 
differences between the Spanish d i c t a t o r i a l regime under Franco and 
the B r i t i s h democratic state were vast, and the motives and aims of 
the national movements were t o a large extent shaped by the nature 
of the state they were confronting. Not only the contents, but also 
the form of the movements were strongly influenced by the prev a i l i n g 
p o l i t i c a l regime. 
I n the Catalan case, a unitary opposition movement organised the 
p o l i t i c a l struggle f o r autonomy, and t h i s demand was ine x t r i c a b l y 
l i n k e d t o the struggle f o r democracy. I n Scotland, the SNP was the 
main vehicle f o r expressing discontent w i t h the central state and 
the desire f o r more autonomy f o r Scotland, p u t t i n g pressure on other 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s t o "do something about" the growing n a t i o n a l i s t 
t i d e . While demands f o r autonomy constituted a d i r e c t threat t o the 
basis of the Spanish state and i n p l i e d a break w i t h the structure of 
the Franco regime, devolution was a concept which could be 
accommodated i n the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l structures i n B r i t a i n without 
too great a s h i f t of power away from the centre. 
However, the development of capitalism i n Spain slowly changed the 
parameters which defined the e d i f i c e of the state. More demands were 
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made on the state, and i t s f a i l u r e t o intervene t o redress the 
i n e q u a l i t i e s and the hardship caused by the economic boom and the 
subsequent c r i s i s i n the 1960's and 1970's mobilised even those 
sectors of Catalan society t o p o l i t i c a l action against the state 
which economically benefited under the dictatorship. Failure t o act 
on behalf of the well-being of c i t i z e n s was i n contradiction with 
the ways i n ^ l i c h the state i n t e r f e r e d i n the socio-cultural sphere, 
repressing the Catalan language and culture, and i n the p o l i t i c a l 
sphere, repressing p o l i t i c a l opposition and a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t class 
organisation. An autonomous government i n Catalonia was therefore 
regarded as a way of g e t t i n g r i d of an i n e f f i c i e n t , corrupt and 
repressive state regarded as a l i e n t o the Catalans, and a symbol f o r 
a democratic a l t e r n a t i v e v^ich would solve the country's problems. 
I n Scotland, the c r i s i s of l e g i t i m a t i o n of the state was of a 
d i f f e r e n t kind, brought about by the f a i l u r e of the welfare state t o 
solve a l l those problems which i t had promised t o solve i n the 
1940's and 1950's. Demands f o r closer control over the a c t i v i t i e s of 
the state and more popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n decision making 
processes concerning the tasks of the state were iirportant arguments 
i n the devolution debate, whereby the nature and degree of popular 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and self-government were not redefined i n radical 
terms. 
As f a r as the response of the state was concerned, i t was noted t h a t 
the democratic B r i t i s h state had more options available t o defuse 
and weaken the n a t i o n a l i s t ground swell. Taking t i n e and exhausting 
a l l possible paths of parliamentary democracy (and bureaucracy) t o 
delay any decision were j u s t two exairples. The Spanish state - i n 
the g r i p of an a u t o r i t a r i a n leadership and with an entrenched, 
corrupt bureaucracy - was less f l e x i b l e , especially v^en i t became 
obvious t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Catalonia had a l o t of 
popular support. Nevertheless, the post-Francoist Suarez government 
succeeded t o some extent i n taking the ra d i c a l edge o f f the movement 
by e x p l o i t i n g the lack of democratic structures w i t h i n i t . 
With respect t o the development i n the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
a f t e r the referendum, the most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect i s probably the 
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continuous erosion of l e g i t i n a t i o n of the - widely regarded as 
au t h o r i t a r i a n and undemocratic - Tory government i n Scotland. The 
c a l l f o r self-government has become louder and more widespread since 
the 1983 elections (Table 5.3). Over the recent years the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Scotland has adopted some of the strategies 
used by the Catalan national movement and resorted increasingly t o 
extra parliamentary forms of popular mobilisation. The very recent 
establishment of a unit a r y opposition organisation, which i s 
claiming t o represent Scottish c i v i l society and t o voice i t s demand 
f o r self-government, i s another step i n the slow process of erosion 
of the government's l e g i t i m a t i o n i n Scotland. 
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TABLES OF CHAPTER FIVE 
Table 5.1: Preferred alternatives for running Scotland as a whole 
(per cent) 
OPINION July/August May Deconber 
1970 1974 1975 
Leave things as they 
are at present 6 14 11 
Keep things much the same as 
they are now, but make sure 
that the needs of Scotland 19 20 16 
are better understood 
Keep the present system but 
allow more decisions to be 26 24 27 
made i n Scotland 
23 19 
Have a new system of 
governing Scotland so that 24 
as many decisions as 
possible are mad i n the area 
Let Scotland take over complete 
responsibility for running 23 18 24 
things i n Scotland 
Don't know 1 1 3 
Source: Opinion Research Centre Poll, in Scotsman. 16.12.1975. 
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Table 5.2: Results of the Spanish parliamentary elections, 1977 
(Per cent i n Catalan provinces and Spain) 
SPAN. PARTIES UCD AP PSOE PCE Othe: CAT. PARTIES Conviv VSC PSUC Pacte EC UDC 
PROVINCES 
Barcelona 15.1 3.1 30.5 19.4 15.2 4.7 5.3 6.7 
Girona 18.0 3.2 24.2 10.0 26.8 2.5 5.5 5.1 
Lleida 18.6 4.2 11.3 9.3 18.6 5.8 7.3 -
Tarragona 27.1 5.9 22.8 16.4 14.3 - 5.8 5.9 
SPAIN 48.0 4.8 33.1* 5.4 2.8 * - 5.9 
* The results of the Catalan parties PSC and EC are included in the 
figure of the Pacte Democratic. 
Source: Diario de Barcelona. 17.6.1977. 
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Table 5.3: "Discussion i s once more going on regarding the setting 
vp of a. p o l i t i c a l Assembly for Scotland. Do you think 
the need for a Scottish Assembly i s greater or less than 
i t was five years ago [1979]?" (in per cent) 
R e l i e s Total SNP Labour Alliance Tory 
Greater 54 76 64 53 29 Less 14 3 9 21 31 About the same 15 10 10 18 22 Don't know 17 11 17 8 18 
Source: System Three Opinion P o l l September 20-25, 1984, i n Radical 
Scotland. 12, December/January 1985, 6-8. 
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T H E P O L I T I C S OF C U L T U R E : 
C U L T U R A L INSTITUTIONS AND I N T E L L E C T U A L S 
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1. INTRDDUCnON 
One of the arguments used i n the previous chapter was th a t culture 
plays an iirportant r o l e i n the l e g i t i i t d s a t i o n of a state. I f a state 
denies and undermines the c u l t u r a l structures and t r a d i t i o n s of i t s 
s\±)jects, i t can lead t o the erosion of i t s legitimacy. This vras the 
case w i t h the Franco regime i n Catalonia, v^iere the p r o h i b i t i o n of 
Catalan as a public language p o l i t i c i s e d everyday a c t i v i t i e s v*Lich 
under "normal" circumstances would not have been regarded as 
p o l i t i c a l . The n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l began as a c u l t u r a l movement 
v ^ c h aimed a t l i b e r a t i n g the public realm of Catalan c i v i l society 
from the influence of the state. Since the Francoist repression of 
Catalan c u l t u r e affected the l i v e s of the majority of Catalans, the 
p o l i t i c a l opposition against the regime was able t o count at least 
on the passive support of a l l social classes. Chapter four has 
explained the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n of several sectors of the middle 
class and the bourgeoisie i n the Catalan unitary opposition by 
reference t o the strong Catalan c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y v^ich 
characterised them. The a v a i l a b i l i t y of a d i s t i n c t i v e culture, which 
could serve as a socio-cultural basis of leg i t i m a t i o n , kept the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement together ( u n t i l the f i r s t elections) despite 
the v a r i e t y of p o l i t i c a l projects t h a t where f l o a t i n g around w i t h i n 
i t s ranks. 
I n Scotland, such a strong and d i s t i n c t i v e c ulture d i d not exi s t . 
Whatever c u l t u r a l differences there existed between Scottish and 
English c i v i l society, they were not considered as a basis of 
le g i t i m a t i o n by the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Therefore, the 
above mentioned f a c t o r which helped t o mobilise and un i f y the 
Catalan movement was only a peripheral concern i n Scotland. This 
surely accounts t o some degree f o r the i n t e r n a l divisions w i t h i n the 
Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement, i t s confused sense of di r e c t i o n , and 
the lack of powerful popular manifestations f o r self-government. I n 
Scotland, i t was l e f t mostly t o the elected p o l i t i c i a n s t o sort i t 
a l l out. 
This chapter looks i n more d e t a i l a t the r o l e which culture played 
i n the process of n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c i s a t i o n and the struggle f o r 
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l e g i t i m a t i o n , and t o the key agents i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements, the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The term "culture" does not only describe the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and imaginative products of a p a r t i c u l a r society, but 
more generally the meanings and values which guide social practice, 
and v\*iich are expressed i n i n s t i t u t i o n s and ordinary behaviour (R. 
Williams, 1961, 41-42). I n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , c ulture and hegemony can 
be taken t o mean v i r t u a l l y the same thing. Raymond Williams regarded 
hegemony as "a c u l t u r e vjhich has also t o be seen as the l i v e d 
dominance and subordination of p a r t i c u l a r classes", but vdiich 
constitutes a sense of r e a l i t y f o r the people because i t expresses 
the meanings and values t h a t are reproduced i n everyday l i f e (R. 
Williams, 1976, 110). 
This view owes much t o Gramsci, v^o recognised culture as a central 
aspect of hegemony. He conceived of i n t e l l e c t u a l s as those people i n 
a given society viho exercise the functions of hegemony. 
I n t e l l e c t u a l s create and disseminate ideologies, sustain, modify and 
a l t e r the modes of t h i n k i n g and behaviour of the masses. I n order 
f o r popular support or consent t o be durable, the i n t e l l e c t u a l s must 
be p a r t of a national-popular culture, or, i n Gramsci's words, the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s nuist come from the people, and know and sense t h e i r 
people's needs, aspirations and feelings'^. Gramsci argued t h a t 
without t h i s l i n k between popular f e e l i n g and i n t e l l e c t u a l 
knowledge, there i s no h i s t o r y and no p o l i t i c s . Any action of 
h i s t o r i c a l dimension can only be carried out by " c o l l e c t i v e man", 
i . e . i t presupposes the creation of c u l t u r a l - s o c i a l unity, f o r v^ich 
a large number of agents w i t h d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s are prepared t o 
form an a l l i a n c e on the basis of a shared world view (Gramsci, 1983, 
257). The h i s t o r i c a l and sentimental bonds between i n t e l l e c t u a l s and 
people can also be described as the national i d e n t i t y of the 
^ I h i s would explain the importance of Romanticism i n the 19th 
century wave of nationalism. According t o Gramsci, Romanticism assumes a 
special r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e l l e c t u a l s and the people ( Gramsci, 
1985, 205). I n Catalonia, i t was under the influence of Romanticist 
l i t e r a t u r e t h a t the c u l t u r a l basis of Catalan nationalism was l a i d . The 
p o l i t i c a l movement then b u i l t on t h i s "national r e a l i t y " , a term with 
\ ^ i c h Catalans describe the s o c i a l practices and organisation which 
d i s t i n g u i s h Catalonia from the r e s t of Spain. 
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i n t e l l e c t u a l s (Gramsci, 1971, 20). Their a c t i v i t i e s t i e them i n t o a 
determined c u l t u r e and c i v i l i s a t i o n , vhich makes them more l i k e l y t o 
develop or preserve a national consciousness. The language i s 
probably the main t i e , because people w r i t e , learn, preach and 
generally conceive of t h e i r environment i n a determined language. 
Many academic studies of nationalism therefore consider 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s as the key social g r o i ^ i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
(Anderson, B., 1983; Hroch, 1985; Nairn, 1977; A. D. Smith, 1982). 
N a t i o n a l i s t moveirients are p o l i t i c a l movements i n which the function 
of c u l t u r e as a un i f y i n g social bond i s p a r t i c u l a r l y obvious. This 
i s heightened i n those cases where language differences e x i s t , or 
v^ere, as i n the Catalan case, a national language i s repressed. 
National c u l t u r e i s reproduced i n i n s t i t u t i o n s of c i v i l society, 
i . e . i n those organisations vdiich are situated between the 
ind i v i d u a l and the state, such as schools, clubs, the media, the 
church, etc.. This i s also true f o r those cultures v^ich are not 
o f f i c i a l , although, i n such cases, the i n s t i t u t i o n s are more remote 
from the state, and tend t o be of a private nature. I n fact , 
precisely the lack of acceptance of c u l t u r a l values and t r a d i t i o n s 
by the stat e promoted i n Catalonia the creation of an extensive 
network of i n s t i t u t i o n s i n which these t r a d i t i o n s were cu l t i v a t e d . 
Thus, i n c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s provide i n t e r e s t i n g information v^ich 
helps t o assess the r o l e of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement, and t o f i n d out what kind of culture i s presented as 
national and by whom. For the purpose of t h i s thesis, i t i s 
s u f f i c i e n t t o pick out a few i n s t i t u t i o n s of v^ich i t i s argued th a t 
they had an important function i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. 
The strong presence of a national language makes a bi g difference t o 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements, because i t i s the main element of a culture 
and a key manifestation of n a t i o n a l i t y . Although Catalan was not the 
o f f i c i a l language i n Catalonia f o r much of modem h i s t o r y (except 
during the Second Republic when i t was c o - o f f i c i a l with C a s t i l i a n ) , 
i t remained the language of the people throughout (Termes, 1986, 
15), and therefore also the medium of coraraunication f o r many 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Catalan i s spoken not only by a majority of the 
inhabitants of Catalonia, but also i n the surrounding areas, such as 
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the province of Valencia and i n the Balearic Islands (Fig. 24). 
Under the repressive conditions of the Franco regime, the Catalan 
language became a u n i f y i n g l i n k between the d i f f e r e n t social groups 
which came t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Scotland, on 
the other hand, demonstrates t h a t language and culture i n the narrow 
sense are not necessarily the main nucleus o f a n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. Most Scots use the language of the B r i t i s h state, and 
therefore share the English and B r i t i s h c u l t u r a l heritage. Gaelic, 
the dominant language i n Scotland vp until the 16th century, has a l l 
but disappeared. Most Scottish i n t e l l e c t u a l s regard English as t h e i r 
language, and only a few of them are focusing on Scotland's 
indigenous languages. 
This chapter w i l l demonstrate th a t culture plays a very d i f f e r e n t 
r o l e i n the Catalan and the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l . I n 
Catalonia, we are faced w i t h a strong and d i s t i n c t i v e culture v ^ i c h 
has been a very conscious pa r t of c i v i l society since the end of the 
19th century. The repression which Catalans suffered under Franco 
due t o t h e i r c u l t u r a l distinctiveness has f a i l e d t o eradicate 
Catalan c u l t u r e . Instead, i t became p o l i t i c i s e d , and i n the 1960's, 
Catalan language and c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s came t o epitomise the 
national struggle against the Franco regime. Thus, here the c u l t u r a l 
movement was leading the p o l i t i c a l movement f o r self-government and 
became intertwined w i t h i t . As an example of the l i n k s between the 
c u l t u r a l and the p o l i t i c a l r e v i v a l of Catalan nationalism, I look a t 
publishing houses, which were p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n s t i t u t i o n s 
i n the 1960's. Many i n t e l l e c t u a l s who were involved w i t h the r e v i v a l 
of Catalan publishing also played important roles i n the leadership 
of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement and of the opposition parties. Since the 
publishing houses exerted t h e i r influence mostly on middle class 
people, i t i s also necessary t o consider more popular and working 
class i n s t i t u t i o n s i n order t o examine the l i n k s between culture and 
p o l i t i c s i n the working class. For t h i s reason I conclude the 
section on Catalonia by analysing the r o l e of the Football Club 
Barcelona (F. C. Barcelona) i n the n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c i s a t i o n 
process. 
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I n the Scottish case, many cbservers have argued t h a t the p o l i t i c a l 
movement has led the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l , rather than vice versa. 
Scottish c u l t u r e since the Union i s regarded as deformed and 
degraded by indigenous i n t e l l e c t u a l s , and modem na t i o n a l i s t s have 
been t r y i n g t o separate the c u l t u r a l from the p o l i t i c a l . As McCrone 
claims, they prefer a nationalism without the encumbrance of heavy 
c u l t u r a l baggage (McCrone, 1989, 172). Section three examines what 
t h i s baggage consists of, and which parts of i t have been accepted, 
or rejected, by the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Ihe c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e of 
Scottish i n t e l l e c t u a l s towards the Scottish c u l t u r a l heritage has 
often been matched w i t h s i m i l a r scepticism about p o l i t i c a l 
nationalism. D i f f i c u l t i e s i n acknowledging, and i d e n t i f y i n g with, 
Scottish popular c u l t u r e has weakened the n a t i o n a l i s t movement and 
r e s t r i c t e d the r o l e of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a w i t h i n i t . Only recently 
has the slow r e v i v a l of Scottish indigenous culture over t h i s 
century become openly discussed and appreciated. 
2. SYMBOLS OF CATALAN rDENTITY: THE CATAIAN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 
I n order t o grasp the central r o l e of Catalan culture i n the 
n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l , we have t o step back and adopt a h i s t o r i c a l 
perspective. Chapter two pointed out t h a t the establishment of the 
Franco regime cut short a process of c u l t u r a l reconstruction v*iich 
had involved several generations of Catalans. By the end of the 
1930's, the Catalan culture was f i r m l y rooted i n c i v i l society, and 
therefore, the Francoist repression v^ich followed had the e f f e c t of 
cementing i t even more. This was not an inevitable process, but 
rather depended, t o a large extent, on the a t t i t u d e of the Catalan 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s , as the next subsections argue. 
2.1 The repression and politicisation of Catalan language emd 
CTolture under Franco 
The repression of Catalanism a f t e r the Spanish c i v i l war (1936-39) 
demonstrated t h a t Catalan autonomy had a deeply h o s t i l e reception 
(Chapter six) (329) 
among many Spaniards, and triggered o f f fears of a breakup of the 
statje. I n h i s analysis of the press and p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e , Benet 
concluded t h a t 
"One of the main reasons, and one of the fundamental aims of 
t i l l s war was the i n t e n t t o annihilate the national 
personality of Catalonia, her language and culture, and the 
a b o l i t i o n of the moderate autonomous government v ^ c h the 
Second Spanish Republic had granted the Catalans." 
(Benet, 1979, 89) 
The Franco regime d i d everything t o remove the symbols and products 
of Catalan c u l t u r e f r a n the public sphere: changing Catalan place 
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names t o C a s t i l i a n , confiscating statues of prominent Catalans from 
publ i c places (Benet, 1979, 349-350), refusing t o accept Catalan 
personal names i n b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e s , p r o h i b i t i n g Catalan f o l k l o r e 
dances, destroying Catalan books i n public l i b r a r i e s and p r o h i b i t i n g 
t h e i r production and sale, placing l o y a l Francoists a t the top of 
c u l t u r a l and educational i n s t i t u t e s , and p r o h i b i t i n g the use of 
Catalan i n public. Thousands of i n t e l l e c t u a l s were forced t o leave 
the country, and i t was no longer possible t o use Catalan as a 
language of cul t u r e and science as i t was banned from schools 
(Benet, 1980, 146-147). Thus, a f t e r the c u l t u r a l boom of the 1930's, 
suddenly there was no more sign of Catalan culture l e f t i n the early 
1940's. For most of the subsequent years of the Franco regime, many 
types of c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y were clandestine i n Catialonia. The 
coirprehensive canpaign of repression of a language vAiich was widely 
used as an o f f i c i a l language affected many Catalans. The shared f a t e 
of having the "wrong" culture became a source of s o l i d a r i t y 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of social class (Benet, 1978, 16), the language i t s e l f 
a symbol of Catalan i d e n t i t y , and, most irrportant of a l l , Catalan 
c u l t u r e was elevated i n t o a quasi p o l i t i c a l issue. 
The Catalan language thus passed i n t o t±ie pri v a t e sphere, became the 
spoken language of the Catalan family which was passed on t o the 
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To mention j u s t a few exaitples, a boulevard named a f t e r the 
Catalan a r c h i t e c t Gaudi was given the name of the 1920's d i c t a t o r 
General Primo de Rivera, the road "Autonomia" was changed i n t o "Unidad", 
etc. (Benet, 1979, 252-253). 
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next generation, but no longer learned properly. A f t e r the period of 
the most s t r i n g e n t repression was over, the anti-Catalan regulations 
were relaxed t o some extent, and the a u t h o r i t i e s more prepared t o 
t u r n a b l i n d eye on purely c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . Max Cahner, v*io was 
a prominent f i g u r e i n the Catalan c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l from the l a t e 
1950's onwards, commented on the developments a f t e r 1945: 
"The model according t o which the regime was now operating 
was t o say, " a l r i g h t , i t i s an ijrpossible t h i n g , an Utopia, 
t o suppress Catalan; i t i s a language v^ich i s used by the 
people, and i t cannot be extinguished. What we can do i s t o 
transform i t from a national language i n t o a regioneil 
language and cul t u r e " . [...] So, i t was a l r i g h t f o r some 
p r i e s t s t o w r i t e poems, f o r some gentlemen t o w r i t e r u r a l 
novels, t o engage i n f o l k l o r e a c t i v i t i e s ...; i n short, a l l 
t h i s was now permitted, and the aim was t o transform Catalan 
i n t o a regional language, l i k e those i n France. [...] They 
decided t o reduce the Catalan language t o a language of 
intimacy, f a m i l i a r i t y , r u r a l environment, memories, etc.. 
But f o r science, economy, f o r earning a l i v i n g , f o r the 
academic world, and above a l l f o r p o l i t i c s , meetings and 
mass events only C a s t i l i a n was t o be used." 
(Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988) 
Censorship was one of the most inportant instruments i n t h i s 
endeavour of rendering the Catalan language i r r e l e v a n t . The 
fo l l o w i n g subsection focuses on the way i n vhich censorship affected 
Catalan c u l t u r e i n the publishing sector. 
2.2 Censorship practices 
Publishing was submitted t o censorship throughout the Franco period, 
and i n Catalan as w e l l as C a s t i l i a n , although over the decades i t s 
appl i c a t i o n underwent changes. These developments have not been 
studied s u f f i c i e n t l y t o draw d e f i n i t i v e conclusions , but some 
general comments can be made about them. 
I t i s only now t h a t censorship material of the f i r s t two decades 
of the Franco regiine can be consulted and analysed, and there are s t i l l 
r e s t r i c t i o n s o f access t o some of t h a t material (Massot, interview, 
28.2.1988). 
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The period i s roughly divided i n t o three phases, wit±i the l a s t 
fading i n t o the t r a n s i t i o n period. The 1940's and 1950's are defined 
as an era of heavy r e s t r i c t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the f i r s t 5 t o 6 years 
of the 1940's u n t i l the new p o l i t i c a l balance of power a f t e r the end 
of World War I I produced the f i r s t changes i n the Franco regime. I n 
the case of Catalonia, the production of Catalan books was almost 
reduced t o zero because the regime decided t h a t i t was no longer a 
language of culture. At the beginning of the .l960's, i n the wake of 
the new economic p o l i c y of the regime, a degree of l i b e r a l i s a t i o n of 
the censorship took place without fundamentally changing the 
premises on which i t was b u i l t . A f t e r Franco's death, many 
r e s t r i c t i o n s f e l l away, although selected items were s t i l l being 
withdrawn u n t i l the Suarez government abolished censorship 
completely^. 
The ideological, p o l i t i c a l and moral censorship was applied t o 
C a s t i l i a n and Catalan publishing a l i k e , and i n the f i r s t phase i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s manifested i t s e l f i n t±ie scarcity of p o l i t i c a l , 
philosophical and social science w r i t i n g . The national theme, f i r s t 
widely defined as anything published i n Catalan and then more 
narrowly defined as the Catalan national question, was an additional 
taboo f o r the Catalan language areas. Even when more books were 
allowed t o be published, themes such as Catalan history, 
nationalism, and Catalanist p o l i t i c s remained severely censored or 
proh i b i t e d u n t i l the t r a n s i t i o n period. Expressions such as paisos 
Catalans (Catalan countries) were forbidden, as was any discussion 
of Catalan autonomy. 
The censorship practices were not usually founded on clear-cut laws, 
but were the r e s u l t of a conplicated mixture of decrees and orders, 
personal a t t i t u d e s of ministers and general directors i n charge at 
d i f f e r e n t times. The frequent changes i n the p o l i t i c a l micro climate 
also influenced them. This created a s i t u a t i o n i n 'which everything 
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Although the Spanish c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1978 denies l e g i t i m a t i o n t o 
these censorship laws, they are s t i l l e x i s t i n g . According t o Massot, 
they have never been abolished (Massot, interview, 29.1.1988). 
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t h a t was not allowed was i n p r i n c i p l e forbidden, w i t h most 
a c t i v i t i e s taking place i n a grey zone of semi-legality established 
through practice. 
The Church played a p r i v i l e g e d r o l e i n t h i s system, because t h e i r 
publications were exeirpted from c i v i l censorship u n t i l the 1966 law 
(an e c c l e s i a s t i c censorship existed w i t h i n the Church) . This 
explains the iriportant r o l e of the Church i n the Catalan c u l t u r a l 
5 
r e v i v a l , because i t was one of the few places which were r e l a t i v e l y 
free of state intervention. The autonomy of the church was 
guaranteed by the Concordate (an agreement between the Vatican and 
the Franco regine) i n 1953 which restored the j u d i c i a l p r i v i l e g e s of 
the Church (abolished w i t h the F i r s t Republic) and reaffirmed the 
independence of the Church as a "perfect society" (Hermet, 1986, 
v o l . 2, 239). 
I n the wake of the new Press and P r i n t i n g Law of 1966, some new 
practices were introduced i n t o the censorship system i n order t o 
r a t i o n a l i s e i t ^ . But f o r most of the Catalan publishing houses which 
had sprung up i n the 1960's, very l i t t l e changed (Edicions 62, 1987, 
38-39) . The Min i s t r y of Tourism and Information or the provincial 
governors were s t i l l able t o i n t e r f e r e i n t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , 
withdrawing t h e i r books, enforcing changes or closing them down 
altogether. 
An inportant d i s t i n c t i o n was made by the reqme between books on the 
one hand, and journals and newspapers on the other. The censors of 
periodic publications were d i f f e r e n t people, usually of a higher 
Massot notes t h a t i n the f i r s t years a f t e r the c i v i l war, the only 
Catalan publications were r e l i g i o u s books published by confessional 
i n s t i t u t i o n s under the aut h o r i t y of the Church (Massot, 1979a, 92) . 
^ O f f i c i a l l y , t h i s law abolished censorship altogether, changing the 
name of "previous censorship" t o "voluntary consultation". But i n 
practice, i t only r a t i o n a l i s e d the censorship methods. Massot said: 
" I n practice i t was a system of cont r o l . The theory however 
was magnificent, because i n theory, the censorship d i d no 
longer e x i s t . " 
(Massot, interview, 29.1.1988) 
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educational standard and w i t h a p o l i t i c a l background (Cahner, 
interview, 11.2.1988), and scrutinised more thoroughly the p o l i t i c a l 
contents. The d i f f e r e n t purpose, s t y l e , d i s t r i b u t i o n and readership 
of the p e r i o d i c a l publications gave them a greater p o l i t i c a l 
significance. Catalan newspapers and journals were generally 
forbidden, and could only be published clandestinely or under the 
protection of the Church. Only the Catalan Communist Party was 
strong enough t o support a clandestine Catalan language magazine 
over a long period (Nous Horitzons), and Serra d^Or i s the only 
exanple of a major Catalan journal which appeared under the name of 
a r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n . 
Thus, due t o state intervention, the reproduction of Catalan culture 
was severely c u r t a i l e d . Even v^en the Franco regime had accepted 
t h a t i t would be iitpossible t o eradicate t±ie language, i t s t i l l 
pursued p o l i c i e s v ^ i c h aimed a t r e s t r i c t i n g the social and public 
functions of Catalan language and culture. Since the reasons f o r 
t h i s were p o l i t i c a l , the struggle of Catalans t o prevent the 
degradation of t h e i r c u lture also assumed a p o l i t i c a l dimension. The 
next p a r t i s concerned w i t h the r o l e of c i v i l society i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l . Although i t i s commonly 
accepted t h a t the takeoff of the Catalan c u l t u r a l movement was 
around 1960, i t i s clear t h a t the f i g h t against state repression had 
already begun wit±i Franco's v i c t o r y i n 1939. 
2.3 Cultural revivcil; The role of intellectvials and institutions 
The c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l was possible because the majority of Catalans 
continued using t h e i r Catalan mother tongue i n private, and because 
a semi-clandestine i n f r a s t r u c t u r e based on private i n i t i a t i v e s and 
the Church emerged where previously a Catalan public in f r a s t r u c t u r e 
existed. This included c u l t u r a l associations such as the Cmnivmi 
Cultural, which organised Catalan language and h i s t o r y courses and 
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teacher training"^; p r i v a t e schools v^ich taught Catalan a f t e r hours, 
and churches where mass was held i n Catalan. The Church based Scout 
movement, also had Catalanist tendencies, and therefore became an 
inportant " a l t e r n a t i v e " education system which allowed Catalan 
middle class families i n Barcelona t o avoid the Francoist youth 
organisation (Frente de Juventudes) (Chapter four, section 4 . 2 . i i i ) . 
Other i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as the excursionist societies and the l o c a l 
(comarcal) h i s t o r y associations had existed before the C i v i l War and 
were reactivated a f t e r the anti-separatist purges of the early 
1940's. -
The Catholic church played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the r e v i v a l . I t was 
mentioned i n the fou r t h chapter (section 4 . 2 . i i i ) t h a t i t was 
syirpathetic t o the conservative, small town roots of the Catalan 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n the 19th centixcy. The L l i g a Regionalista was 
close t o the Catholic Church, and the foundation of the UDC i n the 
Second Republic as a moderate Christian-democratic party continued 
t h i s close r e l a t i o n s h i p i n a more democratic form . The monastery of 
h 
Montserrat displayed a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong a f f i n i t y w i t h Catalan 
c u l t u r e , as Massot suggested i n h i s book on the h i s t o r y of 
Montserrat which i s s u b t i t l e d A Hundred Years i n the Service of 
Catalan Culture (Massot, 1979b) . The Catalan government i n the 
Second Republic d i d not share the a n t i - c l e r i c a l mood of some sectors 
of the republican, s o c i a l i s t and anarchist movements, but could not 
prevent the b i t t e r c o n f l i c t s which drove many c l e r i c s i n t o the 
Francoist zone of the Republic or i n t o e x i l e . I n Franco's Spain, the 
Catholic Church was one of the main p i l l a r s of support f o r the 
regime, a f a c t which d i d not leave the Church i n Catalonia 
unaffected. Nevertheless, the h i s t o r y of Catalanist syirpathies i n 
^For a social background of Qrariium Cultural, see chapter three, 
section 3 , 3 . i i . 
g 
I t has been argued t h a t a s p e c i f i c a l l y Catalan Catholicism 
developed under the influence of the i n d u s t r i a l revolution vhich fused 
w i t h the r e g i o n a l i s t movement i n the early 20th century. Catalan 
Catholicism i n the early decades of t h i s century was described by 
analysts as "expansive, t o l e r a n t and o p t i m i s t i c " , which was seen as a 
consequence of the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l " (Carrasco Calvo, 1985, 439). 
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the Catalan Church proved s u f f i c i e n t l y stirong f o r the lower clergy 
t o become instrumental i n the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l . There were 
corrpelling reasons f o r the Church t o help restore the Catalan 
language, because otherwise i t would have become too dist a n t from 
t±ie people and unable t o carry out i t s hegemonic function. 
I n the "dark period" of the 1940's and 1950's, the c u l t u r a l 
opposition needed the Church as a protective umbrella. Small groups 
l i k e Grup Torres i Bages, Congregaciones Marianas, Academia de l a 
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Llengua Catalana, and Canmissio Abat Oliba were part of t h i s small, 
middle class Catalanist movement which was closely linked to the 
Catalan Church and held together t h r o u ( ^ personal connections. I t i s 
an inward looking movement, closely k n i t and p r o v i n c i a l , viith a 
l i m i t s p o l i t i c a l horizon. I n t h i s early stage of the r e t r i e v a l of 
Catalan c u l t u r e , publishing Church l e a f l e t s i n Catalan was regarded 
as an iiip o r t a n t step i n the struggle f o r Cat:alan culture, as was the 
dancing of the sardana i n f r o n t of churches (evidence from 
interviews; Manent, 1971, 36; Hermet, 1986, v o l . I I , 270-271). 
L i t t l e was l e f t of the Catalan c u l t u r a l boom of the pre-war period. 
Francoism functioned l i k e a f i l t e r , leaving only the most f o l k l o r i s t 
elements of Catalan culture: the Scouts, excursionism, the sardana. 
Montserrat (Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988). As we w i l l 
see i n section three, a s i m i l a r process of f o l k l o r i s a t i o n occurred 
i n Scotland, only over a much longer period, and therefore w i t h more 
damaging r e s u l t s . 
I n the 1950's, the monastery of Montserrat became increasingly 
interested i n the predicament of the Catailan language. This concern 
was n o n p o l i t i c a l i n the f i r s t place, but under the conditions of the 
Franco regime, Montserrat was - often unknowingly - protecting not 
9 
The Ccmissio Abat Oliba prepared a r e l i g i o u s f e s t i v a l a t Monserrat 
i n 1946-47, which was t o involve the vAiole Catalan nation. Josep Benet, 
;^o l a t e r became one of the best known representatives of the Assemblea 
de Catalunya, was involved i n the organsiation. According t o Massot i 
Muntaner, t h i s f e s t i v a l i n i t i a t : e d the re-catalanisation of the monastery 
(Massot, 1979a, 176; see also Manent, 1971, 35-38). 
•""^ The sardana i s a Catalan national dance. 
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only Catalan cul t u r e , but also the Catalan p o l i t i c a l opposition 
(Massot, 1979, 170) . The monastery took the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 
sponsorship f o r the Catalan language journal Serra d' Or, v^ich 
remained the single roost inportant platform of Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s 
u n t i l the 1970's. Since the Church d i d not have t o submit t o state 
censorship, i t was predestined t o be a main source of Catalan 
language publications, and indeed of any w r i t t e n material vAiich f e l l 
outside the ideological framework of the Franco regime (Cahner, 
interview, 11.2.1988). 
The Second Vatican Council (1959) radicalised the lower levels of 
the church hierarchy, most of v^om were from a Catalan background"^'''. 
Amongst other things, t h i s gave a massive boost t o those who had 
been f i g h t i n g f o r the r i g h t t o preach i n the language of the people, 
which i n many parishes was Catalan. A few years l a t e r , the abbot of 
Montserrat, Escarre, wrote an a r t i c l e t o the French paper Le Monde, 
conplaining t h a t he had been prevented from holding a r e l i g i o u s 
ceremony i n Catalan f o r the radio, and. s t a t i n g t h a t the regime 
iitpeded the development of Catalan culture. He went i n t o e x i l e soon 
a f t e r . However, the event was a sign of a marked deterioration i n 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Franco regiine and the Catalan Church, 
i n v*iich the main problem was the status of Catalan culture. 
Montserrat also played a r o l e i n reki n d l i n g Christian-democratic 
p o l i t i c a l organisations during the l a t e r stages of the Franco 
regime. The decimated ranks of the UDC (Uhio Democratica de 
Catalunya) always maintained close contact t o the Monastery, and 
some groups such as the Gmp Torres i Bages and the OC (viiich stood 
f o r Christ and Catalonia), have also been close t o t h i s , i n the 
1950's and 1960's r e l a t i v e l y progressive and Catalanist, sector of 
the Church (Fabre i Huertas, 1981, 54). P o l i t i c a l l y , these groups 
d i d not play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e under Franco, but t h e i r members were 
^lany parish p r i e s t s were of Catalan o r i g i n , although i n the 
episcopacies of Lleida and Tortosa, t h i s was less so. On the other hand, 
most bishops were C a s t i l i a n , although i n the 1960's, popular campaigns 
put pressure on the Vatican t o appoint Catalan bishops (Hermet, 1986, 
v o l . I I , 357-388). 
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a c t i v e i n t h e , f a r s a f e r , c u l t u r a l ground (Marin and Tresseres, 
i n t e r v i e w , 15.2.1988).Only i n t h e mid-1970's d i d these groups become 
t h e seedlings f o r t h e new n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t y o f t h e c e n t r e - r i g h t , t h e 
CDC. 
The 1960's opened a new chapter i n t h e h i s t o r y o f Catalan c u l t u r a l 
r e v i v a l . The c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s m u l t i p l i e d and ejqjanded i n scale. 
They i n v o l v e d mainly younger i n t e l l e c t u a l s vAiich had grown up under 
Franco, b u t had learned Catalan a t home and, i n many cases, been 
educated i n t h e above mentioned independent Catalan i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
T h i s most s i g n i f i c a n t j i i a s e o f c u l t u r a l Catalanism was l i n k e d t o t h e 
economic l i b e r a l i s a t i o n and growing p r o s p e r i t y o f t h e country (see 
Chapter t h r e e , s e c t i o n 3 ) . 
When i n t h e mid 1960's t h e Catalan l i n g u i s t Badia i M a r g a r i t 
i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e s t a t e o f t h e Catalan language i n Barcelona a f t e r 25 
years o f r e p r e s s i o n and m a r g i n a l i s a t i o n , he found t h a t t h e language 
was s t i l l v e r y much a l i v e . I t was more w i d e l y used among t h e o l d e r 
g e n e r a t i o n s , b u t a l s o e n j o y i n g a l o t o f support among t h e younger 
ones v^o had been educated under t h e Franco system. Immigrants who 
had no o p p o r t u n i t y t o l e a r n Catalan i n schools demanded t h a t they 
should be t a u g h t t h e language, as t h i s would h e l p t o i n t e g r a t e them 
i n t o Catalan s o c i e t y ( P o r c e l , 1970, 20-21). Thus, i n t h e atmosphere 
o f economic boom, those viho were occi^jying t h e lowest i:"anks o f 
Catalan s o c i e t y regarded t h e Catalan language as i t i p o r t a n t f o r 
s o c i a l m o b i l i t y (see Chapter f o u r . Table 4.5). Between 1966 and 
1968, canpaigns f o r Catalan a t schools a t t r a c t e d widespread support, 
even from t h e h i g h l y popiiLar Barcelona f o o t b a l l cl\±>s (Benet, 
i n t e r v i e w , 17.4.1988). 
I n one o f numerous p r i v a t e conferences o f Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s and 
12 
businessmen i n 1966 , Benet claimed t h a t Catalan c u l t u r e was i n a 
12 
The "Prrmeres Jomades d'Estudi" were concerned w i t h t h e s t a t e o f 
Catalan c u l t u r e and h e l d c l a n d e s t i n e l y i n t h e house o f F e l i x M i l l e t i n 
(Footnote Continued) 
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s t a t e o f t r a n s i t i o n a f t e r having s u r v i v e d t h e most severe and 
p e r s i s t e n t p e r s e c u t i o n i n Catalan h i s t o r y . According t o Benet, t h i s 
s u r v i v a l was t h e s o l e achievement o f t h e Catalan people, and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s - w r i t e r s , teachers, u n i v e r s i t y 
l e c t u r e r s - vAio d e s p i t e economic and s o c i a l pressure had remained 
f a i t h f u l t o t h e i r language. But e q u a l l y i i r p o r t a n t was t h e sv:55port o f 
"some men from our business w o r l d " v^o 
"had t h e l u c i d i t y and t h e courage t o f u l f i l q u i e t l y t h e i r 
d u t y i n t h e hour o f need by a p p l y i n g t h e i r f i n a n c i a l 
resources and, enthusiasm t o t h e t a s k o f keeping t h e language 
and t h e c u l t u r e o f t h e country a l i v e . These men knew t o 
remain f a i t h f u l t o a t r a d i t i o n o^^ sponsoring v M c h had 
al r e a d y made p o s s i b l e our Renaixenca ( . . . ) . " 
(Benet, 1980, 146) 
I n chapter t h r e e , t h i s phenanenon o f c u l t u r a l sponsorship has 
al r e a d y been mentioned i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t (Chapter t h r e e , 
s e c t i o n 3 . 2 . i i i ) . I n order t o describe i n more d e t a i l t h e 
connections between t h e c u l t u r a l movement, p o l i t i c a l n a t i o n a l i s m , 
and t h e n a t i o n a l l y conscious s e c t o r s o f t h e middle and upper 
classes, I have chosen t h e Catalan p u b l i s h i n g s e c t o r as an example. 
There a r e s e v e r a l reasons f o r t h i s choice. F i r s t l y , t h e p u b l i s h i n g 
houses were a p a r t i c u l a r l y dynamic s e c t o r o f t h e c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l . 
Secondly, t h e y represented a p o l i t i c a l p r o j e c t , namely t o 
r e - e s t a b l i s h t h e Catalan language as a normal v e h i c l e o f 
communication. T h i r d l y , t h e books p u b l i s h e d i n Catalan i n t h e 1960's 
and e a r l y 1970's c o n s t i t u t e d a break w i t h t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l and 
c u l t u r a l i s o l a t i o n vihich had c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e Catalan c u l t u r e i n 
t h e p r e v i o u s decades. F o u r t h l y , t h e p u b l i s h i n g houses were a nucleus 
o f convergence f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l s o f d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i e s v^o found a 
common denominator i n t h e i r a n t i - F r a n c o i s t and C a t a l a n i s t stance. I n 
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January o f 1966. The p a r t i c i p a n t s came from t h e Catalan c u l t u r a l and 
business w o r l d , such as t h e w r i t e r s Salvador E s p r i u , A l b e r t Manent, and 
Joan T r i a d u ; t h e academics J o r d i Carbonell, E m i l i G i r a l t , and Joaqum 
Molas; t h e p u b l i s h e r s C a s t e l l e t and Verdura; and C a t a l a n i s t biasinessmen 
J o r d i P u j o l , L l u i s C a r u l l a and F e l i x M i l l e t . 
•"••^ The Renaixenca was t h e Catalan c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l i n t h e second 
h a l f o f t h e 19th c e n t u r y (see Chapter two, s e c t i o n 3.2). 
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t h i s sense, they were q u a s i - p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r t h e emerging 
a n t i - F r a n c o i s t o p p o s i t i o n v * i i c h l a t e r found i t s expression i n 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s such as t h e Asseroblea de Catalunya (1971-77). F i n a l l y , 
t h e p u b l i s h i n g a c t i v i t i e s p r o v i d e a good exaitple f o r t h e r e l a t i o n s 
between p o l i t i c i s e d i n t e l l e c t u a l s and t h e Catalan business 
community. 
2.4 The Catalan c u l t i i r a l r e v i v a l i n publishincr 
2 . 4 . i The s i t u a t i o n b e f o r e 1960 
A p a r t from c l a n d e s t i n e p u b l i s h i n g a c t i v i t i e s such as Edicions de 
M i t j a Nit, A n t o l o q i a o r Occident, and t h e p u b l i c a t i o n s o f r e l i g i o u s 
books through t h e Church, t h e r e was o n l y one i i r p o r t a n t Catalan 
p u b l i s h i n g house i n Barcelona, Selecta-Aedos. Cruzet, i t s owner, s e t 
i t up i n t h e e a r l y f o r t i e s w i t h c a p i t a l he had accumulated w i t h h i s 
Barcelona bookshop. Cruzet had spent t h e t i m e o f t h e c i v i l war 
o u t s i d e C a t a l o n i a , and was t h e r e f o r e n o t a p o l i t i c a l suspect i n t h e 
eyes o f t h e regime. He g o t a p u b l i s h i n g p e r m i t f o r a novel by 
14 
Verdaguer on 1941 a f t e r l e n g t h y n e g o t i a t i o n s and u s i n g personal 
connections i n t h e Madrid government c i r c l e s . P o l i t i c a l connections 
and o t h e r , f i n a n c i a l l y based, ways o f l u b r i c a t i n g t h e r u s t y doors o f 
t h e M i n i s t r y o f I n f o r m a t i o n and Tourism which was i n charge o f 
censorship were f r e q u e n t l y used by o t h e r p u b l i s h e r s i n l a t e r years. 
I n 1946, Cruzet succeeded i n g e t t i n g a p u b l i s h i n g l i c e n c e v ^ i c h 
l e g a l i s e d h i s e n t e r p r i s e . I n f a c t , t h e t i m e o f t h e founding 
c o i n c i d e d w i t h a s l i g h t change o f p o l i c y i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e 
Catalan problem by t h e regime, which dispatched a new c i v i l 
14 
The novel o f Verdager, and s e v e r a l o t h e r s i n t h e e a r l y 1940's, 
had t o be p u b l i s h e d i n t h e a n t i q u e Catalan v ^ c h preceded t h e normalised 
grammar o f Ponpeu Fabra. With t h i s r u l e , t h e a u t h o r i t i e s t r i e d t o irrpose 
an a r c h a i c image on t h e language vAiich s u i t e d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l aims. 
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15 governor t o Barcelona province. His t a s k was t o g a i n t h e 
syrrpathies o f t h e indigenous i n t e l l e c t u a l s , and t o exercise 
moderation i n h i s approach t o c u l t u r a l issues i n order t o prevent 
t h e Catalan language from becoming a weapon f o r C a t a l a n i s t and other 
l e f t - w i n g opponents o f t h e regime (Massot i Muntaner, 1979a). 
While o t h e r c l a s s i c a l and r e l i g i o u s t e x t s had already been published 
i n Catalan elsewhere, S e l e c t a was t h e f i r s t p u b l i s h i n g house v^iich 
had a determined p r o j e c t (Massot i Muntaner, 1979a, p. 94). I t 
c o n s i s t e d i n making t h e w r i t i n g s o f well-known Catalan authors 
a v a i l a b l e t o 'the people, i . e . t o prevent Catalan l i t e r a t u r e from 
b e i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y f o r g o t t e n . Cruzet t h e r e f o r e planned t o p u b l i s h 
t h e c o l l e c t e d works o f Verdaguer, Maragall, Costa i Llobera, 
R u s i n o l , Sagarra, lopez-Pico e t c . , a l l o f v^om were w r i t e r s o f t h e 
19th c e n t u r y Renaixen<pa and t h e t u r n o f t h e century. Later, 
conterrporary w r i t e r s were added t o t h e programme, b u t o v e r a l l i t was 
s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d i n s e v e r a l respects. For exanple,. t h e p u b l i c a t i o n 
o f t r a n s l a t e d books was made ir r p o s s i b l e by t h e censorship p r a c t i c e s . 
N o n f i c t i o n was l i m i t e d t o r e l a t i v e l y n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l t o p i c s such as 
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l music, landscape and t r a v e l d e s c r i p t i o n s , as w e l l as 
r e l i g i o n . The f i r s t c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l volume appeared i n 1955"'"^ . 
Given t h e narrow d e f i n i t i o n o f c u l t u r e u n d e r l y i n g t h i s p u b l i s h i n g 
house, t h e r e a d e r s h i p reached by t h e p u b l i s h e r was l i m i t e d i n s i z e 
and i n terms o f s o c i a l c l a s s . Judging from t h e e d i t o r i a l catalogue, 
t h e books would appeal t o s e c t o r s o f t h e c u l t u r e d bourgeoisie. 
Therefore, t h e censorship was l e s s r i g o r o u s , because t h i s k i n d o f 
p u b l i s h i n g a c t i v i t y was n o t undermining t h e general government 
p o l i c y o f c a s t i l i a n i s a t i o n o f Catalonia. The e d i t i o n s were u s u a l l y 
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below 3,000 , and t h e number o f books pu b l i s h e d up t o 1960 was o n l y 
15 
Bartolome Barba Hernandez 
•^^Ferrater Mora's Les Formes de l a Vida Catalana, which was f i r s t 
p u b l i s h e d i n C h i l e i n 1944. 
"^ A^ p o l l conducted i n 1961 among sever a l pi±ilishers o f Catalan 
books re v e a l e d t h a t t h e b e s t - s e l l e r s reached 6,000 o r 7,000 copies, b u t 
(Footnote Continued) 
(Chapter s i x ) (341) 
around 300. Nevertheless, between 1952 and 1962, Selecta was t h e 
most i r t p o r t a n t p u b l i s h e r i n Catalonia. When " B i b l i o t e c a Selecta", 
i t s most s u c c e s s f u l s e r i e s , c e l e b r a t e d t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e 300th 
volume i n 1962, Josep Pla, one o f Selec±a's most p r o l i f e r o u s 
w r i t e r s , reminded t h e assembled i n t e l l i g e n t s i a t h a t t h e p u b l i s h i n g 
house was c r e a t e d i n t h e most r e p r e s s i v e years o f t h e Franco regime, 
" a t a t i m e v*ien our l i t e r a t u r e was becoming a mere h i s t o r i c a l 
r e c o r d " (Pla, 1964, 39). Thus Selecta can be described as a f i r s t 
s t e p i n t h e c u l t u r a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , v*iose main achievement was t o 
g e t t h e Franco regime used t o t h e existence o f Catalan w r i t t e n 
language. I n t h e 1960's, t h e new p u b l i s h i n g houses were p o l i t i c a l l y 
and c u l t u r a l l y more ambitious, and i n t e r e s t e d t o reach a much 
broader p u b l i c . 
2 . 4 . i i The pi±ilishinq s e c t o r a f t e r 1960 
a) Serra d^Or 
The f i r s t s i g n i f i c a n t change i n t h e Catalan c u l t u r a l realm was t h e 
appearance o f t h e j o u r n a l Serra d^Or i n 1959. Under t h e Franco 
regime, newspapers and j o u r n a l s were regarded as being p o l i t i c a l l y 
dangerous, and s u b j e c t e d t o f a r more s t r i n g e n t censorship than 
books. The presence o f Catalan newspapers o r j o u r n a l s would have 
m i l i t a t e d a g a i n s t t h e essence o f government p o l i c y on Catalan 
c u l t u r e , as i t would have upgraded t h e s t a t u s o f t h e language. 
Therefore, no newspaper i n Catalan was ever allowed t o appear, and 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on p e r i o d i c a l s were so severe t h a t many were f o r c e d 
i n t o t h e v o l a t i l e e x i s t e n c e o f underground press. The main reason 
why Serra d^Or was able t o operate was t h e p r o t e c t i o n i t had from 
Montserrat Abbey. 
(Footnote Continued) 
t h a t each s i n g l e e d i t i o n d i d n o t exceed t h e l i m i t o f 3,000 (Serra d^Or^ 
1961). 
(Chapter s i x ) (342) 
I t s o r i g i n s l i e w i t h two small n e w s l e t t e r s r e l a t e d t o t h e 
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monastery , which were merged and r e s t r u c t u r e d by Ramon Bastardes 
and Max Cahner. The former had connections w i t h Montserrat through 
t h e Scouts, and Cahner became i n v o l v e d because he r e a l i s e d t h a t t h e 
Church p r o v i d e d t h e be s t cover f o r Catalan c u l t u r e : "We took over 
Germinabit o n l y i n ord e r t o make p o l i t i c s , o f course" (Cahner, 
i n t e r v i e w , 11.2,1988). 
Since t h e j o u r n a l was t h e f i r s t o f general i n t e r e s t t o appear 
o f f i c i a l l y i n Catalan i n t h e post-war p e r i o d , i t needed a wider 
p e r s p e c t i v e t h a n t h e o t h e r j o u r n a l s p u b l i s h e d by t h e church. The 
e d i t o r i a l and a s e c t i o n o f t h e j o u r n a l was dedicated t o r e l i g i o u s 
themes and mostly w r i t t e n by t h e monks o f Montserrat. The r e s t o f 
th e magazine was organised by Cahner and Bastardes, vjho created a 
team o f l e a d i n g Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s t o t a k e charge o f t h e 
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d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s o f t h e j o u r n a l . Serra d^Or was a p r o j e c t aimed 
a t undermining t h e p o l i c y o f t h e regime t o r e l e g a t e t h e Catalan 
language t o t h e p r o v i n c i a l , p r i v a t e , f o l k l o r i s t realm. Therefore, i t 
was i r r p o r t a n t t o reach a h i g h l e v e l o f q u a l i t y , and t o cover t h e 
v^*iole spectrum o f newsworthy m a t e r i a l (Cahner, i n t e r v i e w , 
11.2.1988). 
S o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c i s m o f t h e regime was not voice d openly 
i n t h e j o u r n a l , and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e e a r l y 1960's, t h e p o l i t i c a l 
18 
These were t h e n e w s l e t t e r o f t h e eiiployees o f Montserrat Abbey, 
Seinra d^Or, and t h e b u l l e t i n o f t h e s o c i e t y o f former c h o i r boys o f 
Montserrat (Unio Esc o l a n i a de Montserrat) which was c a l l e d Gendnabit and 
founded by Josep Benet i n t h e mid-1950's. 
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I n t h e e a r l y 1960's, Alexandre C i r i c i was a r t s e d i t o r , O r i o l 
Bohigas e d i t o r f o r a r c h i t e c t u r e , design and town pl a n n i n g , and t h e 
w r i t e r J.V. Foix was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e l i t e r a t u r e s e c t i o n . E. A r t e l l s 
was t h e s p e c i a l i s t on Catalan l i n g u i s t i c s , Curan i Sairpere f o r h i s t o r y 
and archaeology, and J o r d i Carbonell f o r t h e a t r e . Serra d^Or had 
ex t e n s i v e r e p o r t s about a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e smal l e r towns and camargues o f 
Ca t a l o n i a as w e l l as t h e Catalan communities i n French and L a t i n 
American e x i l e , v ^ i c h i n t h e f i r s t p e r i o d were c a t p i l e d by J o r d i P u j o l . 
I t a l s o had r e p o r t s on p o l i t i c s under a s e c t i o n c a l l e d E l mon concret 
(th e r e a l world) v ^ i c h were e d i t e d by Max Cahner, Ernest Lluch and Josep 
Benet, and columns d e a l i n g w i t h t h e economy (Ernest Lluch) and 
geographical issues ( E n r i c L l u c h ) . 
(Chapter s i x ) (343) 
a r t i c l e s more o f t e n than n o t d e a l t w i t h f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s which were 
l e s s s e n s i t i v e t h a n home news. However, t h e concern o f t h e 
p r o g r e s s i v e Catalan middle c l a s s w i t h t h e underfinanced s o c i a l 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f t h e c o u n t r y and, more s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t s i n a b i l i t y 
t o cope w i t h t h e wave o f immigration i s r e f l e c t e d i n Serra d^Or 
(October and November issues o f 1962; see Chapter f o u r , s e c t i o n 
4 . 1 . i i ) . Towards t h e end o f t h e decade, t h e a r t i c l e s became more 
e x p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l , e.g. e j ^ r e s s i n g support f o r t h e emerging 
Ocndsiones Qbreras i n t h e s y n d i c a l e l e c t i o n s o f 1967. With respect 
t o t h e Catalan p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , t h e a r t i c l e s soon expanded from 
l i t e r a t u r e and language issues t o cover aspects o f Catalan h i s t o r y 
such as t h e S o l i d a r i t a t Catalana i n Valencia (Cuco, 1963), t h e 50th 
a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e Catalan Mancomunitat (Benet, 1964), and t h e 
r e g i o n a l i s t p e r i o d o f t h e e a r l y 20th century (Benet, 1968; 
Sole-Tura, 1968). The j o u r n a l a l s o p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e campaigns 
p r e s s i n g f o r Catalan bishops, Catalan language te a c h i n g a t schools, 
e t c . . While anyone who was i n s i ^ j p o r t o f Catalan autonomy and 
c u l t u r e c o u l d c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e j o u r n a l , v*iatever h i s o r her 
p o l i t i c a l stance, t h e censorship r e g u l a t i o n s had t o be taken i n t o 
account. The u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e s t e d w i t h Montserrat v ^ i c h 
o f f i c i a l l y p u b l i s h e d Serra d^Or, although i n p r a c t i c e t h e j o u r n a l 
was produced and p r i n t e d independently o f t h e monastery. Therefore, 
t h e e d i t o r s o f Serra d^Or avoided m i l i t a n c y and p a r t y p o l i t i c a l 
a l l e g i a n c e i n i t s a r t i c l e s . Bastardes explained t h a t 
" i n agreement w i t h t h e authors, we undertook t o a v o i d 
a n y t h i n g t h a t c o u l d cause c o n f l i c t s - always a r a t h e r 
s u b j e c t i v e judgement - and Montserrat r e c e i v e d t h e o f f p r i n t s 
o f a l l t h e m a t e r i a l planned f o r p u b l i c a t i o n and made 
comments on them" 
(Bastardes, 1984, 26) 
Since many o f t h e names which were connected w i t h t h e j o u r n a l i n t h e 
1960's s t i l l dominate Catalan c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e a f t e r 
Franco, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o evaluate t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Serra d^Or i n 
drawing t o g e t h e r i n t e l l e c t u a l s vAio were u n w i l l i n g t o accept t h e 
p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l s t r a i t j a c k e t which t h e Franco regime was 
imposing on them. The people i n v o l v e d i n t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
c o n s t i t u t e d a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l group, vAucii considered i t s e l f as a 
(Chapter s i x ) (344) 
c u l t u r a l vanguard. Cahner a f f i r m e d t h a t i t was always t h e same 
people who were a c t i v e i n t h e c u l t u r a l movement. I n h i s own case, 
" I t h i n k t h a t my t a s k was p r i m a r i l y t h a t o f an a g i t a t o r , o f 
o r g a n i s i n g t h i n g s w i t h a p o l i t i c a l aim i n mind." 
(Cahner, i n t e r v i e w , 11.2.1988) 
The s t r a t e g y was t o f o s t e r c u l t u r a l p o l i t i c s a t a time v*ien 
p o l i t i c a l awareness was s t i l l v e r y weak. A c t i v e p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n 
i n v o l v e d o n l y a s m a l l m i n o r i t y vAiich was o p e r a t i n g c l a n d e s t i n e l y and 
under h i g h r i s k s . Even symbolic p r o t e s t was repressed, as t h e 
i n c i d e n t i n t h e Psdau de l a Musica demonstrated i n 1960. A group o f 
C a t a l a n i s t s , amongst them J o r d i P u j o l , d i s t r i b u t e d l e a f l e t s t o 
p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h e treatment o f t h e Catalans under t h e regime and 
sang t h e Catalan n a t i o n a l anthem. As one o f t h e " r i n g l eaders" o f 
t h e caiipaign, P u j o l r e c e i v e d a p r i s o n sentence o f 7 years, v*iich 
earned him a r e p u t a t i o n o f a p i l l a r o f Catalan r e s i s t a n c e . 
C u l t u r a l p o l i t i c s d i d n o t run such r i s k s . I t t r i e d t o e j ^ l o i t t h e 
holes i n t h e l e g i s l a t i o n and t h e grey areas o f s e m i - l e g a l i t y vAiich 
expanded i n t h e measure i n which t h e government needed t o inprove 
i t s image w i t h i t s economic and p o l i t i c a l p a r t n e r s abroad. I t used 
t h e personal connections w i t h i n t h e small i n t e l l e c t u a l w o r l d o f 
Barcelona v * i i c h had been pushed o u t o f t h e Spanish mainstream and 
v ^ i i c h was h e l d t o g e t h e r through an ever i n c r e a s i n g number o f p r i v a t e 
a s s o c i a t i o n s . As Cahner exp l a i n e d , 
"We p r o f i t e d from t h i n g s t h a t were p e r m i t t e d . I n t h e 1940's, 
u n t i l t h e end o f t h e second w o r l d war, t h e a n t i - C a t a l a n 
r e p r e s s i o n was t o t a l , up t o t h e p o i n t where a v i s i t o r ' s card 
w r i t t e n i n Catalan was a punishable o f f e n c e ; although t h e r e 
was no law t o t h i s end, t h i n g s r e a l l y worked l i k e t h a t . I n 
t h a t p e r i o d [ t h e 1950's], on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e ways o f 
o p e r a t i n g o f t h e government had become more s u b t l e , hidden, 
f l e x i b l e , so as n o t t o cause i n t e r n a t i o n a l scandals." 
(Cahner, i n t e r v i e w , 11.2.1988) 
Many o f those viho were i n v o l v e d i n Serra d^Or were a l s o t h e key 
f i g u r e s o f another p u b l i s h i n g e n t e r p r i s e which came t o be t h e most 
po w e r f u l Catalan p u b l i s h i n g house o f t h e post-Franco p e r i o d : 
Edicions 62. 
b) Edicions 62 
(Chapter s i x ) (345) 
As a n a t u r a l expansion o f Serra d^Or and encouraged by J o r d i P u j o l 
and Josep Benet, Cahner and Bastardes founded a p u b l i s h i n g house i n 
1962. They aimed a t overcoming t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s f a c i n g 
Selecta-Aedos, v ^ c h had c o n f i n e d Catalan c u l t u r e t o a small group 
o f middle c l a s s and i p p e r c l a s s readers. What would r e s t o r e Catalan 
t o i t s former f u n c t i o n o f a modem, popular, a l l purpose language 
was t h e p o l i c y o f p u b l i s h i n g e v e r y t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g t r a n s l a t e d novels 
and n o n f i c t i o n m a t e r i a l . 
"This was a p r o o f o f n o r m a l i s a t i o n . What we were l o o k i n g f o r 
was t o d e s t r o y t h e image o f Catalan as a r e g i o n a l language, 
and t o e s t a b l i s h i t as t h e language o f a n a t i o n a l community. 
T h i s was t h e achievement o f Edicions 62." 
(Cahner, i n t e r v i e w , 11.2.1988) 
The l i t e r a r y e d i t o r , C a s t e l l e t , described t h e p o l i t i c a l - c u l t u r a l 
p r o j e c t o f Edicions 62 thus. F i r s t l y , t h e aim was t o g i v e t h e 
Catalan language a p u b l i c presence. Secondly, contenporary h i s t o r y 
and p o l i t i c s books were p u b l i s h e d i n order t o make' t h e p u b l i c more 
p o l i t i c a l l y informed, and serve as a b a s i s f o r a democratic f u t u r e 
o f C a t a l o n i a . T h i r d l y , t h e study o f c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l , e t c . aspects 
o f t h e present s i t u a t i o n o f Catalonia were promoted by t h e 
p u b l i s h e r . Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s were encouraged t o c o n t r i b u t e t o 
t h i s p a t r i o t i c t a s k by w r i t i n g a p p r o p r i a t e volumes. F o u r t h l y and 
f i f t h l y , new aspects o f popular c u l t u r e were made a v a i l a b l e t o 
Catalan readers, and t h e gaps i n Catalan c u l t u r e began t o be f i l l e d 
(Edicions 62, 1987, 35-36). Thus, t h e f i r s t American modem 
t h r i l l e r s reached Spain through Catalan language e d i t i o n s , Gramsci 
and S a r t r e were published. B o l l and Duras t r a n s l a t e d f o r t h e f i r s t 
t i m e . 
A t t h e beginning, t h i s i n v o l v e d b r i b i n g government f u n c t i o n a r i e s . 
Then, as censorship r e s t r i c t i o n s became more rel a x e d , Edicions 62 
managed t o buy t h e c o p y r i g h t s f o r many f o r e i g n w r i t e r s v^o were not 
p u b l i s h e d i n Spain, and e s t a b l i s h e d i t s e l f as a progressive 
p u b l i s h e r . The c o l l e c t i o n " L l i b r e s a I'Abast" ( v t i i c h t r a n s l a t e s 
samev±iat awkwardly as "books w i t h i n easy reach") demonstrates t h a t 
Edicions 62 t r i e d t o make up f o r 25 years o f i n t e l l e c t u a l i s o l a t i o n 
by p u b l i s h i n g a couple o f books on every major c u r r e n t o f 
contenporary thought, from feminism over T h i r d World development t o 
(Chapter s i x ) (346) 
M a r x i s t philosophy, e x i s t e n t i a l i s m and sociology. Many o f these 
books caused censorship problems, and were regarded by e s t a b l i s h e d 
C a s t i l i a n p u b l i s h e r s as t o o p o l i t i c a l . I n t h e course o f t h e 1960's, 
Catalan p u b l i s h e r s gained an advantage over t h e i r C a s t i l i a n 
colleagues w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e censoring a u t h o r i t i e s . I n a s i t u a t i o n 
o f r a p i d s o c i a l change and p o l i t i c a l f e r m e n t a t i o n , Catalan language 
p u b l i c a t i o n s were regarded l e s s dangerous because i t served a very 
much s m a l l e r r e a d e r s h i p (Pages, i n t e r v i e w , 25.4.1988). This became a 
problem f o r t h e Catalan p u b l i s h e r s , because since o n l y few people 
had p r o p e r l y l e a r n e d t o read and w r i t e , t h e market had become t o o 
sm a l l f o r t h e massive ejq>ansion o f p u b l i s h i n g t o vdiich Edicions 62 
c o n t r i b u t e d i t s f a i r share. 300 new t i t l e s i n 1962 grew t o a t i d e o f 
1,000 o n l y a few years l a t e r ( F i g . 25), and caused an overproduction 
c r i s i s i n t h e l a t e 1960's as a r e s i a l t o f which Cahner had t o declare 
bankruptcy and Edicions 62 had t o f i n d new share h o l d e r s . These were 
n o t d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d i n a Catalan upper middle c l a s s v ^ i c h had 
money t o spend and which cared f o r i t s n a t i v e c u l t u r e . 
The p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f vdiat elsev^ere would s i n p l y be 
regarded as c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s i s undeniable i n t h e case o f 
C a t a l o n i a i n t h e 1960's and e a r l y 1970's. I n t h i s p e r i o d , 
"every book which Edicions 62 p u b l i s h e d was a p a t r i o t i c a c t . 
And t o t h e e x t e n t i t was t h e L e f t i n d i s g u i s e , i t was a 
p a t r i o t i c and revolutionary a c t . " 
(Marin and Tresseres, i n t e r v i e w , 15.2.1988) 
W r i t i n g , p u b l i s h i n g and even buying was a p o l i t i c a l a c t i f i t 
i n v o l v e d a Catalan book. Those v^o were connected t o t h e Catalan 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a bought books because they were i n Catalan. 
"We bought e v e r y t h i n g , psychology, philosophy, anything 
which seemed t o go a g a i n s t t h e F r a n c o i s t establishment..." 
(Pages, i n t e r v i e w , 25.4.1988) 
People thought t h a t t h i s was a necessary investment, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
t h e case o f books which were d e a l i n g w i t h C atalonia. That d o c t o r a l 
theses on H i i l i p XV o f C a t a l o n i a and on t h e War o f Secession o f 1714 
were p u b l i s h e d and s o l d o ut was u n t h i n k a b l e i n any o t h e r country. 
(Chapter s i x ) (347) 
Fig. 25 : ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF BOOKS IN CATALAN, 
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According t o Pages, 
"the most e x t r a o r d i n a r y i s t h e Catalunya en l^Espanya 
Modema by P i e r r e V i l a r , a d o c t o r a l t h e s i s v t i i c h f o r 
someone who i s n o t a s p e c i a l i s t on h i s t o r y i s t o t a l l y 
i ncoirprehensible except f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n s . But i t s o l d 
thousands and thousands o f copies. You can go t o someone's 
heme v*io i n t h i s p e r i o d were between 20 and 35 years o l d , 
and a p a r t from Picasso's Guernica (as a s i g n o f t h e i r 
i d e o l o g i c a l stance) they may have v e r y few books b u t these 
would i n c l u d e Catalunya en I'Espanya Modema, v^tiich was 
another symbol o f t h e i r i d e n t i t y . ( . . . ) I t would not s u r p r i s e 
me i f t h e book had s o l d 60,000 copies o r more." 
(Pages, i n t e r v i e w , 25.4.1988) 
Thus, by t h e mid-1960's, t h e c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l was w e l l under way. 
Two o f t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t p u b l i s h i n g i n i t i a t i v e s - Edicions 62 and 
Serra d'Or - were t h e achievement o f a r a t h e r l i m i t e d group o f 
Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The network o f c i v i l s o c i e t y i n s t i t u t i o n s 
v ^ i i c h i n v o l v e d m ostly middle c l a s s i n t e l l e c t u a l s was t h e b a s i s f o r 
t h e f l o u r i s h i n g o f these i n i t i a t i v e s . However, t h e r e were oth e r 
Catalan p u b l i s h i n g houses v M c h had c l o s e r c o n t a c t w i t h working 
c l a s s i n s t i t u t i o n s . E s t e l a - L a i a i s one such exanple. 
c) E d i t o r i a l Estela-Lai'a 
E d i t o r i c i l E s t e l a - L a i a i s a p u b l i s h i n g house vDnich was founded i n 
1959 i n t h e wake o f t h e Second Vat i c a n Council by progressive 
c a t h o l i c c i r c l e s . I t e x e i r p l i f i e s t h e s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e o f l i b e r a t i o n 
t h e o l o g y on t h e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e i n Spain i n general and on t h e 
Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n p a r t i c u l a r . I t s e d i t o r i a l l i n e , 
which concentrated h e a v i l y on C h r i s t i a n l i t e r a t u r e , changed vihen 
A l f o n s Comin and Josep Verdura became d i r e c t o r s o f E s t e l a . Comin was 
a C a t h o l i c - M a r x i s t i d e o l o g i c a l l y c l o s e t o t h e Frente de Liberacion 
National ( t h e " F e l i p e s " , N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ) , v ^ i i l e Verdura 
was a worker v^o was i n v o l v e d i n t h e workers' movement and close t o 
20 
Catalunya en l a Espanva Modema by V i l a r i s a t h r e e volume 
h i s t o r y o f Cat a l o n i a up u n t i l t h e 19th century, f i r s t p u b l ished i n 
Catalan by Edicions 62 i n 1964. 
(Chapter s i x ) (349) 
t h e Catalan Conraunist Party. He was asked t o j o i n t h e p u b l i s h i n g 
house i n ord e r t o make i t more working c l a s s o r i e n t e d . 
T h i s change i n ideology provoked t h e M i n i s t e r o f I n f o r m a t i o n and 
Tourism, Fraga Ibame, t o cl o s e down t h e p u b l i s h i n g house i n 1971, 
b u t due t o pressure from r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e Catalan c u l t u r a l , 
p o l i t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l w o r l d t h i s d e c i s i o n was reversed soon l a t e r . 
T h i s pressure was e x e r t e d on Madrid d i r e c t l y , and came from 
i n f l u e n t i a l people v^o were l i n k e d t o t h e p u b l i s h i n g house (Pages, 
i n t e r v i e w , 25.4.1988). When i t was reopened, i t had t o change i t s 
name t o L a i a i n ord e r t o save t h e face o f t h e m i n i s t e r . 
E s t e l a - L a i a never subscribed t o r a d i c a l c u l t u r a l Catalanism, and 
always had t h e p o l i c y o f p u b l i s h i n g i n C a s t i l i a n as w e l l as i n 
Catalan. The p u b l i s h e r s perceived Catalonia as a b i l i n g u a l s o c i e t y , 
and recognised t h a t t h e C a s t i l i a n c u l t u r e had a l s o been s u f f e r i n g 
under t h e Franco regime. I t s c l o s e connections w i t h t h e L e f t , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e OC.OO and t h e PSUC, and t h e i n t e n t i o n p u b l i s h f o r 
t h e C a s t i l i a n spea}dng working c l a s s as w e l l meant t h a t a t l e a s t 50 
per cent o f t h e books o f E s t e l a - L a i a were i n C a s t i l i a n . Whether they 
reached t h e i r t a r g e t readership - t h e Catalan working c l a s s - i s 
d o i j b t f u l . A c o l l e c t i o n o f books was produced on t r a d e unionism, b u t 
even those were mostly read by u n i v e r s i t y students vdio wanted t o 
d i s t a n c e themselves from t h e i r c l a s s o r i g i n s and from o t h e r 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The working c l a s s i t s e l f was n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n 
t h e o r e t i c a l e l a b o r a t i o n s o f syn d i c a l i s m ; " i t was a m i l i t a n t working 
c l a s s , b u t n o t a c u l t u r e d working c l a s s " (Pages, i n t e r v i e w , 
15.5.1989). Nevertheless, t h i s p o l i c y i s i n d i c a t i v e o f t h e a t t i t u d e 
o f many Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e Franco regime, i n 
so f a r as i t t r i e d t o prevent a wedge being d r i v e n between t h e 
m i l i t a n t C a s t i l i a n speaking working c l a s s and t h e Catalan 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . 
As a f i n a l exaitple, I l o o k a t t h e Catalan encyclopaedia, v M c h came 
t o epitomise t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e Catalan i n t e l l i g e n t s i a t o 
defend t h e i r c u l t u r e from f a d i n g i n t o h i s t o r y . The Gran Enciclopedia 
Catalana i s i n t e r e s t i n g n o t o n l y because i t was s t a r t e d under t h e 
adverse c o n d i t i o n o f t h e Franco regime, b u t a l s o because i t i n v o l v e d 
(Chapter s i x ) (350) 
scores o f Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s , many o f vAiom became t h e p o l i t i c a l 
e l i t e o f t h e post-Franco era. 
d) GTcin Enciclopedia Catalana 
I t c o u l d be argued t h a t t h e Gran Enciclc^>edia Catalana (GEO) i s t h e 
c u l m i n a t i o n o f t h e determined e f f o r t o f t h e Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s t o 
r e - e s t a b l i s h Catalan as t h e i r r a t i o n a l language. I t became a symbol 
o f c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l , and owning i t i s s t i l l a k i n d o f Catalan 
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i d e n t i t y card, a t l e a s t f o r t h e middle classes. 
L i k e Serra d'Or and Edicions 62, t h e GEX; was i n i t i a t e d by t h e same 
group o f people, mainly Max Cahner, E n r i c LLuch and J o r d i Carbonell. 
Work began i n 1967 i n t h e o f f i c e s o f Edicions 62, b u t c r e a t i n g an 
encyclopaedia from s c r a t c h soon exceeded t h e resources o f t h e 
p u b l i s h i n g house. I t was t h e r e f o r e bought up i n 1969 by Banca 
Catalana, which was mentioned above (Chapter three) i n t h e context 
o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t i c canpaign t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e Catalan economy. 
The encyclopaedia was regarded by t h e e d i t o r s as a c o l l e c t i v e 
c u l t u r a l p r o j e c t vAiich aimed a t c r e a t i n g a reference work f o r t h e 
n a t i o n and i n a language which had s u f f e r e d under decades o f 
r e p r e s s i o n . I n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e f i r s t volume, t h e e d i t o r s 
drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e gaps i n Catalan c u l t u r e which they argued were 
i n f l i c t e d by " d e f i c i e n c i e s o f our s o c i e t y " , and p r a i s e d t h e GEO as 
"the e f f o r t o f a whole g e n e r a t i o n o f Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s 
t o produce a r e f e r e n c e work v M c h r e f l e c t s t h e present 
c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l , and economic s i t u a t i o n o f t h e Catalan 
Countries [Paisos Catcilans]". 
(GEO, 1969, i n t r o d u c t i o n ) 
The l i s t o f e d i t o r s and c o l l a b o r a t o r s i s indeed s e v e r a l hundred 
names l o n g and i n c l u d e s many o f those i n t e l l e c t u a l s who were 
i n v o l v e d i n o t h e r c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . As c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i s m was c l o s e l y connected i n t h e 1960's and 1970's, i t i s not 
s u r p r i s i n g t o f i n d s e v e r a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s among t h e e d i t o r s o f 
t h e GEC vAiQ stepped i n t o l e a d i n g p o s i t i o n s once t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
p a r t i e s were l e g a l i s e d . A few exaitples are g i v e n below: 
(Chapter s i x ) (351) 
H e r r i b e r t Barrera. a Doctor o f H i i l o s o p h y i n physics, and one 
o f t h e l e a d i n g p o l i t i c i a n s o f t h e ERC (Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalvinya), e d i t e d t h e s e c t i o n on science and technology. 
Max Cahner, t h e founder o f t h e GEO, was appointed M i n i s t e r o f 
C u l t u r e t o t h e f i r s t autonomous government (1980). 
Manuel S a c r i s t a n , who l a t e r became p r o f e s s o r f o r philosophy a t 
t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Barcelona, and a prcaxdnent a c t i v i s t i n t h e 
VSUC ( P a r t i t S o c i a l i s t a U h i f i c a t de Catalimya), was t h e head Qf 
t h e p hilosophy s e c t i o n . 
J.M. Ob i o l s . viho i s now t h e chairman o f t h e PSC ( P a r t i t dels 
S o c i a l i s t e s de Catalunya), e d i t e d t h e geology s e c t i o n . 
Joan Colomines i Puig, v*io i s a prominent member o f UDC (Unio 
Deanocratica de CatcLLunya), headed t h e medicine s e c t i o n . 
Josep Benet i M o r e l l , a lawyer and h i s t o r i a n , headed t h e 
s e c t i o n on contemporary h i s t o r y o f Catalonia. He was one o f t h e 
p r i n c i p a l f i g u r e s i n t h e Assamblea de Catalunya (1971-77), and 
became t h e most vote d f o r senator d u r i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . 
I n t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n s , Benet stood as a candidate f o r t h e 
Catalan presidency f o r t h e Communist Party. 
Though t h i s a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l was 
e f f e c t i v e l y a l s o a p o l i t i c a l r e v i v a l , t h e e j ^ l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l 
f u n c t i o n o f t h e Catalan p u b l i s h i n g s e c t o r s t i l l remains t o be 
discussed. 
2.5 I n t e l l e c t x i a l s and p o l i t i c s 
I t i s by no means t h e case t h a t a l l those i n v o l v e d i n c u l t u r a l 
a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g t h e 1960's were a l s o a c t i v e i n t h e p o l i t i c a l 
o p p o s i t i o n . Many i n t e l l e c t u a l s were drawn i n t o a p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n 
s i i t p l y , because under t h e circumstances, Catalan c u l t u r e was a 
p o l i t i c a l i s s u e . But o t h e r s were i n v o l v e d i n t h e c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l 
(Chapter s i x ) (352) 
because t h i s was a p a r t o f t h e i r s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e Franco regime 
and f o r Catalan autonomy o r indeperdence. A l a r g e number o f t h e 
second category were organised i n , o r a t l e a s t c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h , 
t h e Catalan Communist Party, which was t h e b e s t organised 
underground p a r t y and had a s t r o n g presence i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f 
Barcelona as w e l l as t h e workers' movement (Chapter f o u r , s e c t i o n 
4.2. i v ) . Since many Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s were connected t o t h e 
major p u b l i s h i n g a c t i v i t i e s , and a t t h e same t i m e associated i n one 
way o r another w i t h t h e PSUC o r o t h e r l e f t - w i n g p a r t i e s , i t comes as 
l i t t l e s u r p r i s e t h a t o f t e n t h e same people were i n v o l v e d i n both 
c u l t u r a l p o l i t i c s and t h e organised p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n . 
A p a r t i c u l a r g e n e r a t i o n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s became a c t i v e i n t h e 
1960's, and then moved i n t o p o l i t i c s i n t h e 1970's. Those took 
r i s k s v d i i l e i n v o l v e d i n t h e c u l t u r a l movement gained a C a t a l a n i s t 
r e p u t a t i o n , which l i f t e d them i n t o p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e l a t e r on. Pages, 
\iho worked f o r Edicions 62 i n t h e 1960s and i s w i t h t h e p u b l i s h i n g 
house L a i a today, p o i n t e d o u t another connection between t h e 
c u l t u r a l and t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e . He claimed t h a t t h e Catalan 
p u b l i s h i n g houses were a k i n d o f niche, v^ere p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s were a b l e t o earn t h e i r l i v i n g . 
"People who are now i n t h e Catalan Parliament have a t one 
stage been working here as e d i t o r s . People v*io now have 
po s t s i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f c u l t u r e [ o f t h e Catalan 
Government] worked as p r o o f readers, e d i t o r s o r t r a n s l a t o r s 
[ i n t h e p u b l i s h i n g houses]. I n a d d i t i o n , one o f t h e ways f o r 
p u b l i s h e r s t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e p o l i t i c a l r e s i s t a n c e was t o 
p u b l i s h work t o many o f these people (...) vdio had j u s t come 
out from p r i s o n and c o u l d n ' t f i n d work elsevAaere. Far from 
b e i n g an o b s t a c l e , t h i s was t r e a t e d as a recommendation 
here. A mutual f r i e n d would r i n g up and say, "look, 
such-and-such, whom you don't know, has j u s t come out o f 
Burgos p r i s o n ; i f you can do anything f o r him ", Well, i f 
you c o u l d , you d i d . " 
(Pages, i n t e r v i e w , 25.4.1988) 
The p u b l i s h i n g houses regarded i t as t h e i r d u ty t o p r o v i d e work f o r 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s . Josep Verdura had been i n p r i s o n f o r t r a d e 
u n i o n a c t i v i t i e s b e f o r e he came t o L a i a . J o r d i Sole-Tura (now 
p r o f e s s o r o f law a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Barcelona, and prominent 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t f o r t h e S o c i a l i s t Party (PSC), was a communist 
a c t i v i s t i n t h e 1960's. He d i d many t r a n s l a t i o n s f o r "Edicions 62" 
(Chapter s i x ) (353) 
between 1965 and 1969, p a r t i c u l a r l y of social and p o l i t i c a l science 
and philosophy w r i t i n g s . He translated the marxist classics i n the 
" I l i b r e s a I'Abast" series. Verdura i s another exanple. He was 
involved i n trade m i o n a c t i v i t i e s , and was collaborating with 
Marxist parties vdien he came t o work f o r Estela i n the l a t e 1960's. 
Not least because of these personal and work based connections, the 
publishing houses became si t e s of p o l i t i c a l meetings, v^ich also 
involved people v^o were not d i r e c t l y connected with the house. 
"Edicions 62" was 
"a common meeting place f o r people from a l l groups or 
p a r t i e s viiich were i n the anti-Francoist opposition. I t was 
l i k e a permanent t e r t u l i a , v*iere manifestoes were hammered 
out and passed around f o r people t o sign. Putting out more 
or less subversive protest l e a f l e t s was an established 
custom here, and then friends - authors and others - would 
be c a l l e d i n t o sign them. I t also happened frequently that 
a more or less clandestine figure would pass by i n order t o 
c o l l e c t or leave (probably quite innocent) messages. The 
anti-Francoist movement was f u l l of such things, v^ich were 
more i l l u s i o n than r e a l i t y . " 
(Castellet, 1987, 46) 
Although the pxjblishing houses were probably on the periphery of 
undergroijnd p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , i t i s c e r t a i n l y the case that they 
had a p o l i t i c a l r o l e , v^iich was accepted by those involved. Meetings 
i n preparation of the Assamblea de Catalimya were remembered by 
Cahner, as were meetings of leading a c t i v i s t s of the PCE (Partit 
Ocsnunista de Espaiia) and the PSUC (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988). 
What i s s t r i k i n g about the c u l t u r a l movement i n the 1960's, v*iich 
involved p o l i t i c a l nationalism, and gradually evolved i n t o a 
p o l i t i c a l movement, i s the f a c t that i t was so closely k n i t . The 
hard core of the c u l t u r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y active i n t e l l e c t u a l s was 
centred i n Barcelona, and was connected through family, friendship, 
and through i n s t i t u t i o n s of c i v i l society (Scout movement, 
publishing houses, university, c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ) . Even i n the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement under Franco, there were only a few hundred 
a c t i v i s t s (Sellares, interview 14.4.1988). A l t h o u ^ the c u l t u r a l 
movement was touching many more Catalans, i t i s s t i l l d i f f i c u l t t o 
explain how hundreds of thousands of Catalans became s u f f i c i e n t l y 
(Chapter six) (354) 
aware c u l t i i r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y t o j o i n the protest inarches a f t e r 
Franco's death. I t i s inportant therefore t o see t h a t there were 
other i n s t i t u t i o n s of popular culture \^iich reached not only the 
Catalan middle class, but also sectors of the working class. The 
next subsection concerns such popular i n s t i t u t i o n s , vdiich became 
symbols of Catalan i d e n t i t y often despite t h e i r apparently 
u n p o l i t i c a l nature. 
2.6 Popular institutions and Catalan identity 
I f the p r i n c i p a l agents i n the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l were i n t e l l e c t u a l s , 
i t could be questioned t o what extent Catalan nationalism had 
popular support. Catalan books were read i n those days only by 
people viho had the necessary resources t o teach themselves the 
language; t h i s r e s t r i c t e d the people involved i n c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s 
t o the middle and i^per classes. I n order t o show how a mass 
consensus could be achieved i n favour of Catalan autonomy, i t i s 
necessary t o take a look a t another Catalan i n s t i t u t i o n v\^ich 
operated a t a d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l l e v e l and more openly i n the public 
sphere. I t i s often claimed t h a t the F. C. Barcelona (which i s 
commonly abbreviated t o an affectionate Barga), played precisely 
t h i s r o l e . I t was a symbol of catalanism w i t h vdiich people could 
e a s i l y i d e n t i f y , and i t provided the opportunity f o r large numbers 
of people from d i f f e r e n t s ocial and c u l t u r a l backgrounds t o 
assemble. Waving a Catalan f l a g i n the f o o t b a l l stadium became a 
popular way of showing one's national i d e n t i t y i n the 1970's. Even 
today, Catalan flags and those of the club are the only ones used by 
the fans. Any others, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the Spanish f l a g , are 
considered inappropriate (see Preface, p. 26). 
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21 2.6.1 Bar9a - something more than a f o o t b a l l club 
The slogan of the club i n the 1970's said t h a t Beir9a was not only 
about f o o t b a l l ; i t was also about p o l i t i c s . Neither was i t only the 
club of Barcelona c i t y , because there existed another club, Espafiol, 
i n the c i t y , but i t s name alone would have made i t irtpossible t o 
occupy such a c e n t r a l place i n the Catalans' hearts as Barga. But 
more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , Bar^a occi^^ied the r o l e of a national 
i n s t i t u t i o n ; i t was about Catalonia, the nation, not j u s t Barx:elona. 
I n 1988, there were 445 fan clvbs i n existence, the majority of them 
i n Barcelona and the i n d u s t r i a l b e l t , but many also i n the provinces 
of Girona, Tarragona and l i e i d a . With 110,000 club members, Bar9a 
was the largest of the Catalan associations l a s t year, and the 
presidency of the club was regarded as the second most prestigious 
post i n Catalonia, a f t e r the presidency of the Generalitat 
(Sabartes, interview, 4.3.1988). 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o p i n down exactly v^y Barga means so much t o so 
many Catalans. But already before the c i v i l war, the club played a 
p o l i t i c a l r o l e , because i t was used by the n a t i o n a l i s t bourgeoisie -
both the Regionalistes and the republican n a t i o n a l i s t petty 
bourgeoisie - t o mobilise the masses behind the Catalan f l a g 
(Coward, 1981, 23). IXiring the d i c t a t o r s h i p of Primo de Rivera 
(1923-30), the blue and red club colours were paraded i n the streets 
as proxies of the forbidden Catalan red and yellow s t r i p e s . I n 1925, 
the government closed down the club f o r h a l f a year because of 
anti-Spanish protests during the celebrations of i t s 25th 
anniversary ( A r t e l l s , 1972, 177). This event increased greatly the 
popularity of the club a t a time v*ien f o o t b a l l started t o become a 
sport of the popular classes i n Catalonia (La Vancruardia. 1988, 
supplement, 99). Under Franco, the club also became a symbol of 
Catalan i d e n t i t y and a forum f o r expressing popular discontent w i t h 
the r u l i n g class. 
^"^"El Barga es quelcom mes que un club de f u t b o l " was the election 
slogan of Bar^a's president Montal. 
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I t was not t h a t the club directors created t h i s symbol. I n 1939, 
Bar9a became c a s t i l i a n i s e d , j u s t l i k e a l l the other i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
and the Catalan f l a g was removed from i t s code of arms. The 
president was selected by the government, and i n subsequent years 
appointed i n undemocratic ways by prestigious club members v^o were 
mostly sympathetic t o the Franco regime. Most members of the 
directorates were i n some ways connected w i t h the Catalan t e x t i l e 
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bourgeoisie (Sabartes, 1982a, 35), and o f f i c i a l l y , the club was 
a p o l i t i c a l . However, the directors were mostly Catalans, and had a 
d e p o l i t i c i s e d national i d e n t i t y . I n f e s t i v i t i e s of the club such as 
the inauguration of a new stadium vAiich attracted huge numbers of 
people, the Catalan culture would be b r o u ^ t i n t o the stadium i n the 
form of Catalan choral societies (orfeus), sardanes, and open a i r 
masses i n Montserrat. 
But i t was mainly the popular masses who invested t h e i r national 
i d e n t i t y i n t o the club. Vice-president Casaus confirmed t h i s : 
"The t r u t h i s t h a t since Catalanist manifestations were 
prohi b i t e d i n public, Catalans took advantage of mass events 
t o display t h e i r Catalan i d e n t i t y . I t i s therefore l o g i c a l 
t h a t they would take advantage of a f o o t b a l l game wit h tens 
of thousands of spectators i n order t o express t h e i r 
national feelings, vdiich i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere they were 
not able t o show." 
(Casaus, interview, 20.1.1988) 
J o r d i Pujol r e f l e c t e d on the "supreme symbol of Catalanism" a year 
before he stood f o r presidency of the Catalan Generalitat t h a t even 
back i n the dark year of 1951, the Catalan people associated Bar9a 
w i t h Catalan autonomy and democracy. Rather sentimentally, he 
claimed t h a t those masses who l i n e d the streets waiting f o r the 
a r r i v a l of the v i c t o r i o u s team were i n f a c t the same - i n essence -
as those who were waiting f o r the a r r i v a l of the f i r s t Catalan 
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Agusti Montal was president of Barga between 1969 and 1978, v^ien 
the club grew t o be a symbol of Catalan p o l i t i c a l aspirations. As 
geneiral manager of Montalfita SA and vice president of the Caja de 
Jubilaciones y Subsidies de l a Industria Textil, he also was a 
representative of the Catalan t e x t i l e bourgeoisie (Sabartes, 1982b, 
105). 
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president i n 1931 (Pujol, 1979, 15). I t i s probable t h a t i n the eyes 
of many people, Catalonia - which had o f f i c i a l l y ceased t o e x i s t but 
was s t i l l f e l t - came t o be represented by Bar9a. The club 
symbolised the struggle of a nation against a repressive state. The 
enemy were the arch r i v a l Recil Madrid and the Federation of Spanish 
Football, v^iose president was of course appointed by Franco. They 
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were ea s i l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the government . I n the l a s t years of 
the Franco regime, Catalan flags began t o appear i n the stadium, and 
the spectators were singing the Bar9a hymn and the Catalan anthem, 
both of V i ^ c h were r a d i c a l acts under the p o l i t i c a l crrcumstances. 
The membership grew from 52,000 i n 1970 t o 70,000 i n 1974, and 
having a membership card was almost regarded as being part of the 
Catalan opposition movement. 
For immigrants, the club was one of rather few ways t o a c t i v e l y take 
on Catalan n a t i o n a l i t y . Since i t was d i f f i c u l t t o learn Catalan and 
t o become integrated, many immigrants v^o wanted t h i s f e l t t h a t 
"the best way t o become a native Catalan i s (...) t o 
r e g i s t e r t h e i r new baby as a member of Barga as soon as i t 
i s bom." 
(Dieirio de Barcelona. 8.5.1977, 4) 
Although d e t a i l s of the membership are a closely guarded secret of 
the club, vtiich wants t o be seen as a happy family and a true mirror 
of Catalan society, i t i s confirmed t h a t a t h i r d of the membership 
i s of C a s t i l i a n o r i g i n . The popular appeal of the club i s also 
manifest i n the f a c t t h a t many women are members and watch the 
games. Family membership i s a common feature. The club has members 
from a l l s o c i a l classes, w i t h the middle and working class 
c o n s t i t u t i n g most of the membership. But the club i s able t o 
mobilise f a r more people than j u s t i t s members. When i t won the 
European cup i n 1979, h a l f a m i l l i o n are alleged t o have gathered i n 
23 . . . . 
A key event i n the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of Barga was a game against 
Real Madrid i n 1970 v*dch had t o be cancelled a f t e r a biased decision by 
the referee. Bar9a fans invaded the f i e l d v^en police began t o b r u t a l l y 
beat up the protestors, and the v±iole event erupted i n t o an 
anti-government manifestation (Sabartes, interview, 4.3.1988). 
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the c i t y centre t o celebrate the v i c t o r y , many equipped w i t h Catalan 
fl a g s . I n mass demonstrations i n favour of Catalan autonomy, on the 
other hand, many people were wielding the red and blue colours of 
Bar9a. Because of i t s popular appeal, the Catalan L e f t supported the 
club, as i t appeared t o represent the democratic w i l l of the people. 
For exanple, the elections f o r the directorate of the club attracted 
as much a t t e n t i o n i n the media as government elections today. The 
e l e c t i o n campaigns were an opportunity f o r the disenfranchised t o 
express t h e i r preferences, even t h o u ^ not even Barga elections were 
democratic. Nevertheless, i n the p o l i t i c a l desert of Catalonia under 
Franco, they were closely monitored by the media and treated l i k e 
p o l i t i c a l canpaigns. (Sabartes, 1982a, 41-42). 
Cultural i n s t i t u t i o n s during the Franco period, more w i l l i n g l y - as 
i n the case of the publishing houses - or less - as i n the case of 
F.C. Barcelona - became vehicles of p o l i t i c a l mobilisation and 
symbols of Catalan national i d e n t i t y . Culture and p o l i t i c s were 
d i f f i c u l t t o disentangle a t the height of popular p o l i t i c i s a t i o n i n 
the mid-seventies, v*ien a u n i f i e d Catalan movement called f o r 
autonomy and democracy. A f t e r the l e g a l i s a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p arties, 
people were able t o express p o l i t i c a l preferences d i r e c t l y , but 
those c u l t u r a l e n t i t i e s v^^ich were most infested w i t h Catalanist 
sentiment d i d not lose t h e i r symbolic status. And because t h i s 
status lends them cross class popular support, i t becomes important 
f o r the Catalan p a r t i e s t o embrace these i n s t i t u t i o n s i n order t o 
establish t h e i r hegemony. 
This method of gathering p o l i t i c a l svpport was f a r easier than 
t r y i n g t o convince people w i t h p o l i t i c a l arguments and action. When 
i n the l a s t years of the 1970's the abstention from elections was 
r i s i n g and popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c s r a p i d l y declining, the 
new democratic pa r t i e s i n Catalonia made e f f o r t s t o increase t h e i r 
p o p u l a r i t y w i t h the help of the then successful f o o t b a l l club. 
J u t g l a r observed t h a t even before Catalonia was granted autonomy 
o f f i c i a l l y , the pro-autonomy demonstrations on the National Day 
(September 11) halved every year. While i n 1978, only h a l f a m i l l i o n 
demonstrated on t h a t day, twice as many came out t o greet the Barga 
team a f t e r i t s v i c t o r y i n the European Cup i n May 1979. P o l i t i c i a n s 
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of a l l p a r t i e s exploited the occasion, gathered on the Plaga Sant 
Jaume where the Catalan Government has i t s seat, and made long 
speeches t o claim t h a t "the v i c t o r y of Bar9a i s a v i c t o r y f o r 
Catalonia". J u t g l a r was appalled by the f a c t t h a t 
" f o o t b a l l , v ^ c h had been denounced so often by the 
opposition as a b r u t a l i s i n g opium of popular consciousness, 
was now manipulated by the new p o l i t i c i a n s i n a s i m i l a r way 
as before". 
(Jutglar, 1982, v o l . V I I I , 337) 
Even today, popular c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of c i v i l society, such as 
the F.C. Barcelona, command a more stable, p o s i t i o n i n Catalonia than 
democratic p a r t i e s . I n Gramsci's words they represent the trenches 
v*iich p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have t o conquer i n the b a t t l e over hegemony. 
They are used t o create l i n k s w i t h the - often d e p o l i t i c i s e d -
people, but also f o r the purpose of manipulating them. 
So f a r , t h i s chapter has examined the c u l t u r a l basis of le g i t i m a t i o n 
f o r Catalan nationalism i n c i v i l society. From a vast range and 
number of i n s t i t u t i o n s developing i n Catalonia during the Franco 
period, I chose two types which exenplified d i f f e r e n t aspects of the 
l i n k s between public c u l t u r e and p o l i t i c s . These l i n k s were shaped 
by the r e l a t i o n s h i p between c i v i l society and the state, and by the 
ways i n v^i c h Catalan society was structured i n social and cultioral 
terms. The publishing houses threw l i g h t on the involvement of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the n a t i o n a l i s t c o n f l i c t , and the F.C. Baicelona 
served as an exanple of a popular i n s t i t u t i o n vhich became a public 
symbol of shared national i d e n t i t y . 
The next section examines the c u l t u r a l basis of Scottish 
nationalism. I n the f i r s t place, I am concerned w i t h the question 
whether such a basis exist s a t a l l . I n various parts of t h i s thesis, 
i t has been made clear t h a t the c u l t u r a l aspect of Scottish i d e n t i t y 
i s given l i t t l e emphasis i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. The Scottish 
nation i s defined h i s t o r i c a l l y , and w i t h reference t o c i v i l society 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , which have subsequently become part of the B r i t i s h 
s t a t e apparatus (e.g. l o c a l government, the education system, and 
the l e g a l system). Unlike Catalonia, v*iere a d i s t i n c t i v e language 
served t o d i s t i n g u i s h Catalan culture from t h a t of the Spanish state 
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and t o u n i t e the Catalan population, Scotland's culture merges i n t o 
English (and B r i t i s h ) culture. As a r e s u l t , the l i n k s between 
c u l t u r e and nationalism, and the r o l e of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements, have been more ambiguous, and as a v^ole less 
inportant than i n the Catalan case. 
3. SCOTTISH CULTURE - A REGIONAL CULTURE? 
Scottish c u l t u r e was not the strong wind blowing behind the s a i l s of 
the n a t i o n a l i s t movement of the 1960's and 1970's. Some kind of 
r e v i v a l took place, such as a growing i n t e r e s t i n the mass media f o r 
"things Scottish", and a s l i g h t increase i n publishing i n order t o 
feed the p o l i t i c a l debate of the period. But apart from dedicated 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s committed t o t h e i r c u l t u r a l heritage, popular 
knowledge of Scottish culture was scant, and few people had a 
p o l i t i c a l perspective on the issue. I n f a c t , few were proud of vihat 
i s commonly regarded as Scottish culture: 19th century sentimental 
navels, g l o r i f i e d Highland wars vAiich a l l too often ended i n 
defeats, and t o u r i s t oriented f o l k music and tartans. More serious 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s and roost of the Scottish bourgeoisie dissociated 
themselves from t h i s "sub-national c u l t u r e " v^iich always seemed t o 
accept i t s parochial, r i d i c u l o u s image: 
"The remarkable assemblage of heterogeneous elements, 
neurotic double-binds, f a l s e l y honoured shades, and 
brainless v u l g a r i t y \Aiich make up "national c u l t u r e " here 
have n a t u r a l l y troubled i n t e l l e c t u a l s . " 
(Nairn, 1977, 168) 
According t o Nairn, the Tartan monster epitomised the v u l g a r i t y and 
depravity of a national culture without mouth. The long t r a d i t i o n of 
middle class emigration, vAiich meant th a t modem Scottish society 
" i s notoriously marked by the lack of a large, confident and 
p o l i t i c a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l middle class" (Ascherson, 1988, 66), i s 
surely one reason f o r t h i s lack of mouth. Successful w r i t e r s , 
j o u r n a l i s t s and a r t i s t s often move t o London, v^ere they and t h e i r 
work are no longer associated w i t h Scotland; those \Jh.o stay are a t 
best " l o c a l heroes". The word "parochial" haunts Scottish p o l i t i c s , 
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l i t e r a t u r e , education and a r t s (Craig, 1982, 3). This f r a g i l e 
c u l t u r a l basis, v ^ c h lacks prestige even among many Scots, i s t o a 
large degree responsible f o r the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of n a t i o n a l i s t 
resistance and si:$)port (Craig, 1983b, 24-25). McCrone has argued 
t h a t the negative representation of Scottish culture has influenced 
the Scottish i n t e l l i g e n t s i a i n such a way t h a t " t h e i r contributions 
t o the development of neo-nationalism i n Scotland have been negative, 
and c r i t i c a l " (McCrone, 1989, 161). He proposes t h a t Scottish 
n a t i o n a l i s t s should stop worrying about the lack of a d i s t i n c t i v e 
national c u l t u r e , and j u s t get on w i t h p o l i t i c s ( i b i d . . 172-173). 
I f c u l t u r a l difference i s the main nucleias of national i d e n t i t y and 
the national c u l t u r e i s a problem f o r Scots, i t i s not surprising 
t h a t Scottish i d e n t i t y i s not taken f o r granted, p a r t i c u l a r l y by 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . I t becomes the subject of f i l m s and books, v^iere 
Scottishness i s often portrayed through images of defeat and 
powerlessness: the destruction of Highland culture, the displaced 
peasantry, the deprivation i n Glasgow's working class areas. Craig 
argued t h a t these f o c i of i d e n t i t y are one-sided. They constitute 
one end of a d i a l e c t i c which derives i t s power from outside Scotland 
(Craig, 1983a, 8-11). I n t h i s sense, what i s commonly regarded as 
Scottish c u l t u r e today i s a regional culture, "essentially 
f o l k l o r i s t and picturesque", as Gramsci described regional cultures 
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i n I t a l y . Thus, the weakness of Scottish culture cannot be 
isolated, but must be seen as p a r t of Scotland's peripheral 
s i t u a t i o n next t o a dominant English culture. Eue t o i t s image, 
Scottish c u l t u r e i s separated from the p o l i t i c a l and becomes a 
matter of p r i v a t e eJ5)erience (Maxwell, 1980, 4). I t requires a s h i f t 
of consciousness t o recognise t h a t the status of Scottish culture i s 
t o some extent the product of the lack of p o l i t i c a l autonomy. Many 
Scots do not know about t h e i r c u l t u r e because i t has been coirpletely 
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"The ^regional' people were seen from outside through the glasses 
of paternalism, w i t h the disenchanted cosmopolitan s p i r i t of t o u r i s t s i n 
search of strong and o r i g i n a l raw sensations. The deeply rooted 
^ a p o l i t i c a l ' nature of I t a l i a n w r i t e r s , coated w i t h verbose national 
r h e t o r i c , has been r e a l l y harmful t o them" (Gramsci, 1985, 202). 
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absent from the education system (Radical Scotland. Feb./March 1987, 
No. 25, 34). The s i t u a t i o n of the Scottish languages i s a case i n 
point, v i i i c h w i l l be examined i n the section below. 
3.1 Scottish languages; Gaelic cind Scots 
I n contrast t o Catalonia, languages play only a very peripheral r o l e 
i n Scottish nationalism. Throu^out the past f i v e centuries, the 
Scottish languages have been declining, replaced and marginalised by 
the "Queen's English", vfeLch was the language of modernisation. 
Language r e v i v a l s have taken place, but on a much less s i g n i f i c a n t 
scale, because English had become the language of the person i n the 
st r e e t . The reasons f o r the decline of the indigenous Scottish 
languages cannot be discussed here i n d e t a i l , but a few comments 
should i l l u m i n a t e the constraints of language based n a t i o n a l i s t 
claims. F i r s t l y , there are several languages spoken i n Scotland, and 
none of them i s a serious r i v a l t o English as a means of mass 
comfflunication today. Secondly, the status of these languages has 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y been low, a t least since the Union w i t h England. Many 
Gaelic and Scots speakers have regarded i t t o be i n t h e i r own 
i n t e r e s t t o adopt English. Thirdly, the state neglected Scots and 
Gaelic over a long period, and therefore contributed t o t h e i r 
decline. Only recently have some e f f o r t s begun t o teach them a t 
schools and t o use them i n o f f i c i a l media. I t should be noted t h a t 
neither of these s p e c i f i c languages are required as l i n g u i s t i c 
markers, as the Scottish accent i s usually s u f f i c i e n t t o distinguish 
English speaking Scots from other English speakers. 
Turning t o the f i r s t point, there i s not one language deemed t o be 
s p e c i f i c a l l y Scottish, but several, among v^ich Gaelic and Scots are 
the most prominent. The dominant theory i s t h a t never throui^out 
h i s t o r y has Scotland had one single unitary - and uni f y i n g -
language covering her v*iole area. But the d i s t r i b u t i o n of Gaelic 
place names suggests t h a t Gaelic came close t o being a national 
language i n the (pre-nationalist) 15th century. With the 
disappearance of Gaelic (Fig. 26) and Scots from t h e i r l a s t bastions 
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Fig. 26 : DISTRIBUTION OF G A E L I C SPEAKERS IN 
SCOTLAND, 1071 
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i n the Western I s l e s and the North East respectively, the English 
language has almost achieved coitplete dominance (Henderson, 1988, 
263). Since the Union of Crowns (1603), Gaelic has retreated f u r t h e r 
and f u r t h e r i n t o the Highlands, while Scots became increasingly seen 
as a Lowland d i a l e c t of English. However, there i s evidence t h a t i n 
southern parts of Scotland, such as Ayrshire and Galloway, Gaelic 
was s t i l l spoken as l a t e as the l a s t century. The much errphasised 
dichotomy between the Highlands and the Lowlands was not as 
clear-cut as some histo r i a n s led one t o believe ( I a i n MacLaren, 
personal communication; Withers, 1982). However, socio-economic and 
cu l t x i r a l pressures from both inside and outside Scotland spelled the 
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seemingly unstoppable decline of Gaelic (see Chapter two, section 
4.1). I n the Scottish Lowlands, a version of English began t o be 
adopted as the language of the middle and upper classes as early as 
the 14th century. Thou^ a derivation of English, i t developed i n 
d i s t i n c t i v e ways which i n the eyes of some commentators q u a l i f i e s i t 
f o r the status of a language, rather than j u s t a d i a l e c t (Price, 
1984, 187; Weekend Guardian. 1.-2.4.1989, 8). Up u n t i l the Union of 
Crowns (1603), Scots was the o f f i c i a l national language, but not the 
language of the people (Agutter, 1988, 13-14). The "Golden Age" of 
Scots verse i n the 15th and 16th century gave the Scots language a 
place a t the ta b l e of European h i ^ culture. With the Union, i t 
gradually l o s t prestige and became the "street dialec±", as wtiidh it 
i s perceived today. That i t has, however, not l o s t a l l claim t o the 
status of language i s t e s t i f i e d t o by the growing body of 
27 
d i c t i o n a r i e s , grammars and etymologies. As w e l l as being spoken i n 
r u r a l as w e l l as urban environments, Scots i s also s t i l l a l i t e r a r y 
25 
Even a century ago, only 6.9 per cent of the Scottish population 
were b i l i n g u a l or mono-lingual i n Gaelic (Price, 1984, 59). 
26 
B i l l y Kay, a prominent defender of the Scots language, coitpared 
the s i t x i a t i o n of Scots i n B r i t a i n t o t h a t of other minority languages. 
He argued t h a t f o r exaitple Galician i s regarded as a "degraded gutter 
version" of standard C a s t i l i a n , v ^ l e a t the same time i t i s the 
o f f i c i a l language i n Portugal (Weekend Guardian, 1.-2.4.1989, 8). 
27 
Among these are the Scottish National Dictionary, the Dictionary 
of the Older Scottish Tongue, and the Concise Scottish Dictionary. 
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language, v ^ i c h was boosted by the small-scale revivals i n the 18th 
century (Robert Bums) and the 1920's (Hugh MacDiarmid). 
Against the dominant English, neither of these two languages were 
able t o maintain a p o s i t i o n vfcLch would enable them t o serve as a 
c u l t u r a l basis f o r national conscio\:isness. The p o l i t i c a l Union w i t h 
England was p a r t l y responsible f o r t h i s , because i t meant tha t 
English became the o f f i c i a l language. The 1872 Education Acts, f o r 
exanple, made primary school education conpulsory without 
considering the Scottish minority languages. Although the Scottish 
education system i s regarded as a national i n s t i t u t i o n , w i t h a 
h i s t o r y of i t s own and an almost exclusively Scottish s t a f f , i t has 
28 
w i l l i n g l y anglicised the curriculum . But i t i s also inportant t o 
note t h a t the Scottish people themselves promoted the switch t o the 
language of power and social m o b i l i t y . P a r t i c u l a r l y the middle and 
upper classes "have been f a l l i n g over themselves t o loose t h e i r 
Scots and acquire the more prestigious English" (Weekend Gucirdian, 
1.-2.4.1989, 8). S i m i l a r l y , many Gaelic speakers tended t o 
depreciate t h e i r mother tongue which was confined t o such a 
r e s t r i c t e d r o l e t h a t i t became an inpediment t o educational and 
so c i a l advancement. 
The difference t o the Catalan case i s t h a t Scots and Gaelic were not 
the languages of modernisation and i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . They thus 
became relegated t o the pr i v a t e sphere and t o t r a d i t i o n a l r u r a l 
environments. B i l l y Wolfe, the former chairman of the SNP, claimed 
t h a t he was one of few n a t i o n a l i s t s v*io were not only committed t o 
economic independence, but also t o the c u l t u r a l heritage of 
Scotland. Now r e t i r e d from p o l i t i c s and active i n the Scottish 
Poetry Society, he recalled h i s experience of the Scots language: 
" I was b i l i n g u a l from the time I started running out i n the 
s t r e e t . [...] my parents didn't speak Scots, although itty 
28 
The degree t o v^*iich Scottish schools are dominated by English 
c u l t u r e i s c r i t i c i s e d i n a recent report of the Scottish Resources in 
Schools Project, which encouraged schools t o " i n s e r t the Scottish" angle 
i n t o a l l subjects (Radical Scotland^ Aug./Sept. 1985, 15-16). 
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father d i d vs*ien I was older. He had a large vocabulary, but 
i t was looked down v^xDn, as i s the case w i t h l o t s and l o t s 
of languages i n a c o l o n i a l s i t u a t i o n . So, I had a language 
i n the school playground and i n the streets, and a d i f f e r e n t 
vocabulary v^en I was a t home or i n the class room. And most 
Scots are l i k e t h a t even today [ . . . ] . " 
(Wolfe, interview, 25.2.1987) 
While i n Catalonia, i t was the aim of the Franco regime t o reduce 
the Catalan language t o j u s t such a peripheral status through 
repression, the decline of the indigenous Scottish languages 
occurred over many centuries. History shows t h a t f o r c e f u l state 
29 
repression and economic power played a r o l e , and t h a t Westminster 
l e g i s l a t i o n was a very iirportant factor i n the process of 
degradation and decline. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the l a s t 150 years, the 
education system i n Scotland has almost conpletely ignored the 
Scottish languages and indigenous l i t e r a t u r e , as English l i t e r a t u r e 
and c u l t u r e was taken t o epitomise the ideal model f o r c i v i l i s e d 
development not only f o r B r i t a i n , but also f o r the v^ole Enpire 
(Craig, 1987, 2), But c u l t u r a l n a t i o n a l i s t s cannot blame only 
fore i g n powers f o r the s i t u a t i o n of the languages, and f o r the 
deficiencies of Scottish culture i n general; they also have t o make 
t h e i r own coitpatriots responsible f o r i t . As Chapter four i r p l i e d , 
most Scottish i n t e l l e c t u a l s have subscribed t o the hegemony of 
English cu l t u r e , rather than reconstructing the indigenous c u l t u r a l 
structures, as happened i n Catalonia. Given these pressures on 
d i s t i n c t i v e Scottish c u l t u r e , i t comes as a surprise not only t h a t 
Scots and Gaelic s t i l l e x i s t , but t h a t they are the languages i n 
v^i c h a great deal of Scottish l i t e r a t u r e has been created i n the 
20th century. 
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I n McGrath's play The Cheviot, the Stag and the Black, Black O i l , 
the decline of the Gaelic speaking population was explained thus: 
"Because English i s the language of the r u l i n g class. 
Because English i s the language of the people who own the 
highlands and con t r o l the highlands and invest i n the 
highlands -". 
"Because English i s the language of the Development Board, 
the Hydro Board, the Tourist Board, the Forestry Commission, 
the County Council and, I suppose, the Chicago Bridge 
Construction Conpany." 
(McGrath, 1981, 52) 
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I n the l a s t decades, i n t e r e s t has been growing i n conserving Gaelic 
and reconsidering the status of the Scots language. TV and radio run 
programmes i n Gaelic, research i n t o popular culture has been 
i n t e n s i f y i n g , and publishing houses are now more prepared t o take on 
Scots and Gaelic publications (evidence from interviews). While the 
languages now have a greater public presence than before, they 
remain minority languages, and the Scottish i n t e l l e c t u a l s using them 
c r e a t i v e l y hardly ever receive much atte n t i o n . This contrasts 
s t a r k l y w i t h the Catalan publishing r e v i v a l i n the 1960's, vihere 
anyone who was remotely able t o conpose a book was begged by editors 
t o publish something (Cahner, interview). As long as i t was i n 
Catalan, i t d i d not even have t o be readable. So, even today 
Scottish i d e n t i t y i s f a r more linked t o the Scottish accent than 
e i t h e r Gaelic or Scots, and even the Scottish accent i s often kept 
i n defiance of pressures t o speak proper English"^ 
The next section discusses the relationship between Scottish culture 
and n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c s . Although culture has never been as strong 
a symbol of national i d e n t i t y as i n most other n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements, there are i d e n t i f i a b l e l i n k s between the p o l i t i c a l and 
the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l , v^ich suggests that we are not dealing with a 
straightforward absence of c u l t u r a l nationalism. 
3.2 The role of Scottish culture in nationcilist politics 
I n the past few decades, Scottish culture has achieved a better 
image, and there i s now a greater awareness of i t i n Scotland than 
before. There are diverging opinions v^ether t h i s c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l 
i s a side e f f e c t of p o l i t i c a l nationalism, or whether both went hand 
i n hand. What i s c e r t a i n i s t h a t the c u l t u r a l and the p o l i t i c a l have 
been much less closely related than i n Catalonia. Rather than being 
a fundamental b u i l d i n g stone of p o l i t i c a l nationalism, Scottish 
A couple of years ago, a Scottish pop duo conposed a song about 
the Scottish accent which r e f l e c t s these pressures. The t e x t of Throw 
your 'R' away i s reproduced i n Table 4.1. 
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c u l t u r e can be regarded as forming part of the f u m i t u r e w i t h which 
n a t i o n a l i s t s intend t o make the reconstructed nation homely. This 
does not mean t h a t there have not been many Scots dedicated t o the 
idea of a national culture. Hamish Henderson, the heart and soul of 
the School of Scottish Studies (founded i n Edinburgh i n 1951 and 
expanding ever since u n t i l 1979), maintained t h a t f o r him, 
"the v^ole national question has been saturated w i t h the 
necessity of defending the Scottish c u l t u r a l position". 
(Henderson, interview, 9.8.1988) 
Although n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c i a n s formulated demands aimed at 
fo s t e r i n g and increasing public awareness f o r Scottish culture, t h i s 
was regarded more as a token gesture vdiich was not expected t o r a l l y 
the masses. Ascherson found i n 1977, a t the peak of in t e r e s t i n 
Scottish self-government, t h a t none of the Scots questioned i n a 
radio interview (about the c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l acccmpaniment 
t o the p o l i t i c a l r e v i v a l ) 
"seemed t o see a c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l , most were sceptical about 
the p o l i t i c a l r e v i v a l , nobody wished t o speculate about the 
future or even, r e a l l y , t o discuss the present. The only 
"creative" name mentioned upon middle-earth was B i l l y 
Connolly." 
(Ascherson, 1986, 5) 
Despite new magazines, publishers and some developments i n Scottish 
theatre, there was r e a l l y no flowering of Scottish culture which 
corresponded t o the p o l i t i c a l movement. But t h i s was not because the 
s o i l was too t h i n f o r such a flowering. 
" I t i s p a r t l y the a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l bias of the SNP (...). 
I t i s mostly t h a t the connection between p o l i t i c a l and 
c u l t u r a l movements can't be established." 
(ibid . ) 
C u l t u r a l n a t i o n a l i s t s d i d not enjoy a hi^ p r o f i l e i n the p o l i t i c a l 
movement as i n Catalonia. I n t e l l e c t u a l s involved i n the re v i v a l of 
Scottish c u l t u r e , such as Hamish Henderson, were involved i n the 
p o l i t i c a l movement, but not prominently. B i l l y Wolfe thought t h a t 
t h i s d i v i s i o n between culture and p o l i t i c s was a general 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n Scotland: 
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"Most people i n Scotland, including 99 per cent of a l l the 
active p o l i t i c i a n s , aren't i n the s l i g h t e s t interested i n 
c u l t u r e , and would not even accept t h a t cult\ire has anything 
t o do w i t h p o l i t i c s . As f a r as they are concerned, i t ' s only 
economics, and social issues related t o wealth and the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth". 
(Wolfe, interview, 25.2.1987) 
SNP p o l i t i c i a n Stephen Maxwell argued t h a t the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement i s , unlike most other European nationalisms, without a 
l i n g u i s t i c basis. Although the SNP would appeal t o people's sense of 
pride i n being Scottish and support Gaelic speaking and the teaching 
of Scots l i t e r a t u r e and Scottish h i s t o r y i n schools, the party does 
not give prominence t o s p e c i f i c c u l t u r a l causes. 
" I n Scotland, i f someone wants t o make a c u l t u r a l case f o r 
nationalism, they're l i k e l y t o do i t post-facto; i n other 
words, they are l i k e l y t o say, "when we have independence 
then we can s t a r t developing i n s t i t u t i o n s V i^iich w i l l support 
a more vigorous Scottish culture. [...] I'm not saying t h a t 
a l i n g u i s t i c r e v i v a l i n both Gaelic and Scots may not be an 
important element i n a revived culture, but they can never 
lead even the c u l t u r a l case, l e t alone the p o l i t i c a l " . 
(Maxwell, interview, 27.2.1987) 
Some commentators regarded the marginal r o l e of culture i n Scottish 
nationalism during the 1970's as a weakness of the p o l i t i c a l 
movement. The n a t i o n a l i s t movement showed some awareness of the way 
i n vAaich Scottish culture had been suppressed by the metropolitan 
cu l t u r e , but d i d not propose any r e a l challenge t o the dominant 
c u l t u r a l modes. What i t offered was 
"a b i t more Scottish h i s t o r y , a look at MacDiarmid and 
McLlevanney, greater tolerance of Scots and Gaelic ...". 
(Tumbull and Beveridge, 1980, 2) 
This lijnitedness i n the c u l t u r a l aspirations of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement, the authors argued, t o some extent j u s t i f i e d c r i t i c i s m s of 
Scottish nationalism as parochial and chauvinistic. 
However, i f the lack of f a i t h i n Scottish culture i n the SNP can be 
explained w i t h reference t o middle class t r a d i t i o n s of accepting 
English c u l t u r a l hegemony, one might expect of the Labour Party t o 
take a more p o s i t i v e approach. Since the Labour Party both embraces 
a large p a r t of the Scottish i n t e l l i g e n t s i a and of the working 
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class, and due t o i t s strong p o s i t i o n i n Scottish l o c a l government, 
i t has played a dominant r o l e i n Scottish popular culture. But the 
Labour Party's unionist t r a d i t i o n weighs heavily. I n the 1960's and 
1970's, v^^en n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c i s a t i o n posed a threat t o the 
party's dominant r o l e i n Scottish society, those v*io t r i e d t o 
promote Scottish c u l t u r e were often r i d i c u l e d by the party. The 
iitpression was created t h a t "to support your indigenous culture was 
t o be narrow-minded, bigoted and even possibly r a c i s t i n some way" 
( I a i n MacLaren, personal coraraunication). Thus, Scottish indigenous 
c u l t u r e d i d not have a home i n the "party of the people" either, 
despite the f a c t t h a t " d i s t i n c t i v e l y Scottish culture has more 
a f f i n i t y w i t h the working classes than English culture, i s more 
imbued w i t h a continuing sense of a l i v i n g ^ f o l k ' c ulture" (Craig, 
1987, 3). When Labour came t o support devolution, i t was due mostly 
t o p o l i t i c a l and socio-economic, and not f o r c u l t u r a l , reasons. 
Thus, neither sector of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n the 1970's 
presented a c u l t u r a l case f o r nationalism, or consciously attenpted 
t o r e t r i e v e and t o f o s t e r those c u l t u r a l practices which existed 
outside the major i n s t i t u t i o n s of Scottish c i v i l society. I t seemed 
inpossible t o b r i n g the c u l t u r a l together with the p o l i t i c a l - at 
l e a s t u n t i l the p o l i t i c a l case of nationalism f a i l e d t o win i n 1979. 
I f the c u l t u r a l basis of Scottish i d e n t i t y i s generally elusive and 
changeable, there are some aspects of popular culture v^ich f o r a 
long time have been seen as symbols of national i d e n t i t y . As i n 
Catalonia, f o o t b a l l has occupied a priviledged p o s i t i o n among these 
symbols. But the l i n k t o nationalism i s clearer i n Scotland, which 
has her own national team. The yearly annual between England and 
Scotland developed i n t o inportant demonstrations of n a t i o n a l i s t 
sentiments. As Moorhouse notes, 
"most Scots can understand the weight of neglect and disdain 
by England t h a t might drive f o o t b a l l fans t o seek and enjoy 
symbolic v i c t o r i e s against the old enemy." 
(Moorhouse, 1989, 226) 
When Scotland goes t o play i n a World cup, i t i s as i f i t were the 
national team of an independent country. And i t seems tha t Scottish 
f o o t b a l l r e f l e c t s the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n Scotland. I n 1977, 
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Scotland won against England i n Wembley, a t a time v^en the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement was a t i t s height; one year l a t e r , the 
disastrous performance of the Scottish team i n the World Cup 
coincided w i t h the downturn of the SNP. Some Scots argue th a t the 
disappointment and humiliation of Scotland i n the World Qjp actually 
caused a loss of national confidence, and thus influenced the 
outcome of the devolution referendum. 
Hamden Park, the national home ground, i s "the nearest thi n g 
Scotland has t o a National Assembly". At the Scottish c i ^ f i n a l i n 
1988, Scots used i t t o express t h e i r disagreement w i t h the B r i t i s h 
Prime Minister who attended as a guest, and brandished red cards a t 
her (McCarra, 1989, 29) . Thus, as i n the case of Catalonia, Scottish 
f o o t b a l l has served as a substitute f o r independent p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . But since most Scots have accepted ( u n t i l recently) 
the B r i t i s h state as representative and legitimate, f o o t b a l l has not 
been p o l i t i c i s e d t o such a degree. 
I n section 3.3, I look beyond the referendum and argue th a t the 
Scottish c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l i n the recent decades has come t o support 
p o l i t i c a l nationalism i n the 1980's. 
3.3 A recent cultural revival 
The Scottish c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l i n the 20th century began i n the 
1920's, v^en i t was connected w i t h nationalism. Although i t 
continued a f t e r the second world war, the c u l t u r a l movement was 
s t i l l only a poor and d i s t a n t cousin of p o l i t i c a l nationalism i n the 
1970's. But i n the 1980's, there were signs t h a t t h i s might change. 
Since the l a t e 70's, the overriding inportance of o i l and 
independence and the hold of the SNP over the n a t i o n a l i s t discourse 
were broken. Some have argued t h a t i t i s p o l i t i c a l f r u s t r a t i o n which 
tri g g e r e d o f f the boom of Scottish theatre, painting, pop music and 
l i t e r a t u r e . A remarkable ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l i n 
Scotland i s i t s tendency t o seek i t s roots and i t s audience i n the 
working class. This h i g h l i g h t s the gap between "working class, 
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Labour voting Scotland" and "class unconscious, Thatcher voting 
England", and i s laced w i t h n a t i o n a l i s t overtones. 
Theatre i s a case i n point. While the 7:84 conpany under John 
McGrath was a lone voice i n the 1970's, many small conpanies and 
playwrights have joined i t i n the 1980's. Actors viho, t r a i n i n g i n 
Scottish drama colleges i n the early 1970, "were not encouraged t o 
be Scottish actors", and had no contenporary Scottish dramas t o 
perform, now f i n d themselves r i d i n g on a wave of Scottish 
productions (Radical Scotland, April/May 1988, 30). The poet and 
playwright Liz Lochhead had b i g successes w i t h plays translated i n t o 
Scots, as w e l l as w i t h her own plays which integrate "archaic Scots 
and present-day Glaswegian" and deal w i t h p o l i t i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y 
relevant issues. For her, 
"the most e x c i t i n g t h i n g [... ] about being a playwright i n 
Scotland a t the moment i s the very r e a l hunger i n Scottish 
audiences f o r plays t h a t speak t o them about t h e i r own 
c u l t u r e and/or h i s t o r y . " 
(Radical Scotland, April/May 1988, 30) 
This sounds rather more l i k e Catalonia i n the 1960's. Similar t o the 
developments i n Scottish theatre, there has been a notable increase 
i n Scottish pop bands. The "Proclaimers" and "Hue and Cry", two of 
Scotland's more popular bands, have made songs on the p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n of Scotland i n B r i t a i n , and shared the platform with SNP 
candidate Jim S i l l a r s i n the Govan by-election campaign (Scotland on 
Sunday, 19.3.1989, 33). The f o l k music movement, i n Catalonia a 
powerful vehicle of national consciousness, has been r e l a t i v e l y 
strong i n Scotland since the early 1950's"^ ''". But here, the 
n a t i o n a l i s t end of the f o l k music spectrum was part of the "parodic, 
sentimental kailyardery" (Wright, 1987, 36-7) whose skin deep. 
^The recent f o l k song r e v i v a l started with the People's Festival 
i n 1951 which was organised by the s o c i a l i s t Labour Festival Committee. 
From the beginning i t had a strong p o l i t i c a l conponent, and not only 
because f o l k songs deal w i t h the l i v e s of ordinary people. Gramsci 
suggested t h a t f o l k c u l t u r e developed a separate way of perceiving the 
world v*iich i s opposed t o o f f i c i a l and dominant culture. This element of 
protest and dissent can be found i n the more p o l i t i c a l f o l k songs. 
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a p o l i t i c a l nationalism has been present i n Scottish culture ever 
since Walter Scott. 
The conteirporary c u l t u r a l boom i n Scotland cannot be separated from 
i t s p o l i t i c a l context. I t has already been mentioned i n the context 
of working class plays t h a t they r e f l e c t an increasing awareness of 
Scotland's working class c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s , much of v^iich has been 
reproduced through l o c a l t r a d i t i o n bearers, rather than i n 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . To some extent, the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l of the 1980's 
r e f l e c t s a change i n a t t i t u d e o f middle class i n t e l l e c t u a l s . This 
has l e d t o a greater public appreciation of Scottish c u l t u r a l 
t r a d i t i o n s v^ich had been less noted before. 
One reason f o r the home grown c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l and i t s popular 
appeal i s surely t h a t following the disappointing r e s u l t of the 
SNP's p o l i t i c a l nationalism and Labour's devolutionism i n 1979, 
Scots turned t o t h e i r c u l t u r a l roots. These roots are linked t o the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement, which i s no longer commanded by one party as 
i n the 1970's, but has a wider base i n Scottish society. The years 
of Thatcherite economics and neo-conservative c u l t u r a l values have 
antagonised a vast majority of working and middle class Scots, and 
the lack of p o l i t i c a l weapons against v ^ t many regard as a vicious 
attack against Scottish c i v i l culture has brought about the 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of cult u r e . The Conservatives c r i t i c i s e d the Scots 
f o r t h e i r values v^ich set them apart, from the English mainstream. 
Nicholas Ridley said i n an interview with the Scotsman; 
"The Scots have fastened on t h e i r separate i d e n t i t y as a 
nation t o t r y and establish t h a t somehow a l l t h i s does not 
apply t o them (...). I don't t h i n k they can go on having a 
d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l philosophy and a t the s ^ ^ time expect 
t o b e n efit economically l i k e the re s t of us." 
(quoted i n Harvie, 1988, 12) 
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He continued: "You cannot have i t both ways; you cannot both be the 
underdog - the dependent nation asking always f o r more 
largesse - and a t the same time get the prosperity which a 
d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e has produced i n the res t of the English 
mainland". 
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But i t seems t h a t Scots are not prepared t o adhere t o English 
c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l values as before. There are signs t h a t 
Scottish values diverge considerably from what are widely regarded 
as the values of Thatcher's B r i t a i n . The B r i t i s h Social Attitudes 
report of 1987 showed t h a t i n Scotland, a greater proportion tended 
t o explain poverty i n terms of social i n j u s t i c e than i n the other 
B r i t i s h regions ( B r i t i s h Social Attitudes, 1987). More Scots than 
other B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s - 67 per cent - believed i n 1984 t h a t the 
low l e v e l of social benefits causing hardship ( B r i t i s h Social 
At t i t u d e s , 1984) . I n 1986, t h i s percentage increased t o 70 per cent 
i n Scotland, and declined t o 29 per cent i n Southern England 
(Lindsay, 1987, 14). Elsev^iere, research on social values of Scots 
revealed t h a t Conservative economic p o l i c i e s and cuts i n public 
spending were widely regarded as inappropriate t o the Scottish 
r e a l i t y (Dickson, 1989, 63). Given t h i s reluctance t o share 
neo-conservative values, v^i c h underpin the Tories' "greedy grasping 
s e l f i s h r a t race p o l i c i e s " (as one Scottish interviewee labelled 
them), i t i s not surprising t h a t Scottish dissent finds expression 
i n the c u l t u r a l arena, i f the p o l i t i c a l channels t o Westminster 
appear blocked. 
CONCLUSION 
The uneven treatment of the two case studies demonstrates t h a t the 
c u l t u r a l coitponent of n a t i o n a l i s t movements can be of varying 
importance. I n Catalonia, the language and culture are deeply rooted 
i n society, and therefore played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the national 
r e v i v a l i n the 1960's. I n Scotland, on the other hand, culture i s a 
marginal f a c t o r i n the mobilisation of the people behind n a t i o n a l i s t 
demands. That Scottish culture i s widely regarded as i n f e r i o r t o the 
dominant English culture i s p a r t l y a resiiLt of the absence of an 
autonomous Scottish government. But i t i s also due t o the 
d i s i n t e r e s t of the Scottish bourgeoisie and i n t e l l i g e n t s i a i n t h e i r 
own cu l t u r e . The experience of many decades of c u l t u r a l decline, 
Vvtiich was p a r t l y due t o repressive p o l i c i e s i n the c u l t u r a l sphere 
and p a r t l y t o economic and social pressures from w i t h i n the Scottish 
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community, means t h a t Scottish culture was f a r less d i s t i n c t i v e as a 
v*iole than Catalan culture a f t e r twenty or t h i r t y years of 
Francoism. 
The a t t i t u d e of Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s has been more supportive of 
the indigenous cu l t u r e . Last century, the Catalan bourgeoisie and 
i t s organic i n t e l l e c t u a l s have put a l o t of e f f o r t i n t o constructing 
and appropriating the c u l t u r a l heritage of Catalonia, and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r the language, v ^ c h had been the mother tongue of most 
Catalans a l l along. Before the c i v i l war, Catalans had t h e i r own 
government, and Catalan was an o f f i c i a l language, together with 
C a s t i l i a n . The Franco regime was not able t o wipe out a culture with 
such strong roots, and i t s attempts t o do so strengthened the 
Catalans' determination t o maintain t h e i r language and culture even 
more. 
The c u l t i i r a l r e v i v a l i n Catalonia i n the 1960's formed the basis f o r 
the p o l i t i c a l Catalanism, v^ich gradually came out i n public i n the 
1970's. The organisers of the r e v i v a l were mostly i n t e l l e c t u a l s from 
the middle and upper classes, because they could a f f o r d i t . As Pages 
explains. 
"Es ovio que l a burguesia catalana jugo un papel 
excepcional, l a burguesia mediana, l a a l t a burguesia, l a 
pequeha burguesia, porque estamos hablando de un sentimiento 
Catalan comun. (...) La creacion de escuelas privadas en 
donde se podia ensehar e l Catalan clandestinaroente o 
semi-legalmente, quien podia hacer eso? - Claro que tenia 
que ser l a pequeha burguesia y l a burguesia mediana que era 
capaz de mandar a sus h i j o s a una escuela privada. (...). 
Era ovio que l a burguesia catalana puse l a base para una 
infr a e s t r u c t u r a escolar Catalana. La clase obrera que no era 
Catalan y que no tenia los recursos no l o podia hacer." 
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" I t I S obvious t h a t the Catalan bourgeoisie - the middle 
bourgeoisie, the b i g and the petty bourgeoisie - played an outstanding 
r o l e , because we are t a l k i n g about a shared Catalan sentiment. (...) The 
creation of p r i v a t e schools, i n which i t was possible t o teach Catalan 
clandestinely or semi-legally, v^o was able t o do that? - Of course, i t 
would be the p e t t y bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie v^ich were 
able t o a f f o r d t h e i r children a pr i v a t e school. (...) I t i s obvious t h a t 
the Catalan bourgeoisie l a i d the foundations f o r a Catalan school 
(Footnote Continued) 
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(Pages, interview, 15.5.1988) 
The same i s t r u e f o r the other c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s v^ich were the 
nucle i f o r the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l . 
At the same time, c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s were closely linked t o 
p o l i t i c a l dissent. Many of those i n t e l l e c t u a l s v*io were on the 
fo r e f r o n t of the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l also became involved i n the 
Catalan opposition movement, v ^ c h was held together by moderate 
n a t i o n a l i s t demands, and/or were active i n clandestine l e f t - w i n g 
p a r t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the PSUC. Thus, a c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l e l i t e 
was formed v\^ich was able t o command popular support on the basis of 
a common Catalan i d e n t i t y . On the other hand, the image of 
parochialism which i n f e s t s Scottish culture has i n h i b i t e d a 
full-grown r e v i v a l . The conparison w i t h Catalonia highlights the 
irrportance of a bourgeoisie and a middle class w i t h a commitment t o 
the national c u l t u r e . I n Scotland, the indigenous bourgeoisie has 
always been looking towards England f o r i t s culture, and now i t s 
ranks have been decimated by economic decline. I f public and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l support f o r Scottish w r i t e r s was not forthcoming i n 
the 1970's, p r i v a t e sponsors were also t h i n on the ground. I t was 
demonstrated above t h a t i n Catalonia, private c a p i t a l was the main 
source of finance f o r c u l t u r a l projects. I n Scotland, those vJho 
could a f f o r d i t were not w i l l i n g t o pay f o r t h e i r culture, because 
i t seemed p r o v i n c i a l t o them. There are f a r less " c u l t u r a l heroes" 
i n Scotland than i n Catalonia a f t e r three decades of n a t i o n a l i s t 
r e v i v a l . But t h i s i s also due t o the f a c t t h a t those Scots v^o were 
c u l t u r a l a c t i v i s t s were given less c r e d i t f o r t h e i r e f f o r t s , not 
lea s t because there i s no autonomous Scottish government which could 
reward them w i t h p o l i t i c a l and other s i g n i f i c a n t posts. Only i n 
recent years has the Scottish public been made aware of a c u l t u r a l 
r e v i v a l . This f l i g h t i n t o culture has been related t o the decline of 
legitimacy of established p o l i t i c s i n Scotland. 
(Chapter six) (377) 
TABLES OF CHAPTER SIX 
Table 6.1 : Lyrics of "Throw the ^ R' away". 
I've been so sad 
since you said itr/ accent was bad. 
He has worn a frown 
t h i s Caledonian clown. 
I'm j u s t gonna have t o learn t o hesitate 
t o make sure ray words don't assasinate your ears. 
But I would't know a single word t o say 
i f I f l a t t e n e d a l l the vowels and I throw the ^ R' away. 
You say i f I want t o get ahead 
the language I use should be l e f t f o r dead. 
I t doesn't please your ears 
t h a t ' s a p i t y , t h a t's a p i t y . 
And though you're (...) 
i t seems you're s t i l l f u l l of John B u l l . 
You j u s t refuse t o hear. 
Oh what can I do 
t o be understood by you. 
Perhaps w i t h some money 
I could t a l k l i k e a bee dripping honey. 
(Chapter six) (378) 
Chapter seven: 
T E R R I T O R Y AND NATIONALISM 
379 
1. HJTRODQCTIQN 
Culture, p o l i t i c a l power and class come together i n the issue of 
t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , vMch i s not only central t o n a t i o n a l i s t movements, 
but also a fundamental human need (Johnston et a l . (eds.), 1986, 
482). T e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s an important par t of national i d e n t i t y , 
v*iich i s always attached by a d i s t i n c t i v e g r o i ^ t o a s p e c i f i c 
geographic space. But more importantly, t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , as "the 
attenpt by an i n d i v i d u a l or groups t o influence, a f f e c t or control 
objects, people and relationships by d e l i m i t i n g and asserting 
c o n t r o l over a geographic area" (Sack, 1983, 56), permits one t o 
analyse the c o n f l i c t s vdiich arise from n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n a 
more detail e d , focused manner. I n the previous chapters i t was shown 
t h a t c o n f l i c t s are not j u s t l i m i t e d t o the struggle f o r power over a 
t e r r i t o r y between n a t i o n a l i s t s and the central state. They also 
ari s e w i t h i n the sub-state nation between d i f f e r e n t social groups. 
T e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s also irtportant here. On the one hand, i t i s used 
i d e o l o g i c a l l y i n order t o u n i f y the d i f f e r e n t social classes i n the 
"national i n t e r e s t " and t o create t e r r i t o r i a l l y based class 
a l l i a n c e s , as James Anderson argued (J. Anderson, 1988, 32). On the 
other hand, the dominant social class can disguise and l e g i t i m i s e 
s o c i a l c o n t r o l by associating i t w i t h a place i n v^ich t h a t control 
i s exercised - i n t h i s case, the national t e r r i t o r y . 
Although t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s recognised t o generally play a 
s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements because i t represents one 
of t h e i r key claims, i t must also be acknowledged t h a t i t s relevance 
t o the n a t i o n a l i s t discourse i n Catalonia i s f a r more pronounced 
than i n Scotland. The p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i n Catalonia 
i s t o some extent a consequence of autonomy, v^iiich was granted i n 
1979. Thus, the debate surrounding the t e r r i t o r i a l reorganisation of 
Catalonia i n 1987, and the question of a u n i f i c a t i o n of the Catalan 
speaking t e r r i t o r i e s , v*iic±i has been thrown i:ip repeatedly by various 
separatist groups, can both be regarded as belonging t o a new phase 
i n the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of t e r r i t o r i a l and national i d e n t i t y . But t o 
the extent t h a t both issues, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the f i r s t , have played 
a r o l e i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement throughout i t s h i s t o r y , they 
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i l l u m i n a t e some aspects of the roovemient which have received only 
l i m i t e d a t t e n t i o n i n the previous chapters. I n p a r t i c u l a r , they help 
t o explain t h a t alliances between d i f f e r e n t class sectors i n the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement have a t e r r i t o r i a l basis, and t h a t l o c a l 
i d e n t i t y can be mobilised i n support of nationalism. 
I f i n Catalonia l o c a l t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t i e s appear t o be a 
co n s t i t u t e n t p a r t of nationalism, the case of Scotland shows th a t 
t h i s does not necessarily have t o be so. Although the geography of 
Scotland i s as d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of the r e s t of B r i t a i n as 
Catalonia's from the r e s t of Spain, t h i s distinctiveness has not 
been p o l i t i c i s e d t o nearly the same extent. I n Scotland, 
t e r r i t o r i a l i t y has not been a contentious issue. The l o c a l 
government reorganisation i n 1975, a t the height of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
upsurge, was treated as separate from any debate about devolution 
and self-government. Nationalism i s not, as i n the case of 
Catalonia, l i n k e d t o a s p e c i f i c t e r r i t o r i a l organisation, and the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement does not have any p a r t i c u l a r demands i n t h a t 
respect. 
I n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, the issue of t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s assessed 
f o r both n a t i o n a l i s t movements. I n the case of Catalonia, i t i s 
argued t h a t t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s connected w i t h c u l t u r a l and 
geographical distinctiveness, and has been enployed f o r p o l i t i c a l 
purposes. I n Scotland, i n t e r n a l t e r r i t o r i a l organisation was 
d e p o l i t i c i s e d and defined i n terms of managerial e f f i c i e n c y and 
gove m a b i l i t y . 
2. TERRITORIALITY AND THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN C3VEALQNIA 
The t e r r i t o r i a l issue has been inportant f o r Catalan nationalism i n 
two areas. The f i r s t concerns the d e f i n i t i o n of the Catalan 
t e r r i t o r y , and although t h i s i s a minority issue i n Catalonia, i t 
has received more a t t e n t i o n i n the 1980's. However, the question, 
viiether the present boundaries of the Catalan autonomous community -
v ^ i c h correspond t o the Catalan Principat or dukedom - should be 
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accepted, or a l l Catalan speaking t e r r i t o r i e s (Paisos Catalans) be 
united, has been around much longer. Even during the Franco period 
i n the 1960's and 1970's, p o l i t i c a l organisations such as the PSAN 
(Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacionalista) existed vtiich 
claimed t o f i g h t f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of a l l the Catalan countries, 
rather than j u s t Catalonia. Thus, there has been a small sector 
w i t h i n Catalan nationalism advocating pan-Catalanism on the basis of 
a shared language and culture. I n most cases, i t i s linked t o 
independentist demands. 
The second issue i s w i t h i n the main stream of Catalan nationalism, 
and concerns the i n t e r n a l t e r r i t o r i a l organisation of Catalonia. 
Since the early beginning of the Catalanist r e v i v a l of l a s t century, 
the t e i n r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n has been a symbol of Catalan demands f o r 
self-government. I t was argued by those early Catalan p a t r i o t s that 
the comarca was the fundamental natural and/or h i s t o r i c a l u n i t of 
Catalonia, v ^ i l e the o f f i c i a l t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n i n provinces had 
been irtposed on the country i n the i n t e r e s t of the Spanish state. 
tXiring the Second Republic, the Generalitat adopted a t e r r i t o r i a l 
d i v i s i o n which was based on the comarca, and under Franco, t h i s was, 
of course, abolished along w i t h Catalan autonomy. The Catalan 
opposition took the comarcal d i v i s i o n on board, and i t became a 
symbol f o r the Catalan struggle f o r autonomy and democracy. While i t 
i s probable t h a t the repression under Franco increased the 
significance of the comarcal d i v i s i o n , there i s s t i l l the question 
of how and why the l o c a l sense of belonging t o a comarca has been 
incorporated i n t o the n a t i o n a l i s t doctrine i n the f i r s t place. Did 
ce r t a i n social groups have a vested i n t e r e s t i n the comarcal 
organisation, and d i d i t r e f l e c t the t e r r i t o r i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
power and influence? I n post-Franco Catalonia, the debate on the 
t e r r i t o r i a l organisation r e f l e c t s p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t crosscutting 
geographical d i v i s i o n s , and demonstrates v t o t a central r o l e 
t e r r i t o r y can play i n struggles over p o l i t i c a l hegemony. 
2.1 The question of the Paisos Catalans 
(Chapter 7) (382) 
The Paisos Catalans (PP.CC.) are defined according t o c u l t u r a l and 
h i s t o r i c a l rather than p o l i t i c a l and economic c r i t e r i a . 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , the boundaries of the Catalan Countries are traced 
back t o the Kingdom of Aragon and Catalonia. C u l t u r a l l y , they 
delineate the Catalan speaking areas (see Chapter s i x . Fig. 24). 
P o l i t i c a l l y and economically, however, the development i n the 
d i f f e r e n t parts of the Kingdom of Aragon and Catalonia, was 
diverging. The northernmost p a r t of the Catalan speaking area was 
l o s t t o France i n 1659. Aragon was an agrarian and feudal country, 
while Valencia and the Balearic I s l e s had a feudal countryside and 
mercantile c i t i e s . Only the Principat, or vihat i s now referred t o as 
Catalonia, underwent an i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n process; Valencia's 
t e n t a t i v e e f f o r t s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n i n the mid-19th centiary were 
fr u s t r a t e d , and i t specialised on Mediterranean a g r i c u l t u r a l produce 
f o r e>port. Thus, the i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie, uhich became the main 
p o l i t i c a l force i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, was concentrated i n the 
Principat, and had economic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t which were rather 
d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of the other regions (Fontana, 1977, 5-7). 
Despite the common language - which i s spoken by f a r less people i n 
Valencia and i n Aragon than i n Catalonia and the Balears -, each 
Pais Catalan looks back on a d i s t i n c t i v e social and economic 
development. 
There was no national consciousness which united the Paisos Catalans 
i n the early 20th century, when the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n 
Catalonia was struggling f o r autonomy, and i t i s l i m i t e d t o a small 
minority even today (Ribo, 1977, 120). The p o l i t i c a l landscape i n 
Catalonia was d i f f e r e n t from t h a t i n the other Catalan countries. 
The Lliga Regionalista, the Esquerra R^jublicana de Catalimya, and 
l a t e r the PSUC the CiU and other Catalan p o l i t i c a l organisations 
which evolved under the Franco period and thereafter, were only 
operating i n the Principat. As l a t e as the 1960's, a Valencian 
n a t i o n a l i s t commented on h i s home country as "a land without 
p o l i t i c s " (Fuster, 1968, 23). 
Claims of pan-Catalan u n i t y nevertheless go back t o the beginning of 
t h i s century, but have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been r e s t r i c t e d t o the c u l t u r a l 
sphere. The d e f i n i t i o n of the Paisos Catalans r e f l e c t e d t h i s , as i t 
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e x p l i c i t l y ignored any ( p o t e n t i a l l y d i v i s i v e ) factors other then 
the c u l t u r a l heritage vihich unites the Catalan-speaking areas. Thus, 
"the Paisos Catalans are the Catalan-speaking areas; areas 
\* i i c h are p o e t i c a l l y r elated t o each other through language 
and form a higher, s p i r i t u a l u n i t , beyond economic, social 
or p o l i t i c a l conjunctures..." 
(Carod-Rovira, 1987, 50) 
But i t was only i n the 1960's t h a t concrete p o l i t i c a l claions were 
attached t o t h i s common c u l t u r a l heritage. This was due t o the f a c t 
t h a t the Catalan language was oppressed not only i n Catalonia, but 
also i n the other Catalan speaking areas, v^ich produced a cer t a i n 
degree o f s o l i d a r i t y . I t also mobilised the national consciousness 
among people on the Balearic Islands and i n Valencia. By the time 
Franco died, Valencia was caught up i n n a t i o n a l i s t mobilisation as 
w e l l . I n 1975, Valencians witnessed the f i r s t declaration, by people 
from a wide p o l i t i c a l spectrum i n favour of Valencian autonomy (but 
separately from the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t claims), and particip a t e d i n 
demonstrations and popular manifestoes i n support of Catalan t o 
become the o f f i c i a l language followed (Guia, 1977, 30-31). 
Some years before i n Catalonia, a l e f t - ^ i n g n a t i o n a l i s t party was 
formed ( i n 1969), vdiich c a l l e d i t s e l f " s o c i a l i s t national l i b e r a t i o n 
party" (Peirtit Socialista d'AlliJaerament Nacionca dels PP.CC.), and 
demanded the independence and u n i f i c a t i o n of the Catalan countries. 
Despite i t s pan-Catalan d e f i n i t i o n of the national t e r r i t o r y and i t s 
independentist stance, the PSAN collaborated w i t h the other Catalan 
opposition p a r t i e s and accepted the four demands of the Assemblea de 
Catalunya. These refe r r e d t o the re-establishment of the Catalan 
Genersaitat of the Second Republic and d i d not t a l k of independence 
or the Paisos Catalans. I n 1974, there was a s p l i t w i t h i n the PSAN 
over the a t t i t u d e towards armed struggle. Various other c o a l i t i o n s 
and s p l i t s took place i n the second h a l f of the 1970's and i n the 
1980's, and o v e r a l l , the r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t cairp remained very 
small, and divided between those v*io supported ETA strategies and 
those v^o rejected them. I t was not u n t i l 1980 t h a t an armed group, 
Terra Lluire, was forroed, but so f a r without achieving nearly as 
much popular support as ETA has i n the Basque Country. I n the 
mid-1970's, the predominantly Barcelona based PSAN incorporated 
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increasing numbers of Valencian and Balearic a c t i v i s t s and became 
prominently involved i n the popular democratic canpaigns (Colomer J. 
et a l . , 1976, 108). Electoral r e s u l t s i n the autonomous elections, 
however, were poor. 
Most of the Catalan p a r t i e s , including the n a t i o n a l i s t CiU, have 
shown no signs of adopting nationalism and of extending t h e i r 
operations beyond the boundaries of the Catalan Generzilitat 
(Crexell, 1988, 31). As f o r the Balears and the Valencians, they now 
have t h e i r own autonomous communities and t h e i r own parties, and 
many n a t i o n a l i s t s there resent the " i n p e r i a l i s t " a t t i t u d e s of 
independentists from Catalonia. But i n the p o l i t i c a l landscape of 
Catalonia i n the 1980's, the minority groups o f ra d i c a l 
n a t i o n a l i s t s have started t o a t t r a c t mainly young people with no 
d i r e c t ejqDerience of the consensus p o l i t i c s of the 1970's. Groups 
l i k e the Crida and the Moviment de Defensa de l a Terra have given 
the issues o f t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r a t i o n and independence a wider 
audience, pan-Catalan p o l i t i c a l journals such as E l Temps and Debat 
Nacioncilista provide a forum f o r discussion i n i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s . 
Pan-Catalan independence seems t o a t t r a c t mainly middle class 
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youths and i n t e l l e c t u a l s . However, both Cnda and MET have adopted 
s o c i a l i s t ideas, and oppose f o r example multinational c a p i t a l w i t h 
^The Crida a l a Solidaritat en notn de l a Llengvia, l a Cultxira i l a 
Nacio CatcLLanes was formed by several i n s t i t u t i o n s i n order t o mobilise 
a wide spectrum of Catalan society behind a canpaign v^iich was pr i m a r i l y 
l i n g u i s t i c and c u l t u r a l . I t wanted a more r a d i c a l and faster 
c a t a l a n i s a t i o n of the society. 
2 
Sellares explained: 
"Where do these sectors of n a t i o n a l i s t youths come from? I 
t h i n k they are b a s i c a l l y the children of the middle class, 
people from the comarques. Not so much from the b i g 
bourgeoisie, although a c e r t a i n conversion t o Catalanism has 
been taking place among the bourgeoisie, vdiich has sided 
w i t h Pujol (...). But the middle class i s very irrportant i n 
Catalonia; the botiquers, those v*io belong t o the pe t t y 
bourgeoisie. And we are t a l k i n g about t h e i r children. (...) 
I would say t h a t today the children of the p u i o l i s t e s and 
the Esquerra Rejjublicana are w i t h the Maviment de Defensa de 
l a Terra." 
(Sellares, interview, 14.4.1988) 
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great vigour. Their social and p o l i t i c a l strategies f o r the Paisos 
Catalans today are s t i l l i d e o l o g i c a l l y incoherent, and command 
l i t t l e popular i n t e r e s t . Nevertheless, i t i s l i k e l y t h a t they w i l l 
become more prominent i n future. 
2.2 Catalan nationalism and the internal division of Catalonia 
I f pan-Catalan nationalism i s remote from the main strand of Catalan 
nationalism, the question of the i n t e r n a l organisation of the 
Catalan t e r r i t o r y has played an irtportant r o l e since the early 
beginning o f p o l i t i c a l Catalanism. Central t o t h i s question i s the 
comarcal d i v i s i o n . I n order t o put the recent comarcal debate i n t o 
context, i t i s necessary t o go back t o the l a s t century, vAoich i s 
vdien the t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n of Catalonia became part of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t discourse. The following subsections discuss how and v^y 
the comarcal d i v i s i o n was invented, what r o l e i t played i n early 
Catalan nationalism, and how i t was used t o establish conservative 
n a t i o n a l i s t hegemony i n the 1980's. 
2.2.i Inventing the comarcal d i v i s i o n of Catalonia; the p o l i t i c a l 
and h i s t o r i c a l context 
The idea of the comarca i s not a construct of the 19th century. 
Already i n the early 17th century geography books talked about 
comarques as the basic t e r r i t o r i a l u n i t of Catalonia. The camarca 
was, however, not defined i n terms of precise geographic boundaries; 
i t rather represented a l o c a l area constituted through shared 
everyday ej<perience. I t captured a f e e l i n g of belonging t o an area 
V\*iich was loosely held together by a set of economic and social 
r e l a t i o n s . 
"La comarca era un s e n t i t de pertinen(5a; era aquesta idea 
c u l t u r a l mes que f i s i c a , cultural. La gent que es sentia, 
doncs, s o l i d a r i a perque tenia e l s mateixos problemes - a 
vegades com a consequencia per a l a u n i t a t de les condicions 
f i s i q u e s , per que es trobaven en e l itat e i x aplec, perque es 
trobaven en e l mateix mercat, en f i , l a gent, sense saber be 
perque, d' aquest t r o s de t e r r a deien " e l Valles", o 
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"I'Enpordal^, pero mai s'havien preocupat on cxjmencaven i on 
acabaven," 
(Casassas, interview, 27.4.1988) 
These small counties appeared on maps i n the early 18th century, but 
without boundaries. When the Liberal Party took power i n Spain a f t e r 
the death of the ab s o l u t i s t king Ferdinand 7th (1833), they 
immediately began t o reorganise and r a t i o n a l i s e the administrative 
system by casting over the old, hazardous d i v i s i o n a g r i d of 
provinces, f o r v i i i c h they took t h e i r i n s p i r a t i o n from the French 
departmental d i v i s i o n . This new t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n was t o enable 
the government" i n Madrid t o modernise the country and t o irtpose i t s 
p o l i c i e s through l o y a l c i v i l governors (qobemadores c i v i l e s ) , who 
were appointed t o preside over the administration i n the provincias. 
At the sarne time, the new regiiiie was aware t h a t the provinces were 
too large t o maintain control over a country as poorly equipped with 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e as Spain. Therefore, i t divided the provinces i n t o 
smaller u n i t s , the p a r t i t s i u d i c i a l s . i n such a way t h a t the c i v i l 
guard (quardia c i v i l ) could reach every point i n the area w i t h i n 
twelve hours. The centre of a p a r t i t j u d i c i a l was usually a market 
town i n v ^ c h a bureaucratic structure developed as a magistrate, a 
r e g i s t r a r , a s o l i c i t o r , a tax c o l l e c t o r and a quardia c i v i l post 
were allocated t o i t . The four provinces of Catalonia were divided 
i n t o 35 p a r t i t s i u d i c i a l s, which closely resembled the comarcal 
d i v i s i o n developed some decades l a t e r (Casassas, interview, 
28.4.1988). 
I n creating the par1:its i u d i c i a l s , a s t r a t a of bureaucrats and 
professionals were established i n positions of influence which 
closely connected them t o the class of l o c a l landowners and 
"The coraarca was a sense of belonging. I t was a cultural, rather 
than physical, concept of people who f e l t s o l i d a r i t y w i t h one another 
because they shared the same problems - sometimes as a consequence of 
the u n i t y of physical features, or because they found themselves i n the 
same aplec, because they belonged t o a spe c i f i c market place ... . I n 
short, without r e a l l y knowing ;*Ly, the people called t h i s piece of land 
"Valles", or t h a t "anporda", but they never worried about v^ere i t began 
and v^ere i t ended." 
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i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . These social groups were based i n the r u r a l towns, 
many of v*iich were important a g r i c u l t u r a l markets or had some 
t e x t i l e industry. As mentioned i n Chapter two (section 3.1), the 
early i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n during the 18th century ( u n t i l the steam 
engine became widely used) centred not so much on the coast, but 
inland on the r i v e r s of the Llobregat, Cardener, Ter, Freser, Anoia, 
Fluvia, and i n the c i t i e s of Manresa, Vilanova, Sabadell, Terrassa, 
Reus, Salt de Girona, Mataro and Calella. Thus, the new classes of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , workers and professionals connected w i t h 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n were also present i n the small towns. The largest 
i n d u s t r i a l centre, however, was Barcelona, vAiich i n the course of 
the 19th century developed r a p i d l y t o become the f i r s t i n d u s t r i a l 
centre and Spain's largest c i t y . 
I n the same period a wide range of associations and i n s t i t u t i o n s 
were formed, w i t h vdiich the economic and i n t e l l e c t u a l bourgeoisie 
ej<pressed t h e i r hegemony over Catalan c i v i l society and established 
the defence of t h e i r material and ideological' interests. The 
"excursionist movement" was part o f t h i s process, i i ^ i c h was also 
affected by the Catalan c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l and the Rcaianticist 
i n t e r e s t i n r u r a l l i f e and landscape. I n 1876 and 1878, the 
Associacio Catalanista d'Excursions Cientifiques and the Associeicio 
d'Excursions Catalana were founded by sections of the young 
generation of the t h r i v i n g bourgeoisie. These societies were not 
siroply mountaineering clubs, but comprised a v^ole range of 
a c t i v i t i e s i n volving the study of Catalan landscapes, archaeology, 
fauna and f l o r a , etc.. Ihey aimed a t expanding the knowledge of 
Catalonia a t a time when no such studies took place i n formal 
education. This movement became part of the Catalan c u l t u r a l and 
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national r e v i v a l , and much of the comarcal debate took place i n i t s 
associations. The approach t o Catalan geography taken by the 
The f i r s t Catalanist congress, v^ i c h took place i n 1880, included 
among i t s 850 p a r t i c i p a n t s 87 members of the Associacio d'Excursionistes 
Catalana and the Associcicio Catalana d'Excursions Cientifiques. The 
other p a r t i c i p a n t s were involved i n c u l t u r a l associations and journals 
such as the D i a r i Catala, l a Renaixensa and La I l u s t r a c i o Catalana (see 
Chapter two, section 3.2). 
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i n t e l l e c t u a l s of "excursionism" resembled t h a t of Vidal de l a 
Blache's regional geography, which stressed the uniqueness of small 
communities as the r e s u l t of the i n t e r a c t i o n of c u l t u r a l and 
physical phenomena (Holt-Jensen, 1988, 34). 
I n the 1880's and 1890's, vihen the n a t i o n a l i s t ideologies were being 
thrashed out, the s c i e n t i f i c discussion about the coraarcal d i v i s i o n 
i n the excursionist associations was i n f u l l swing. Three types of 
comarcal studies were debated i n the Catalanist c i r c l e s , a l l of 
v*iich were the product of the generation of the second h a l f of the 
19th century. Pella i Forges (1852 -1919) maintained t h a t the 
comarques were defined by the physical r e l i e f (which gave them 
eternal v a l i d i t y ) , v M l e Flos i Calgat (1859 - 1929) perceived them 
as products of ethnic and c u l t u r a l h i s t o r y . Font i Sague (1874 -
1910) integrated these views and ended up w i t h the follcwi n g -
rather V i d a l ian - d e f i n i t i o n of the comarca, vAiich became the basis 
of the n a t i o n a l i s t v i s i o n of the Catalan comarques: 
"The comarca i s a t e r r i t o r y vAiich i s determined by cer t a i n 
t o p o g r a ^ i i c a l accidents and v^ere c h a r a c t e r i s t i c differences 
i n language, production, uses, customs, etc. are 
perceived." 
(quoted by Marti-Henneberg, 1986, 34) 
The attachment t o the l o c a l area and Catalan p a t r i o t i s m was one main 
reason f o r j o i n i n g excursionist i n s t i t u t i o n s . Though he belonged t o 
a l a t e r generation of excursionist, the well-known geographer Josep 
I g l e s i e s provides an example of how one became interested i n the 
Catalan comarques and i d e n t i f y w i t h them. His involvement 
demonstrates the close connections between excursionisme. comarcal 
studies and Catalan geography: 
"My attachment t o geography derives frcsn being an 
excursionist. As a youth, I was not s i j i p l y a t r a i l b l a z e r , 
walking around b l i n d l y without taking notice of the things 
around me. I always asked myself many questions and 
developed a great i n t e r e s t and love f o r Catalonia, though 
not i n abstract terms, but w i t h a desire t o touch her and 
get t o know her down t o the l a s t d e t a i l , i f t h a t were 
possible. When I was young, I belonged t o the excursionist 
section of the Centre de Lectures de Reus, where we b r o u ^ t 
about a r e v i v a l i n i t s c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s and orientations 
w i t h the help of weekly conferences, well-known speakers 
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from Barcelona and the d i s t r i c t s , group outings and canps, 
ex h i b i t i o n s , courses, etc.." 
(Iglesies, quoted i n Nogue i Font, 1986, 107) 
The increasing incidences of class struggle and working class 
r a d i c a l i s a t i o n , vAiich could be witnessed during the Federalist 
Revolution of 1868 and the F i r s t Republic (1868-74), had a notable 
influence on the excursionist movement. I t led t o a c r i t i c a l 
a t t i t u d e towards the metropolis, where the working class was most 
numerous and best organised, and v^iich was recognised as the centre 
of the revolutionary ideas. Ihe a l t e r n a t i v e p i c t u r e which was now 
being propagated centred on the (mountainous) i n t e r i o r of Catalonia 
as the symbol of s o c i a l peace. 
"...the poets and the bourgeoisie thought t h a t too many 
ideas were f l o a t i n g around i n the c i t y , and destructive 
ones, too. The balance was disturbed; and the l i t e r a t u r e 
r e f l e c t e d the new s t a t e of mind, according t o vrfiich the c i t y 
was the centre of perversion, while the mountains s i g n i f i e d 
s o c i a l peace. I n t h i s context, the Catalan excursionist 
movement, and l a t e r p o l i t i c a l nationalism, represented the 
attempt of the bourgeoisie t o group the d i f f e r e n t social 
spheres around a common i d e a l . From t h i s stems the popular 
character v ^ i c h the movement was always claiming ( . . . ) . " 
(Marti-Henneberg, 1986, 28) 
This was the s i t u a t i o n i n which the idea of the camarca became 
a t t r a c t i v e t o some sectors of the bourgeoisie. I t represented the 
i d e a l of s o c i a l peace a t a time vAien class c o n f l i c t became more 
frequent i n the urban i n d u s t r i a l centres, especially Barcelona. 
Rooted i n popular t r a d i t i o n and everyday ej^jerience, i t was a 
national-popular element of Catalan i d e n t i t y , i d e a l l y suited t o 
u n i t e the more conservative sectors of society. 
There was, however, another reason f o r the r e v i t a l i s a t ion of the 
comarca as a t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n . The ejqaansion of urbanised 
c a p i t a l posed a t h r e a t t o the l o c a l bourgeoisie i n the smaller r u r a l 
towns, as Casassas explained: 
"Es crea c a p i t a l financer catala que va t e n i r en aquest 
moment molta inportancia. I l o primer que va f e r e l c a p i t a l 
financer es i n v e r t i r e l s diners a l a corrpra de t e r r e s i a l 
c o n t r o l de l e s banques locals. I aixo e l s espanta. I 
aleshores, es curios, es en aquests moments, els 1850, 1860, 
que apareix l a idea de que, primer, f r o n t a les provincies 
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de Madrid, que iirplanten una p o l i t i c a de t i p u s l l i b e r a l , 
segon, f r o n t a l poder economic i p o l i t i c de Barcelona. S'han 
de crear uns centres p o l i t i c s de poder l o c a l que serveixen 
de contrapes. I aleshores (...) l a idea apareix en aquests 
moments de que les provincies son 1'organ del central isme de 
Madrid, que que realment interesa es e l reflotament de unes 
u n i t a t s p e t i t e s que consagrin e l poder de les classes r u r a l s 
amb un t e r r i t o r i per poder salvaguardar els seus interessos 
- cosa que no diuen mai, sino de salvaguardar l a seva 
personalitat. De salvaguardar les caracteristiques especials 
de cada una d' aquestes comarques. I a Catalunya, l o que es 
normal, natural, t r a d i c i o n a l , etc., son les ccmiarques. I l a 
comarca s'ha de conve r t i r en una futura Catalunya en 1'organ 
de govern de Catalunya, perque es e l ^  respecte a l a 
i n d i v i d u a l i t a t de cada t r o s de t e r r i t o r i . " 
(Casassas, interview, 28.4.1988) 
But, as Riquer pointed out, t h i s d i d not s i g n i f y t h a t the r u r a l 
bourgeoisie was i n the least opposed t o the c a p i t a l i s t modes of 
production and property ownership. I t m i l i t a t e d against the "urban 
values" and l i b e r a l ideas v ^ c h were associated w i t h the domination 
of the countryside through the i n d u s t r i a l c i t y and v^ich threatened 
the p o s i t i o n of the r u r a l bourgeoisie i n the r i c h comarques (Riquer, 
1987, 82-83). Thus, the reasons f o r wanting t o promote the comarques 
as the proper d i v i s i o n of Catalonia t o some extent r e f l e c t e d the 
p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t s of the bourgeoisie, both i n the 
c i t y o f Barcelona and the ccmarcal towns. Although the r u r a l and the 
urban bourgeoisies were on one l e v e l engaged i n a struggle f o r 
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"Catalan f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l was formed v*iich a t the time was of 
great importance. And the f i r s t t h i n g finance c a p i t a l d i d was t o invest 
money i n land property and i n the cont r o l of l o c a l banks. This 
frightened them. And t h i s i s the time, i n the 1850's and 1860's, vAien 
the idea appeared t h a t one should stand up f i r s t l y t o the provinces of 
Madrid from v^ere the l i b e r a l p o l i c i e s were coming, and secondly t o the 
economic and p o l i t i c a l power of Barcelona [which i s also a pr o v i n c i a l 
c a p i t a l ] ; t h a t p o l i t i c a l centres of l o c a l power had t o be created vMch 
could serve as a counterweight. At t h i s point, (...), the idea appeared 
t h a t the provinces were the instrument of centralism of Madrid, and t h a t 
a resurrection of small u n i t s was necessary, i n order t o preserve the 
power of the r u r a l classes w i t h i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s , and t o enable them 
t o safeguard t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . They would never say t h i s e j q j l i c i t l y , but 
rather express i t i n terms of "safeguarding the personality of the 
t e r r i t o r y " ; safeguarding the peculiar characteristics of each one of 
these comarques. And i n Catalonia, the comarques stand f o r normality, 
naturalness, t r a d i t i o n , etc.. Thus, the comarca must become the 
government organ i n a future Catalonia, because i t i s the respect f o r 
the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of every piece of t e r r i t o r y . " 
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surpremacy, both agreed on the need t o keep the working class out of 
the p o l i t i c a l arena, and thus shared a deeply conservative a t t i t u d e 
(Riquer, 1987, 80-81; see Qiapter two, section 5.2). The f a c t t h a t 
i t drew on already e x i s t i n g senses of belonging among the population 
i s also inportant, because i t e j ^ l a i n s v^y the comarcal idea 
appealed t o the people, and not only t o those vdio had a vested 
i n t e r e s t i n s o c i a l peace and t e r r i t o r i a l l y f i x e d property. 
The question now arises how and v^y the ccsmarques became p a r t of the 
Catalanist movement i n the f i n a l decades of the 19th century. I t i s 
iitpor t a n t t o remember i n t h i s context t h a t there was a b i g overlap 
between the p o l i t i c a l and the c u l t u r a l aspect of the movement, and 
t h a t associations l i k e the excursionists were deeply involved i n 
c u l t u r a l Catalanism. But t h i s does not automatically ejqjlain why a 
p o l i t i c a l movement which had as i t s centre Barcelona adopted an idea 
vi i i c h woiild strengthen the r u r a l towns and t h e i r respective economic 
and s o c i a l leaders. 
2 . 2 . i i Catalanisinq the comarques: the Catalanist movement a t the 
t u r n the century 
The comarcal d i v i s i o n played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the major 
conpeting ideological t r e a t i s e s of bourgeois Catalanism a t the end 
of the 19th centiiry. Reference t o two w r i t e r s of the time, A l m i r a l l 
and Terras i Bages, w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t t o demonstrate t h i s . The 
f i r s t promoted a Catalan regionalism based on a powerful bourgeoisie 
and a modem, i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t society vihich. should aim a t as 
much autonomy from the r e s t of Spain as possible (Sole-Tura, 1970, 
109). The second represented the r u r a l conservative strand i n 
Catalan nationalism and promoted the comarcal d i v i s i o n as a means of 
preserving the o l d s o c i a l order against the t h r e a t o f revolution. 
A l m i r a l l perceived Catalonia as an organic, o b j e c t i v e l y e x i s t i n g 
u n i t , the p a r t i c u l a r i t y of vMch i s denied by the c e n t r a l i s t Spanish 
state. Sole-Tura argues t h a t 
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" [ i ] n denouncing bureaucratic centralism, he also r e j e c t s 
the progressive contents of Jacobinism and takes p o s i t i o n 
against party p o l i t i c s , propagating instead the organic 
i n t e g r a t i o n o f a l l classes and s t r a t a of every d i s t i n c t i v e 
nucleus." 
(Sole-^Tura, 1970, 111) 
This a n t i - c e n t r a l i s t p o s i t i o n led him t o defend the comarques as the 
proper t e r r i t o r i a l organisation o f Catalonia. But how d i d t h i s f i t 
the v i s i o n o f a i n d u s t r i a l society a t a time vdien Barcelona was 
already set t o became the dominant c i t y i n Catalonia? The answer 
probably l i e s w i t h the r e a l geographic and p o l i t i c a l divisions 
w i t h i n Catalonia, vfeLch made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r any n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement t o embrace the whole population, or even a l l sectors of the 
dominant class. A l m i r a l l ' s answer t o t h i s was h i s p a r t i c u l a r i s t 
t h e s i s v i i i c h consecrated not only the d i s t i n c t i o n s between d i f f e r e n t 
nations and peoples, but also the personality of every group or 
v a r i e t y within them. I n A l m i r a l l ' s view, the solutio n to the 
c o n f l i c t between the hegemonic classes of Catalonia and Spain 
consisted i n autonomy f o r Catalonia, v t i i l e the c o n f l i c t s between 
d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l groi^js within Catalonia can be reconciled only by 
perceiving Catalonia as an organic v^ole, the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of ^ ^ihose 
constituent parts i s respected. 
I n the w r i t i n g s of Torras i Bages, one of the most i n f l u e n t i a l 
ideologues o f p o l i t i c a l Catalanism and bishop of Vic, the class 
i n t e r e s t s connected w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s t s ' i n t e r e s t i n the comarca 
become more obvious. I n h i s essay on the church and regionalism , 
Torras i Bages looked a t the developments i n neighbouring France, 
and argued t h a t the disappearance of regionalism there had been a 
causal f a c t o r o f the French Revolution - which i n h i s view caused 
"miserable s o c i a l d i s s o l u t i o n " : 
"The strongest argument against centralism i s the modem 
revo l u t i o n , v^iich had been impossible under the antique. 
Tbrras i Bages, J. (1985): L'Esqlesia i e l Reqionalisme i a l t r e s 
textos (1887-1899). The t i t l e essay was w r i t t e n i n response t o two 
publications by A l m i r a l l , l o Catalanisme i n 1886 and L'Espaqne t e l l e 
qu'elle est i n 1887, v*iich most bourgeois Catalanists and the Church 
found too l e f t - w i n g . 
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r e g i o n a l i s t s o c i a l system, j u s t as a serious disease i s 
iitpossible i n a body v^iere the humours are balanced and 
appropriately d i s t r i b u t e d over a l l i t s constituent parts 
(...) Thus, the Revolution came as a consequence of the 
a n n i h i l a t i o n of the antique society which was organised i n 
regions, and therefore, due t o t h i s s i n f u l legacy with v ^ c h 
i t was conceived^ and which forms par t of i t s nature, i t i s 
a n t i - r e g i o n a l i s t of necessity." 
(Terras i Bages, 1985, 35) 
This v i s i o n , which looks back t o a g l o r i f i e d medieval past, 
perceives the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , the state and b i g c a p i t a l as the 
forces vtiich destroy the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of the comarques. These are 
characterised • by communal property, a g r i c u l t u r a l banks, communal 
schools and other i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n other words, the essence of the 
comarques, as seen by Terras i Bages, i s being destroyed: 
"The foundation of the regional l i f e i s the love (...) f o r 
one's own land, (...), t h a t a f f e c t i o n f o r the comarca, i t s 
mountains, r i v e r s , v i l l a g e s , churches, f o r the customs by 
which i t i s governed, f o r the i n s t i t u t i o n s vdiich l i v e i n 
i t , the monuments v^ic h adorn i t (...). 
(Terras i Bages, 1985, 39) 
As Sole-Tura points out. Terras i Bages regarded the r u r a l Catalonia 
as the only "authentic" one, and largely ignored the i n d u s t r i a l and 
urban sector. Whenever he d i d r e f e r t o i t , he adopted a moralistic 
tone. I n h i s view, the society i n the modem c i t i e s had l o s t i t s 
s p i r i t u a l bonds and was held together only by m a t e r i a l i s t and egoist 
i n t e r e s t s . While i n the large c i t y immoral l i f e s t y l e s , despotism and 
anarchy prospered, the rural/regional l i f e was dominated by the love 
of the home and the fatherland, v^ich was the necessary condition 
f o r a morally sane society (Sele-Tura, 1970, 82). 
The two ideologists presented above r e f l e c t the considerable 
tensions v^^ich existed w i t h i n Catalonia between the countryside and 
the i n d u s t r i a l c i t y , between comarcal towns and Barcelona c i t y , and 
between the new urban p r o l e t a r i a t and the bourgeoisie. The c r i s i s of 
the Spanish state of 1898, which affected both the r u r a l and the 
urban bourgeoisie i n Catalonia, brought about a convergence between 
^Terras i Bages refers t o Catalonia as a "region", 
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the two groups. The r u r a l bourgeoisie had always been c r i t i c a l of 
government influence and keen t o preserve t h e i r l o c a l power bases, 
and had therefore a strong r e g i o n a l i s t lobby. Now, the urban 
i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie had also come round t o the r e g i o n a l i s t 
p o s i t i o n (Riquer, 1987, 84). The comarcal d i v i s i o n became a symbol 
f o r the ideological conpromise between the two sectors of the 
Catalan bourgeoisie. I t was useful i n reconciling the d i f f e r e n t 
n a t i o n a l i s t and r e g i o n a l i s t visions t o one single n a t i o n a l i s t 
doctrine t h a t was acceptable t o the t r a d i t i o n a l r u r a l and the urban 
i n d u s t r i a l middle and upper classes. As mentioned above (Chapter 
two, section 5.1) Prat de l a Riba formed i n 1891 the Unio 
Cataleinista, which i n i t s f i r s t assembly one year l a t e r i n Manresa 
approved the Beises per l a Constitucio Regioncil Catalcina. The Bcises 
accepted the comarcal d i v i s i o n as the proper t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n of 
Catalonia, and from then on, the comarcal structure became an 
i n t e g r a l p a r t of the n a t i o n a l i s t doctrine, and a symbol of 
resentment against the e x i s t i n g c e n t r a l i s t structure of the Spanish 
state. 
2 . 2 . i i i Makinq the comarca functional: the t e r r i t o r i a l theme i n the 
f i r s t Generalitat 
The f i r s t opportunity of converting the n a t i o n a l i s t ideal of 
i n t e r n a l t e r r i t o r i a l organisation i n t o r e a l i t y arose with the 
establishment of the autonomous government of the General i t a t i n 
1931. Soon a f t e r i t was established by the Republican Government, 
the General i t a t appointed a commission, the Ponencia d'Estudi de l a 
Divisio T e r r i t o r i a l de Catalxmya, t o elaborate a t e r r i t o r i a l 
d i v i s i o n based on the comarques which could be used t o decentralise 
the administration of the General i t a t . Pau V i l a , a geographer who a t 
the time presided over the Centre Excursionista de Catalunya, became 
the vice-president of the Ponencia, vAiich consisted of highly 
respected professionals and i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Pau V i l a had previously 
worked on a comarcal d i v i s i o n based on Font i Sague's map, but the 
commission decided t o elaborate a d i v i s i o n from scratch. 
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"At the time i t was made known tha t the planned survey would 
s t a r t from scratch, and t h a t no previous report, not even 
one signed by i n d i v i d u a l members of the committee, would 
influence the decisions i n any way." 
(Iglesies, quoted i n Nogue i Font, 1986, 111) 
When the Ponencia began i t s research, i t soon transpired t h a t the 
d e f i n i t i o n and delineation o f the comarques was based on popular 
perceptions of belonging. They approached the over 1,000 lo c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s and asked them t o which comarca they belonged. As a 
r e s u l t , 118 comarques emerged. Other c r i t e r i a used were economic 
(market), which yielded 87 comarques. Since the commission believed 
t h a t such large numbers of administrative u n i t s were not functional, 
they returned t o the part i t s i u d i c i a l s and the old comarcal maps, 
modified them s l i g h t l y i n the l i g h t of t h e i r findings, and drew up a 
map of 38 comarques, which was accepted by the government (Casassas, 
interview, 28.4.1988) (Fig, 27). As soon as the map was published i n 
1933, conplaints began pouring i n of people and i n s t i t u t i o n s which 
d i d not accept the new d i v i s i o n . But the suspension of the 
Generalitat between 1934 and 1936 and other, more urgent, p r i o r i t i e s 
during the C i v i l War prevented the irrplementation of the new 
t e r r i t o r i a l organisation i n any case. However, the revolutionary 
p a r t i e s and the syndicates used these comarques f o r administrating 
g 
some aspects of the war economy , and i n 1937, the Generalitat 
legalised t h i s practice ( I l u c h and Nel.lo, 1984, 25; Sole-Sabaris, 
1984, 111). 
However strong or weak the popular acceptance of the comarcal 
d i v i s i o n a t the time and the f a i l u r e t o f u l l y iirplement i t , the 
o f f i c i a l acceptance by the Generalitat had undoubtedly converted i t 
i n t o an i n t e g r a l p a r t of Catalan p o l i t i c a l autonony. This became 
clear i n the 1970s when the p o l i t i c a l p arties f e l t t h a t they could 
not avoid the inclusion of the comarcal d i v i s i o n i n t h e i r catalogue 
of deinands, even i f they had wanted. 
g 
The Concell d'Econcmia (Catalan Department of Economy) was the 
d r i v i n g force behind t h i s use of the comarcal structure as the 
t e r r i t o r i a l organisation of the new c o l l e c t i v i s e d structures of the 
Catalan economy. 
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2.2, i v The use of the comarca as a c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l symbol 
durinq the Franco period 
Under Franco, the the comarx:al structure was abolished together with 
the General i t a t . Although the comarques l o s t t h e i r o f f i c i a l r o l e , 
they remained an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the suppressed Catalan p o l i t i c a l 
c u l t u r e , and were used i n some p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Catalan 
opposition, such as the Assamblea de Catalvmya and the Ccannissions 
Obreres, as w e l l as by c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the Qimim 
Cultural and the Congres de Cultura Catalana. The excursionist 
t r a d i t i o n and the informal study of Catalan canarques was also 
resumed. 
Soon a f t e r the end of the war, the excursionist associations 
increased t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s again, assuming the r o l e of an 
a l t e r n a t i v e popular u n i v e r s i t y which was t r y i n g t o f i l l the gaps 
created by an education system strongly opposed t o Catalan studies. 
Within the same movement, comarcal study i n s t i t u t i o n s were formed t o 
b r i n g together l o c a l researchers and people interested i n t h e i r 
c u l t u r a l and physical environment. From 1950 onwards inter-comarcal 
conferences took place i n d i f f e r e n t towns i n Catalonia , often 
coinciding w i t h the opening of a p r i v a t e l y funded comarcal study 
centre, l i b r a r y , or museimi, and consisting of papers on d i f f e r e n t 
aspects of the p a r t i c u l a r comarca which was hosting the conference. 
I g l e s i e s , who had been Secretary of the Ponencia of 1932-33, and a 
c u l t u r a l adviser t o the Republican Generalitat, was the fi g u r e i n 
organising these conferences. 
Some of the la r g e r and more established comarcal study centres 
became inportant f o c i f o r Catalanists and researchers working on 
Catalan themes a t a time when these were absent from the c u r r i c u l a 
of the schools and u n i v e r s i t i e s . I n the 1960's and 1970's c u l t u r a l 
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Between 1950 and 1982, 27 comarcal assemblies took place. The 
f i r s t was i n Matorell,and was one of the f i r s t public events held i n 
Catalan. The second, i n Santes Creus, had t o take place behind closed 
doors f o r fear of intervention of the a u t h o r i t i e s (Gran Enciclopedia 
Catalana, Supplement, 1983, 82; Nogue i Font, 1986, 109). 
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r e v i v a l , many Catalan comarcal journals, such the Revista del 
Centre de Lectura de Reus. Aplec de Treball of the Centre d'Estudis 
de l a Conca de Barbera and the Miscel.lania Penedescena, originated 
i n comarcal study centres. Ihey usually published a r t i c l e s on l o c a l 
h i s t o r y , architecture, earth sciences, a r t s and f o l k l o r e , and 
botany, s i m i l a r t o the 19th century Associeicid Catalana d'Excairsions 
Cientifiques. 
Guillamet has argued t h a t large parts of the comarcal press assumed 
a p o l i t i c a l r o l e i n the 1960s and the 1970s i n the struggle against 
the d i c t a t o r s h i p and f o r the democratic and national reconstruction 
of Catalonia. He maintained t h a t publishing a t the comarcal l e v e l 
and f o r a comarcal or l o c a l readership was deeply rooted i n 
Catalonia from the 19th century, and tloat attenpts t o establish a 
p r o v i n c i a l press l i k e i n the r e s t of Spain f a i l e d t o eradicate t h i s 
t r a d i t i o n (Guillamet, 1983, 24-26). As i n many other exairples of 
anti-Francoist a c t i v i t i e s , the comarcal press i s not p o l i t i c a l i n 
the narrow sense. However, under the conditions of the Franco 
regime, the decision of groups of people t o maintain or revive t h e i r 
c u l t u r a l practices was interpreted as p o l i t i c a l . 
The Catalan language jou r n a l Serra d^Or (see Chapter s i x , section 
2 . 4 . i i ) also adopted the comarcal d i v i s i o n as a frame of reference 
f o r i t s news section "Informacio C u l t u r a l " . I n the f i r s t year of 
the j o u r n a l , J o r d i Pujol was i t s coordinator and i n charge of 
l i a i s o n s w i t h the comarques (Bastardes, 1984, 27). The news included 
reports from excursionist centres, f o l k l o r e groups, ScLcdana 
associations, poetry readings and l o c a l conferences, church 
a c t i v i t i e s and choir performances, etc., and t e s t i f i e d t o the 
r e v i v a l of Catalan c u l t u r e i n the comarques. 
As i n previous periods, the comarcal d i v i s i o n was used by Catalan 
n a t i o n a l i s t s t o u n i f y the Catalan t e r r i t o r y , a l t h o u ^ some 
c r i t i c i s e d the " u n r e a l i s t i c egalitarianism" i n the comarcal movement 
"""^This section was l a t e r c a l l e d " L ' a c t u a l i t a t catalana", "Vida 
catalana" and "Terres catalanes". 
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which tended t o ignore the huge differences i n the economic and 
soc i a l v a r i a t i o n s between the comarques (Table 7.1). The problem of 
caciquisme, i . e . the control of a l o c a l i t y by a l o c a l l y powerful, 
p o l i t i c a l l y well-connected, wealthy i n d i v i d u a l or social group, was 
closely l i n k e d t o these v a r i a t i o n s . I t was also claimed t h a t the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s v i i i c h promote comarcal studies are often linked t o 
these l o c a l oligarchies (Carreras e t a l . , 1971, 24). This c r i t i c i s m 
shows t h a t the class i n t e r e s t s i n the comarcal d i v i s i o n played a 
r o l e i n the 1960's as w e l l as a t the t u r n of the century. I t 
anticipated the accusations frcm the Catalan L e f t vhich were 
directed against the dominant conservative-nationalist 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the comarcal organisation under the Generalitat i n 
the 1980's. 
Althou(^ some oppositional p o l i t i c a l forces used the comarcal 
d i v i s i o n f o r t h e i r i n t e r n a l organisation, i t seems t h a t under 
Franco, the d i v i s i o n had f a r more ideological and symbolic 
significance than p r a c t i c a l relevance. Most of the n a t i o n a l i s t and 
anti-Francoist a c t i v i t i e s took place i n and around Barcelona anyway, 
and p o l i t i c a l awareness was rather low i n roost other areas. I t was 
only w i t h the re-establishment of the Catalan Generalitat a f t e r the 
demise of the Franco regime t h a t the p o l i t i c a l debate about the 
i n t e r n a l organisation of Catalonia was revived. This was the moment 
v^en the comarca turned from being p a r t of a discourse established 
i n defiance of the d i c t a t o r s h i p i n t o an issue of p o l i t i c a l control, 
decentralisation and l o c a l administration, by vhich a l l the 
settlements and inhabitants could f e e l affected"'"'^. The doubts about 
the legitimacy of the comarcal d i v i s i o n of 1933 and i t s relevance t o 
Catalonia i n the 1980's now came t o the surface: 
^Ihe l i v e l y p ublic debate on the issue of t e r r i t o r i a l organisation 
t e s t i f i e d t o t h i s i n t e r e s t . Between only January of 1984 and September 
of 1985, lAuch and Nel.lo l i s t e d 36 debating events and conferences, 
most of v^iich involved l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , comarcal study centres, 
educational i n s t i t u t i o n s , geographic societies, and p o l i t i c i a n s . The 
pu b l i c i n t e r e s t was greatest i n the areas most affected by population 
concentration or depopulation, and i n those areas vAiere the comarcal 
d i v i s i o n was contested (Lluch and Nel.lo, 1985, 29, 32-35). 
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"Tothom tenia asumit que d i n t r e de l a rei v i n d i c a c i o 
catalanista republicana c a l i a tambe f e r referenda a les 
comarques d'en Pau V i l a com a contraposicio a l a 
provincia, i per aixo doncs h i havia estudis comarcals i 
col.leccions de geografia comarcals i a l t r e s coses 
d'aquest t i p u s , i per t a n t les comarques historiques es 
feien funcionar en e l mon academic como u n i t a t s d'analisi. 
Pero a l a hora de donar'ls h i una personal i t a t p o l i t i c a , 
ningii s'ho acabava de creujg, i ningu acabava de t e n i r 
ganes de fer-ho realment." 
(Nadal, interview, 20.4.1988) 
The Estatut d'Autoncmia of 1979 committed the Catalan government t o 
introduce a comarcal d i v i s i o n , but a t the same time guaranteed the 
already existent levels of l o c a l government autonomy. Since i t d i d 
not specify which kind of comarcal d i v i s i o n was t o be created, and 
made no mention of the comarcal map of 1933, i t revived the debate 
about the d e f i n i t i o n of the comarcal d i v i s i o n . A f t e r years of 
demanding Catalan autonomy and the r e i n s t i t u t i o n of the comarcal 
d i v i s i o n i n the same breath, the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s now had doubts 
vAiether the comarques of 1933 were a t a l l . useful f o r modem 
government requirements. Subira'^'^, from the CDC (Oonvergencia 
Democratica de Catalunya), maintained t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the 
d i v i s i o n of 1933 was arguable: 
"We thought t h a t the 1936 d i v i s i o n had been mystified, 
because i t never had functioned. I t was a thin g v^ich had 
only p o s i t i v e connotations and no defects, since i t never 
had been put i n t o practice." 
(Subira, interview, 28.3.1988) 
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"Everybody assumed t h a t w i t h i n the framework of the republican 
Catalanist demands, they also had t o demand t h a t the comarques of Pau 
V i l a replaced the provinces. Therefore, comarcal studies were pursued, 
and geographical c o l l e c t i o n s on the comarques and other studies of t h i s 
type were produced. I n t h i s way the h i s t o r i c a l comarques were used i n 
the academic world as u n i t s of analysis. However, v^en i t came t o giving 
them a p o l i t i c a l function, i t turned out t h a t no one believed i n t h i s , 
and nobody r e a l l y f e l t l i k e doing i t . " 
•^"^Antoni Subira represented the r u l i n g n a t i o n a l i s t party i n the 
second commission on the t e r r i t o r i a l reorganisation, v^ich was set up by 
the Catalan Parliament i n 1984. 
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Only i n 1987 d i d the government c o a l i t i o n r e l u c t a n t l y present a b i l l 
t o the Catalan Parliament which dealt w i t h the issue and f i n a l l y 
brought a long-winded debate t o an end v\hich gave r i s e t o b i t t e r 
confrontations between the d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l forces. I n the 
fol l o w i n g section, some of the main issues i n the debate are 
discussed. 
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2.2.V. I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s i n g the comarca: the p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t over 
the t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n i n the autonomous Catalonia 
The p o l i t i c a l significance of the t e r r i t o r i a l debate i n the 1980's 
must be seen i n the context of demographic, economic and social 
changes t h a t had taken place i n Catalonia since the 1930's,and viiich 
had strong s p a t i a l inpacts. Enric Lluch sketched out these rnajor 
changes t h a t developed during the 1960's and 1970's: 
"The concentration of productive a c t i v i t i e s , the transport 
system and population, i n \ihat we would describe today as 
the itietropolitan area of Barcelona, i s a very important 
phenomenon. A f t e r the r i s e of Tarragona and i t s surrounding 
areas i n the 1960's, another area has emerged i n the 
comarques of the Caitp region \^iich bears no r e l a t i o n w i t h 
the same area i n 1931. Along the coast of Region I I of the 
Generalitat, between Blanes and Portbou, there has been an 
extraordinary transformation, provoked by the phenomenon of 
European tourism, v ^ c h has produced a t e r r i t o r i a l structure 
vt i i c h d i d not e x i s t before: the Costa Brava. (...) There 
have also been very s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n the A l t Pirineu: 
The snow, the m i l k and the summer tourism are probably now 
the main income sources. And everyv^ere i n Catalonia there 
i s the other, negative, side: the r u r a l exodus, the 
d e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n of the comarques of the i n t e r i o r . " 
(quoted i n Borja, 1984, 625) 
Changes i n the s p a t i a l organisation of production, the h i ^ e r degree 
of s p a t i a l i n t e g r a t i o n through irrproved transport, and the grossly 
uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n of people (Fig. 28) thus threw doubts on the old 
ccfmarcal d i v i s i o n , vMch may or may not have suited the Catalonia of 
the 1930's. 
But even urare inportant was the question v t o t purposes a new 
comarcal organisation should serve, and vdiom i t should serve. I t was 
mentioned i n Chapter f i v e (section 3.1.i) t h a t there has been a more 
general development a t the l e v e l of the state v^iich influenced the 
comarcal debate. The functions of the state as a provider of social 
and physical i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and the bureaucratisation of the public 
and p r i v a t e spheres v ^ c h came along w i t h these functions, increased 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y over the l a s t decades. The process of democratisation 
of the p o l i t i c a l system had given r i s e t o new public demands on the 
state . The issue of the Catalan t e r r i t o r i a l organisation therefore 
received a new p o l i t i c a l dimension i n addition t o t h a t of being part 
(Chapter 7) (402) 
of a set of n a t i o n a l i s t demands. Hie t e r r i t o r i a l debate of the 
1980's brought a new set of p o l i t i c a l questions t o the surface vtiich 
were connec±ed t o d i f f e r e n t conceptions of decentralisation, 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and greater transparency of l o c a l p o l i t i c s . Should i t 
be geared t o administration w i t h i n the present t e r r i t o r i a l 
structures, or should i t rather serve as an instrument of redressing 
the uneven geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n of economic and demographic 
development? Should the comarques make centr a l government more 
e f f i c i e n t , or l o c a l government more autonomous and accessible t o the 
people i t represents? Should the new t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n replace 
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the municipal u n i t s (many of v ^ c h are too small ) , the provinces, 
both, or neither? Apart from representing yet another layer of l o c a l 
government, the provinces were i n the eyes of many na t i o n a l i s t s a 
symbol of c e n t r a l government con t r o l . I n 1980, the Catalan 
Parliament was prevented from t r a n s f e r r i n g the conpetences of the 
four p r o v i n c i a l governments t o the Generalitat, because the 
Constitutional Court decided i t was unconstitutional. This 
f r u s t r a t e d atteirpt a t solving the problem of t e r r i t o r i a l 
organisation made the Generalitat wary of the whole issue. The 
Generalitat also seemed reluctant t o decentralise power so soon 
a f t e r i t had gained i t . I t argued th a t i n a period of national 
reconstruction, "the government had t o keep the reins of power i n 
i t s own hands and control the s i t u a t i o n " (Casassas, interview, 
28.4.1988). 
On the other hand, the debate over degrees and types of i n t e r n a l 
decentralisation and devolution of power was governed by party 
p o l i t i c a l considerations of t e r r i t o r i a l c ontrol. The Socialists were 
i n charge of the metropolitan area of Greater Barcelona and the 
c a p i t a l s of the other three provinces, while the n a t i o n a l i s t 
c o a l i t i o n CiU was stronger i n the less populated r u r a l areas and the 
smaller comarcal towns, where i t managed t o establish a voting 
14 . . 
The t o t a l number of l o c a l government u n i t s (municipis) was 935. 
More than 70 per cent of these had less than 2,000 inhabitants, and a 
large percentage of the Catalan population was concentrated i n 
r e l a t i v e l y few l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s (Bemis i Calatayud, 1987, 10). 
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m a j o r i t y between 1980 and 1984 (Table 7.2 and 7.3; Fig. 29). 
Creating an administrative t i e r , vAiich would give more power and 
influence t o the r u r a l t e r r i t o r i e s and take administrative functions 
away from the provincias. could therefore create a power base f o r 
the government c o a l i t i o n . Thus, the question about the comarcal 
organisation was no longer only a problem of the lack of precision 
of l o c a l people's perceptions of place and sense of belonging, but 
became a p o l i t i c a l question about the purpose of comarcalisation and 
about models of autonomous government. Ultimately, i t was about hew 
t o establish p o l i t i c a l hegemony. 
Since the p o l i t i c i a n s were reluctant t o address themselves t o the 
issue i n parliament, they took t h e i r time over i t . IXiring the f i r s t 
GenercLLitat under a minority government of the n a t i o n a l i s t CiU 
c o a l i t i o n , the Catalan Parliament set up a commission t o prepare 
l e g i s l a t i o n on t e r r i t o r i a l organisation. The commission l i m i t e d 
i t s e l f t o c o l l e c t i n g opinions from i n s t i t u t i o n s of c i v i l society, 
but never used them constructively: 
"Aleshores aquesta gent - poc a poc sense correr massa - van 
comengar a f e r un t r e b a l l que sera interesant de l l e g i r un 
dia o a l t r e pero que ningu ha v i s t mai, de r e c u l l i r opinions 
de gent. Van convidar persones que s'havien preoct^^at per l a 
d i v i s i o t e r r i t o r i a l , organitzacions patronals, els 
sindicats, l e s u n i v e r s i t a t s , l a societat catalana de 
geografia, alguns autors que havien e s c r i t l l i b r e s , per 
eixenple j o h i vaig anar per l a societat de geografia, j o h i 
va i g anar per I ' u n i v e r s i t a t , i j o h i vaig anar com autor 
d'un l l i b r e de l a organitzacio t e r r i t o r i a l de Catalunya. 
(...) Ja es veia, i j a es veia que a mes a mes no tenien cap 
in t e r e s de correr, de que s'acabaria l a l e g i s l a t u r e i que no 
haurien acabat e l seu informe. Perque no tenien cap ganes 
de f e r un informe. Perque, a l n i v e l l personal, ique e t 
confesaven? Doncs, que s i que 1'opinio general gairebe de 
tothom es de que s'havien de r e s t a b l i r les comarques del 
1936, pero, roes, roenys, mes grands, mes p e t i t e s , s'havia de 
canviar l a idea de que no havia de s e r v i r de base, pero no 
h i havia un acord exactament quins havien de ser i sobretot 
l o que no h i havia era un a'Jgi^ sobre e l contingut qu' 
havien de t e n i r les comarques." 
15 
"Now, these people began - without great hurry - t o document 
people's opinions. One day i t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o read t h i s 
(Footnote Continued) 
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(Casassas, interview, 27.4.1988) 
Thus, there was a general consensus t h a t the comarques had t o be 
re-established because they were p a r t of the demands f o r autonomy 
and formed pa r t of the Catalan s p i r i t . No Catalan p o l i t i c a l party 
wanted t o dissociate i t s e l f from these n a t i o n a l i s t tenets. 
Everything else however was undecided. 
From the academic debate during the 1970's and the early 1980's, two 
basic models of t e r r i t o r i a l organisation emerged. One defended the 
comarcal d i v i s i o n of 1933 wi t h the 38 comarques. The other was based 
on an in v e s t i g a t i o n by Casassas and Clusa i n the l a t e 1970's 
(Casassas and Clusa, 1981). They came up w i t h a d i v i s i o n of the 
t e r r i t o r y i n f i v e regions - dominated by the present pr o v i n c i a l 
c a p i t a l s , and Manresa - which would serve f o r the decentralisation 
of the administration of the Genercilitat . Next t o these c i t i e s , the 
other Catalan towns which the d i v i s i o n of 1933 designated as 
comarcal c a p i t a l s play a much lesser r o l e . As f a r as the loc a l 
government structure was concerned, Casassas and Clusa found that 
only a few t e r r i t o r i e s were functioning according t o the comarcal 
model. Much more frequent were smaller areas, consisting of a group 
of v i l l a g e s and small towns without a dominant urfean centre v*iich 
they c a l l e d municipalies. These municipalies functioned as an 
"extended town" of everyday i n t e r a c t i o n and mutual dependence. 
According t o Casassas, the new t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n should respond 
t o contenporary needs. I t should be based on the p r i n c i p l e s of l o c a l 
(Footnote Continued) 
material, but no one has ever set eyes on i t . They i n v i t e d people vho 
had occupied themselves w i t h the t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n , ertployers' 
organisations, trade unions, u n i v e r s i t i e s , the Societat Catcilana de 
Geografia, authors who had w r i t t e n books on the issue. I was summoned 
three times (...). But one could see already t h a t they had no in t e r e s t 
i n a cting f a s t , and t h a t Parliament would f i n i s h without them having 
f i n i s h e d t h e i r report. Because i n f a c t , they d i d not f e e l l i k e ma3d-ng a 
report. What d i d they confessed t o you under four eyes? Well, t h a t the 
general opinion of nearly everyone was t h a t the comarques of 1936 had t o 
be re-established, but t h a t they should be made more, or less, or 
larger, or smaller... The idea t h a t the d i v i s i o n of 1936 should not 
serve as a basis had t o be abandoned, but there was no agreement about 
exactly how the comarques should look l i k e , and above a l l , what was 
missing was an agreement about the content they should be given." 
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democracy and p a r t i c i p a t i o n , s i r t p l i c i t y , and administrative and 
economic e f f i c i e n c y , rather than being modelled on the necessities 
of the autonomous government: 
"(?Es una e n t i t a t jerarquitzada, c a p i t a l , subdits, senyor que 
mana, senyors que obeiexen? Aixo seria una d e f i n i c i o que ens 
en a n i r i a be per posar-hi e l representant de l a Generalitat, 
perque es e l que mana, i el s a l t r e s que obeeixen. O be per 
l a gent que v i u a l t e r r i t o r i , no e l s que estan a un despatx 
a Barcelona, sino e l s que viuen a l t e r r i t o r i , l a comarca es 
un conjunt de raunicipis interrelacionats amb relacions 
d i a r i e s . "-^ ^ 
(Casassas, interview, 28.4.1988) 
Casassas' and Clusa's ideas were taken up by the Communist Party 
(PSUC) and used i n the e l e c t i o n programme f o r the autonomous 
elections i n 1984 (PSXX:, 1984, 59) and i n the parliamentary debates 
i n March 1987. The PSUC wanted t o abolish the four provinces and t o 
l e t the l o c a l government administrations decide t o vdiich comarca 
they wanted t o belong, ejqsecting t o a r r i v e a t 80 t o 90 w i t h t h i s 
"method from below". 
As the f i r s t Ponencia f a i l e d t o reach a solution, a second 
parliainentary commission was set up a f t e r the 1984 elections i n 
v ^ c h CiU won the majority of the seats. This gave them the power t o 
enforce t h e i r own t e r r i t o r i a l model on the commission. Catalonia was 
now carved up i n t o S o c i a l i s t and CiU t e r r i t o r i e s , w i t h the former 
dominating the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona (CMB) and the 
Provincial Governments (diputacions), and the l a t t e r winning most of 
the r u r a l areas and small towns. The l e g i s l a t i o n v^ich reached the 
Parliament i n March 1987 was put forward by CiU and affected the 
CMB, the l o c a l governments, the provinces and the comarques. They 
i ) abolished the CMB, 
"What i s a comarca? I s i t a h i e r a r c h i c a l u n i t , w i t h a c a p i t a l and 
subordinates, one v^o gives orders and the r e s t v^o obeys? This would be 
an appropriate d e f i n i t i o n i f we wanted t o locate there representatives 
of the Genercilitat, because they would give the orders and the others 
would have t o obey. For those people v^o l i v e there - not those vAio are 
i n an o f f i c e somewhere i n Barcelona, but those who l i v e on the t e r r i t o r y 
- the comarca i s a group of municipal a u t h o r i t i e s v*iich are linked to 
each other thrvDugh everyday i n t e r a c t i o n . " 
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i i ) adopted the c e n t r a l l e g i s l a t i o n framework f o r l o c a l 
government t o the Catalan case, 
i i i ) created a framework f o r future laws vdiich would enable the 
Generalitat t o assume the conpetences of the diputacions, 
and 
i v ) established the comarccil d i v i s i o n of 1933. 
The e l e c t o r a l system and the boundaries adopted f o r the comarques 
made i t possible f o r CiU t o control a l l but four comarcal councils, 
because of the concentration of the urban i n d u s t r i a l population i n 
only a few comarques. 
The p o l i t i c a l debate about the t e r r i t o r i a l organisation i n the 
1980's also demonstrated t h a t the consensus between the Catalan 
p a r t i e s on the issue o f self-government had broken down. A l t h o u ^ 
the Catalan president, Pujol, ostensibly wanted the t e r r i t o r i a l 
organisation of the country t o be reached by consensus (Uuch and 
Nel.lo, 1985, 27), neither the r e s u l t nor the way i n vAiich i t was 
achieved suggest t h a t t h i s was the case. I n r e a l i t y , i t was a 
struggle f o r hegemony i n Catalonia between d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s vtiich 
had formed p a r t of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Matias Vives, the 
speaker f o r the PSUC i n the t e r r i t o r i a l debate, argued t h a t CiU 
never r e a l l y t r i e d t o establish a consensias because i t would have 
had t o corrpromise considerably. CiU attenpted t o i s o l a t e i t s main 
opponent, the S o c i a l i s t s (PSC-PSOE), by creating a "national 
a l l i a n c e " w i t h the "Catalan" p a r t i e s , Esquerra R^jublicana and the 
PSUC, against the " c e n t r a l i s t Spanish" PSC-PSOE and AP. This f a i l e d , 
but the S o c i a l i s t s d i d not collaborate w i t h the other opposition 
p a r t i e s by accepting an a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n t o the comarcal 
d i v i s i o n proposed by the CiU (Vives, interview, 11.4.1988). The 
S o c i a l i s t party was concerned w i t h keeping hold o f i t s power base i n 
the CMB, and t o prevent the s h i f t of functions and resources from 
the e x i s t i n g l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o the cxxnarques. Joaquim Nadal, the 
S o c i a l i s t president of the federation of Catalan l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
(Federacio de Municipis Catcilana) said t h a t h i s view, 
" - which i s not exactly t h a t of the s o c i a l i s t party - i s 
t h a t by p o l a r i s i n g the whole a t t e n t i o n on the L l e i de l a 
Corporacio Metropolitana, the problems posed by the other 
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laws were d i l u t e d . I t h i n k t h a t the debate about the CMB 
dominated a l l the other debates, and therefore caused damage 
above a l l t o the comarcal and the municipal laws." 
(Nadal, interview, 20.4.1988) 
The comarcgies v^ i c h the Generalitat established i n 1987"^^ have few 
resources and powers. Squeezed between the p r o v i n c i a l administration 
and the v i r t u a l l y unchanged l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , they have t o r e l y on 
functions v^iich the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s are not capable of carrying 
out, and on tasks transferred t o them by the Generalitat. I t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o see how they could develop i n t o anything other than a 
bureaucratic t i e r through vAiich the governing CiU can s t a b i l i s e and 
extend i t s c o n t r o l . 
Despite the extensive nature of the debate on, and behind, the 
p o l i t i c a l stage, i t seems t h a t the wrong questions were addressed. 
Casassas suggested t h a t fundamental problems, such as the 
decentralisation of government and the uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
development and resources, were neglected, and the whole issue was 
turned i n t o a party p o l i t i c a l struggle: 
"Es curios, perque totes quatre l l e i s , discutides una a una, 
van omplir roesos i mesos de discussions. I l a discussio va 
ser com a una cortina de fum; yo crec que va ser una manera 
d'entretenir e l pais devant de a l t r e s problemes mes 
ijTportants que h i havia - i que h i ha -, i una mostra de l a 
r i v a l i t a t que h i ha entre els dos p a r t i t s m a j o r i t a r i s que no 
s'arriben a entendre mai. Pero, va s e r v i r per f e r 
desapareixer l o que fa referenda a l a organitzacio 
t e r r i t o r i a l e l v e r i t a b l e problema que es: iQuina es l a 
naturalesa de les comarques? iQue representa l a comarca a 
Catalunya? iQue es, amb t o t a l a seva evolucio h i s t o r i c a 
desde que va apareixer e l concepte de l a comarca p o l i t i c a 
f i n s a l a comarca p o l i t i c a actual? <|.Perque ha seguit una 
determinada t r a j e c t o r i a ? A^ qui I'interesa l a comarca? c.Per 
a que volen l a comarca? Aquest debat no es va t e n i r . Amb 
molta a b i l i t a t e l govern va convertir e l debat, i potser amb 
A f t e r the laws had gone through the Catalan parliament, three 
a d d i t i o n a l comarques were conceeded by the Commission which was dealing 
w i t h popular objections t o the comarcal boundaries. These are Pla de 
I'Estany, v ^ i c h l i e s t o the west of Girones; Pla d'Urgell south of 
U r g e l l ; and A l t a Ribagorga i n the northwestern comer of Catalonia on 
the border w i t h the autonomous community of Aragon. Other conplaints by 
l o c a l governments and proposals f o r new comarques were rejected 
(Casassas, interview, 18.4.1988). 
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una curtedat de v i s t a de l a posicio, en una discussio de que 
interesa e l s consells que govemaran les comarques, ccan 
s'anomenaran e l s consellers ...^entens?, en questions de 
t i p u s tecnic. El dialeg va ser un d i i l e g de sords, un dialeg 
molt l l a r g , pero l a clau fonamental de que es l a comarca, 
per que serveix l a comarca, a qui ha de s e r v i r l a comarca, 
(...) no es va d i s c u t i r , i vam continuar dient que les 
comarques del 32-36 eren unes comarques magnifiques i que l a 
unica questio era q u i govemaria les comarques i com es 
r e p a r t i r i a e l poder." 
(Casassas, interview, 28.4.1988) 
2.2.vi. T e r r i t o r i a l ortranisation and p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l 
The t e r r i t o r i a l organisation was picked out as a conponent of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t discourse v ^ i c h has transformed over time and adapted by 
d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l and social forces, but nevertheless continued t o 
be p a r t of the Catalan h i s t o r y . Conparable t o the Catalan language, 
the sense of belonging t o a comarca - v^iatever i t s exact boundaries 
- i s deeply rooted i n a large p a r t of the population, and has been 
g l o r i f i e d by another p a r t vMch l i v e s i n metropolitan areas v^ere 
other t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t i e s are stronger. Since the ccanarcal 
i d e n t i t y i s not class s p e c i f i c , i t can serve as a cohesive agent, 
and be p o l i t i c i s e d i n a v a r i e t y of ways. Thus, the comarques have a 
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"The four laws, discussed one by one, took months and months of 
discussion. And the discussion had the e f f e c t of a c u r t a i n of smoke. I 
t h i n k t h a t i t was a way of entertaining the country, v t i i l e other, more 
inportant problems, vfcLch existed then and vtiich s t i l l e x i s t today, were 
pushed i n t o the background. I t was a demonstration of the r i v a l r y 
between two major p a r t i e s vfeLch w i l l never reach an understanding. But 
i t also succeeded i n keeping out from the agenda of t e r r i t o r i a l 
organisation some r e a l problems, such as these: What i s the nature of 
the comarques? What represents the comarca i n Catalonia? How has the 
meaning of the p o l i t i c a l comarca changed since i t f i r s t made i t s 
appearance? Why has i t followed a s p e c i f i c process of developanent? Who 
i s interested i n the comarca? Why do they want the coriarca? I h i s debate 
has not taken place. The government converted the debate w i t h great 
s k i l l , and maybe w i t h a short-sighted view, i n t o a discussion about the 
councils v ^ i c h govern the comarca, about how these councillors are t o be 
elected, i n short, about technical questions. The dialogue became a 
dialogue of the deaf, and a very long dialogue, but the key questions, 
vihat the comarca i s and v^om i t should serve, was not discussed. So they 
kept repeating t h a t the comarques of 1933-36 were magnificent comarques 
and t h a t the only problem was \iho should govern them and how the powers 
should be d i s t r i b u t e d . " 
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conservative connotation stemming from the 19th century, and a 
progressive, or even r a d i c a l , h i s t o r y v ^ c h i s linked t o the 
republican Generalitat, and vii i c h was carried i n t o the 
anti-Francoist opposition a f t e r the c i v i l war. 
During the d i c t a t o r s h i p , the t e r r i t o r i a l debate re-emerged w i t h the 
c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l , and i t s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h Catalanism of 
d i f f e r e n t versions, but s p e c i f i c a l l y of the Second Republic, 
heightened i t s p o l i t i c a l significance and converted i t i n t o a major 
issue a f t e r autonomy was achieved. The part i c i p a n t s of the debate 
were always i n t e l l e c t u a l s ( i n the widest sense) and p o l i t i c i a n s , but 
the t o p i c was much less specialised and tedinocratic than i n other 
countries, and more people took an i n t e r e s t i n i t (Tables 7.4 and 
7.5). 
With the a r r i v a l of Catalan autonony, the "comarcal consensus" began 
t o break, but no p o l i t i c a l party was w i l l i n g t o distance i t s e l f from 
t h i s Catalanist symbol. The law of 1987 v^iich re-established the 38 
comarques was described by Vives as a "great piece of archaeology" 
because i t dug out the o l d comarcal boundaries. Since the comarcal 
i d e n t i t y was also e x i s t i n g among the popular classes, i t coiiLd not 
be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h any s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l ideology (Vives, 1987, 
51). However, the functions, vMch the comarcal d i v i s i o n were given 
i n 1987, d i d correspond t o the i n t e r e s t of the r u l i n g Catalan party, 
which took i t as an opportunity t o f o r t i f y i t s influence and i t s 
bureaucratic structure i n large parts of the t e r r i t o r y , and t o 
establish a coirpeting l e v e l of government i n others, vtiere i t had 
less support. At the same time, i t was able t o claim t h a t i t gave 
the Catalan people back the r i g h t t o govern themselves i n t h e i r own 
t e r r i t o r y , and thus l e g i t i m i s e i t s Catalanist innage. 
3. TERRITORIALITY AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN SOOTIAND 
While t e r r i t o r y and i t s organisation have an inportant place i n 
Catalan nationalism, these issues were less p o l i t i c i s e d i n the case 
of Scotland. The reasons are p a r t l y h i s t o r i c a l , because, unlike the 
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Catalans, the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement d i d not have an 
a l t e r n a t i v e government model t o v^ich they could easily r e f e r . But 
geographical d i v i s i o n s , v ^ i c h are interwoven w i t h economic, social 
and c u l t t i r a l discrepancies, are also present i n Scotland, as i s the 
need f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t movement t o reconcile d i f f e r e n t social 
grov:ps and t e r r i t o r i a l l y based in t e r e s t s . The previous chapters have 
exposed some of these geografiiical d i s p a r i t i e s . The next three 
subsections demonstrate t h a t the external boundaries of the Scottish 
nation have been successfully questioned by unionists, and the 
i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n o f Scotland's t e r r i t o r y remained confined t o 
questions of administrative e f f i c i e n c y . 
3.1 The Shetlcind pawns: Scottish territory and North Sea o i l 
interests 
The Scottish t e r r i t o r y i s a well-defined economic u n i t , which has 
long been used i n government s t a t i s t i c s and censuses. I n the 
Scottish O f f i c e , Scotland has also a separate administrative body. 
Even before the n a t i o n a l i s t movement became p o l i t i c a l l y relevant i n 
the 1960's, the t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries of Scotland were we l l 
established and widely recognised. Far less accepted was the 
argument t h a t the people w i t h i n these boundaries had a legitimate 
claim t o p o l i t i c a l autonomy. However, when the Scottish National 
Party s t a r t e d t o voice these claims w i t h increasing volume, at least 
one t h i n g seemed c l e a r l y defined, and t h a t was the t e r r i t o r y to 
v^iich these claims referred. 
Things changed when North Sea o i l was pushed t o the f o r e f r o n t of the 
p o l i t i c a l agenda i n Scotland, and the SNP claiined t h a t i t was 
Scottish o i l . Those areas, v^ere vested i n t e r e s t s were most 
concentrated, became subject t o t e r r i t o r i a l c o n f l i c t s . The 
Nat i o n a l i s t s argued t h a t most of the North Sea o i l and gas f i e l d s 
belonged t o Scotland, i f the Continental Shelf J u r i s d i c t i o n Order of 
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19 1968 or the Continental Shelf Treaty were applied. Given the 
prospects of s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y i n o i l and of huge tax revenues, the 
SNP o i l caiipaign was a d i r e c t economic t h r e a t t o the B r i t i s h state. 
This was the perception of those sectors of the Labour and 
Conservative p a r t i e s v ^ i c h opposed devolution w i t h the argument th a t 
i t would only lead t o separatism. To counter t h i s threat, they 
undermined the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Scotland by playing the 
Shetland card. The same methods of delineating the maritime 
boundaries were used t o ascertain t h a t more than h a l f of the 
supposedly Scottish resources would i n f a c t belong t o the Shetland 
Islands (Glasgow Herald, 4.4.1977). Media at t e n t i o n thus switched t o 
the Shetland Islands, l y i n g t o the northeast of Scotland, v^iich were 
claimed t o not r e a l l y belong t o the Scottish nation, because t h e i r 
c u l t u r a l heritage was d i s t i n c t i v e l y Norse, rather than C e l t i c or 
Anglo-Saxon as the Scottish mainland. The Shetlanders, i t was 
argued, may not want t o be p a r t of an independent Scotland, but 
prefer a favourable deal w i t h Westminster, i f i t gave them more 
autonomy. The reason was t h a t the Shetland Islands d i d not need a 
strong Scottish Assembly t o help t h e i r economy t o i t s feet, because 
they were experiencing an unprecedented economic boom based on the 
o i l industry. The Shetland council had j u s t been established as a 
single t i e r l o c a l a u t h o r i t y under the l o c a l Government (Scotland) 
Act i n 1973, and been given special planning powers t o deal w i t h o i l 
developments. Fear arose t h a t these powers would be diminished by a 
f u t u r e Scottish Assembly, and o i l wealth would be "gobbled up" by 
the areas of deprivation i n the central b e l t (Lawson, 1989, 13). 
Therefore, they d i d not share Scotland's i n t e r e s t i n devolution 
(Times. 16.11.1977). I t was asserted t h a t an independent Scotland 
under SNP c o n t r o l would almost c e r t a i n l y refuse t o respect the 
Shetlanders' "autonomy" , because i t would be economically too 
dependent on the o i l revenues t o do so: 
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This order was drawn up by the B r i t i s h government i n order t o 
separate the reference of accidents, crimes, etc. t o e i t h e r the Scottish 
or the English l e g a l system. 
(Chapter 7) (412) 
"The islanders' only hope i s t h a t England, i n the 
t r a n s i t i o n a l period, would i;phold t h e i r r i g h t t o 
independence and t o be governed, w i t h whatever status, from 
Westminster. ( — ) Scotland, w i t h i t s appetite f o r o i l 
resources and adequate resources of i t s own, would, i n 
extremes, sirtply annexe i t . A community of 20,000 people 
without patronage alliances could not r e s i s t a country of 
f i v e m i l l i o n people." 
(Glasgow Herald, 4.4.1977) 
That the Shetlanders' r i g h t t o independence was equalled i n the 
above a r i i i c l e t o the r i g h t t o be governed from Westminster suggested 
t h a t i t s author could see no reason v^y Westminster would want to 
give the Shetlanders r e a l independence. They were only pawns i n the 
p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t between Nationalists and the B r i t i s h government. 
The r e a l reason was t o undermine the SNP's arguments f o r an 
independence \ft^ich was made a t t r a c t i v e through the prospect of o i l 
wealth. I n t h i s endeavour, the unionist parties used the ambiguous 
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issues of t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t y . Although i t i s tr u e t h a t the 
Shetlanders have preserved t h e i r own i d e n t i t y and expressed greater 
concern about t h e i r s p e c i f i c problems and t h e i r own well-being, t h i s 
was not the r e a l reason f o r focusing the devolution debate on 
Shetland. Rather, the issue was blown up t o a c r u c i a l problem i n the 
devolution debate by opponents of devolution f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons, 
and used i n order t o weaken the n a t i o n a l i s t case. 
The Scottish Conservative MP Galbraith illuminated the new i n t e r e s t 
f o r the Shetlanders by asking during a debate of the Scotland and 
Wales B i l l (vAiich he admitted he "hated"): 
"But i f they were going t o s t a r t t o s p l i t up B r i t a i n , vdiy 
stop a t Scotland? Why not take the i n t e g r a l parts of which 
Scotland was conposed, and s t a r t w i t h that?" 
(Times. 20.1.1977, 9) 
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Another such issue was the l o y a l t y many Scots f e l t f o r B r i t a i n , 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r class based s o l i d a r i t y . Since several t e r r i t o r i a l 
i d e n t i t i e s can e x i s t next t o each other, i t i s not surprising t h a t Scots 
w i t h a dual i d e n t i t y f e l t t h a t claiming the o i l f o r Scotland alone was 
u n f a i r i n the face of the severe economic problems v^i c h depressed 
regions i n England were facing (see Chapter three. Tables 3.9 and 3.10). 
The Labour Party i n p a r t i c u l a r seized upon t h i s c o n f l i c t of l o y a l t i e s i n 
Scotland, and used i t against the SNP. 
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Labour "rebel" MP Abse asked f o r a separate referendum on the 
Devolution B i l l f o r the Shetland Islands, the outcome of vMch was 
e>^)ected t o be negative. Hinting a t the r e a l reason f o r h i s concern 
f o r the Shetlanders, he claimed t h a t an SNP controlled Scottish 
Assembly would 
" t o t a l l y s n a r l up the r e t r i e v a l of UK o i l and subvert the 
v^ole strategy upon \*dch our present economic plans r e s t . " 
(Times, 5.11.1977, 1-2; enphasis mine) 
Another Labour MP f o r Scotland, Buchan, said t h a t the SNP had 
adopted an i n p e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n i n the case of Orkney and Shetland 
t h a t was "even cruder than B r i t i s h imperialism a t i t s roost crude", 
although the SNP had promised t o guarantee the e x i s t i n g r i < ^ t s of 
the Shetlanders^-*" (Times. 20.1.1977, 9). 
As f a r as the powers of the Scottish Assembly over Shetland was 
concerned, most of the matters devolved i n the Scotland and Wales 
B i l l were already under the administration of the Scottish Office. 
The issue of c o n t r o l over the o i l was also t h e o r e t i c a l , since the 
B r i t i s h government d i d not intend t o devolve any powers over o i l 
developments or revenues t o Scotland, or, f o r t h a t matter, the 
Shetland Islands, e i t h e r i n the Scotland and Wales B i l l or i n the 
subsequent Scotland B i l l : 
"Of course, the Government i n no way concedes a scrap of 
c o n t r o l over North Sea o i l t o the proposed assembly." 
(Times. 5.11.1977, 1-2) 
Nevertheless, the SNP was caught out by the un i o n i s t arguments, 
which seemed t o apply t o Shetland i n p r i n c i p l e the same l o g i c as the 
N a t i o n a l i s t s i n t h e i r claim t h a t i t was "Scotland's o i l " , even 
though there was never a question of Westminster allowing Shetland 
t o become the independent owner of the vast o i l f i e l d s . Shetland i n 
I n order t o pacify concerns on the Orkney and Shetland Islands 
about the s o c i a l and environmental disruption, vdiich would be caused by 
o i l - r e l a t e d on-shore developments. Parliament passed the Orkney and 
Zetland County Council Acts i n 1974. These acts gave the island l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s considerable pwers t o control o i l developments and t o 
generate considerable o i l - r e l a t e d income (Lawson, 1989, 12). 
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the end agreed t o accept a conpramise i n form of a special 
representative i n the Scottish Assembly, not least because refusing 
t o be devolved w i t h Scotland would have created p r a c t i c a l problems 
of governing the islands. An amendment ("Grimond Amendment" named 
a f t e r the islands' Liberal MP) was included i n the Scotland B i l l 
v s ^ i i c h guaranteed - yet another - Constitutional Commission t o 
investigate the r e l a t i o n s h i p of Orkney and Shetland t o the Scottish 
Assembly. According t o the SNP p o l i t i c i a n Maxwell, i t would not have 
been i n the Shetlanders' i n t e r e s t t o stay w i t h Westminster, because 
the o i l e x p l o i t a t i o n p o l i c y of the SNP i n an independent Scotland 
would have served t h e i r long term inte r e s t s better. The v^ole issue, 
however, exposed some weaknesses of the Nationalists' o i l based 
strategy i n the 1970's. Moreover, i t revealed the iiiportance of 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y t o the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. I n the case of 
Scotland, the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the national t e r r i t o r y was 
obviously not equally strong i n a l l areas, and p a r t i c u l a r l y weak i n 
Shetland. I n the devolution referendum i n 1979, 72 per cent of the 
Orkney and 73 per cent of the Shetland vote went against the Act 
(see Chapter two. Table 2.3). 
The following two subsections deal i n greater d e t a i l with i n t e r n a l 
d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n Scotland. F i r s t l y , I analyse the i n p l i c a t i o n s of 
the t e r r i t o r i a l reorganisation of Scotland f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement; and secondly, I consider the s p a t i a l manifestation of 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l cleavages, i n the context of n a t i o n a l i s t 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n . 
3-2 I n t e r n a l t e r r i t o r i a l organisation 
The most r a d i c a l reorganisation of l o c a l government i n Scotland f e l l 
p recisely i n t o the period of n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l . At f i r s t sight, i t 
i s s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i t was investigated and carried out conpletely 
separately from the i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes, which 
was set up i n 1969 i n response t o the r i s e of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. Both, the popular d i s i n t e r e s t i n l o c a l government and the 
r i s e of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, had a common source i n the 
"insistence t h a t government could and should do much more, and an 
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almost contenptuous dismissal of the present system" (Mackintosh, 
1968, 142). The Scottish National Party was attacking the 
bureaucratic l o c a l government machinery of Labour councils i n the 
West of Scotland, some of vAiich had been i n power f o r decades. I n 
Glasgow, where the Labour Party was dominant over a long period, the 
l o c a l e l e c t i o n turnout was only 28 per cent i n some seats i n the 
early 1960's. I n the 1968 elections, people's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h 
the Labour establishment was r e f l e c t e d i n a b i g swing t o the SNP. 
The surprised Times reported t h a t labour had " l o s t control of 
Glasgow, t h e i r l a s t r e a l l y b i g municipal bastion, v*iere they had 
been i n power f o r more than 30 years" (Times. 8.5.1968, 1). 
I n the following pages I argue t h a t i n establishing two separate 
commissions, the government managed t o d e p o l i t i c i s e the issues of 
decentralisation, devolution of power and t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t y . 
A f t e r the l o c a l government reorganisation had been f i n a l l y carried 
out, devolution became f o r many, and p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the new l o c a l 
bureaucracy w i t h a vested i n t e r e s t i n the e x i s t i n g structures, "yet 
another" t i e r of l o c a l government. 
The t h i r d section deals w i t h the iirportance of t e r r i t o r i a l 
i d e n t i t i e s f o r nationalism and the "interweaving of place and 
p o l i t i c s " vdaich a f f e c t i t . Although the l o c a l government 
reorganisation was i n i t i a t e d by the ce n t r a l government, and removed 
a long established structure, there was no s i g n i f i c a n t popular 
m o b i l i s a t i o n against the changes, or f o r a d i s t i n c t i v e l y Scottish 
structure. The i n t e r n a l geograjiiical d i v i s i o n i n Scotland i s 
strongly r e f l e c t e d i n l o c a l t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t i e s . However, vfcLle 
they are manifest i n p o l i t i c a l v o t i n g patterns, they have not been 
an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the national i d e n t i t y as i n Catalonia. Euring 
the 1960's and 1970's, the n a t i o n a l i s t movement never had i t s centre 
i n the Scottish heartland - the Glasgow conurbation or the Edinburgh 
administrative centre - nor i n the r u r a l , c u l t u r a l l y d i s t i n c t i v e 
Highlands, v*iere many national symbols and myths are rooted. I t has 
not been able t o embrace the geographical d i v i s i o n s frcm i t s 
st r o n ( ^ o l d i n the towns i n between, which have shaped the image of 
the SNP. 
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3.2.i The Wheatley Commission and i t s recommendations 
I n 1966, the Wheatley Commission was set vp by the Labour Government 
t o review the structure of l o c a l government i n Scotland, vMch had 
been l e f t untouched since 1929 (Fig. 30). I t consisted of many small 
government u n i t s , some of v^dch, e.g. many small burghs, originated 
i n medieval Scotland (Sewel, 1987, 5-6), and a few very large ones 
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i n the i n d u s t r i a l b e l t , and i t was divided s t r i c t l y between the 
r u r a l (county) and the urban ( b u r ^ ) Scotland. 
The Commission went ahead w i t h the meticulous and time consuming 
approach common t o such bodies, and published 26 volumes of w r i t t e n 
evidence over following few years v*iich collected the opinions of 
every i n s t i t u t i o n of c i v i l society and every l o c a l government body 
i n Scotland t h a t wished t o comment on the matter. What was l i m i t e d 
about t h i s all-embracing enquiry was i t s frame of reference. The 
Commission was t o l d by the government th a t i t should not deal with 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l matters of devolution of power t o Scotland, which 
were being investigated by the Kilbrandon Commission from February 
1969 onwards (Wheatley Report, 1969, 5). This was i n l i n e w ith the 
p o l i c y of B r i t i s h governments t o break up "the question of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform, almost as i f t o ensure t h a t the broader issues 
w i l l not be discussed", as argued Mackintosh (1968, 39). For the 
Wheatley Commission not t o consider devolution t o Scotland was "a 
great mistake", as the r i s e of the Scottish National Party had shown 
t h a t "there i s f a r more i n t e r e s t i n nationwide decisions and 
therefore s i n g l e - u n i t government, than i n a series of i n t e r n a l 
regions". I n the case of Scotland, a single u n i t " i s f a r more 
democratically v i a b l e " (Mackintosh, 1968, 40-41). 
The p r i n c i p a l consideration of the Wheatley Commission was not 
creating u n i t s v*iich would make more l o c a l democracy more vigorous. 
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There were the four powerful counties of c i t i e s of Aberdeen, 
EUndee, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 21 large burghs, 176 small burghs with 
under 20,000 inhabitants, 33 counties and 196 d i s t r i c t s . Their functions 
depended t o a large extent on t h e i r size, irrespective of t h e i r status 
(Royal Commission on Local Government i n Scotland, 1969, Report, 26). 
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but rather creating u n i t s which would be functional i n terms of 
st r a t e g i c economic planning. On the basis of the then fashionable 
c i t y - h i n t e r l a n d model, Scotland was subdivided i n t o city-centred 
regions, w i t h the largest (Strathclyde) including h a l f the 
population of Scotland. The f a c t , t h a t many submissions suggested a 
regional d i v i s i o n of Scotland, r e f l e c t e d the awareness of Scots 
about the regional i s a t i o n of the t e r r i t o r y (Bur^iardt, 1982, 
131-133). A second t i e r was created below t h a t of regional 
government: the d i s t r i c t s . Ihe small bun^is, seen as the the place 
v*iere Scottishness i s most intense (Ascherson, 1988, 14), 
disappeared, and the large buirghs l o s t many of t h e i r functions 
(Mclver, interview, 30.10.1987). For the islands, all-purpose island 
councils were established by the government, a f t e r a successful 
canpaign of the island councils against the Wheatley proposals t o 
lunp them together w i t h the enormous Highland region, and t o thus 
remove most l o c a l government functions from them. 
H i s t o r i c a l considerations played a r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n 
the Wheatley Commission, as the a b o l i t i o n of the burghs 
demonstrated. A l t h o u ^ the Wheatley Report often mentioned the term 
"community", i n the actual recommendations i t "gave l i t t l e w e i ^ t t o 
[the ] c a l l f o r the maintenance o f community", v ^ i c h was heavily 
stressed i n most submissions (Bun^iardt, 1982, 139). Community had 
f o r Wheatley the meaning of "a grouping o f the population on a 
geographical basis - large or small - which has social and economic 
coherence" (Wheatley Report, 1969, 139). But i n the end, the 
"community" only found ejq^ression i n the Community Councils, which 
have no functions. I n the attertpt t o f i n d out from the people 
themselves v*iat they considered as t h e i r "home area", the Commission 
d i d not get any "help i n b u i l d i n g up the pi c t u r e of communities 
v i i i c h e x i s t f o r wider purposes" (Wheatley Report, 1969, 140-141). 
However, numerous conplaints were lodged about the way i n v^iich 
small u n i t s were swallowed up by larger neighbours, and about how 
l o c a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e was ignored. Wheatley's decision t o place 
most functions w i t h the s i x regions he had designated, meant t h a t 
the p u b l i c and the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s concentrated t h e i r cairpaign on 
t r y i n g t o maintain t h e i r regional structure, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
Borders and F i f e , rather than f i g h t i n g over the status of indi v i d u a l 
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bunghs. The Borders and F i f e were l a t e r established as regions by 
the Conservative Government, v^iich enacted the l o c a l reorganisation. 
The submission of the SNP t o the Wheatley Commission argued f o r 
greater l o c a l autonomy and smaller u n i t s , and stressed t h a t people's 
i d e n t i t y w i t h d i s t i n c t i v e l o c a l communities should form the basis 
f o r l o c a l democracy: 
"The root of l o c a l democracy i n Scotland l i e s i n the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s personal i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h h i s l o c a l 
community, and reorganisation of l o c a l government must i n no 
way seek t o create large lanits of administrative convenience 
by a r b i t r a r i l y destroying the feelings of l o c a l pride and 
community awareness t h a t are so valuable i n protecting the 
i n d i v i d u a l from the social and c u l t u r a l s t e r i l i t y of an 
increasing conformist society." 
(Royal Commission Written Evidence, v o l . I I , 9) 
This advocacy f o r small u n i t s was c r i t i c i s e d by Labour Party 
sympathisers as "petty bourgeois", and as not i n the i n t e r e s t of the 
working class people (Young, 1975, 71 and footnote 10 on 83), whose 
r e a l needs required centralised planning. And generally, such 
arguments c a r r i e d the day, as most of the recommendations of the 
Wheatley Commission were taken up by the - then Conservative -
government. A Local Government B i l l was passed i n 1973, vfeLch 
converted the o l d structure i n t o a two t i e r system w i t h regional and 
d i s t r i c t councils (Fig. 31). 
3 . 2 . i i The e f f e c t of l o c a l government reorganisation on the 
devolution debate 
The reorganisation, t h o u ^ supposedly conpletely independent from 
any discussions about c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes v^ich were being led by 
the Kilbrandon Commission, had inportant repercussions f o r the 
devolution debate i n the 1970's. As the f i r s t White Paper on 
Devolution was being drafted by the Labour Government, p o l i t i c a l 
pressure was b u i l d i n g up f o r l o c a l government changes. I t was widely 
argued by a l l the major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s t h a t the Scottish Assembly 
would have the powers and the duty t o reorganise the l o c a l 
government structure. The SNP, which had campaigned f o r l o c a l 
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government reorganisation t o be delayed u n t i l the s e t t i n g up of a 
Scottish Assembly, c r i t i c i s e d the 1973 Act as "a mistake" and 
proposed a system of s i n g l e - t i e r a u t h o r i t i e s by phasing out the 
regions (SNP Policy Document on Local Government, 1977). The party 
l i s t e d l o c a l government reform among t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e p r i o r i t i e s i n 
a futu r e Scottish Assembly, i n order t o prevent " r i g o r mortis" 
s e t t i n g i n (Scotsman. 19.11.1975). Ihe Tories' committee on 
devolution also recommended a one-tier system, but the labour Party 
was " o f f i c i a l l y s i t t i n g on the fence", arguing t h a t the newly 
established councils. needed time t o prove themselves (Scotsman ^  
14.10.1975). 
Indeed, f o r the Labour Party which had committed i t s e l f under 
e l e c t o r a l pressure t o go through w i t h devolution, the lo c a l 
government reform became a great hindrance. The Convention of 
Scottish Local A u t h o r i t i e s (CCGLA), v^ich was dominated by the large 
labour councils, was o f f i c i a l l y pro-devolution, but i n practice less 
than enthusiastic. At the OOSIA annual conference i n 1977, "much 
scorn was poured on the idea of changing the whole system only two 
years a f t e r the large changes" (Times, 1.4.1977, 2), and "most 
delegates ( — ) appeared unenthusiastic about many aspects of 
devolution" (Times, 2.4.1977, 3). Most of the powers v^ich were t o 
be devolved t o the Scottish Assembly - housing, planning, transport, 
environment etc. - were also functions of lo c a l government, and 
therefore a large body of opinion i n OOSLA, including i t s then 
president George Sharp, feared interference and opposed a Scottish 
Assembly (Scotsman, 2.4.1977). The Government sent the Minister of 
State t o the conference t o dampen fears about the eff e c t s of a 
powerful assembly, re a f f i r m i n g i t s r e j e c t i o n of economic powers f o r 
a Scottish Assembly. I n 1979, the s i t u a t i o n had not changed. OOSLA 
stated 210 reasons cigainst devolution, but said t h a t i t was not 
against i t . Party p o l i t i c a l considerations also played a r o l e here, 
since many of the central b e l t councils were dominated by Labour and 
the Scottish Assembly would possibly be dominated by the SNP. 
Anti-devolutionists i n the Labour Party seized upon t h i s , and d i d 
exactly what the Royal Commission under Wheatley was t o l d not t o do, 
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namely t o l i n k the issues of devolution of power and lo c a l 
democracy. The Assembly, i t was argued, was j u s t another l e v e l of 
government which made the bureaucratic structure of the state even 
more conplicated and oppressive; i t therefore contravened the 
i n t e r e s t s of those v*io wanted t o bring people closer t o the leavers 
of power. Labour MP Dalyell said i n h i s paiiphlet, e n t i t l e d Why not 
a l l Scots support proposals f o r an Edinburgh Assembly: 
"We Scots c ^ hardly have Brussels, Westminster, the Royal 
High School , the Region, the D i s t r i c t , the Community 
Council on top of us. I f we have an assembly, the Regions 
would have t o disappear. (...) Ihe f i r s t option, vAiatever 
else i t i s , i s c e n t r a l i s i n g decision-making i n Edinburgh, 
not the devolution of power." 
(Dalyell, 1976, 3-4) 
The widespread discontent w i t h the whole machinery of government, 
which despite i t s large volume had f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y the demands of 
the Scottish people (see Chapter f i v e , section 3.3), was f u e l l e d by 
such arguments. Presenting the Scottish Assembly as a fur t h e r layer 
of government, wi t h l i m i t e d powers and resources, danpened 
expectations and enthusiasm about the whole issue of devolution. As 
Mackintosh argued, "the tragedy of the recent reform of l o c a l 
government i s t h a t i t has induced a mood of t o t a l scepticism about 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes (Mackintosh, 1982, 125). Conflicts between 
d i s t r i c t s and regions over functions, r i s i n g rates and larger more 
remote u n i t s gave Scottish l o c a l government a worse press than 
anywhere else i n B r i t a i n (Times. 1.4.1977, 2). "Scotland says no" 
canpaign used "overgovemment" as an argument against devolution 
(Bochel et. a l . , 1981, 172). Thus, the l o c a l government 
reorganisation influenced the devolution debate i n a negative sense, 
g i v i n g opponents an ideological weapon, and establishing an 
i n f l u e n t i a l body i n l o c a l government, which had a vested i n t e r e s t i n 
f i g h t i n g the creation of a strong Scottish Assembly. A f t e r the l o c a l 
government elections i n 1977, the newly elected representatives were 
"^^ The Royal High School i s the bu i l d i n g v^ere the Scottish Assembly 
was t o be housed. 
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unsympathetic t o another l o c a l government reorganisation through a 
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Scottish Assembly (Mclver, interview^ 30.10.1987) 
But the reorganisation, and the Wheatley Commission v^ich prepared 
i t , d i d not have great repercussions f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t resurgence 
i n general. This i s surprising, because the Act l e v e l l e d out 
differences i n l o c a l government, and v i r t u a l l y abolished the 
d i v i s i o n between bur^is and counties, which were cha r a c t e r i s t i c f o r 
Scotland, by creating city-regions. Many burghs had a long h i s t o r y 
and represented the small town l e v e l between the c i t y and the 
countryside. This l e v e l "shows the nation a t i t s most authentic and 
l e a s t d i l u t e d " , according t o Ascherson (1988, 15). At a time v*ien 
the awareness of being Scottish was becoming increasingly 
p o l i t i c i s e d , such interference w i t h old-established l o c a l u n i t s 
could have become p o l i t i c a l l y sensitive. Why then d i d the 
reorganisation of these and other Scottish places not produce a 
stronger p o l i t i c a l response from the affected population? Why d i d 
the reorganisation not mobilise people's i d e n t i t y w i t h t h e i r l o c a l 
t e r r i t o r y i n t o a source of support f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t movement? 
I t appears t h a t the issue of l o c a l government and l o c a l i d e n t i t y on 
the one hand, and devolution and Scottish nationalism on the other, 
were not as closely linked as i n Catalonia, v^ere the comarcal 
d i v i s i o n has been regarded as part and parcel of Catalan autonomy. 
I n Scotland, a s p e c i f i c a l l y Scottish t e r r i t o r i a l organisation has 
never been formulated as a p o l i t i c a l demand. Reorganisation was 
i n i t i a t e d by the c e n t r a l state. I n the Wheatley Commission and the 
Local Government Act of 1973, v^ich eventually emerged from i t , the 
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A f t e r seveiral years of the Conservative Government curbing l o c a l 
government grants and taking pcwers away from l o c a l government, Scottish 
l o c a l governments have become more interested i n the prospects of 
Scottish autonomy. OOSLA set up a subcommittee t o investigate a 
s i n g l e - t i e r structure under a future Assembly, which indicates t h a t "the 
v^ole question of l o c a l government has changed from being a d i v i s i v e 
f a c t o r on the Assembly question t o being a strongly supportive one" 
(Stewart, 1987, 11). Stewart observed t h a t \Aiile previously, some of the 
strongest opposition t o a Scottish Assembly came from l o c a l government, 
"Regions and D i s t r i c t s are now amongst the strongest supporters of the 
Campaign For A Scottish Assembly" (i b i d . ) . 
(Chapter 7) (422) 
reorganisation of Scottish l o c a l government was guided f i r s t and 
foremost by considerations of e f f i c i e n c y i n planning and service 
provision. Local p o l i t i c s and feelings of belonging d i d not play 
such an iirportant r o l e . The process of reorganisation followed a 
well-established, long-winded procedure, which involved a great 
number of i n s t i t u t i o n s . But i t was not aimed a t involving the people 
themselves; rather, i t responded t o problems of govemability, and 
was i n i t i a t e d by the state. 
I t could be argued t h a t people's i n t e r e s t i n l o c a l government and 
t e r r i t o r i a l organisation had not been great. Their a l i e n a t i o n from 
the l o c a l government apparatus was r e f l e c t e d i n low p o l l s and a 
general low prestige of l o c a l government representatives. 
Increasingly, power was removed from l o c a l public control and handed 
over t o appointed boards and "quangos" (Mackintosh, 1982, 28-29). 
Another reason i s t h a t the Scots accepted l o c a l government as part 
of the B r i t i s h state apparatus, and therefore the government could 
l e g i t i m a t e l y reorganise i t s structure. I t must be borne i n mind 
t h a t , u n like i n Catalonia where l o c a l bourgeoisies developed an 
i n t e r e s t i n a decentralised t e r r i t o r i a l structure v^ich would 
protect them from the c e n t r i p e t a l power of Barcelona, such l o c a l 
base of power were not strongly developed i n Scotland outside the 
bi g c i t i e s . The Scottish bourgeoisie and the middle classes were 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y much less rooted i n t h e i r places, and f a r more 
prepared t o move away from t h e i r home t e r r i t o r i e s . Scotland's 
geographical d i v e r s i t y was therefore not integrated i n t o the 
n a t i o n a l i s t ideology, but rather formed part of a conplex pattern of 
p o l i t i c a l d i s p a r i t i e s , which has posed d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement. 
3.3. Geographical divisions and p o l i t i c a l and social cleavages 
Support f o r the SNP i n the 1960's and 1970's (see Fig. 32) was 
unevenly d i s t r i b u t e d i n Scotland and d i d not sinply follow 
geographical d i v i s i o n s or patterns of social and economic cleavages. 
The same can be said about the d i s t r i b u t i o n of support f o r 
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devolution, vAiich i n the 1979 d i d not correspond t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of the SNP vote (Fig. 33). The "interweaving of place and p o l i t i c s " 
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y conplex i n those parts of Scotland V i i i i c h neither 
belong t o the Highlands - t r a d i t i o n a l l y Liberal - nor the - Labour 
c o n t r o l l e d - Strathclyde region" (Agnew, 1987, 131). 
Some of the SNP e l e c t i o n successes happened i n areas w i t h a mixture 
of r u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l population, which were undergoing social and 
economic changes. These were p a r t i c u l a r l y strongly f e l t i n new towns 
such as Cumbernauld and Kirkcauldy, whose inhabitants lacked l o c a l 
roots and t r a d i t i o n a l class allegiances. Ihe party had much less 
support i n the b i g Scottish c i t i e s , v^ere Tories and Labour had 
already carved out t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . But there were exceptions, 
such as Glasgow Govan and Dundee. Very r u r a l areas also proved 
d i f f i c u l t f o r the party, because p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s were more 
entrenched and communication networks scarti^e, and because the 
population was scattered over a wide area and d i f f i c u l t t o access. 
I n the mixed areas and the towns, i t was possible t o b u i l d vp l o c a l 
support, but v*iere people r e l i e d on the "national" media, the SNP as 
an outsider party had d i f f i c u l t y (MacCartney, interview, 10.2.1987). 
Frequent changes i n the constituency boundaries make i t d i f f i c u l t t o 
coirpare the strength and weakness of the SNP i n d i f f e r e n t places i n 
the l a s t few decades. The voting pattern suggests t h a t the SNP has 
been p a r t i c u l a r l y successful i n i n d u s t r i a l i s e d but p a r t l y 
25 
a g r i c u l t u r a l Lowland constituencies such as Cunbarton , Clackmannan 
?6 PV ?8 
and S t i r l i n g s h i r e , West Lothian and Lanarkshire (Table 7.7). 
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I n IXinbartonshire East, the SNP had over 20 per cent of the vote 
i n the 1974 and 1979 elections. 
Clackmannan and East S t i r l i n g came under SNP control i n 1974, 
Vy±ien more than 40 per cent voted f o r George Reid. But t h i s was not so 
s u r p r i s i n g , because the SNP vote had been over 19 per cent since 1966. 
As i n most other areas, the Tories suffered losses, but Labour also l o s t 
20 points t o the SNP. I n 1979, a Labour candidate was returned, but the 
SNP s t i l l maintained a respectable share of the vote. The three seats i n 
S t i r l i n g and Clackmannanshire had between 16 and 26 per cent SNP vote i n 
the 1966 e l e c t i o n , and belongs therefore t o the N a t i o n a l i s t "heartland". 
(Footnote Continued) 
(Chapter 7) (424) 
I t was t o these areas outside the Strathclyde region t h a t the new 
industries of the 1960's and 1970's went, transforming the e x i s t i n g 
s o c i a l structure i n the communities and weakening o l d party 
l o y a l t i e s . 
I n the c i t i e s of Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow, the support was 
much more v o l a t i l e (Table 7.7). Edinburgh was most res i s t a n t t o the 
SNP t i d e , while the Tory vote i n Glasgow turned out t o be more 
vulnerable t o the SNP attack. I n Glasgow, the SNP polled 26 per cent 
i n October 1974, and narrowly missed v i c t o r y i n Glasgow Govan, which 
SNP's Margo MacDonald had won i n 1973. The party showed t h a t i t 
could threaten the Labour Party i n Glasgow as early as 1968, vhen 
Labour l o s t c o n t r o l over the c i t y council and the SNP gained 13 
seats. The Times took t h i s as a confirmation of 
" t h e i r a b i l i t y t o win support i n the s o l i d i n d u s t r i a l areas 
\^^ere they used t o f i n d the most stubborn resistance t o 
t h e i r appeal." 
(Times. 9.5.1968, 1) 
But i n retrospect, i t can be said t h a t the Nationalists found i t 
d i f f i c u l t t o esta b l i s h a s o l i d base of support i n the Strathclyde 
region. I n many seats, the Labour Party held t h e i r vote i n the 1974 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Westlothian was one of the main battlegrounds between Labour and 
the SNP, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y between Labour MP Dalyell and h i s SNP 
r i v a l B i l l y Wolfe. Wolfe won 23.3 per cent i n a by-election i n 1962 and 
managed t o undermine the Tory f u r t h e r and t o make some inroads i n t o the 
Labour vote i n the mid-1960's. I n 1964, he received 30.5 and i n 1966, 
35.3 per cent. I n October 1974, Labour almost l o s t the seat, and wi t h 
the exception of the 1983 el e c t i o n (18.4 per cent), the SNP has polled 
over 20 per cent here even a f t e r the 1979 referendum. 
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The most s t r i k i n g SNP success was i n Hamilton i n 1967, a 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y safe working class seat i n i n d u s t r i a l Lanarkshire vvhich 
has become more of a commuter town since the 1960's. Both the o l d county 
and the Glasgow borough constituencies have been t r a d i t i o n a l l y Labour 
t e r r i t o r y , but even i n 1966, the SNP had around 10 per cent of the vote 
i n those Glasgow constituencies which i t contested. 
West S t i r l i n g s h i r e (now F a l k i r k West) has voted 21 per cent SNP i n 1970. 
I n October 1974, the N a t i o n a l i s t vote peaked a t 38.2 per cent and came 
very close t o a v i c t o r y over Labour, but i t declined t o 18 per cent i n 
1979. 
(Chapter 7) (425) 
elections, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the Catholic working class remained 
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s o l i d Labour . Since the mid-1970's, the t i d e has gone against the 
SNP, while the Labour Party rank and f i l e i n the West of Scotland 
has moved t o a more m i l i t a n t p o s i t i o n i n favour of Scottish autonomy 
or independence. 
Despite i t s o i l caiipaign, the SNP made a weak irrpact i n Aberdeen, 
^ftiiich was a t the centre of o i l based developments. But i n Dundee, 
the N a t i o n a l i s t s d i d w e l l i n the 1973 by-election and maintained a 
strong presence ever since. Apart, from Dundee, the SNP success i n 
the c i t i e s i n the October e l e c t i o n of 1974 proved t o be a quirk. I t 
was d i f f i c u l t t o b u i l d up a s o l i d support, and easy t o lose voters 
again. 
" i n a b i g c i t y area, where people don't read l o c a l 
newspapers very much because they tend t o read national 
papers, they don't get news of the l o c a l cattpaigns and the 
l o c a l p a r t i e s ; so, i t i s much more d i f f i c u l t I f you f i n d 
t h a t the t i d e i s coming i n , i t comes i n a l l over Glasgow, 
a l l over Edinburgh, a t rou<^y the same percentage; and i f 
i t i s going down, you get bad r e s u l t s everyv^iere .... People 
there react t o the national media, not the l o c a l . " 
(MacCartney, interview 10.2.1987) 
I n 1979, the "SNP crag has vanished, leaving only a mound" as 
"Labour and Conservative cut the SNP vote i n h a l f , a t the national 
l e v e l , and shared the spoil s almost equally between them" (Scotsman. 
5.5.1979, 7). 
I n the more r u r a l areas, the SNP found a more f a i t h f u l support more 
re a d i l y . The Highland counties i n the North, the mixed a g r i c u l t u r a l 
and i n d u s t r i a l counties i n the East, and the border constituencies 
i n the South were mostly i n the hands of the Liberals or the Tories. 
The SNP seats of 1974-79 (Angus South, Banffshire, Moray and Nairn, 
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The Catholic population i s p a r t i c u l a r l y strong i n the Strathclyde 
region, estiiiated a t 25 per cent or 624,000 i n 1977 (Agnew, 1987, 124). 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y Labour voters, the Catholic working class population has 
tended t o be c r i t i c a l of Home Rule and devolution proposals. I n the 
February elections of 1974, almost 80 per cent of Scottish Catholics 
remained l o y a l t o Labour a t a time when the SNP encroached on the Labour 
vote (Agnew, 1987, 126). 
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Aberdeenshire, Galloway, A r g y l l and Bute, Dunbartonshire, Perth and 
East Perthshire) were a l l won from the Conservatives w i t h the help 
of the opposition Labour and Liberal vote"^^. I n some areas such as 
Perthshire, the SNP already had gained a foothold i n previous 
elections (16 - 21 per cent i n 1966). I n Angus South, the SNP 
consistently p o l l e d over 23 per cent since 1970 against the dominant 
Tories, and won the seat i n 1974. Indeed, most of the eleven SNP 
seats i n 1974-79 were i n these semi-niral counties. Two seats were 
i n the Highlands and the Western I s l e s , three each i n the Tayside 
and the Graitpian region, and one each i n Strathclyde, Dumfries and 
Galloway and the Central region. The Hi(^iLands had t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
weak attachments t o the two major B r i t i s h p a r t i e s , and here as i n 
the islands, l o c a l issues have a h i ^ e r p r i o r i t y than Scottish or 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s (Agnew, 1987, 131). 
The n a t i o n a l i s t vote f o r the SNP d i d not sinply r e f l e c t structures 
of class and economic i n t e r e s t structures, although i t i s true t h a t 
i n many areas the SNP was a refuge f o r disenchanted Tory voters. The 
SNP d i d w e l l i n some of the most deprived areas outside the Glasgow 
region, v ^ i c h were r u r a l and syirpathetic t o the SNP, such as A r g y l l 
and Bute, Perth and the Western I s l e s , or i n d u s t r i a l , such as West 
Lothian . I n the high income areas of Midlothian, the SNP was doing 
not so w e l l , and the Conservatives held t h e i r vote i n Edinburgh 
b e t t e r than anyv\^ere else. Thus, "even f o r a party which bases i t s 
appeal around Scottish themes and inter e s t s rather than B r i t i s h or 
class ones, place and l o c a l i t y continues t o set l i m i t s t o 
partisanship" (Agnew, 1987, 167). The great v a r i e t y of places, v^ere 
the SNP d i d f i n d support, caused problems f o r the party \ihen i t came 
t o concrete p o l i c y matters. I t was accused by p o l i t i c a l opponents of 
promoting s o c i a l i s t p o l i c i e s i n working class areas and other 
p o l i c i e s i n professional and middle class constituencies v«tiich were 
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I n Moray and Nairn, the Labour vote of 22.8 per cent was reduced 
t o only 1 per cent between 1970 and 1974. 
•^"''Argyll and Bute had a per capita income of only 71 per cent of 
the Scottish average i n 1967/8, Perth had 82 per cent, and West Lothian 
73 per cent (Agnew, 1987, 121). 
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o f t e n contradictory. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the contradictions were cilso 
present i n the ranks of the party, where i n the 1970's a gap 
developed between the social-democratic and the 
conservative-fundamentalist sectors, viiic h could roughly be 
associated w i t h the Central-Western and the Northeastern 
constituencies. 
So even i n the 1970's, d i f f e r e n t types of nationalism were attached 
t o the SNP vote which varied strongly across the Scottish t e r r i t o r y . 
This pattern has become even more ccmplicated i n the 1980's as more 
r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t positions developed among labour Party 
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supporters p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Western Central Scotland . I t i s now 
widely acknowledged t h a t voting f o r Labour can be as much a 
manifestation of Scottish nationalism as voting f o r the SNP. So f a r , 
no single party has succeeded i n reconciling these fragmented 
expressions of n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment and t o integrate them. Although 
i t was shown i n the previous section t h a t the l o c a l t e r r i t o r i a l 
i d e n t i t i e s were rather separate from the issue of nationalism, i t i s 
obvious t h a t p o l i t i c a l nationalism i s geographically fragmented and 
based on a v a r i e t y of l o c a l i n t e r e s t s . I t could be argued t h a t t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n favours a cross party approach t o the national question, 
since no hegemonic force has been able t o inpose i t s n a t i o n a l i s t 
v i s i o n on the v^ole of Scotland. 
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One of the more recent ejqjression of n a t i o n a l i s t pressure w i t h i n 
the Labour Party was the s e t t i n g up of a Scottish Laboiir Action group a t 
the Scottish labour Conference i n 1988, vhich i s lead by party a c t i v i s t s 
from Western and Eastern Central constituencies such as Midlothian and 
North Paisley. Scottish Labour Action argued t h a t the Tory Party had no 
mandate i n Scotland, and t h a t therefore i t s government could 
l e g i t i m a t e l y be "made d i f f i c u l t " w i t h c i v i l disobedience. The p r i n c i p a l 
aim was seen i n bringing about the "early establishment of a l t e r n a t i v e 
democratic forms of government i n Scotland" (Radical Scotland. ;^ril/May 
1988, 32, 9 ) . 
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4. CONCLUSION 
T e r r i t o r y i s an indispensible factor i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements, which 
d i s t i n g u i s h themselves from other p o l i t i c a l movements by t h e i r 
demand f o r autonomy over a s p e c i f i c piece of land. I n Catalonia and 
Scotland, the outer boundaries of the area t o v^ich these claims 
r e f e r are well-defined. Within Catalan nationalism, there exists a 
small r a d i c a l minority, v*iich defines the national boundaries i n 
c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l terms and demands independence and u n i t y f o r 
a l l Catalan speaJcing areas. This current, however, has kept a low 
p r o f i l e i n the consensus oriented 1960's and the 1970's, and only 
began t o become more prominent i n recent years. I n the case of 
Scotland, the lack of national consciousness among the small island 
communities i n the northeast has been used i n the 1970's by 
opponents of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, but t h i s was f o r strategic 
reasons, rather than being based on fundmental c o n f l i c t s over the 
Scottish boundaries. The problem has now a l l but disappeared. 
Far more s i g n i f i c a n t f o r both n a t i o n a l i s t movements were the social 
c o n f l i c t s , the uneven economic development and the c u l t u r a l 
differences, which existed within the national boundaries, and v ^ c h 
overlapped each other i n a conplex pattern of geographical 
d i v e r s i t y . I n order t o mobilise the population, the n a t i o n a l i s t 
leadership had t o f i n d ways of convincing them t h a t what united them 
was more important and more deeply rooted than the s t r u c t u r a l and 
geographical d i v i s i o n s . I n Catalonia, the comarcal d i v i s i o n was a 
useful symbol f o r Catalan u n i t y ( p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r i t had became 
popular during the f i r s t Generalitat and been abolished by the 
Franco regime). Although i t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d the geographical 
d i v i s i o n s , i t also claimed t h a t i t was precisely these divisions 
v\^ich distinguished Catalonia from the r e s t of Spain. Once the 
comarcal d i v i s i o n was accepted as par t of the national-popular 
heritage, i t became a powerful instrument of t e r r i t o r i a l control f o r 
v^iichever p o l i t i c a l force aimed a t gaining hegemony i n Catalonia. 
This message emerged from the t e r r i t o r i a l debate, v*iich was pushed 
i n t o the foreground i n the 1980's. At the same time, the debate 
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showed t h a t arguments i n favour of decentralisation and l o c a l 
democracy tended t o f a l l under the table, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f a 
n a t i o n a l i s t party, such as the CiU, took a c e n t r a l i s t stance w i t h i n 
i t s "own" t e r r i t o r y . I n the 1980's, the p o l i t i c a l parties in 
Catalonia were more worried about consolidating the power of the 
Generalitat, rather than about strengthening decentralised 
democratic structures i n Catalan c i v i l society. 
I n Scotland, the i n t e r n a l geograjMcal d i v i s i o n s were even more 
pronounced than i n Catalonia, but the n a t i o n a l i s t movement had not 
elaborated a model of i n t e r n a l organisation, v^ich could bridge 
these d i v i s i o n s and gain the support of a t least the most prominent 
so c i a l groups. One reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y , the urban 
and r u r a l bourgeoisies and the Scottish i n t e l l e c t u a l classes had not 
found i t necessary t o elaborate a p o l i t i c a l project j u s t f o r 
Scotland. Nationalism had never been the hegemonic p o l i t i c a l force 
i n Scotland, but rather occupied only a very marginal r o l e u n t i l the 
1970's. When the i n t e r n a l t e r r i t o r i a l organisation was dicussed i n 
the l a t e 1960's, i t was not related t o nationalism, and the 
discussion was conducted i n a comparatively a p o l i t i c a l manner. Once 
the new l o c a l governments were set up i n the middle of the 1970's, 
they helped t o conserve the e x i s t i n g c e n t r a l i s t structures of 
government. I n the course of the 1970's i t became obvious t h a t the 
t e r r i t o r i a l basis of support f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, v^ich was 
then i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the SNP, was constrained, and t h a t no 
n a t i o n a l i s t model existed which could forge the d i f f e r e n t l o c a l 
types of national and t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t y together. 
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Table 7.1 : Population distribution i n the Catalein cxanargues i n 1981 
CC»1ARQUES POPULATION ECXDNCMICALLY ACTIVE POPUIAnON IN 1975 
i n 1981 % Primary % Secxjndciry % Tertiary 
REGION I 4,104,898 
Baix Llobregat 516,360 2.6 68.3 29.1 
Barcelones 2,511,592 0.5 44.5 55.0 
Maresme 253,527 7.8 59.9 32.3 
Valles Occidental 608,477 1.5 68.7 29.8 
Valles Oriental 214,942 6.2 67.8 26.0 
REGION I I 427,268 
Alt Dtporda 80,790 20.4 34.7 44.9 
Baix Bnporda 81,990 15.0 47.6 37.4 
Garrotxa 45,245 13.9 61.5 24.6 
Girones 136,637 8.0 45.0 47.0 
Selva 82,606 11.6 58.0 30.4 
REGION I I I 345,899 
Alt Camp 33.027 24.4 48.6 27.0 
Alt Penedes 63,530 15.0 56.2 28.8 
Baix Penedes 29,023 14.8 54.4 30.8 
Garraf 70,448 6.1 61.7 36.2 
Tarragones 149,871 6.9 47.1 46.0 
REGION rV 171,744 
Baix Canp 118,091 16.9 40.7 42.4 
Oonca de Barisera 18,140 31.5 43.6 24.9 
Priorat 10,529 53.0 27.1 19.9 
Ribera 29,984 29.0 44.9 26.1 
REGION V 129,257 
Baix Ebre 65,961 33.8 32.7 33.5 
Montsia 49,564 39.6 32.7 33.5 
Terra Alta 13,732 60.9 23.7 15.4 
REGION VI 156,661 
Cerdanya 12,041 26.7 32.0 41.3 
Osona 111,518 11.3 60.8 27.9 
Ripolles 33,102 10.6 64.2 25.2 
REGION V I I 281,399 
Anoia 78,348 7.8 68.2 24.0 
Bages 150,657 5.4 65.6 29.0 
Bergueda 41,630 11.4 65.9 22.7 
Solsones 10,764 40.7 30.6 28.7 
REGION V I I I 289,927 
Garrigues 22.810 56.2 23.6 20.2 
Noguera 45,350 42.7 30.7 26.6 
Segarra 17,359 38.1 34.0 27.9 
Segria 169,066 25.5 32.0 42.5 
Urgell 35,342 36.2 32.6 31.2 
REGION IX 49,361 
Alt Urgell 19,335 29.7 33.9 36.4 
PcLLlars Jussa 18,768 34.6 32.9 32.5 
Pallars Sobira 5,450 52.9 21.1 26.0 
Va i l d'Aran 5,808 21.8 30.1 48.1 
CATALONIA 5,956,414 6.3 51.0 42.7 
Sources: Estadistica i Societat, March//^ril 1981, 8-9; i b i d . , Dec. 
1982, 21, 2. 
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Table 7.2 : Election for the Catalan Pcirliament i n 1980 
(per cent of vote) 
OCMARQUES UCD PSA CiU ERC PSC PSUC Others Abst. 
Baix Lldbregat 5.8 4. 4 19.0 5.1 25.6 31.8 8.3 35.8 
Barcelones 9.0 3. 0 24.8 9.2 23.6 19.9 10.5 41.5 
Mctresme 8.2 3. 5 36.3 8.6 20.2 14.9 8.3 31.3 
Valles Dec. 5.6 2. 7 27.2 5.8 22.4 27.5 8.8 34.2 
Valles Orient. 7.6 3. 9 34.3 6.2 22.5 17.5 8.0 32.9 
Alt Elrporda 18.7 1. 5 32.4 12.1 22.9 5.7 6.7 34.8 
Baix Enporda 14.3 1. 5 32.4 14.0 19.1 12.4 6.3 31.5 
Garrotxa 15.6 0. 5 41.8 10.9 15.8 6.3 9.1 30.0 
Girones 12.9 1. 4 37.7 9.4 20.3 10.6 7.7 31.3 
Selva 13.3 1. 5 42.4 8.3 18.1 10.0 6.4 32.4 
Alt Camp 12.9 1. 5 33.7 14.4 18.1 11.9 7.3 29.5 
Alt Penedes 9.6 1. 7 34.4 8.8 26.9 8.8 9.8 30.3 
Baix Penedes 10.7 2. 2 24.9 6.8 31.9 8.5 15.0 34.1 
Garraf 8.2 2. 2 20.9 10.0 29.6 11.2 17.9 32.4 
Tarragones 15.6 1. 1 22.8 10.3 20.2 18.0 12.0 41.3 
Baix Canp 15.2 2. 5 26.0 15.1 20.4 13.4 7.4 42.3 
C. d. Bcirbera 18.3 0. 8 34.0 8.2 14.2 16.9 7.6 37.1 
Priorat 26.6 0. 4 19.3 12.4 16.9 16.1 8.3 31.5 
Ribera d'Ebre 21.7 2. 6 19.4 13.1 16.5 16.8 9.9 40.3 
Baix Ebre 28.4 0. 5 17.1 5.8 18.8 13.5 15.9 47.2 
Montsia 34.0 0. 4 13.8 4.9 27.7 17.2 2.0 46.0 
Terra Mta 38.1 0. 3 17.6 6.6 13.2 12.2 12.0 32.3 
Cerdanya 25.3 1. 1 39.5 7.4 16.5 4.7 5.5 39.2 
Osona 8.8 1. 2 44.4 12.6 11.9 9.0 12.1 28.7 
Ripolles 15.0 0. 9 38.6 10.0 18.8 8.9 7.8 28.4 
Anoia 7.5 2. 0 37.7 7.8 26.3 10.6 8.1 31.4 
Bages 8.1 1. 4 37.6 7.3 21.1 14.7 9.8 29.5 
Bergueda 11.0 1. 1 41.2 10.9 12.8 11.2 11.8 32.3 
Solsones 31.4 0. 7 47.4 6.8 7.1 2.6 4.0 40.0 
Garrigues 21.0 0. 2 24.5 15.0 20.1 11.8 7.4 35.9 
Noguera 23.9 0. 4 26.7 14.4 15.9 12.5 6.2 40.1 
Segeirra 25.2 0. 4 38.6 13.8 7.2 7.2 7.6 40.7 
Segria 22.4 0. 8 22.2 11.7 23.3 13.4 6.2 41.5 
Urgell 23.3 0. 4 36.3 14.3 15.8 5.0 6.9 36.0 
Alt Urgell 23.8 0. 7 36.0 7.1 19.0 8.4 5.0 44.7 
Pallars Jussa 25.6 0. 8 34.8 9.6 16.8 6.5 5.9 43.6 
Pallars Sobira 22.4 0. 1 29.2 20.4 18.2 4.3 5.4 44.4 
V a i l d'2^ran 26.8 0. 6 29.6 3.2 26.5 6.9 6.4 42.9 
CATAIDNIA 10.6 2. 6 27.6 8.9 22.3 18.7 9.3 37.9 
Source: Equip de Sociologia Electoral(UAB), 1982. 
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Table 7.3 : Election for the Catalan Parliament i n 
(per cent of vote) 
1984 
CCMARQUES AP CiU ERC PSC PSUC Others Abst. 
Baix Llobregat 6. 0 30.0 a. 1 43.0 9.5 38.8 
Barcelones 9.2 43.2 4. 0 31.9 6.0 4.6 37.7 
Mare-sme 6.1 52.1 5. 0 27.6 4.0 4.4 31.9 
Valles Occ. 5.6 38.7 3. 4 36.6 7.7 7.3 37.0 
Valles Orient 3.7 49.0 3. 5 32.0 5.0 4.0 33.3 
Alt Eirporda 6.3 56.8 6. 2 24.4 1.7 3.5 33.9 
Baix Ettporda 5.5 56.1 7. 0 23.3 3.8 3.4 30.2 
Garrotxa 4.3 66.6 7. 2 15.9 2.0 2.5 28.6 
Girones 6.3 55.9 6. 0 22.7 4.0 3.8 29.6 
Selva 5.2 61.0 5. 6 20.1 3.4 3.8 32.0 
Alt Canp 5.1 59.1 5. 4 22.2 3.3 3.9 24.9 
Alt Penedes 5.0 56.5 5. 8 25.7 2.8 3.2 27.6 
Baix Penedes 6.1 50.4 3. 7 32.0 3.2 3.6 31.4 
Garraf 7.1 43.1 5. 3 32.7 5.8 5.2 36.4 
Tarragones 10.4 40.7 3. 7 32.8 5.9 5.3 35.8 
Baix Camp 8.0 49.8 5. 7 26.1 4.3 4.8 41.6 
C. d. Barbera 7.3 61.3 5. 9 15.5 5.9 2.5 29.4 
Priorat 8.8 49.1 6. 8 23.5 5.9 4.3 26.6 
Ribera d'Ebre 10.5 44.1 10. 7 22.1 7.5 4.0 36.7 
Baix Ebre 15.0 48.4 2. 7 23.1 5.9 3.1 40.9 
Mbntsia 12.4 45.9 2. 5 25.8 6.4 5.1 37.2 
Terra Alta 21.7 53.7 5. 5 11.4 4.5 1.9 30.0 
Cerdanya 6.2 71.9 3. 8 13.6 1.7 2.0 29.5 
Osona 4.7 67.8 5. 8 13.4 2.0 3.3 27.3 
Ripolles 3.3 68.1 5. 3 16.9 2.7 2.7 25.3 
T^oia 4.9 56.1 4. 7 27.3 2.5 3.4 29.7 
Bages 4.2 61.0 4. 6 21.8 4.2 3.7 27.1 
Bergueda 4.9 64.6 7. 0 16.6 2.6 3.4 29.4 
Solsones 7.8 75.7 3. 8 8.9 0.4 2.4 29.7 
Garrigues 8.2 54.0 7. 8 21.7 2.9 4.6 30.3 
Noguera 8.0 63.6 6. 4 14.3 3.0 3.6 31.3 
Segairra 8.5 71.2 4. 4 9.5 0.8 4.7 31.9 
Segria 10.7 48.1 5. 3 26.0 3.8 4.9 39.0 
Urgell 6.6 65.8 7. 1 15.2 1.2 3.2 29.9 
Alt Urgell 7.4 69.6 4. 1 13.6 2.4 2.3 36.0 
Pallars Jussa 5.3 63.1 5. 4 19.2 2.0 4.2 39.6 
Pallars Sobira 4.9 66.3 10. 4 13.6 1.4 2.4 34.9 
Vail d'Aran 6.7 47.9 0. 7 17.4 0.9 22.5 30.6 
CATALONIA 7.7 46.6 4. 4 30.0 5.6 4.9 35.7 
Source: Equip de Sociologia Electoral (UAB), 1986. 
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Table 7.4 "Frente a las cuatro provincias actuales. l a nueva 
legislacion divide a Catalvma en 38 cxxnarcas. iCree usted 
que estas cxxnarcas deberian substituir a l a larga a las 
cuatro provincias?" 
(per cent) 
Areas No Yes Don't knew/ 
No r ^ l y 
Barcelona City 45 43 12 
Metrc^litan area 
of Barcelona 
44 43 13 
Rest of Catalonia 52 31 17 
Catalonia (total) 46 39 15 
Source: Opinion p o l l i n E l Pais, 27.3.1987, 25 
"The new l e g i s l a t i o n divides Catalonia i n 38 cx3marques, as opposed 
t o the four e x i s t i n g provinces. Do you t h i n k t h a t these comarques should 
replace the four provinces i n the long term?" 
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Table 7.5 "A que cree usted que responde mas l a nueva ordenacion 
t e r r i t o r i a l de Cataluna que se hace en este proyecto de 
ley?"^ 
(per cent) 
REASONS Barcelona City 
Metrc^litan 
area of B. 
Rest of 
Catcilonia 
Catalonia 
(total) 
Al deseo de mejorar y 
racionalizar l a situa-
cion eidministrativa y 
t e r r i t o r i a l de Catciluna 
41 45 39 43 
A los intereses p a r t i -
distas de Convergencia 
i Unio 
41 41 29 37 
Don't know/no r ^ l y 18 14 32 20 
Source: Opinion p o l l i n El Pais. 27.3.1987, 25. 
2 
" I n your opinion, \ ^ c h of the following i s the more irtportant 
reason f o r the new t e r r i t o r i a l organisation v^ich has been drawn up i n 
the new b i l l ? " . The reasons given below t r a n s l a t e as follows; i ) "To the 
wish t o iirprove and r a t i o n a l i s e the acininistrative and t e r r i t o r i a l 
s t r u c t u r e o f Catalonia", and i i ) "To the party p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of 
Oonvergencia i Unio". 
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Table 7.6: Analysis of voting i n Scottish c i t i e s , October 1974 to 1987 (Per cent of the vote) 
CITY YEAR CON LAB LIB/AIiL SNP 
Aberdeen 1970 34.6 51.9 6.1 6.7 01974 24.2 42.3 8.9 24.6 1979 29.6 48.6 11.2 10.6 1983 23.9 44.3 25.4 7.1 1987 24.4 46.4 19.3 10.0 
Dundee 1970 40.2 50.0 8.8 01974 17.6 36.9 3.7 41.3 1979 22.0 41.6 2.3 33.7 1983 18.6 38.2 12.4 30.4 1987 15.4 47.9 8.7 27.7 
Edinburgh 01974 32.2 33.3 10.7 23.7 1979 38.2 39.0 12.3 10.1 1983 34.7 30.8 28.6 5.4 1987 32.3 37.5 22.8 7.0 
Glasgow 01974 20.2 49.0 4.2 26.2 1979 25.8 58.0 4.0 11.4 1983 18.8 51.9 21.2 7.6 1987 12.6 61.8 14.9 10.2 
Source: The Tiines Guide t o the House of Cctimons, 1970, 1974, 1879 1983 
and 1987. 
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Table 7.7: Regional distribution of high levels of st^jport for the SNP 
(over 20% of vote per constituency) 
REGIONS ELECTION DATE 
1964 1966 1970 Feb.1974 Oct.1974 1979 1983 
Strathclyde — _ 1 11 29 0 0 Central - 2 1 3 3 1 0 Lothian 1 1 1 3 9 0 0 Fi f e - - - 1 4 0 0 Tayside 1 2 5 5 4 4 Borders - - 0 0 0 0 0 Granpian ( i n c l . 
Orkney & Shetland - - 2 4 6 3 2 Dumfries and 
Galloway — — 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: Agnew, 1987, 132-133. 
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Fig. 28 : COMARCAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CATALAN 
POPULATION. 1986 
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Fig. 2 9 : D I S T R I B U T I O N O F CiTT V O T E S I N 
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Fig.30 SCOTLAND 
BY COUNTY. 1973 & 1974 
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FIG.32: SNP VOTE IN OCTODER ELECTIONS, 1974 
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Chapter eight: 
S U M M A R Y AND C O N C L U S I O N 
445 
1. SUMMARISING THE ARGUMENTS 
The thesis aimed t o denranstrate t h a t today's n a t i o n a l i s t moveraents 
i n Catalonia and Scotland, v^ich were i l l u s t r a t e d i n the preface, 
are not an accidental occurrence or a coincidence. I t looked f o r 
ways t o explain t h i s n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l (vtiich also affected other 
states i n Europe and elsevv*iere) by i d e n t i f y i n g common causal 
processes. However, i t was not possible t o i d e n t i f y a single theory 
\(\*iich would be able t o explain the recent growth of sub-state 
nationalism i n a l l advanced i n d u s t r i a l countries. I n the f i r s t 
chapter, therefore, a framework was suggested f o r the analysis of 
Catalan and Scottish nationalism, based on Gramscian concepts and 
conplemented w i t h other fragments from conteitporary social theory. 
I t s p r i n c i p a l purpose was t o replace the c l a s s i c a l Marxist model of 
base - superstructure r e l a t i o n s i n c a p i t a l i s t societies w i t h a 
t r i a n g u l a r model o f c i v i l society, state and economy, vtiich does not 
assume dete r m i n i s t i c relationships between the three constructs. 
Rather than seeing p o l i t i c a l action as determined by economic 
structures, the framework concentrates on the changing relationships 
between state, c i v i l society and economy, and examines p o l i t i c a l 
a c tion i n the l i g h t of these processes. I t i s also important t o 
recognise the t e r r i t o r i a l i t y of state, c i v i l society and econany, 
which adds another dimension t o these relationships. This becomes 
e x p l i c i t i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements, which represent the p o l i t i c a l 
struggle of a (sub-state) national c i v i l society w i t h i n a defined 
t e r r i t o r y against the dominance of a central state. 
I n the remainder of t h i s section, I w i l l b r i e f l y summarise the main 
arguments o f the previous chapters. Section two concludes t h i s 
t h esis w i t h a c r i t i c a l look back on i t s approach, r e f l e c t i n g on i t s 
achievements and shortcomings; and w i t h a look forward towards 
futu r e research, v ^ i c h might help t o inprove our understanding of 
conteirporary n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
1.1 History and national identity 
(Chapter eight) (446) 
I t i s ittportant t o r e a l i s e t h a t conteiiporary n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
are - more than other social and p o l i t i c a l movements - rooted i n 
hi s t o r y . This does not mean t h a t they are j u s t a new e d i t i o n of ol d 
c o n f l i c t s over p o l i t i c a l control and hegemony. But i n order t o 
l e g i t i m i s e t h e i r struggle against an established nation state (vMch 
i s i t s e l f f o r t i f i e d through h i s t o r y ) , n a t i o n a l i s t movements "conjure 
up the s p i r i t s of the past t o t h e i r service", i n Marx' words. Thus, 
the h i s t o r y of independence and of n a t i o n a l i s t struggle i s enployed 
by n a t i o n a l i s t a c t i v i s t s i n order t o l e g i t i m i s e t h e i r demand f o r 
self-government today. Martyrs and heroes of the struggle f o r 
national l i b e r a t i o n are ret r i e v e d t o demonstrate t h a t the struggle 
i s r i ^ t f u l , and t h a t the nation i s a r e a l i t y which cannot be denied 
or repressed i n d e f i n i t e l y . History gives n a t i o n a l i s t movements t h e i r 
raison d^etre. 
At the same time, Chapter two argued, n a t i o n a l i s t movements are not 
the expression of an a h i s t o r i c essence, but rather p o l i t i c a l 
constructs v ^ i c h emerge under s p e c i f i c s t r u c t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l 
conditions. Previous s t i r r i n g s o f nationalism i n Catalonia and 
Scotland i n the 18th and 19th century were related t o speci f i c 
conditions. However, h i s t o r i c explanations of the appearance and 
disappearance of nationalism throw up a fundamental problem, because 
the evaluation o f h i s t o r y depends on the perspective of the 
in t e r p r e t e r . H i s t o r i c a l analysis often has t o r e l y on 
historiography, which always has been a v i t a l instrument of 
l e g i t i m a t i o n not only f o r n a t i o n a l i s t movements and t h e i r demands, 
but also f o r "nation states" which oppose them. 
This apparent contradiction i s p a r t i c u l a r l y obvious i n Catalan 
nationalism. Throughout t h i s century, Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s have 
been aware of the need t o re b u i l d the nation ( i . e . the 
inf r a s t r u c t u r e s of i t s c i v i l society) and t o reanimate national 
consciousness, f i r s t l y because Spanish state and c i v i l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
were seen as not appropriate f o r Catalans' i n t e r e s t s and t h e i r ways 
of l i f e , and secondly because Catalan i n s t i t u t i o n s had been 
destroyed or repressed more than once. At the same time, the Catalan 
government's preparation f o r the celebration of "A Thousand Years of 
Catalonia" (mi l l e n a r i ) i n 1992 i s an act of recreating h i s t o r y i n 
(Chapter eight) (447) 
order t o argue, as Ainaud de Lasarte does, t h a t "we existed 
throughout h i s t o r y " (Ainaud de Lasarte, interview, 30.3.1988). The 
r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s t o r y from a n a t i o n a l i s t perspective i s a much 
more popular and rewarding a c t i v i t y i n Catalonia than i n Scotland. 
This i s party due t o the f a c t t h a t i t was supported by the Catalan 
a u t h o r i t i e s during the short spells of autonomy i n the past. But i t 
i s also because Catalans perceived t h e i r national community as 
m a t e r i a l l y more advanced, p o l i t i c a l l y more progressive, and 
c u l t u r a l l y more creative than the Spanish centre, and therefore i t s 
recent h i s t o r y was woirth investigating. 
I n Scotland, the weakness of Scottish national i d e n t i t y and i t s 
c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l p eripheralisation during the Union d i d not 
become as b l a t a n t l y obvious as i n Catalonia. There was no widespread 
awareness among Scottish i n t e l l e c t u a l s of the need t o construct a 
modem p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y , not least because numerous elements of 
national i d e n t i t y - however hollow - were preserved (Nairn, 
interview, 30.10.1988). I t was obvious enough t h a t Scotland was 
Scotland, and not England. But a t another, less obvious and more 
s t r u c t u r a l l e v e l , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the Scottish nation was not 
very strong, and t h i s f r a g i l i t y of Scottish national i d e n t i t y was 
l a i d open by the f a i l u r e s of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n the 1970's. 
The i n t e l l e c t u a l s and middle classes, v^iich elsev*iere are 
instrumental i n the i r p o r t a n t processes of creating the c u l t u r a l and 
c i v i c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s and r e t r i e v i n g h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l 
t r a d i t i o n s , played a negative r o l e here. Ihey tended t o accept and 
pronote a " B r i t i s h " c u l t u r e which does not recognise i t s English 
domination, i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the economic fortunes vAiich B r i t i s h 
empire provided, and were l i t t l e supportive of Scottish popular 
c u l t u r e . Scottish h i s t o r y a f t e r 1707 was defined as B r i t i s h , and the 
Scottish h i s t o r y before 1707 belonged t o a Scotland V\*iich i s now 
hardly recognisable. Indeed, many i n t e l l e c t u a l s maintain t h a t the 
"making of Scotland" as we know i t today occurred under the Union 
(Brewer, 1989, 27). 
Although the p a r t i a l i t y of much historiography must be recognised, 
there i s no way around an h i s t o r i c a l approach t o nationalism. Why 
and when n a t i o n a l i s t movements re-emerge, how they change, and v^y 
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they are strong or weak depends on the formation and restructuring 
of c i v i l society, economy and the state through h i s t o r y . But i t also 
depends on the presence or absence of n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n the 
past. As soon became obvious, the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t s i n the 1970's 
were able t o feed on the successes of t h e i r predecessors, while the 
Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement had l i t t l e n a t i o n a l i s t h i s t o r y t o 
b u i l d on. Chapter two therefore looked a t the h i s t o r y of n a t i o n a l i s t 
p o l i t i c s i n the context of p o l i t i c a l and economic developments from 
the 18th t o the mid-20th century. I t showed t h a t the economic and 
p o l i t i c a l circumstances i n Catalonia a t the end of the 19th century 
made the development of a n a t i o n a l i s t movement more l i k e l y than 
those i n Scotland. At t h a t time, Catalan language and culture i n 
general was experiencing a r e v i v a l i n the upper classes, and was now 
not only the language of the people, but also the language of 
i n d u s t r i a l society and economic progress, and of bourgeois p o l i t i c s . 
The main reason f o r t h i s was the isolated p o s i t i o n of the Catalan 
i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie and of the Catalan working class i n a 
predominantly r u r a l Spain, vhich. led the Catalan r u l i n g class t o 
consolidate i t s power base i n Catalonia. 
A s i m i l a r t h i n g could not have happened i n Scotland. Not only was 
there no l i n g u i s t i c basis f o r nationalism, a f t e r the repression and 
the fragmentation of the Gaelic-speaking Highland population. From 
the beginning of the i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n processes, English was the 
language of modem Scotland, of the Scottish bourgeoisie and i t s 
organic i n t e l l e c t u a l s , and through education and state l e g i s l a t i o n 
also of the popular classes. A l i n g u i s t i c and c u l t u r a l case f o r 
nationalism was put forward by a handful of Scottish poets and 
w r i t e r s v^o were involved i n the creation of the n a t i o n a l i s t party 
i n 1928, but t h i s soon became a marginal factor even w i t h i n the 
marginal n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Up u n t i l the 1950's, economic 
in t e r e s t s stood squarely against Scottish nationalism, because the 
Scottish bourgeoisie was committed t o the B r i t i s h and irrperial 
markets, and consequently t o Conservative unionism. The Labour 
movement l o s t i t s Scottish perspective as i t became integrated i n t o 
the corporate state of economic planning and social reformism i n the 
earl y decades of t h i s century. By s e t t i n g i t s hopes on capturing the 
State, the Labour Party had no more room f o r self-government 
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demands. However, a few decades l a t e r , the demise of the B r i t i s h 
enpire, the decline of the Scottish bourgeoisie, and a growing 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h central state planning among the popular 
classes permitted the unprecedented r i s e of Scottish nationalism i n 
the 1960's. 
1.2 E<x>ncmic structures^ class interests# cind nationcilism 
Based on t h i s h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t account of the emergence of 
nationalism i n the two study areas, chapters three t o seven explored 
various aspects of the relationships between economy, c i v i l society 
and the s t a t e i n order t o throw l i g h t on i t s recent r e v i v a l . I t was 
pointed out i n the introduction t h a t these relationships were 
neither thought t o be f i x e d , nor of the same nature i n both cases, 
and t h a t the ways i n which they influenced n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c s 
could d i f f e r greatly. 
Chapter three dealt w i t h the relationships between the Catalan and 
Scottish econorr^ on the one hand, and state and c i v i l society on the 
other. Marxist and modernisation t h e o r i s t s have often t r i e d to 
e>q)lain the emergence of n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n terms of 
s t r u c t u r a l economic factors, but they f a i l e d t o account f o r the 
recent n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l . However, t h i s does not necessarily mean 
t h a t contenporary n a t i o n a l i s t movements are not conditioned by 
economic r e l a t i o n s , but only t h a t no specific economic re l a t i o n s are 
conditional f o r t h e i r emergence. 
The economic developments which affected the formation of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements were rather d i f f e r e n t i n Catalonia and 
Scotland. I n the case of Scotland, t h i s was the j u x t a p o s i t i o n of 
i n d u s t r i a l decline and the discovery of o i l resources. I n d u s t r i a l 
decline and s t r u c t u r a l economic and social problems i n Scotland did 
not improve w i t h c e n t r a l economic planning as premised and expected, 
and t h i s gave r i s e t o c a l l s f o r more appropriate state action 
(Labour), and f o r a more appropriate state (SNP). The o i l findings 
provided the SNP w i t h an inportant economic argument f o r 
independence, and c e r t a i n l y contributed t o the r i s e of the party in 
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elections and opinion p o l l s , but they d i d not constitute the main 
cause f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l . The Scottish Development Agency 
was an atteitpt by the central state t o d i f f u s e the economic 
grievances, but i t was not s u f f i c i e n t . I t d i d not address the 
demands f o r democratically accountable control over the Scottish 
economy, and the devolution b i l l f o r Scotland, v*iich was f i n a l l y and 
r e l u c t a n t l y sanctioned by Parliament, d i d not o f f e r t h a t either. 
I n Catalonia, economic factors i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n the 
1960's are more mediated than i n Scotland. The h i s t o r i c development 
gap between Catalonia and the r e s t of Spain narrowed i n the Franco 
period, and Catalan nationalism i n the 1960's appeared as a 
predominantly c u l t i o r a l , and not even p o l i t i c a l , movement. However, 
there were some economic processes which were favourable t o Catalan 
nationalism and the anti-Francoist opposition, the intertwined 
p o l i t i c a l currents which cannot easily be separated. Economic 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n and the growth boom pre c i p i t a t e d demand f o r greater 
p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i s a t i o n , especially i n Catalonia, v^ich benefited 
disproportionately from the economic miracle of the 1960's. The 
j u x t a p o s i t i o n of chaotic and uneven economic growth and continued 
state repression created contradictions which p o l i t i c i s e d 
increasingly larger sections of the middle and working class, and t o 
a lesser extent the middle bourgeoisie. The strong p o s i t i o n of the 
Catalan economy i n Spain encouraged these social groups t o take the 
Catalan nation as a framework of reference f o r social and p o l i t i c a l 
change. 
I n both cases, the strong involvement of the state i n the economy 
contributed t o the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of economic and class re l a t i o n s . 
I n Scotland, the f a i l u r e of the Keynesian state t o restructure the 
economy and prevent hardship revealed i t s e l f i n the 1960's. The 
Scottish economic diinension, v^ich had been re-enforced through 
economic planning aimed at the depressed Scottish region, now served 
as a framework of reference f o r expressions of disagreement w i t h the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the "State i n london". Due t o i t s economic 
involvement, the state was becoming d i r e c t l y affected by i n d u s t r i a l 
c o n f l i c t s , which i n Scotland sometimes took the form of struggles 
between the people on one side, and the state and c a p i t a l on the 
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other. I n Catalonia, the Francoist state was also d i r e c t l y involved 
i n class and economic r e l a t i o n s , because i t controlled the 
eitployers' and workers' syndicates and had shares i n some large 
f a c t o r i e s , such as SEAT. I n the 1970's, i n d u s t r i a l struggles often 
took on a p o l i t i c a l dimension, which was channelled by labour 
leaders i n t o support f o r Catalan autonomy. 
To a greater or lesser extent, changes i n the economic sphere set 
the scene f o r a n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l i n Catalonia and Scotland. But 
they were not the main cause of n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c i s a t i o n . I t i s 
therefore doubtful t h a t the instrumental r o l e some analysts ascribed 
t o s o c i a l classes i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements can be taken f o r granted. 
Marxists have argued t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t movements are i n f a c t class 
struggles, whereby n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c s are seen as being merely the 
expression - or a t least the representation - of class interests, 
which i n t u r n are determined by the economic structure. A l t h o u ^ 
t h i s view was rejected as economic deterministic and as unable t o 
explain the presence o f several social classes i n the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements, the inportance of social classes i n st r u c t u r i n g c i v i l 
s ocieties and p o l i t i c s was not denied. Chapter four examined how the 
the class structures of advanced c a p i t a l i s t society were re f l e c t e d 
i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
This thesis argued w i t h Urry t h a t social classes had t o be defined 
not as categories of economic agents, but rather as categories v*iich 
are constituted w i t h i n c i v i l society (Urry, 1981, 66). But c i v i l 
society i s not only the sphere i n which social classes are 
constructed, but also where t e r r i t o r i a l and national i d e n t i t i e s are 
constituted (Urry, 1981, 72). Where people are l i v i n g , v^ich 
language they grow up wi t h , etc., are soc i a l experiences which can 
cut across class boundaries. I n the context of n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements, soc i a l classes must therefore be considered not only 
according t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the economy, but also i n t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the state, t h e i r r o l e i n c i v i l society and t h e i r 
c u l t u r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
Looking a t the case studies, chapter four found t h a t f i r s t l y , the 
a t t i t u d e of s p e c i f i c social classes t o nationalism have changed over 
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time; secondly, i t was not the same i n Scotland and i n Catalonia; 
and t h i r d l y , the class structure of Catalan and Scottish society had 
undergone changes i n the l a s t decades \v*iich had repercussions i n 
n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c s . H i s t o r i c a l l y , the Scottish bourgeoisie was 
p o l i t i c a l l y and economically integrated i n t o the B r i t i s h enpire and 
d i d not support self-government. The early Scottish labour movement, 
on the other hand, and some g r o i : ^ o f l i b e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s 
perceived home r u l e as a progressive demand, although i t was not a t 
the top of the p o l i t i c a l agenda. I n Catalonia, i t was the other way 
round; the bourgeoisie and the i n t e l l e c t u a l s were the main 
protagonists of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement a t the beginning of the 
century, while the Catalan working class organisations were 
i n d i f f e r e n t or even h o s t i l e t o nationalism. This was t o a large 
extent because the working class was largely excluded from p o l i t i c s , 
and nationalism was eitployed by the Catalan bourgeoisie t o promote 
i t s own class i n t e r e s t s . 
I n the 1960's and 1970's, i t was the growing ranks of the middle 
classes which revived the issue of self-government. A large 
proportion of the middle classes consist of i n t e l l e c t u a l s ( i n the 
Gramscian sense), v^o are the main social force i n the relations 
between c i v i l society and the state. Their function as builders o f 
consensus and hegemony involves the a r t i c u l a t i o n of the 
national-popular, which i s shared by the whole society. This 
function can cause n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c i s a t i o n i f a discrepancy 
appears between the national-popular values and i n s t i t u t i o n s of a 
national community and the state. One must also.,take i n t o account 
t h a t i n conteitporary c a p i t a l i s t societies, increasing numbers of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s are working i n public i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t are dependent 
on the state. They are not i n d i r e c t class c o n f l i c t , and therefore 
more l i k e l y t o be involved i n struggles v^ose main l i n e of c o n f l i c t 
confronts c i v i l society and the state, as i s the case wi t h 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
I n Catalonia, the middle class i n t e l l e c t u a l s were alienated from the 
Francoist state, \ * i c h repressed Catalan language and culture and 
destroyed many i n s t i t u t i o n s of Catalan c i v i l society. I n addition t o 
the general p o l i t i c a l repression i n Spain under Franco, t h e i r 
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p o l i t i c a l and public function was therefore severely constrained 
through the irrposition of C a s t i l i a n culture. As the most d i r e c t l y 
affected group, Catalan i n t e l l e c t u a l s led the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l i n 
the 1960's and forged i t t o anti-Francoism. Ihe working class, too, 
was affected by the c u l t u r a l repression, but i t was c u l t u r a l l y 
divided due t o massive C a s t i l i a n immigration. Their antagonistic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the state, however, led some iirportant sectors of 
the working class t o support n a t i o n a l i s t demands. They considered 
embracing Catalan nationalism as inportant i n the struggle f o r 
hegemony over Catalan c i v i l society. The involvement of the 
bourgeoisie i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement increased i n the 1970's, 
v*ien i t saw the chance of making a strong inpact on the t r a n s i t i o n 
t o a democratic and autonomous Catalonia. The Catalan bourgeoisie 
had l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l influence on the Franco regime despite i t s 
economic strength. During the 1960's and before, i t s more 
n a t i o n a l i s t sector helped the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l by g i v i n g f i n a n c i a l 
support. The Catalan b i g bourgeoisie, however, opted f o r the regime 
and c a s t i l i a n i s a t i o n . This enabled the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
t o present i t s e l f as s o c i a l l y progressive, w i t h the Catalan "people" 
on one side and the c a p i t a l i s t s and the state on the other. 
The Scottish case revealed a d i f f e r e n t c onstellation, a l t hou(^ here, 
too, i t was not possible t o reduce nationalism t o any p a r t i c u l a r 
class i n t e r e s t s . I n the 1960's, i t was i n the f i r s t place the middle 
classes v*iich supported the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. They were c r i t i c a l 
o f Scotland's " p r o v i n c i a l second-class status", which seemed t o be 
perpetuated, rather than eliminated, by central state intervention. 
The growing n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c i s a t i o n around economic and p o l i t i c a l 
issues was channelled i n t o the SNP. The h i s t o r i c a l l y grown cleiss 
r e l a t e d support f o r the Conservative and the Labour Party l e f t the 
SNP w i t h a broadening middle ground, v ^ i c h included p r i v i l e g e d 
sectors of the working class and the small bourgeoisie, as w e l l 
r u r a l communities v^i c h were t r a d i t i o n a l l y less strongly divided 
along class l i n e s . The increasing support f o r nationalism shook the 
Labour movement out of i t s unionist mould i n the mid-1970's and 
forced i t t o adopt devolution. This change of mind paved the way f o r 
a broadening n a t i o n a l i s t movement, which i s no longer confined t o 
the SNP. The Scottish bourgeoisie was and has remained largely 
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h o s t i l e t o self-government demands, p a r t l y because i t was already 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the Scottish agencies of the central government, 
and p a r t l y because i t feared t h a t i n an autonomous Scotland, t h e i r 
power could be d r a s t i c a l l y reduced. 
1.3 C i v i l society and the state 
From Chapter four i t emerged t h a t the class c o n s t i t u t i o n of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements was not so much determined by economic 
i n t e r e s t s as by the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the national c i v i l society 
- and i t s constituent social classes -, and the central state. I t 
depends on the form of the state and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the c i v i l 
society how strong and how u n i f i e d the n a t i o n a l i s t movements are, 
vAiether they are successful and how the state f i g h t s back to 
maintain power over the disputed t e r r i t o r y . 
The Catalan and the Scottish movements both aimed at transforming 
t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , but they adopted d i f f e r e n t strategies. This was 
l a r g e l y explained w i t h the i n s t i t u t i o n a l form of the state they were 
challenging. Chapter f i v e argued t h a t there were obvious differences 
between the B r i t i s h and the Spanish case. Spain was ruled by a 
d i c t a t o r i a l regime, v^i c h maintained a very h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e to 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements w i t h i n i t s realm. The Catalan t e r r i t o r y was 
occupied a t the end of the c i v i l war, and w i t h the loss of democracy 
(as elsev^ere i n Spain), the Catalans also saw t h e i r autonomous 
government abolished by a sinple decree. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , most of 
the Catalan opposition considered autonory and democracy as 
connected demands. From t h e i r point of view, overthrowing the Franco 
regime was the precondition f o r democracy, social j u s t i c e and 
Catalan autonomy. 
The government's repressive p o l i c i e s against not j u s t p o l i t i c a l , but 
also c u l t u r a l manifestations of Catalan national i d e n t i t y gave r i s e 
t o the broad c u l t u r a l - n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Catalonia in the 
1960's. The reason f o r t h i s was t h a t by denying the r i g h t of a 
d i s t i n c t i v e Catalan language and culture t o e x i s t and t o f i n d free 
ej^ression, the Franco regime progressively undermined i t s 
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l e g i t i m a t i o n among the Catalan population. The reactionary, 
irtpoverished and d i s t o r t e d brand of Spanish nationalism, which the 
Franco regime forced down the throat of i t s c i t i z e n s , was not able 
t o provide an adequate replacement"^, p a r t i c u l a r l y since the v^ole 
country was subjected t o p o l i t i c a l repression and censorship. The 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s of the State aimed a t repressing Catalan 
language and cul t u r e and p o l i t i c a l opposition were i n strange 
contrast t o the l a i s s e z - f a i r e approach of the government i n other 
spheres v i i i c h affected people's l i v e s . Social problems as a r e s u l t 
of uncontrolled c a p i t a l i s t economic growth throughout the 1960's 
were exacerbated by widespread corruption, vdiich reached i n t o the 
top l e v e l s of the state bureaucracy. This added t o the pressure on 
the state i n the 1970's. However, the central government succeeded 
a f t e r Franco's death i n preventing r a d i c a l changes i n the state 
apparatus, and i n ensuring t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t challenge d i d not 
threaten the u n i t y of the Spanish state. 
Looking a t Scotland as part of the B r i t i s h state, chapter f i v e 
argued t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t movement - and p a r t i c u l a r l y the SNP's 
demand f o r independence - ca l l e d i n t o question the legitijmation of 
the state. The reasons included the f a i l u r e of the state t o de l i v e r 
the promises of equality and welfare, and t o solve the s t r u c t u r a l 
economic and s o c i a l problems i n Scotland w i t h central planning. 
Thus, the attenpt o f the state t o establish hegemony t h r o u ^ 
planning and increasing intervention generated new bases of 
resistance, v*iich were a r t i c u l a t e d i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. The 
stat e was perceived as remote and d i f f i c u l t t o contr o l , and the 
Scottish O f f i c e was a constant reminder t o the Scots t h a t they had 
^ e Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t leader J o r d i Pujol said t h a t the Franco 
regime had taken away the Catalans' p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y and cul t u r e 
without o f f e r i n g anything i n return. He wrote i n 1958: 
"We cannot resign ourselves t o the a n n i h i l a t i o n of our 
people. C a s t i l l e , ;^*lich won the war and destroyed our h a l f 
b u i l t tenple, has not provided another one vMch could be of 
use t o us. I n the l a s t f i v e hundred years, the only useful 
structures v ^ i c h have been created here were ours -
i n s u f f i c i e n t as they may be." 
(Pujol, 1980, 47) 
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t h e i r own bureaucracy, but i t was only a long arm v ^ c h was moved 
from London. Independence meant f o r the SNP simply chopping t h a t arm 
o f f , and devolution meant f o r the Labour Party some Scottish control 
over the f i n g e r movements v t i i l e leaving the arm i n t a c t . 
While the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t and anti-Francoist movement was 
operating i n semi-legality or openly i n defiance of the state, the 
Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement was p a r t of the democratic p o l i t i c a l 
system, and i n t h a t respect, i t d i d not threaten the basic 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l structures. Both independentists and devolutionists 
t r i e d t o achieve t h e i r aim of greater autoncatiy through Westminster 
parliament. Within t h a t system, the p o l i t i c c i l forces v^ich wanted t o 
maintain the i n t e g r i t y of the B r i t i s h state had a greater range of 
options i n dealing w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. These options 
included "stealing the n a t i o n a l i s t s ' clothes", delaying l e g i s l a t i o n 
and evoking the dual national i d e n t i t y of Scots. This i s hew the 
Labour Party succeeded i n maintaining i t s hegemony i n Scotland, 
which looked so f r a g i l e i n the mid-1970's. 
1.4 National Culture; source of legitimation for nationalism? 
From the argument summarised above, i t can be deduced th a t the 
s o c i o - c u l t u r a l sphere represents a s i g n i f i c a n t source of 
l e g i t i m a t i o n , which under c e r t a i n circumstances can be mobilised by 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements against the state. Chapter s i x showed t h a t 
t h i s was the case i n Catalonia, where the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l in the 
1960's paved the way f o r p o l i t i c a l nationalism i n the 1970's. 
Language being a fundamental source of i d e n t i t y , i t i s not 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the widely spoken Catalan language became a symbol 
of Catalan nationalism during the period of c u l t u r a l repression 
under Franco. EXje t o state intervention i n the Catalan c u l t u r a l 
sphere, v^iich aimed a t eradicating and l a t e r a t demoting Catalan 
c u l t u r e from a national t o a regional culture, a c t i v i t i e s such as 
publishing or holding mass i n Catalan, forming Catalan c u l t u r a l 
associations, etc. were not only p o l i t i c i s e d , but often even 
regarded by the state as p o l i t i c a l acts of defiance. Thus, the 
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c u l t u r a l sphere formed the basis of l e g i t i m a t i o n f o r the Catalan 
n a t i o n a l i s t and anti-Francoist movement. 
The close r e l a t i o n s h i p between Catalan culture and p o l i t i c s was 
r e f l e c t e d i n the conposition of Catalan p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s . I t was 
noted t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r generation of i n t e l l e c t u a l s , v^ich had grown 
up under the Franco regime, became active i n the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l 
and/or the p o l i t i c a l opposition movement a f t e r 1960. Among the c i v i l 
society i n s t i t u t i o n s which were cent r a l t o the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, 
chapter s i x concentrated on Catalan publishing houses, because they 
involved many p o l i t i c a l l y active i n t e l l e c t u a l s vAiich i n the 1970's 
became p a r t of the new p o l i t i c a l establishment of democratic and 
autonomous Catalonia. 
Although the Catalan c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l became s i g n i f i c a n t only i n the 
1960's, i t must be stressed t h a t small scale - and often underground 
- c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s i n the f i r s t two decades of Francoism played 
an inportant r o l e . Those w r i t e r s and h i s t o r i a n s , v^o had experienced 
the republican era under the Generalitat and who had stayed i n 
Catalonia, constituted a v i t a l l i n k t o the Catalan (and the 
Catalanist) heritage. The claim t h a t "once more i t has been a 
handful of banned w r i t e r s , t i r e d o l d poets and sacked philosophers 
v^o have stubbornly kept a l i v e the memory of another kind of culture 
and society, another way o f being c i t i z e n s ..." (Guardian. 
30.11.1989) could be applied t o Catalonia. 
I n Scotland, there was no recent persecution of indigenous culture, 
and therefore no banned w r i t e r s or sacked jAiilosophers. Those poets 
and w r i t e r s v^±io t r i e d i n the 1920's (and thereafter) t o revive a 
d i s t i n c t i v e Scottish language and culture remained a t the margin of 
Scottish nationalism. This i s p a r t l y due t o the dwindling numbers of 
Gaelic speakers, and t o the f a c t t h a t the Scots langiiage was 
perceived a f t e r the Union of Crowns as a degraded d i a l e c t of English 
t h a t was only used by the lower classes and i n informal situations. 
But more irrportant was perhaps t h a t Scottish culture had a low 
prestige among the Scottish population, vAiich has been r e i t e r a t e d 
and reinforced by many Scottish i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Being par t of the 
B r i t i s h eitpire also involved speaking i t s language and becoming 
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anglicised, v ^ i c h was vtiat generations a f t e r generations of Scottish 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s helped t o carry out. 
Again, h i s t o r y explains t o some extent the predicament of Scottish 
c u l t u r e and i t s r e l a t i v e unimportance i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. 
But one must also consider t h a t Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t s view t h e i r most 
recent h i s t o r y from the vantage point of - a t least p a r t i a l -
success, from vAiich isolated individuals and small groups of young 
and dynamic i n t e l l e c t u a l s appear as the heroes o'f the c u l t u r a l 
r e v i v a l . I n Scotland, such people also e x i s t ; Scottish culture has 
ejq)erienced a steady r e v i v a l , vMch was encouraged by the growth of 
p o l i t i c a l nationalism. But the Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t movement d i d not 
achieve a change i n state-society relationships, and the status of 
Scottish c u l t u r e therefore remained l a r g e l y unchanged. I n the 
1980's, however, there are signs i n d i c a t i n g t h a t culture i s beccming 
a more important conponent of Scottish i d e n t i t y , as p o l i t i c a l 
nationalism i s s t i l l l i c k i n g i t s wounds frcan the b a t t l e f o r 
devolution i n the 1970's. 
1.5 T e r r i t o r i a l i t y and nationalism 
The t e r r i t o r i a l d e f i n i t i o n of n a t i o n a l i s t movements distinguishes 
them from other p o l i t i c a l movements, and therefore t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s 
c e n t r a l t o an understanding of nationalism. The sense of belonging 
t o a place, a region and a country i s a fundamental i n t e r p e l l a t i o n 
which constitutes s u b j e c t i v i t y , and there are several layers of 
t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t y . Chapter seven argued t h a t a shared t e r r i t o r i a l 
i d e n t i t y i s an inportant cohesive f a c t o r i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
Both Catalonia and Scotland have well-defined boundaries vMch 
co n s t i t u t e the geographical l i m i t s i n v^hich the n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
was operating. I n Scotland, the national boundaries are h i s t o r i c a l l y 
and c u l t u r a l l y defined and s o c i a l l y reproduced, v ^ i i l e i n Catalonia, 
the boundaries are s o c i a l l y and economically defined. I f c u l t u r a l 
c r i t e r i a are used t o define the Catalan nation, then adjacent 
t e r r i t o r i e s have t o be included. Within Catalan nationalism, there 
i s therefore a minority v^iich adheres t o pan-Catalan nationalism, 
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but i n the period examined i n t h i s thesis, t h i s minority was 
r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l l y . The o i l propaganda of the 
Scottish n a t i o n a l i s t s i n the 1970's gave the unionist forces the 
opportunity t o undennine the c r e d i b i l i t y of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
by p o i n t i n g out the c u l t u r a l distinctiveness of the Orkney and 
Shetland Islands. The unionists saw i n the SNP's po l i c y of counting 
these small islands t o Scotland but granting them autonomy w i t h i n an 
independent Scotland an i m p e r i a l i s t a t t i t u d e . What the Shetland 
problem demonstrated was i n the f i r s t place the weakness of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t strategy and p o l i t i c a l discourse. The second lesson was 
the f a c t t h a t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the national teinritory turned out 
t o be less self-evident than assumed, not least because there are 
other t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t i e s coexisting and c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h the 
national i d e n t i t y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , c o n f l i c t s are l i k e l y t o arise vAien 
vested i n t e r e s t s are involved. 
Harvey's argument t h a t i n t e r - r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s also have a material 
basis because some c a p i t a l i s f i x e d t o the t e r r i t o r y (Harvey, 1982, 
419-420) goes a long way towards explaining why the Shetland problem 
was played up so strongly i n the mid-1970's. I t also helps t o 
e>q)lain how and f o r what reasons t e r r i t o r i a l l y based class alliances 
2 
emerge on a national l e v e l , as demonstrated i n Scotland , and more 
3 
c l e a r l y defined i n Catalonia , These d i f f e r e n t layers of t e r r i t o r i a l 
i d e n t i t i e s based on s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n do not necessarily c o n f l i c t 
w i t h each other, as the comarcal theme i n Catalan nationalism shows. 
Here, the i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n of Catalonia, vfcLch h i s t o r i c a l l y gave 
r i s e t o c o n f l i c t s between d i f f e r e n t f r a c t i o n s of Catalan c a p i t a l , 
was incorporated by 19th century n a t i o n a l i s t s i n t o the national 
t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t y . Comarcalism since then became an i n t e g r a l part 
2 
Such Scottish class alliances became apparent i n s p e c i f i c 
c o n f l i c t s such as the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders work-in and as a less 
well-defined p o l i t i c a l trend i n the early 1970's i n response t o the 
unenployment problem, and i n the 1980's i n opposition t o the Thatcher 
governments. 
"^In Catalonia, the class a l l i a n c e strategy on a national platform 
was an e x p l i c i t strategy of the Catalan anti-Francoist opposition i n the 
1970's. 
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of Catalan nationalism, and has been used by the r u l i n g conservative 
party i n Catalonia t o l e g i t i m i s e i t s power. I n Scotland, i n t e r n a l 
differences are no less s i g n i f i c a n t , but they have not become 
integrated i n t o nationalism i n a s i m i l a r way. This became obvious 
during the reorganisation of l o c a l government i n 1973, which was 
decilt w i t h separately from the n a t i o n a l i s t problem. Rather than 
enhancing nationalism - as i n Catalonia -, l o c a l i d e n t i t y and 
distinctiveness within Scotland set l i m i t s t o n a t i o n a l i s t support. 
2. CRmCMj REFLEXDTIONS 
The second p a r t of t h i s chapter i s reserved f o r c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s 
on the approach I have taken i n t h i s thesis. While the thesis i t s e l f 
shows t h a t the approach i s both useful i n coping w i t h contenporary 
nationalism i n a coitparative perspective, and f e r t i l e i n throwing up 
relevant questions and providing a framework w i t h i n which t o deal 
w i t h them, some problems arose from i t vAiich should be mentioned. 
F i n a l l y , some areas are pointed out v^iich deserve f u r t h e r research, 
and which would help t o r e f i n e the framework used here. 
2.1 Problans with the approach 
The aim of t h i s thesis was not t o solve the problems of social 
science i n f i n d i n g an adequate theory f o r the r e v i v a l of nationalism 
i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t states. Rather, i t was t o recognise the 
coitplicated nature of t h i s phenomenon, and t o argue t h a t a whole 
series of processes have affected i n a more or less d i r e c t manner 
the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of national i d e n t i t y . N a t i o n a l i s t movements, as 
we found them i n Catalonia and Scotland i n the 1970's, must be 
understood i n the context of charging relationships between the 
c e n t r a l state, the national c i v i l society, and the economic sphere. 
These relationships have fundamental features i n common i n societies 
vdiich are based on c a p i t a l i s t modes of production. More 
s p e c i f i c a l l y , I argued t h a t i n the period has v^ich witnessed the 
recent r e v i v a l of nationalism, perceivable changes were occurring 
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t h a t were h i g h l i g h t i n g the increasingly active r o l e of the state i n 
a l l spheres of l i f e . As a r e s u l t , boundaries between the 
s o c i o - c u l t u r a l , the economic, and the p o l i t i c a l ( i . e . between c i v i l 
society, economic sphere, and the state) have become less and less 
c l e a r l y defined. This leads f i r s t l y t o the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of 
n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s , which are constructed i n c i v i l society and 
involve i t s national-popular elements; and secondly t o a tendency of 
i n t e r p r e t i n g s o c i a l problems and c o n f l i c t s i n terms of a 
confrontation between the state and the people. Of course, these 
processes. do not only occur i n areas v^iere a strong national 
i d e n t i t y e x i s t s ; but i t i s i n those areas where these processes can 
lead t o a r e v i v a l of nationalism. 
While i n theory the connectedness of these relationships between 
c i v i l society, economy and the state stands t o reason, i t i s f a r 
more d i f f i c u l t t o p i n down how i n practice changes i n the 
relationships can a f f e c t and condition n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
Various problems have cropped up i n t h i s thesis v^iich help t o 
explain these d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
F i r s t l y , i n analysing the ways i n v ^ i c h state intervention rendered 
economic and s o c i o - c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s p o l i t i c a l , i t became clear 
t h a t the type of state and the reasons f o r intervening were 
d i f f e r e n t i n Catalonia and Scotland. These differences became clear 
a t the l e v e l of c i v i l society, because the Francoist state 
intervened mainly i n order t o control and repress i t s population, 
while i n the case of Scotland, i t was the intervention of a welfare 
sta t e . Despite these differences, the r e s u l t - loss of l e g i t i m a t i o n 
and p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of national i d e n t i t y - was similar,, a l t h o u ^ the 
degree varied t o \^^ich the n a t i o n a l i s t movement was able t o ejq^loit 
i t . However, these differences between the two cases also impinge on 
the question t o what extent common causal processes are 
i d e n t i f i a b l e . I n the case of Scotland, the cause of the l e g i t i m a t i o n 
problem was h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c , because the state never had such 
powers t o intervene before. But a u t h o r i t a r i a n states \jhidh exercise 
t h e i r powers t o repress c i v i l society have existed a t a l l times, and 
therefore, the Francoist repression of Catalan culture appeared more 
as a problem o f authoritarianism. Nationalism i n Catalonia was 
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i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d w i t h anti-Francoism; but i t s continued existence 
i n the post-Franco era demonstrates t h a t i t was not j u s t a reaction 
t o the c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s of the Franco regime. 
Second, and rather more fundamental, i s the problem of defining the 
boundaries between state, c i v i l society and economy. Part of the 
argument advanced i n t h i s thesis i s t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t movements aim 
t o redefine these boundaries, Vvhich undergo s h i f t s as the t r i a n g u l a r 
relationships change. I n the case of Scotland, i t proved d i f f i c u l t 
t o decide v±iether f o r exairple the education system was part of the 
s t a t e apparatus or of the Scottish c i v i l society. Even more 
ambiguous i s the p o s i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . While these posed no 
problems i n Catalonia, as they were i l l e g a l and therefore separate 
from the state, i t was d i f f i c u l t t o decide i n Scotland. A f t e r a l l , 
the Labour Party was i n power when i t t r i e d t o embrace Scottish 
nationalism by t y i n g i t down t o devolution. I n other contexts, 
Labour (and other parties) were considered as a force i n c i v i l 
society. Thus, i t seems t h a t the terminology used here i s too coarse 
t o cope w i t h processes and structures we are able t o d i s t i n g u i s h "on 
the ground". How t o r e l a t e t h e o r e t i c a l concepts w i t h s p e c i f i c pieces 
of evidence becomes a problem, i f v t o t we are dealing w i t h are very 
basic concepts. 
The t h i r d major constraint of the approach taken i n t h i s thesis i s 
closely r e l a t e d t o i t s strength. By looking a t general processes and 
relationships, the amount of information vhich i s d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y relevant i s d i f f i c u l t t o l i m i t . However, i f the available 
time, space and resources are l i m i t e d , i t becomes almost inevitable 
t o concentrate on s p e c i f i c case studies w i t h i n each set of 
fundamental relationships. For example, the analysis of the c u l t u r a l 
r e v i v a l i n Catalonia centred on the r i s e of the Catalan publishing 
sector. This i s only one - a l b e i t inportant - aspect of the r e v i v a l , 
and other a c t i v i t i e s which involved d i f f e r e n t groups of people 
remained unexamined. The choice of d e t a i l e d studies r e f l e c t e d the 
inportant r o l e t h a t t h i s thesis ascribed t o the i n t e l l e c t u a l s as the 
key agents i n n a t i o n a l i s t movements, as the vast majority of the 
interviewees belonged t o t h i s social sector. I n t h i s thesis, I t r i e d 
t o r e s i s t the temptation t o force the two n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n t o 
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a uniform mould, and t o allow f o r the considerable variations 
between them. Together w i t h the need t o concentrate on specific 
d e t a i l s i n order t o do j u s t i c e t o the ccarplex processes t h a t were 
re l a t e d t o the r i s e of nationalism, differences were given a greater 
enphasis than s i m i l a r i t i e s . However, i t i s ray view t h a t the approach 
i s j u s t i f i e d , because i t managed t o avoid both mono-causal 
explanatory models, and p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c analysis v^hich t r e a t s 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements as inconparable, and thus ignores fundamental 
causal processes. 
2.2 Futiire research 
This thesis was mostly concerned wi t h the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l i n the 
1960's and 1970's, but i t was informed by l a t e r developments and 
made use of t h i s information. The referenda on autonomy ( i n 
Catalonia) and devolution ( i n Scotland) i n 1979 d i d not lay the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements t o r e s t . I n various parts of t h i s thesis 
developments i n the 1980's were hinted a t , suggesting t h a t 
nationalism i s s t i l l present i n Catalonia and Scotland, although the 
former has now an autoncraous government and the l a t t e r has not. IXie 
t o the d i f f e r e n t outcomes of the referenda, the year of 1979 was 
seen as a watershed; i n the case of Catalonia, relationships between 
c i v i l society, economy, and state underwent some fundamental changes 
thereafter. The most obvious one was the creation of a Catalan 
government and bureaucratic apparatus. A f t e r repeated v i c t o r i e s of 
Convergencia i Unio, the a l l i a n c e i s so thoroughly intertwined with 
p o l i t i c a l power i n Catalonia t h a t Catalans begin t o f i n d i t natural. 
Pujol isme appears now as the hegemonic version of Catalan 
nationalism, and despite popular alliances i n the 1970's, t h i s 
conservative version of nationalism ended up i n dominating Catalan 
p o l i t i c s . 
I n the 1980's, support f o r Catalan independence has grown mainly 
among the young, v^ich have l i t t l e or no memory of the hard times 
under Franco. For them, the present arrangements are not 
s a t i s f a c t o r y , and they want t o see f a r greater autonomy (Sellares, 
interview, 14.4.1988). Movements such as the Moviment de Defensa de 
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l a Terra (Movement of the Defense of the Country) and Crida (a 
r a d i c a l c u l t u r a l n a t i o n a l i s t movement founded i n 1980) regard 
Catalonia as a nation suppressed by the Spanish state, and c a l l f o r 
l i b e r a t i o n . Their support i s s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y small, but they catch 
many of those v*io are not p o l i t i c a l l y apathetic. I n Catalonia, 
therefore, a r a d i c a l i s a t i o n of nationalism has taken place vAiich 
could have repercussions i n the 1990's. 
I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o study these developments i n the l i ^ t of 
ciianging relationships between state, economy, and c i v i l society. 
When a n a t i o n a l i s t movement succeeds i n having i t s demands met by 
the state, i t - or a pa r t of i t - assumes control over the new 
p o l i t i c a l structures, and becomes part of the state apparatus. As 
the n a t i o n a l i s t popular a l l i a n c e broke up towards the end of the 
1970's, d i f f e r e n t strands of nationalism became obvious; some 
l e g i t i m i s e the r u l i n g party and class, and others are used t o 
question t h a t legitimacy. 
Developments i n Scotland point i n a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n , and i n scane 
ways resemble more the Catalan s i t u a t i o n i n the early 1970's. I n 
Scotland, the referendum debacle l e f t the n a t i o n a l i s t claims 
unsolved. An embarrassed silence descended on Scotland, the SNP 
drowned i n b i t t e r i n t e r n a l struggles, and everything seemed t o point 
t o the f a c t t h a t the Scots had given up. But according t o Nairn, 
" t h a t defeat and what followed has done more t o reshape underlying 
Scottish a t t i t u d e s than the SNP's heady v i c t o r i e s " (Nairn, 1989, 7). 
Nationalism today i s d i f f e r e n t from t h a t i n the 1970's, and t h i s 
difference has i t s roots i n the changing relatio n s h i p between 
Scottish c i v i l society and the B r i t i s h state, as Chapter f i v e 
already suggested. I f anti-Francoism was one . of the main bu i l d i n g 
stones of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n the 1970's i n Catalonia, 
anti-Thatcherism f u e l l e d Scottish nationalism i n the 1980's. As the 
largest opposition party, the Labour Party has benefited the most 
from the r e j e c t i o n of Thatcher's p o l i c i e s . The experience of the 
1980's seems t o have Scots more aware of t h e i r own c u l t u r a l values. 
Thus, t o playwright John MoGrath, the r e j e c t i o n of Thatcher ism i s 
"only one manifestation of a deeper difference: the surviv a l i n 
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Scotland of hope f o r the future, of the b e l i e f t h a t i t i s worth 
st r u g g l i n g f o r a b e t t e r society" (McGrath, 1989, 2). Widespread 
popular resistance against the p o l l tax, vAiich was introduced i n 
Scotland i n A p r i l 1989 by the Conservative government, j i a s t i f i e s 
t h i s opinion. The sharpening confrontation between people and the 
s t a t e has strengthened the more progressive side of Scottish 
nationalism, and t i e d s o c i a l struggles more f i r m l y t o the national 
struggle. 
While the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Catalonia was aiming f o r democracy 
and autonomy, the a l t e r n a t i v e t o the status quo i n Scotland i s less 
straightforward t o define. A f t e r a l l , B r i t a i n i s a democracy. This 
throws up a more fundamental question about the conceptualisation of 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements as s t r i v i n g f o r a more democratically 
accountable state and f o r more popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l 
decision making. These goals are hardly achieved by establishing 
autonomous or independent governments without strengthening the 
democratic structures of c i v i l society. Again, t h i s i s a question of 
changing the boundaries between c i v i l society and the state. 
These are j u s t some ideas about studying the more recent 
developments i n the two case studies. There are, of course, a number 
of other n a t i o n a l i s t movements vtiich are l i t t l e understood, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r those i n Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, v^ich have 
come only recently t o our a t t e n t i o n . The n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n 
the B a l t i c states and various other parts of the region have t h e i r 
own h i s t o r y , and t h e i r r e v i v a l i n recent years surely surprises 
l o c a l people less than Western commentators and analysts. The 
framework of analysis used f o r t h i s thesis assumes t h a t the 
r e l a t i o n s between state, c i v i l society and economy are shaped by the 
c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s of production. I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o 
analyse the r i s e of nationalism i n s o c i a l i s t countries, and t o see 
how these relationships d i f f e r from those i n Scotland or Catalonia. 
The differences might t u r n out t o be less fundamental than assumed. 
This t h e s i s was c r i t i c a l of theories of nationalism, because they 
often advanced inappropriate economistic explanations. I t now seems 
t h a t Marxism's f a i l u r e s i n t h i s f i e l d are no longer only of a 
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t i i e o r e t i c a l nature, but also r a p i d l y turning i n t o a fundamental 
cause f o r the defeat of p r a c t i c a l socialism as epitomised by the 
Soviet Union. To quote from Raymond Williams: 
"Many s o c i a l i s t s are influenced by u n i v e r s a l i s t propositions 
of an ideal kind, such as the int e r n a t i o n a l p r o l e t a r i a t 
overcoming i t s national d i v i s i o n s . (...) There can then be a 
rapid i n t e l l e c t u a l supersession of a l l the conplex 
a c t u a l i t i e s o f s e t t l e d but then dislocated and relocated 
communities, t o the point v^iere some vanguard has a clear 
set of ' s o c i a l ' positions only t o f i r x i t h a t the majority of 
i t s nominally connected people have declined t o follow i t . 
When t h i s turns, as sometimes, t o abusing them, there i s a 
ce r t a i n f i n a l i t y of defeat." 
(R. Williams, 1983, 196) 
This thesis argued against adopting a u n i v e r s a l i s t and econcamist 
approach t o conteiiporary n a t i o n a l i s t movements. I t suggested t h a t 
vdiile people make t h e i r own h i s t o r y not i n conditions of t h e i r own 
chosing, t h e i r action can change these conditions. The relationships 
between state, economy and c i v i l society are f i x e d , but constantly 
changing. I n order t o change them, people may form n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements, and the outcome and the d i r e c t i o n of these movements are 
not predetermined. I t became clear from the study of the Catalan and 
the Scottish case t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t movements r e f l e c t the desire of 
people t o have more cont r o l over t h e i r own l i v e s , and t o r e a f f i r m 
t h e i r sense of belonging t o a community. Building a society vMch i s 
centred around people's needs and aspirations i s a creative process, 
vMch must involve the people themselves and s t a r t from t h e i r " l i v e d 
and worked and placeable social i d e n t i t i e s " (R. Williams, 1983, 
197). The n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n Scotland and Catalonia have 
showed up some of the problems which conteirporary p o l i t i c a l and 
soc i a l relationships between state and people pose t o the 
r e a l i s a t i o n of such a society. They may not have succeeded i n 
challenging these e x i s t i n g relationships enough - a l l t h a t i s 
c e r t a i n i s t h a t people w i l l continue t o do so. 
(Chapter eight) (467) 
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A P P E N I D I X ONE 
OCMMENTS ON METHOD AND METHODODDGICMJ PROBLEMS 
1. Theory and evidence 
I n Chapter one I described the aim of the thesis being t o f i n d out 
v*iy and how n a t i o n a l i s t movements became prominent i n Catalonia and 
Scotland during the 1960's and 1970's. A h i s t o r i c a l approach was 
taken which traced nationalism back t o i t s beginning, and which 
required a ce r t a i n amount of h i s t o r i c a l reconstruction of the 
so c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l events and processes of the l a s t few 
decades i n the study areas. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Catalan case, a 
sca r c i t y of information material on the p o l i t i c s of the opposition -
t o Which the n a t i o n a l i s t movement belonged - under Franco made i t 
d i f f i c u l t t o document these processes. Interviews were p a r t i c u l a r l y 
inportant here, because they could throw i:^ new, h i t h e r t o unknown 
issues, or bring i n new perspectives. Rather than conceiving of 
interview material purely as empirical evidence vjhich i s held 
against a theory or a hypothesis, i t was integrated i n t o the 
argument, and used t o i n t e r p r e t . 
I n t h i s thesis, theory and empirical evidence are not divided by 
r i g i d boundaries. This i s p a r t l y due t o the nature of the questions 
asked, and p a r t l y t o the subject matter of the thesis. Although i t 
i s possible and necessary t o look a t n a t i o n a l i s t movements from a 
th e o r e t i c a l perspective v*dch stresses the interdependent 
relationships between economy, c i v i l society and state, and vAiich 
upholds t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , there i s no theory of n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements which can be tested with e n p i r i c a l data. I found no model 
which could explain convincingly why Catalonia and Scotland came t o 
produce n a t i o n a l i s t movements at t h i s moment i n time, and i t i s not 
the aim of t h i s thesis t o come up wit h such a general theory. Thus, 
the research agenda and the subject matter favoured what Sayer and 
Morgan would describe as an intensive research design (Sayer and 
Morgan, 1985, 150), v^ich allows f o r d i n s t i n c t i o n between 
"necessary" and "contingent" causal r e l a t i o n s . However, t h e i r case 
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example of the e l e c t r i c a l engineering sector i n South Wales was able 
t o assume rather more straightforward "necessary causal re l a t i o n s " 
than was possible f o r the p o l i t i c a l movements I was studying. I n 
p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c a l movements, people are even less predictable 
than i n c a p i t a l i s t production, and t h e i r actions seldomly conform t o 
preconceived models and theories. I t i s a world i n which "people can 
contradict themselves as w e l l as others, giving (...) d i f f e r e n t 
versions of the t r u t h " (D. M. Smith, 1988, 258) . Therefore, the 
d i v i s i o n between theory and evidence are more blurred here. 
2. Comparative approach 
2.1 Does i t make sense t o compare n a t i o n a l i s t movements? 
Although I have already commented on the reasons f o r choosing the 
two case studies i n Chapter one (section 1.3), i t i s appropriate t o 
discuss here the problems i n conparing the chosen movements. 
F i r s t l y , n a t i o n a l i s t ideologies stress the unique characteristics t o 
the national t e r r i t o r y and i t s population. The sense of being 
d i f f e r e n t from the outside world i s t o a large extent inherent i n 
sub-state nationalism because of the need t o delineate the nation 
from the surrounding "nation-state". For many n a t i o n a l i s t a c t i v i s t s 
I spoke t o , i t was d i f f i c u l t t o see any s i m i l a r i t i e s t o other 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements, and few saw the point of coirparing Scottish 
and Catalan nationalism w i t h each other. 
Though some argued t h a t i t was iitpossible f o r an outsider t o grasp 
the essence (sic) of t h e i r nationalism, i t must also be recognised 
t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r affected people t o step back and analyse 
t h e i r own n a t i o n a l i s t movement and abstract from i t . (This applies 
also t o researchers who come from the dominant state culture, such 
as Stephen Kendrick, who looked at Scottish nationalism, and Luis 
Moreno, who conpared "decentralisation" i n Catalonia and Scotland). 
Interviewees i n both study areas reacted p o s i t i v e l y t o the f a c t t h a t 
I was a German outsider, vMch i n t h e i r view made me more i n p a r t i a l . 
However, some Scottish contacts were surprised t o hear t h a t I was 
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attached t o an English u n i v e r s i t y , because they argued - with some 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n - t h a t the scarcity of Scottish information material 
i n England would hanper my research. 
2.2 Pr a c t i c a l problems of doing comparative research 
One of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of conparing n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n two 
states i s the t r a v e l l i n g i t requires. Living outside Scotland made 
frequent t r i p s north necessary during 1987, and some i n 1988. The 
frequency was l i m i t e d by the f a c t t h a t my t r a v e l expenses were never 
f u l l y covered, and without the help of friends i n Scotland i t would 
have been impossible t o make as many v i s i t s as I ended up doing. 
As f a r as Catalonia was concerned, i t was more convenient t o stay 
f o r several months a t a time, which I d i d i n spring 1987, and f o r 
the f i r s t four months i n 1988. This second prolonged stay was 
financed by a studentship of the Catalan government, and I am 
g r a t e f u l t o Enric Lluch f o r drawing my a t t e n t i o n t o i t . The 
experience of l i v i n g i n Barx^lona and immersing myself i n the 
Catalan d a i l y (and sometimes night-) l i f e was as irrportant as the 
l i t e r a t u r e research and interviews I conducted there, because i t 
opened ray eyes t o many aspects of the Catalan c i v i l society v^ich 
would otherwise remained hidden or inconprehensible. 
I d e a l l y , I would have l i k e d t o have spent a s i m i l a r period of time 
i n Edinburgh or Glasgow, but I was unable t o f i n d a grant t o study 
Scottish a f f a i r s . The present p o l i t i c a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l setup i n 
Scotland explains t h i s lack of i n t e r e s t i n - and consequently 
resources f o r - such research. I n contrast, the Catalan government 
and other public i n s t i t u t i o n s have a vested i n t e r e s t i n supporting 
Catalan studies, because they help t o l e g i t i m i s e Catalan 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . Although a longer s p e l l i n Scotland would have been 
b e n e f i c i a l , i t was not as v i t a l as i n the Catalan case, because a 
l o t o f the research could be done from Curham. 
2.3 Methodological problems of comparing Catalonia and Scotland 
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I n the course of researching the n a t i o n a l i s t movements, several 
methodological issues emerged v4iich required some thought. 
As I gathered more information about the case studies, I became more 
aware of the differences between them. At timves, the differences 
seemed t o overshadow the s i m i l a r i t i e s , and t h i s posed questions f o r 
the organisation of the thesis, and more fundamentally f o r the 
purpose of the coitparison. I f the Catalan and the Scottish 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements were so d i f f e r e n t , then cortparing them would 
be a f u t i l e exercise from which l i t t l e could be learned. 
The question of s i m i l a r i t y and difference depends on the focus one 
adopts. A narrow focus which concentrates on d e t a i l s usually 
enphasises differences, while a wider and more general view often 
recognises the s i m i l a r i t i e s . This thesis started from the premise 
t h a t a phenomenon as strong and widespread as the n a t i o n a l i s t 
r e v i v a l i n various advanced c a p i t a l i s t states was l i k e l y t o be based 
on a s i m i l a r set of processes. I t i d e n t i f i e d a number of themes 
which seemed central t o conteitporairy n a t i o n a l i s t movements, such as 
historiography, economic development, national culture and 
t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , and suggested a conceptual framiework w i t h i n v*iich 
these themes could be ejq)lored. However, since i t deals w i t h 
processes rather than f i x e d structures, and w i t h causal r e l a t i o n s , 
the carparison becomes rather conplex. The conposition, outlook, 
development and success of the n a t i o n a l i s t movements v^iich I chose 
t o study depended on s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c cirxrumstances i n each case, 
and therefore d i d not lend themselves t o generalisation. 
That t h i s thesis found many differences between Catalonia and 
Scotland i s p a r t l y the outcome of i t s structure. I t assumed 
fundamental processes and structures which apply t o both areas, and 
fi n d s a f t e r more detailed investigation t h a t the combinations and 
inner contradictions of these processes are d i f f e r e n t i n each case. 
I t i s therefore not surprising t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t movements vary 
considerably i n structure, motivation and d i r e c t i o n . 
Despite the l i m i t a t i o n s of the conparison, i t proved very useful i n 
several ways. F i r s t l y , i t avoids the extremes of excessive 
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concentration on unique characteristics and unfounded 
generalisation, both of which are quite often the the outcome of 
single case studies. Conparing two cases always forced me t o step 
back from the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of each of them, and t o weigh up 
c a r e f u l l y any general statements on n a t i o n a l i s t movements I 
encountered or generated. Secondly, the coitparison soon ruled out 
any t e s t i n g of theories, because there was no theory which accounted 
f o r both cases. I t therefore enabled me t o t h i n k about a d i f f e r e n t 
framework of studying n a t i o n a l i s t movements, and I found the 
t r i a n g l e of economy, state and c i v i l society a useful (even i f not 
very elaborate) framework. F i n a l l y , one of the main inspirations of 
t h i s thesis was t o f i n d an ejqjlanation f o r the contenporary upsurge 
i n sub-state nationalism i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t countries. I t was 
necessary t o use more than one case i n order t o tease out any common 
underlying tendencies. I n the l a s t few years, n a t i o n a l i s t movements 
have also emerged w i t h considerable force i n advanced s o c i a l i s t 
countries, and i t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o see v^ether they share any 
causal processes w i t h those i n the c a p i t a l i s t West. However, the 
events i n Eastern Europe and the USSR came too l a t e t o make an 
inpact on t h i s thesis. 
3. Collecting information 
3.1 Language requirements 
Since language and culture often play an inportant r o l e i n 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements, i t i s essential t h a t researchers should be 
able t o communicate i n the national language. The language factor 
already entered i n t o my thesis when I was t r y i n g t o decide v^ich 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements t o compare. Since I was f l u e n t i n Cas t i l i a n 
and English, Spain and B r i t a i n offered themselves as p l u r i n a t i o n a l 
states. I n Scotland, English i s the dominant language of the people 
and of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Given the low percentage of Gaelic 
speakers i n Scotland and the status of Scots, i t was unnecessary t o 
speak e i t h e r of them f o r the purposes of t h i s thesis. However, the 
language issue was more conplicated i n Spain. The choice f e l l on 
Catalonia as the study area i n Spain a t least p a r t l y because the 
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language issue was more coirplicated i n Spain. The choice f e l l on 
Catalonia as the study area i n Spain a t least p a r t l y because the 
Catalan language i s r e l a t i v e l y easy t o learn f o r a person w i t h a 
knowledge of C a s t i l i a n and French, and because there was an 
opportunity t o take a language course i n the Spanish Department a t 
the University of Curham. 
Without an understanding of Catalan, research i n Catalonia would 
have been inpossible, since most of the relevant l i t e r a t u r e i s 
w r i t t e n i n Catalan. Oral coraraunication does not require Catalan 
because most people are b i l i n g u a l i n C a s t i l i a n , but there are many 
v*io have d i f f i c u l t i e s i n expressing themselves i n Ca s t i l i a n . Far 
more irrportant i s however the f a c t t h a t speaking Catalan i s part of 
people's national i d e n t i t y , of which they are very conscious. 
P a r t i c u l a r l y the generations of Catalans who have ej^)erienced 
c u l t u r a l repression under Franco (but also the young generations 
brought, up i n the Catalan schools of the present autonomous regime) 
regard speaking Catalan as a basic r i g h t and a symbol of t h e i r 
i d e n t i t y . I n some si t u a t i o n s , i t would have been paradoxical t o 
conduct interviews on Catalan nationalism i n C a s t i l i a n , because t h i s 
woiald have undermined from the beginning the legitimacy of 
n a t i o n a l i s t demands and the basis f o r a good rapport w i t h the 
interviewee. But i t also must be recognised t h a t many Catalans were 
brought up and educated i n Castilians, and therefore f e e l more 
comfortable i n t h a t language. 
Since I had more d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h Catalan than w i t h C a s t i l i a n , i t 
took some time t o gather s u f f i c i e n t courage f o r interviewing i n 
Catalan. This was one of the main reasons f o r conducting most of my 
interviews during my second v i s i t t o Barcelona. Many people being 
b i l i n g u a l , i t was usually the f i r s t contact w i t h the informant or 
interviewee which decided ;*iich language would be used. From 
background information, I t r i e d t o decide which language would be 
most l i k e l y t o s u i t the interviewee best, and i n vAiich case the 
choice of language would be s t r a t e g i c a l l y inportant. For example, I 
usually approached i n Catalan those v*io were strongly involved i n 
the c u l t u r a l side of nationalism, vAiile I spoke i n C a s t i l i a n w i t h 
trade unionists and working class a c t i v i s t s . A l t h o u ^ t h i s seems t o 
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r e f l e c t language and class structures t o a ce r t a i n extent, w i t h many 
working class Catalans having a C a s t i l i a n family background, i t was 
mostly a matter of my own convenience. I n general, my interviewees 
were very t o l e r a n t o f my l i n g u i s t i c l i m i t a t i o n s and appreciated my 
e f f o r t s . The r e s u l t i s a mixture o f Catalan and Ca s t i l i a n , as 
appendix 2 of the interviews shows, and does not necessarily 
represent the prefererx:es of the in d i v i d u a l or the s o c i o - l i n g u i s t i c 
structures. 
I n the th e s i s t e x t , o r a l quotes were rendered i n the o r i g i n a l 
language with^ an English t r a n s l a t i o n given as a footnote a t the 
bottom o f the page v^ere appropriate, so t h a t the languages should 
not be an obstacle t o English readers. Quotes from Catalan, 
C a s t i l i a n , German and I t a l i a n p r i nted sources were translated only, 
as t h i s i s not a l i n g u i s t i c piece of work, and therefore the precise 
wording i s not inportant t o the meaning of the passages. Any 
mistakes i n t r a n s l a t i n g e i t h e r o r a l or w r i t t e n quotes are my 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
3.2 The l o c a l i s a t i o n and kinds of secondary sources 
Secondary sources of information regarding nationalism i n Catalonia 
and Scotland are very inportant t o t h i s thesis, because i t i s 
concerned w i t h the reconstruction of a p o l i t i c a l debate. One 
essential task consisted i n making available Catalan and Cas t i l i a n 
sources o f information, since l i t t l e was w r i t t e n i n English on the 
subject of Catalan nationalism, a t e r i a l , p a r t i c u l a r l y since i t 
involved t r a v e l s t o the study areas. 
I n the case of Catalonia, most of t h a t material was only available 
i n the study area, and even then sometimes d i f f i c u l t t o get hold of. 
Unlike Scotland, v ^ c h has a large National Library i n Edinburgh 
V i^ere much relevant information i s held, Catalan w r i t t e n sources of 
information previous t o 1975 are scattered i n d i f f e r e n t public and 
p r i v a t e l i b r a r i e s and archives as a r e s u l t o f the censorship and 
c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l repression under Franco. F i r s t l y , there i s a 
sc a r c i t y o f material covering the Franco period (and also the 1920's 
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during the d i c t a t o r s h i p of Primo de Rivera), because Catalan 
nationalism was pro h i b i t e d and research on Catalan issues t o a large 
extent a taboo. Secondly, the material vdiich i s available was often 
produced under d i f f i c u l t circumstances, often i l l e g a l , and i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d and t o evaluate. The process of c o l l e c t i n g and 
r e t r i e v i n g documents of contenporary Catalan h i s t o r y i s progressing 
slowly, and i s hampered by the lack of resources (Benet, interview, 
1988). However, there are a number of inportant l i b r a r i e s , of which 
the Biblioteca de Catalunya turned out the most useful f o r t h i s 
research. I also had access t o the l i b r a r y of the Ateneu de 
Barcelona, which held many brand-new books related t o my subject 
v±iich I could not a f f o r d t o purchase, and used the l i b r a r y of the 
I n s t i t u t Catolic d'Estudis Socials and the f a c u l t y l i b r a r i e s of the 
Universitat AutoiKma de Barcelona. I n the public l i b r a r y and archive 
of the C i t y of Barcelona, Casa de I'Ardiaca, I found some i l l e g a l 
journals and panphlets of the 1960's and 1970's which gave me a 
t a s t e of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l struggles and debates t h a t were 
ta k i n g place then. 
These vtiere the most important places of secondary material in 
Barcelona, and very i n t e r e s t i n g and pleasiorable working 
environments, too. Furthermore, the Generalitat was establishing i n 
1988 a centre of autonomy studies (Centre d'Estudis Autoncmioos), 
which c o l l e c t e d many journals, l e g a l documents and monographs on the 
subject of p o l i t i c a l decentralisation and was mostly concerned with 
the developments a f t e r autonomy. A national archive was being set up 
by the Generalitat but s t i l l not usable i n 1988, and various other 
documentation centres existed or were under way (such as the 
n a t i o n a l i s t Fundacio Centre de Documentacio Polxtica). This 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of l i b r a r i e s made the search f o r information both 
fascinating and t i r i n g , and helped mie t o quickly f i n d my way around 
the c i t y . 
Back i n England, i t became d i f f i c u l t and time-consuming to trace 
Catalan and C a s t i l i a n material, although the i n t e r l i b r a r y loan 
service and the l i b r a r y o f the University of Cambridge were loseful 
on numerous occasions. From t h i s point of view, the Scottish case 
was easier t o research, because the secondary material was easier to 
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come t o know about and t o get hold of. There i s however less of i t , 
because the c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l was not so prominent (see Chapter six) 
as i n the Catalan case, and because of the p o l i t i c a l disenchantment 
\\*iich followed the f a i l u r e of the referendum i n 1979. As a r e s u l t , 
only a l i m i t e d number of books were produced on the subject, and 
r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e research has been done on the n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
i n Scotland i t s e l f . 
Since f o r d i f f e r e n t reasons I found published material i n ce r t a i n 
areas t o be t h i n on the ground, I needed t o look a t newspapers and 
p o l i t i c a l magazines i n order t o reconstruct the h i s t o r y of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l and the p o l i t i c a l events v^iich manifested t h i s 
r e v i v a l . I had the fortune of being given access t o Dr. Adams' 
voluminous c o l l e c t i o n of newspaper cuttings v^iich cover the peak 
period of Scottish nationalism between 1975 and 1979. Due to a lack 
of time and resources, I could make only very l i m i t e d use of i t , but 
mich of the press information used i n t h i s thesis stems from the 
press cuttings of Dr. Adams, who lectures Geography at the 
University of Edinburgh. Since Scotland has a d i s t i n c t i v e newspaper 
cu l t u r e , v\^ich has been successful a t defending the Scottish realm 
from the "national media" emanating from London, i t i s necessary t o 
look a t the regional Scottish newspapers such as the Glcisqow Herald 
and the Scotsman information on Scottish events. Kendrick pointed 
out t h a t the Scottish press i n the 1970's was playing up nationalism 
and enphasising the Scottish dimension (Kendrick, 1983, 130 and 
personal communication), but t h i s was not surprising, since i t was 
an issue of public i n t e r e s t and one of the few times v^en there was 
a c t u a l l y something happening on the Scottish p o l i t i c a l scene. 
^The Glasgow Herald i s mostly read i n and around Glasgow, and 
reaches about 122,000 readers, according t o a survey i n 1986. The 
Scotsanan i s mainly an Edinburgh paper, but i s also t h a t Scottish d a i l y 
which i s most l i k e l y t o be found on newsstands i n England. I t s e l l s 
around 96,000 copies. I n eastern Scotland, the readership i s divided up 
i n t o the Dundee Courier (125,000) and the Press and Journal (108,000) 
around Aberdeen. I n coirparison, the London based q u a l i t y newspapers 
reach only between 9,000 (Independent) and 24,000 (Daily Telegraph) 
readers ( C a r g i l l , 1987, 139), and they do not carry a great deal of 
Scottish news. 
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Scottish p o l i t i c a l scene. Na t i o n a l i s t bias i n the newspaper reports 
was not a b i g issue i n my own view. For information on the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n the 1980's, Radicca Scotland was an 
essential source. 
I n Catalonia, press coverage was not so useful because i t was 
r e s t r i c t e d by censorship. Only i n the mid-1970's, the n^^spapers 
became more independent, and Catalan p o l i t i c a l magazines such as 
Arreu were available. A l t h o u ^ two Catalan d a i l i e s have been founded 
since the death of Franco , most Catalan readers r e l y on Cas t i l i a n 
newspapers such as E l Pais and La Vanguardia. vMch cover Catalan 
a f f a i r s extensively, nevertheless, the Catalan press i s not as 
separate from the Spanish miedia than i n Scotland. 
3.3 Published s t a t i s t i c s 
P a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the t h i r d chapter, which looks a t the economic 
background of p o l i t i c a l nationalism, I used some published data t o 
back up and s i m p l i f y the description of economic changes i n the 
context o f v*iich the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l was set. Since Scotland i s 
tr e a t e d separately frxjm the r e s t of the UK i n most governmental 
s t a t i s t i c s , i t i s easy t o pick out and t o corpare w i t h the B r i t i s h 
or UK average. But i n the case of Catalonia, I found few useful 
governmental s t a t i s t i c s . I used the annual reports on the national 
(Spanish) income of the Banco de Bilbao, v*iich i s thought t o be the 
most accurate and ccarprehensive source, and some more recent Catalan 
s t a t i s t i c s . U n t i l the reestablishment of Catalan autonomy, 
s t a t i s t i c s d i d not discriminate a t the Catalan l e v e l , but were only 
broken down i n t o provinces and smaller u n i t s . 
2 
Awd was founded i n 1976 as a Catalan newspaper embracing the 
n a t i o n a l i s t cause, but i t s readership declined as the paper was ge t t i n g 
closer and closer t o the p o l i t i c a l l i n e of Oonvergencia. I n 1987, the 
S o c i a l i s t Party (PSC-PSOE) f a s c i l i t a t e d the reappearance of the 
discontinued Diario de Barcelona, t h i s tms i n Catalan (Diari de 
Barcelona), but t h i s , too, has only a small readership conpared w i t h the 
C a s t i l i a n d a i l i e s . 
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For background information on voting preferences, on people's 
a t t i t u d e s towards self-government and on t h e i r self-professed 
national i d e n t i t y , I took published opinion p o l l s . Because the 
outcome of such p o l l s depend heavily on the way i n which the 
questions are asked and on the general p o l i t i c a l atmosphere, i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o draw hard and f a s t conclusions from them or t o make 
in t e r n a t i o n a l conparisons. This emerged from Moreno's thesis, vfcLch 
was not able t o back up as intended w i t h opinion p o l l s the claim 
t h a t Catalans and Scots had a double national i d e n t i t y (Moreno, 
1986, 66-67). Thus, the opinion p o l l s are used as only one of many 
sources of information v ^ i c h convey the story o f contenporary 
nationalism. 
3.4 Interviews 
The main primary source of information were interviews w i t h key 
agents, who could be expected t o provide insider information and t o 
make connections between d i f f e r e n t events and processes vAiich they 
had witnessed. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y inportant i n the Catalan case, 
due t o the f a c t t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v i v a l was f o r p o l i t i c a l 
reasons scarcely documented. For exanple, there were s t i l l no 
sources available about the cairpaigns i n the mid- t o late-1960's 
f o r Catalan teaching. Here as i n many other instances, the 
researcher has t o r e l y on assertions of other researchers and t o 
take the r i s k of g i v i n g credence t o unsubstantiated statements. 
Interviews are useful i n t r y i n g t o f i l l these gaps of information. 
With such a wide and conplex topic, interviewees have t o be chosen 
according t o t h e i r s p e c i f i c ejqDerience and knowledge of p a r t i c u l a r 
aspects of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Most interviewees were 
academics, p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s and/or p o l i t i c i a n s , and can therefore 
be described as i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the Gramscian sence. I t must be 
borne i n mind t h a t they are not meant t o be representative of the 
V\*iole population; rather, t h e i r personal involvement i n p o l i t i c a l 
and c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s , and i n some cases t h e i r r o l e i n p o l i t i c a l 
decision making are meant t o throw l i g h t on processes and events 
which are inportant t o the understanding of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
(;^pendix one) (479) 
movements. Many of them were involved i n one way or another i n the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement, even t h o u i ^ they espouse a great v a r i e t y of 
p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s and backgrounds. Because I was concerned with 
r e l a t i n g the p o l i t i c a l movements t o underlying structures and 
relevant decision makers, i t was necessary t o approach individuals 
viio were involved i n the decision making, and/or vho had refl e c t e d 
on and analysed these dynamic relationships. Appendix 2, vMch 
contains the l i s t of a l l interviewees, serves t o give not only an 
overview o f the interviewing a c t i v i t i e s , but also an indi c a t i o n of 
the interviewees backgrounds, because these were decisive i n ray 
selecting them. Of course, there are many more v^o could or should 
have been interviewed, but time and f i n a n c i a l resources l i m i t e d miy 
a c t i v i t i e s . The interviewees themselves were not d i f f i c u l t t o 
contact, and w i t h very few exceptions also able t o grant ray request. 
Since my interviewees were selected according t o t h e i r contexts, 
they were interviewed i n t e r a c t i v e l y . I camie w i t h a l i s t of questions 
vAiich was more or less d i f f e r e n t f o r each of them, because each 
informant was sipposed t o contribute a piece t o the piizzle. 
Depending on the time available f o r the interview and the type of 
person, i t was possible t o f i n d out new and sometimes even puzzling 
information, ^ i c h could change the d i r e c t i o n of the conversation. 
From the outset already, every interview was d i f f e r e n t , though i n 
some cases I asked s i m i l a r sorts o f questions. 
Most o f the interviews taped w i t h a portable recorder, except i n 
those cases -where the environment was not conducive, the recorder 
f a i l e d or the interviewee d i d not want t o be quoted. 
F i n a l l y , I should p o i n t out t h a t w i t h one exception, a l l 
interviewees were mien. The mvain reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t very few 
women had the positions and backgrounds v^i c h I required f o r the 
purposes out l i n e d above. This of course r e f l e c t s the scarc i t y of 
women i n decision making positions, academia and p o l i t i c s , which i n 
t u r n i s . a r e s u l t o f the b l a t a n t l y uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n of power 
between the sexes. Though t h i s may be gradually changing, i t i s 
c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i n the 1960's and 1970's, very few women were 
a c t i v e l y involved i n those spheres of public l i f e vMch I was 
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concerned w i t h i n Catalonia and also i n Spain. The e f f e c t s of my 
experience of cross-gender interviewing are impossible t o define 
precisely. However, my subjective inpression i s t h a t i n some cases, 
the male expert and/or decision maker I was interviewing t r i e d t o 
dominate and c o n t r o l the interview by answering i n long speeches. 
Though t h i s behaviour i s p a r t l y due t o everyday practice among 
p o l i t i c i a n s and academics, i t has been suggested t h a t males 
interviewed by female researchers are more prone t o i t (Mc;Kee and 
O'Brien, 1983, 150). I n i n t e r a c t i v e interviews, the danger of 
manipulation by the interviewee i s greater, because they are often 
less formal and less structured. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
INTERVIEWEES AND INFORMANTS 
NAME 
Adams, I . 
Ainaud de Lasarte^ J. M. 
Alay, A. 
Arribes, R. 
Benet i Morell, J. 
Cahner, M. 
Canavan, D. 
Casassas i Simo. L I . 
Casaus, N. 
INTERVIEW 
DETAILS 
Edinburgh 
15.1.1987 
(English) 
Barcelona 
30.3.1988 
(Catalan) 
Barcelona 
12.2.1988 
(Catalan) 
Terrassa 
22.3.1988 
4.3.1988 
(Catalan) 
Barcelona 
1.6.1987 
(Castilian) 
17.4.1988 
(Catalan) 
Barcelona 
11.2.1988 
(Catalan) 
Edinburgh 
17.9.1988 
(English) 
Barcelona 
27.4.1988 
(Catalan) 
Barcelona 
20.1.1988 
(Castilian) 
BACK3R0UND 
Lecturer i n Geography, 
Edinburgh University; Member 
of the SNP. 
Historian; 
Barcelona 
Democratica 
f r i e n d and 
Pujol. 
c i t y councillor of 
(Oonvergencia 
de Catcilvmya); 
advisor of Jo r d i 
Leading p o l i t i c i a n of the 
Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalxanya; member of the 
Catalan Parlament. 
Geographer. 
Historian and lawyer; author; 
leading f i g u r e i n Assanblea de 
Catalunya, senator f o r Entesa 
de Catalunya (1977-82); PSUC 
candidate f o r presidency i n 
the 1980 Catalan elections; 
d i r e c t o r of the I n s t i t u t de 
H i s t o r i a Contenporanea of the 
Generalitat (1988). 
Editor; Minister of Culture of 
the Generalitat (1980-83). 
Labour Party MP f o r West 
S t i r l i n g s h i r e since October 
1974; former teacher. 
Professor Emeritus i n 
Geography a t the Universitat 
de Barcelona; President of the 
Societat de Geografia. 
Vice-President of the F. C. 
Barcelona. 
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elements Conte^ A. 
Craig, C. 
Doig, A. 
Ferrer i Girones.' F. 
Garcia Sanchez , C. 
Gasoliba i Bohm^  C. 
Halliday. J. 
Harvie. C. 
Henderson, H. 
Hendry, J. 
Barcelona General Secretary of the Unio 
21.3.1988 dels Sindicats de Ocmissions 
(Castilian) Obreres de Bcircelona (since 
1978); executive member of 
Partit dels Ocanrtiunistes de 
Catalunya (1981-1989). 
Edinburgh Lecturer of English a t 
11.2.1987 Edinburgh University; 
(English) e d i t o r i a l board of Cencrastus. 
Edinburgh Member of SNP and of the '79 
27.10.1987 Group (1979-82); Parliamentary 
(English) candidate f o r the SNP (1987). 
Girona Member of Pujol's OC group; 
22.3.1988 founder member of CDC ( u n t i l 
(Catalan) 1978); Senator (1977-). 
Barcelona Co-founder o f the Ocmission 
29.3.1988 Obrera Nacional de Catalixnya; 
(Castilian) PSUC Member of the Cortes 
Constitutionales (1977-79), of 
Cortes (1979-82), and of the 
Catalan Parlament (1984-88). 
Barcelona Economist; CDC Member of the 
27.4.1988 European Parliainent (1985- ) . 
(Catalan) 
Dundee Chairperson of the SNP (1955-
5.3.1987 60); Chairperson of Scots 
(English) Independent newspaper; 
le c t u r e r i n h i s t o r y , EXmdee 
College of Education. 
London Professor of B r i t i s h Studies 
4.9.1987 at Universitat Tubingen. 
(English) 
Edinburgh Lecturer at the School of 
9.8.1988 Scottish Studies of Edinburgh 
(English) University; poet and w r i t e r . 
Glasgow Trade Union o f f i c i a l a t the 
18.11.1987 Scottish Trade Union Congress; 
(English) p a r t i c i p a n t i n the 
Constitutional Steering 
Committee. 
lambie, D. . I r v i n e Labour MP f o r Cunninghams 
7.8.1988 South (since 1983) and Central 
(English) Ayrshire (1970-83); former 
teacher. 
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Lawson,, A. 
Leslie, G. 
Lindsay, I . 
Lluch i Martinf Enric 
Lopez Raimundo, G 
Macartneyf A. 
MacLaren, I . 
Manentf A. 
Marin, E. 
Massot i Muntaner, J. 
Maxwell, S. 
Molas, I . 
Edinburgh 
18. 9.1987 
(English) 
Glasgow 
24.2.1987 
(English) 
Edinburgh 
24.2.1987 
(English) 
Barcelona 
12.4.1987 
(Catalan) 
Barcelona 
16,5.1989 
(Castilian) 
Edinburgh 
10.2.1987 
(English) 
IXiriiam 
various dates 
(English) 
Barcelona 
28.3.1988 
(Catalan) 
Barcelona 
15.2.1988 
1.3.1988 
(Catalan) 
Barcelona 
21.1.1988 
29.2.1988 
(Catalan) 
Edinburgh SNP a c t i v i s t and member of the 
9.2.1987 79 Group; p o l i c y researcher 
(English) w i t h the Scottish Council of 
Voluntary Organisations. 
Barcelona leading p o l i t i c i a n of the PSC; 
21.3.1988 Vice-president of the Catalan 
(Catalan) Parlament (1984-88); Writer 
and l e c t u r e r of law a t the 
Universitat Autoncma de 
Barcelona. 
Editor of Radical Scotland. 
Veterinarian; parliamentary 
candidate f o r SNP since 1966. 
le c t u r e r of Sociology a t the 
University of Strathclyde; 
vice-president of the SNP. 
lec t u r e r of Geography a t the 
universitat Autoncana de 
Barcelona. 
General Secretary o f the PSUC 
(1956-1977). 
Lecturer of P o l i t i c s a t the 
Open University; leading 
p o l i t i c i a n of the SNP. 
Research Assistant; University 
of Durham. 
Li t e r a r y c r i t i c ; Department of 
Culture of the Generalitat. 
Lecturer of Jounralism a t the 
Universitat Autoncma de 
Barcelona; a c t i v i s t i n 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement Crida. 
Editor of Publicacions de 
I'Abadia de Montserrat. 
(i^pendix two) (484) 
Nadal, J. 
Nadal. P. 
Nairn. T. 
Ortega, J. M. 
Pages, F. 
Paterson, G. 
Pi-Sunyer, P. 
Prat. J. 
Ross. J. 
Sellares. M. 
Girona 
20.4.1988 
(Catalan) 
Rubi 
27.1.1988 
(Catalan) 
Edinburgh 
30.10.1987 
(English) 
Barcelona 
23.2.1988 
(Castilian) 
Barcelona 
25.4.1988 
16.5.1989 
(Catalan) 
Glasgow 
28.10.1987 
(English) 
Barcelona 
8.4.1988 
(Catalan) 
Barcelona 
17.3.1988 
(Catalan) 
Edinburgh 
9.8.1988 
(English) 
Barcelona 
14.4.1988 
(Catalan) 
Mayor of Girona; MP of the 
Catalan Parlament f o r the PSC; 
president of the ( s o c i a l i s t ) 
l o c a l government federation i n 
Catalonia, IWC. 
Manager of multinational 
chemical plant; CDC supporter. 
Writer of the New Lef t . 
Master of students' residence 
Col.legi Major of the 
Universitat de Barcelona. PSUC 
a c t i v i s t . 
Catalan publications e d i t o r 
f o r Laia. 
Small businessman; executive 
vice-chairman f o r l o c a l 
government of the SNP. 
Minister of Education and 
Culture i n the provisional 
Catalan government under 
Tarradellas (1977-1980). 
Department de Politica 
Territorial of the Generalitat 
leader of the High Mountain 
Action Group. 
Undersecretary of state f o r 
l o c a l government of the 
Scottish Office (1975-79); 
Secretary of the 
Constitutional Steering 
Committee., 
CDC co-founder and a c t i v i s t 
of the Asseanblea de Catalunya; 
d i r e c t o r of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
Fundacio Centre de 
Documentacio Politica and 
ed i t o r of Debat Nacionalista, 
the Catalan p o l i t i c a l magazine 
(1988-). 
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S i l l a r s . J. 
Sayrach, M. 
Subira, A. 
Ventura, J. 
V i l a . M.-A. 
Vives. M. 
Wilson, G. 
Wolfe. B. 
Edinburgh Former Labour (1970-75) and 
28.2.1987 Scottish Labour MP (1975-79); 
(English) vice-president of the SNP and 
SNP MP f o r Govan (1988-). 
Barcelona Sub-editor of Publicacions de 
23.2.1988 I'Abadia de Montserrat; member 
(Catalan) of Acadesnia de Llengua 
Catalana (1953-1966). 
Barcelona Member of Catalan Parlament 
8.4.1988 f o r CDC (1980-); member of the 
(Catalan) parliamentary commission f o r 
the t e r r i t o r i a l organisation 
of Catalonia (1984-87); 
economist. 
Leading member of the Entesa 
dels Nacionalistes d'Esquerra. 
Barcelona 
18.4.1988 
(Catalan) 
Barcelona 
10.2.1988 
(Catalan) 
Tarragona 
11.4.1988 
(Castilian) 
Geographer and lawyer; member 
of Catalan Parlament f o r ERC 
(1980-88). 
Member of Catalan Parlament 
f o r PSUC (1980-1988); member 
of parliamentary commission 
f o r the t e r r i t o r i a l 
organisation of Catalonia 
(1984-1987); lawyer. 
Dundee Chairperson of the SNP since 
6.3.1987 1978; MP f o r Dundee East (?) 
(English) since 1972?; lawyer. 
Edinburgh Chairperson of the SNP (1968-
25.2.1987 78); president of the SNP 
(English) u n t i l 1982; accountant. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
APPENDIX OF CATALAN AND SPANISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 
Moderate c e n t r i s t and conser^^ative c a t a l a n i s t parties 
Accio Catalana S p l i t o f f from Lliga i n 1922, involving the 
younger and more r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t sectors. 
CDC Centre-right Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t party 
Convergencia Democratica de Catalvinya, w i t h 
together w i t h the small UDC has been dominating 
Catalan p o l i t i c s since the autonomous elections 
i n 1980. 
CiU C o a l i t i o n between CDC and UDC since 1979 (?). 
Lliga Regionalista Founded i n 1901 by Prat de l a Riba; catalanist 
party of the bourgoisie i n the f i r s t two decades 
of t h i s century. 
Pacta Democratic c e n t r e - l e f t Catalanist c o a l i t i o n f o r the f i r s t 
general e l e c t i o n of 1977 including Convergencia 
Democratica de Catalunya, Esquerra Democratica, 
PSC 
- Reagn?)ament and Front Nacional de Catalvmya. 
UDC Christian-democratic cata l a n i s t Unio Desijocratica 
de Catalunya, which a f t e r the f i r ^ t e l e c t i o n 
formed a permanent all i a n c e w i t h Oonvergencia 
(CiU). 
Spanish right-wing p a r t i e s 
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AP f r a n c o i s t party, of vfcLch Convivencia Catalana 
i s the Catalan subsidiary. 
UCD Union del Centro Democratico, the post-francoist 
party v ^ i c h drew together the younger elements 
of the Franco administration and dominated the 
t r a n s i t i o n . period 1977-1979; i t s Catalan 
subsidiary was OC, Centristes de Catalvmya. 
Spanish and Catalan Social-democratic parties 
Entesa dels Catalans The c o a l i t i o n of Catalan social-democratic and 
communist parties f o r the elections t o the 
Senate i n 1977. PSC Catalan social-democratic 
P a r t i t dels Socialistes de Catalunya. 
EC Esquerres de Catalunya. Catalanist and l e f t i s t 
c o a l i t i o n f o r the f i r s t general elect i o n of 1977 
wi t h Esquerra Republiccina de Catalunya, Estat 
Catala, Partit del Treball, Associacio Catalana 
de l a Dona and Confederacio de Sindicats 
Unitaris. 
ERC Esquerra Republicana de Catalvmya, the party 
v^iich was dominant i n Catalonia during the 
Second Republic. Participated i n the government 
of the Generalitat i n 1980 and moved slowly down 
the independentist road since 1987. 
PSOE Spanish social-democratic Partido Socialista 
Obrero Espanol, vAiich has formed Spanish 
governments since 1982. 
PSC-PSOE Catalan sector of the PSOE v^^ich was formed by 
u n i t i n g PSC and the Catalan f r a c t i o n of the 
PSOE, FSC. 
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Communist p a r t i e s 
BOC Bloc Obrer i Caitperol, Catalan Marxist party 
founded i n 1929. 
PCE Partido Ccmnunista de Espana. 
POUM Partit Obrer Unificat Marxista, Catalan 
Tr o t z k y i s t party founded i n 1930. 
PSUC Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, the 
Catalan communist party federated w i t h the PCE 
POC Partido Ccraunista de Catalunya. Catalan wing of 
the Partido Ccraunista de los Pueblos, PCP, which 
broke away from the PSUC and the PCE 
respectively i n 1981. 
Catalan separatist p a r t i e s 
BEAN Bloc d'Esquerra d'Alliberament Nacional de 
Catalunya, the Catalan n a t i o n a l i s t party 
committed t o independence and the u n i f i c a t i o n of 
the Catalan countries. 
Estat Catala Separatist party-movement, founded by Macia i n 
1925. 
PSAN Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional 
MDT Moviment de l a Defensa de l a Terra 
Trade Unions 
CADCI 
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Centre Autoncmista de Dependents del Ocmerg i de 
l a Industria was an organisation of white collar 
(489) 
employees i n the service and manufacturing 
sector. 
CNT Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo, the 
anarcho-syndicalist umbrella organisation of 
workers' unions. Founded i n Barcelona i n 1909. 
CC.OO. Ccanisiones Obreras. Workers' commissions vMch 
emerged from 1958 onwards. Established as a 
union i n 1976. 
Uni6 de Rabassaires i de Altres Treballadors del Canp was the union 
f o r peasants and land labourers, formed i n 1922. 
C i v i l society organisations 
Ateneu Barcelones Founded i n 1872 (fusion of the Ateneu Catala 
(1860) and the Casino Mercantil Barcelones 
(1864)) as a c u l t u r a l centre of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie and professionals and i n t e l l e c t u a l s . 
Camera de Oanercio de Barcelona was founded i n 1886 as an 
organisation of Catalan i n d u s t r i a l and business 
groups. 
Fcroento del Trabajo Nacional was founded i n 1889 (fusion of the 
Institute Industrial de Catalvina (1847), the 
Fcmento Produccion Nacional (1869) and the 
Fcanento de Produccion Espanola (1876)). As i t s 
precursors, i t represented the economic 
in t e r e s t s of the bourgeoisie. 
I n s t i t u t Agricola Catala de Sant Isidre was founded i n 1851 to 
represent the inter e s t s of the Catalan 
landowners and the landed aristocracy. 
(^^pendix three) (490) 
Sociedad Econcanica de Amigos del Pais was founded i n 1822 t o 
represent the interests of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie. 
P o l i t i c a l Pacts 
T^semblea de Catalunya was founded i n 1971 as an umbrella 
organisation of oppositional groups i n 
Catalonia. 
Assemblea de Parlamentaris was formed i n 1977. I t included a l l 
Catalan representatives t h a t had been elected t o 
the Spanish parliament and the senate i n the 
1977 elections. 
Concell de Forces Politiques de Catalunya was founded i n 1976 as an 
organisation of Catalan opposition parties. 
Coordinadora de Forces Politiques de Catalunya was the precurser of 
the Assemblea, formed i n 1969. 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
GLOSSARY OF CASTILIAN AND CATALAN TERMS 
botiguer (Cat.) shopkeeper 
comarca, comarques (pi.) 
(Cat.) Catalan l o c a l government area 
construccio (Cat.) construction, shaping (of the nation) 
diputacio (Cat. pr o v i n c i a l government 
Estatut d'Autonomia (Cat.) Catalan st a t u t e of autonomy 
" " de Nuria (Cat.) proposal f o r the Catalan statute of 
autonomy i n 1931, which was drawn up i n 
Nuria 
" " de Sau (Cat.) proposal f o r the Catalan statute of 
autonony i n 1978, which was drawn up i n 
Sau. 
f e r pais (Cat.) creating the in f r a s t r u c t u r e of the 
nation 
f e t nacional (Cat.) national r e a l i t y (as opposed t o 
"national question") 
gobemador c i v i l (Cast.) c i v i l governor of a Spanish province 
menestralia (Cat.) craftsmen, artisans 
inunicipi (Cat.) lowest l e v e l of l o c a l government 
(Appendix four) (492) 
nacionalitzacio (Cat.) integrate i n t o the national structures 
of c i v i l society; i n f e s t w i t h 
nationalism 
normalitzacio ( l i n g u i s t i c a ) 
(Cat.) restore (language) t o i t s "normal", 
national state 
orfeu (Cat.) Catalan choral society 
paisos Catalans (Cat.) 
p a r t i t s j u d i c i a l s (Cat.) 
those areas of Spain and France which 
belong t o the Catalan c u l t u r a l region, 
i. e . Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic 
Islands, Rossello or the French part of 
Northern Catalonia, and the Eastern 
f r i n g e of Aragon. 
Spanish l o c a l government u n i t s (19th 
century) 
p e t i t s pays (Fr.) d i s t i n c t i v e c u l t u r a l and geographical 
region 
ponencia (Cat.) 
provincia (Cat.) 
pujolisme (Cat.) 
parliamentary commission 
province; Spanish l o c a l government u n i t 
s p e c i f i c brand of Catalan nationalism 
associated w i t h President J o r d i Pujol. 
rabassa morta (Cat.) 
rabassaire (Cat.) 
long-term sharecropping contract based 
on the l i f e of a vineyard, w i t h 1/3 of 
the harvest going t o the proprietor and 
the r e s t t o the sharecropper. 
sharecropper 
rambla, rambles (pi.)(Cat.) promenade i n the c i t y centre 
(Appendix four) (493) 
regional i s t e s (Cat.) 
renaixenga (Cat.) 
t e r t i i l i a (Cat.) 
vegueria (Cat.) 
Volksgeist (Ger.) 
a c t i v i s t s of the Lliga Regionalista 
Catalan c u l t u r a l renaissance i n the 
second h a l f of the 19th century 
group of people assembled t o discuss and 
eat i n a relaxed environment 
Catalan region 
national s p i r i t 
(Appendix four) (494) 
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